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"The Special Economic Zones are a 
window, being the window of technology, 
the window of management, the window of 
knowledge, and the window of foreign 
policy. "
Deng Xiaoping
ABSTRACT
This thesis seeks to advance the study on China's Special 
Economic Zones (SEZs) by exploring two important issues
untouched by previous researches ---- the reasons for the
problem of policy inconsistency, ambiguity and 
unpredictability in the SEZs, and the effectiveness and 
significance of their experimental function as a "laboratory" 
for China's ongoing industrial reform and "open-door" policy. 
The Xiamen SEZ, rarely investigated by Western scholars, is 
chosen as the object of this case study because of its unique 
suitability. It is hoped that the findings from this thesis 
will significantly enhance the understanding of the difficulty 
and complexity of the reform and openness in China in general 
and in the SEZs in particular.
This thesis approaches the two issues from three 
perspectives, which reflect three most important relationships
regarding the development of the SEZs the one between the
economic reform and the Special Policy, the one between the 
local economic development and foreign direct investment 
(FDI), and the one between the SEZs and the domestic economy. 
It examines the enterprise reform, transformation of the local 
industry through utilizing FDI, and the relationship between 
the foreign trade reform and the price reform, in the Xiamen 
SEZ in its first decade of the 1980s. In particular, it 
includes a detailed analysis of the characteristics and 
effects of Taiwan investment in Xiamen in recent years and 
hence represents one of very few, if not the first, serious 
studies, at the moment, on the subject.
It concludes that the policy problem in Xiamen has been 
caused mainly by 1) the confusion of the economic reform and 
the implementation of the Special Policy, 2) the increasing 
dominance of Taiwan capital on the local economy, and 3) the 
close institutional link between the SEZ and the domestic 
economy. Also, it finds that a decade of the reform and 
development in Xiamen has produced few innovative and 
applicable experiences which could benefit the domestic reform 
and "open-door." Thus, the effectiveness and significance of 
the SEZ's experimental function has so far been very limited.
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
The 1980s was not only a decade in which many developing 
countries adopted a series of major economic policy reforms, 
but also a historic period in which all socialist and the 
formerly socialist countries, with apparent exception of Cuba 
and North Korea, undertook varying degrees of radical reforms 
in their Soviet-type, centrally planned economies. While the 
reforms in the former case were carried out often as part of 
the structural adjustment programmes attached to the lending 
conditionality of international financial organisations, such 
as the World Bank and International Monetary Funds (IMF), the 
restructurings in the latter case were based largely on the 
realization that market forces or market-like mechanisms are 
more efficient than command mechanisms in allocating and 
utilizing resources.
Emerging from nearly three decades of isolation, the 
People's Republic of China (PRC), as a both developing and 
socialist country, has so far positioned herself largely in 
the mainstream of the reform of the 1980s. China's economic 
reform and "open-door" policy have not only produced 
significant changes in its domestic economy but also exerted 
a profound impact on the Asia-Pacific and indeed world 
economies as well. In the meantime, the unique Chinese reform 
and opening experiences have attracted more and more 
attentions from the international community and become one of 
the most important areas of contemporary Chinese studies.
1-1 In What Way Does This Thesis Build on Previous Researches?
The establishment of China's first four Special Economic
15
Zones (SEZs) in 1980 and the fifth in 1988 and their 
subsequent development have spawned a booming academic 
research on them both within and outside China. In China, 
articles, books, yearbooks, and edited volumes on the SEZs are 
abundant, as indicated by the country's most comprehensive 
bibliographic index, Quanguo Baokan Suoyin. At the same time, 
researchers in Hong Kong (and few in Taiwan) have also 
produced a number of substantive works on the SEZs. All these 
Chinese-source studies have provided a great deal of first­
handed information and insightful analyses. As they will serve 
as important references throughout this thesis, they are not 
investigated here.
The English-language literature on the SEZs, on the other 
hand, has been published predominantly by Western (and some by 
Hong Kong) scholars.1 According to Crane (1990), the work has 
been focused on two major aspects: fist, the actual economic 
achievements, which show, on balance, "a sub-optimal 
performance;" and second, the evolution of zone policy, which 
emerges as "inconsistent," ambiguous ("never very clear"), and 
unpredictable ("changing unexpectedly") (pp. 5-6). As a 
result, most authors tend to attribute the less than 
satisfactory economic performance to the policy problem.2
The above conclusion may be correct, but the studies that 
give rise to it do not go further to explicate the causes of 
the policy problem. Although Crane (1990) makes some 
noteworthy contributions in searching the reasons from the 
perspective of China's political economy, in particular "the
1. For major English-language publications on the SEZs, 
see Stoltenberg (1984) ; Sit (1985) ; Wong and Chu (1985) ; 
Oborne (1986); Jao and Leung (1986); Falkenheim (1986); Pepper
(1986); Wong (1987); Battat (1987); Harding (1987); Wong
(1987); Hsueh and Woo (1988); Sit (1988); Crane (1990) and 
(1992); and Wall (1992).
Among the best journalistic sources in English on the 
SEZs are the Far Eastern Economic Review; China Trade Report; 
The Asian Wall Street Journal; Beijing Review; and The China 
Business Review.
2. For a typical view, see Hsueh and Woo (1988), pp. 509-
10.
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relationship between political structures and zone problems" 
(p. 8) , it has not made the task of searching economic reasons 
any easier.
In addition, the previous researches seem to have two 
other major defects. First, they tend to approach the SEZs in 
the context of EPZs and pay inadequate attention on the 
special circumstances of China's changing economy [typically, 
Sit (1988)]. In other words, they are unable or neglect to 
study the SEZs in the context of the Chinese economic reform 
and "open-door," in particular to search the reasons for zone 
problems from the interaction between the SEZs and the 
domestic economy. As a result, the analyses are concentrated 
mainly on the gains or losses in areas like size of foreign 
capital inflow, employment creation, exports, foreign exchange 
earnings, tax revenues, and technology transfer, but rarely on 
issue such as the interrelationship between the development of 
the SEZs and the domestic economic reform. In doing so, they
have failed to explore an important area of SEZ study --  the
experimental function of the SEZs serving as a "laboratory" 
for the Chinese domestic economic reform.
Second, the previous researches in most cases focus only 
on the Shenzhen SEZ, the flagship of China's SEZs, due partly 
to its much publicized "spectacular success" and partly the 
comparatively easier access to the information of it. However, 
the SEZs are quite different in terms of socio-economic 
legacies, geographical conditions, resource endowments, and 
the level of current economic development, and hence have 
exhibited different features and patterns in the process of 
their development. By concentrating mainly on Shenzhen, the 
researches can, therefore, hardly represent the whole picture 
of China's SEZs.
In short, the previous studies provide only a rudimentary 
understanding of the complexity and diversity of the SEZs. 
More work needs to be done in searching the reasons for the 
policy problem in the SEZs and assessing the effectiveness and 
significance of its experimental function as a reform 
"laboratory." The tasks may have to be done by expanding the
17
research scope into other SEZs in order to get more 
representative and accurate findings on the SEZs.
1-2. Goals of This Study
This thesis, therefore, intends to open up a new area of 
the study on China's SEZs, by 1) answering the two important 
questions raised but unanswered by the previous researches and 
2) shifting the research focus from the traditional target,
the Shenzhen SEZ, to a new one, the Xiamen S E Z  "the second
most important" one, according to Crane (1992: 848). It is to 
conduct a comprehensive and systematic case study on Xiamen in 
order to find out the reasons for the problem of policy 
inconsistency, ambiguity and unpredictability in the SEZ and 
to assess the effectiveness and significance of the SEZ' s 
experimental function. It is hoped that the findings from this 
study will greatly advance the understanding of the 
characteristics and problems of the reform and openness in 
China in general and in the SEZs in particular.
A new analytic approach will be adopted, whereby the 
analysis of a Chinese SEZ will be conducted in the context of 
not only EPZs, as done by most of the previous researches, but 
also China's ongoing reform and "open-door." More 
specifically, not only the relationship between the local 
economic development and FDI in Xiamen but also, for the first 
time, the one between the economic reform and the Special 
Policy, and the one between the SEZ and the Chinese domestic 
economy are to be examined in this thesis.
1-3. Why Xiamen?
To date, only modest efforts have been made in studying 
the Xiamen SEZ, both within and outside China. They include a 
number of articles published in newspapers and journals, and 
one conference report edited by the National Centre for 
Development Studies, the Australian National University 
(Brogan, 1988) . But like other studies on the SEZs, they
18
provide no answers toward the questions regarding the policy 
problem in the SEZ and the effectiveness and significance of 
its experimental function.
Xiamen, located in the south of Fujian province, is the 
only SEZ converted wholesale from the original city (Xiamen 
Shi) , which had already had more than three decades of 
economic and social development under the People's Republic. 
The other three SEZs in Guangdong province were all built on 
scratch, either on remote, rural boarder areas (in cases of 
Shenzhen and Zhuhai) or in the outskirts of a city (in case of 
Shantou). As a result, Xiamen exhibits three unique features:
First, it is a typical small- and medium-sized industrial 
city in China, with all its well-established political, 
administrative, economic, and social structures in place. This 
implies that it, inevitably, still maintains substantial, if 
not close any more, links with domestic markets, institutions 
and policies. Not surprisingly, in 1988 the State Council 
designated it, together with other sixteen cities, as a "pilot 
city for the comprehensive urban reform" (Zhonghe Chengshi 
Gaige Shidian Chengshi).
Second and related, it possesses an all-round but 
underdeveloped industrial base, which contains about 588 
largely public-owned and technologically outmoded enterprises 
with about 45,000-strong workforce. This means that Xiamen, 
like many Chinese cities, faces the formidable task of 
transforming the irrational industrial structure and 
inefficient enterprises.
The above two special features indicate that Xiamen is an 
ideal object for the investigation on how the reform of 
China's Soviet-style planning and management system, together 
with its old, inefficient industry, is carried out in a SEZ, 
at both the macro- and micro-levels. This should provide a 
opportunity for one to explore the relationship between the 
reform and the Special Policy and the one between the SEZ and 
the domestic economy.
Third, it is a historic trading seaport and has extensive 
and close trade links with all over the world, especially with
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Taiwan, Hong Kong and the Southeast Asia. In recent years, it 
has become the focus of Taiwan direct investment (TDI) in 
mainland China. Indeed, Taiwan capital is transforming the 
SEZ's economy. This special feature suggests that Xiamen is 
the most appropriate place to carry out a study on the effects 
of FDI, especially TDI, on the local economic development, as 
well as the economic link between the PRC and Taiwan.
Thus, it is not an exaggeration to say that the Xiamen 
SEZ encompasses all of the complexities and difficulties of 
China's reform and "open-door." This makes it a perfect object 
for the assessment of the effectiveness and significance of a 
SEZ serving as a "laboratory" for the industrial reform and 
foreign economic development.
1-4. Unique Contributions of This Study
This thesis will examine three important topics which, 
deriving from Xiamen's special features, are not only 
essential to Xiamen's development but also have significant 
implications for the country's ongoing economic reform and 
"open-door." They are Xiamen's enterprise reform; utilization 
of FDI, especially TDI, in connection with the local 
industrial transformation; and the relationship between its 
foreign trade liberalization and its price reform during its 
first decade of the 1980s.
The significance of this study may be highlighted at 
least by the following four unique and important contributions 
it is to make to the research on the SEZs and other related 
fields.
First, it is the first special, comprehensive and 
systematic case study on the Xiamen SEZ, and hence will 
undoubtedly widen the scope of the existing researches on 
China's SEZs. In particular, it will enable people to observe 
and analyze how a socialist country restructures its Soviet- 
style, command economy in a small, market-oriented policy 
enclave.
Second, it is the first serious attempt to link the
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analysis of the SEZs with the changes and developments in the 
Chinese domestic economy, or more specifically, to search the 
causes of the problem of zone policy from the interaction 
between the development of the SEZs and the domestic economic 
reform. In particular, the examination of the Separation of 
Tax and Profits in Chapter 5 is the first, at the time of 
writing, detailed study on the enterprise reform programme 
conducted in English language. Consequently, this will, on the 
one hand, add one more dimension into the growing knowledge of 
the effects of China's domestic economic reform and, on the 
other hand, increase the understanding of the experimental 
function of the SEZs.
Third, it is the first detailed case study on the effects 
of TDI on the PRC economy, particularly on the local 
industrial transformation. This will certainly help the 
discussion of the increasing economic link between the PRC and 
Taiwan and indeed may shed light on the development of the so- 
called "Greater China Economic Areas," consisting mainly of 
the PRC, Taiwan and Hong Kong.
And finally, due to the multi-faceted nature of the 
Xiamen SEZ, the study on it will inevitably link China's 
experience to those of developing countries striving for 
industrialization, countries using the device of EPZ, and 
reforming socialist and the formerly socialist countries. As 
a result, the study is bound to make valuable contributions to 
the study on each of these areas.
1-5. Literature Review and Historical Background
The theoretical perspective for this thesis is derived 
from the growing literature on the industrialization and 
economic policy reform in developing countries, especially the 
Neoclassical approach; the development of EPZs; and the 
economic reforms in the formerly socialist economies. It is 
believed that a brief examination of relevant views, policies, 
changes and developments in each of these areas will provide 
a proper analytic context for the discussions of the Chinese
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present reform and openness in general and the development of 
the Xiamen SEZ in particular.
1-5-1. Alternative Theories of Industrialization and Economic 
Reform in Developing Countries3
For at least three decades, industrial and trade reform 
has been high on the policy agenda of many developing 
countries striving for industrialization. Macro imbalances and 
micro inefficiencies have forced them to reconsider their 
policy towards industry and trade. In general, there are three 
major alternative theoretical approaches to the policy. They 
are Structuralist, Radical and Neoclassical.4
Structuralist Approach
The Structuralist school, seen as representing the 
conventional wisdom on developing countries in the 1950s and 
1960s, contends that the structure of an economy, particularly 
the size of its industrial sector, is a key determinant of the 
long-term growth. It covers a wide range of authors, notably 
Paul Rosenstein-Rodan, Ragnar Nurkse, W. Arthur Lewis, Paul 
Prebisch, Hans Singer, and Gunnar Myrdal. Among key 
characteristics, the belief that development is a process of 
major structural transformation with manufacturing industry 
having a crucial role to play, is the most prominent one. 
Central to this argument are two important concepts: 
externalities and linkages.
Externalities can be defined, according to Scitovsky 
(1958), one of the best classic article in this regard, as the 
effects created by individual producers or consumers, that are 
incurred and received by other producers or consumers but are
3. The following discussion draws mainly on Todaro 
(1982), Weiss (1988) and Meier (1989).
4. This categorization is now used regularly in text­
books of development economics (e.g. Herrick and Kindleberger, 
1983; and Weiss, 1988).
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not taken into account by the original creators of the 
effects.5 It is important to understand that the net benefits 
of externalities, where they exist, to the economy as a whole 
can be quite different from those accruing to private 
producers. In addition, the existence of externalities has to 
a large extent justified the need of appraising investments 
from a broad economic perspective and of planning and 
coordinating investment activities (p. 3 01) . To rationalize 
the greater potentiality of industry in generating external 
effects, however, one must rely on the concept of linkages.
Hirschman (1958) defines linkages as an inducement 
mechanism whereby the activity of one firm is created by the 
actions of another. He has also distinguished two types of
production linkages --  backward linkages from a particular
industry to its input suppliers and forward linkages from an 
industry to its output users.6 Both linkages, reflecting 
production interdependence, can be used as a mechanism to 
transmit externalities. In general, the activities with the 
highest linkage effects tend to have the greatest potential 
for creating externalities.7 This enables planners in 
developing countries to assess the consequences of different 
patterns of investment and thus to choose the leading 
industrial sector and the optimal form of expansion.
Central to the Structuralist position is the view that 
externalities are more significant in manufacturing industry 
than in other major sectors, such as agriculture and services. 
This is because manufacturing can generate much greater 
linkage effects both within the sector itself and on other 
sectors, and thus has the potential for greater positive
5. Scitovsky divides this broad concept further into 
Technological Externalities and Pecuniary Externalities. For 
details, see Scitovsky (1958).
6. Albert O. Hirschman has later broadened his linkages 
approach by going beyond production linkages of input-output 
character to consider consumption and fiscal linkages. See 
Hirschman (1977).
7. Of course, not all linkages generate desirable 
externalities.
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externalities. Using an input-output table, Yotopoulos and 
Nugent (1973) assesses the linkage potential of different 
branches and the result has confirmed the above conclusion.8 
Young (1928) provides an excellent explanation of this 
situation. As manufacturing is increasingly characterized by 
interrelated and specialized branches of activities, it has 
the potential for a high degree of "roundaboutness" in its 
production structure. This means that when its aggregate 
output expands there is far greater scope for labour division 
and specialization within the sector itself, than is the case 
for other sectors. Further, manufacturing is the sector which 
produces the capital goods and other machinery equipment used 
by other sectors. A strong machinery (or engineering) sector 
is essential for initiating and transmitting technical and 
productivity changes, since its growth will also raise 
productivity in other major sectors through their purchases of 
capital and intermediate goods and the transfer of knowledge 
between machine makers and users. That is why Kaldor (1967) 
sees manufacturing as an engine of growth.9
Radical View
The radical analysis approaches industrialization from a 
wider political-economy perspective. Despite varying degrees 
of modification to its classical Marxian approach in the last 
3 0 years or so, It can be described as "that which is highly 
critical of capitalism, favours socialism, and often employs 
Marxian analysis" (Griffin and Gurley, 1985: 1089). Its most 
distinct and influential approach to development issues is the 
"Dependency Theory," which views developing economies as part 
of the world capitalist economy, whose current economic, 
social and political conditions have been determined by
8. See Table II in Yotopoulos and Nugent (1973), p. 163.
9. Some Structuralists have done some empirical work on 
the role of manufacturing in developing countries. See, 
typically, Brailovsky (1981) , which examines the Mexican 
growth in this perspective.
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contact with the advanced capitalist economies. Consequently, 
much of the Radical literature emphasises the obstacles to and 
limitations of industrialization in developing countries under 
existing international and domestic systems. Although some of 
these arguments, particularly those on the role of 
transnationals and their relations with the state and local 
capital, raise important policy issues, the conclusion that 
capitalist industrialization in developing countries is deemed 
to be distorted or blocked appears to be unconvincing.
Neoclassical Perspective
The Neoclassical approach to development has become 
increasingly influential since the 1960s and 1970s. The 
central tenet of this school is, as defined by Ian Little, one 
of the foremost representative of this school, A) a belief in 
the effectiveness of the market mechanisms as a means of 
allocating resources, and B) an emphasis on the potential 
gains from participation in world trade (Little, 1982) . As a 
result, the school's critique of the industrialization 
policies in developing countries focuses on two important 
aspects: 1) the government interventions have stifled the
operation of the market and contributed to an economically 
inefficient form of industrialization; and 2) the trade 
policies and patterns have reduced export growth and ignored 
specialization on the basis of comparative advantage. An 
economically rational industrial policy, it is argued, is one 
which removes both of these sources of inefficiency.
In general, the Neoclassical position sees government 
intervention in the operation of the market, using such policy 
instruments as tariffs, quantitative import controls, minimum 
wage legislation, budgetary and credit subsidies, controlled 
interest rates, and indirect taxes, as the main reason for the 
distortion of prices. At the same time, trade policy is seen 
as a key component of industrial policy since it has a major 
influence on the pattern and pace of industrial development. 
As industry generally produces tradable goods, exposure to
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foreign competition is viewed as essential to stimulate 
efficiency gains. Trade reform is therefore central to the 
success of industrial reform. Hughes (1992), representing the 
current orthodox Neoclassical position, argues that market 
reform, including trade liberalization, will create a stronger 
industrial sector in developing countries. As a result, the 
Neoclassic school argues strongly for introducing market- 
oriented reforms and in particular trade liberalization.10
Arguments for Market-Based Refozm The underlying reasons 
for market and trade reforms can be represented 
diagrammatically using the standard production possibility 
frontier in a two-commodity model.11 Figure 1-5.1 shows an 
economy producing two goods, A and B, both of which are 
internationally tradable, and the combinations of A and B that
Figure 1-5.1 Allocative costs of protection
Units of 
good B
Q
Units of good A
can be produced on the frontier QQ given domestic resource and 
technological constraints. II' is the international price line 
that prevails under free trade, while DD' is the domestic 
price line with some form of trade barrier. Px is the 
efficient production point on the frontier under free trade,
10. For more influential arguments of the Neoclassical 
case for industrial reform, see Little et al. (1970), Corden 
(1974), Balassa (1982a), Little (1982) and Krueger (1984) .
11. The following discussion draws on Adhikari, et. al. 
(1992), pp. 4-6, with modifications.
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while trade along II' allows a combination of goods X to be 
attained. On the other hand, P2 is the production point under 
protection, and trade along II' under this restricted 
conditions will allow a lower combination of goods X1 to be 
obtained. Thus the allocative efficiency loss in terms of Good 
B is given by R1! on the vertical axis. Here the production 
under protection may still be on the frontier but it is at the 
sub-optimal point.
The more significant cost of protection in developing 
countries, however, often derives from the loss of potential 
output because either of rent-seeking behaviour (bribery and 
lobbying etc.) to get favourable treatments from a control 
system, or of the negative incentive effects of protection, 
which induce X-inefficiency and raise unit costs (Bhagwati, 
1989). Either effect will, as shown in Figure 1-5.2, cause the 
production possibility frontier moving inwards to QlQi. This 
means that production now can only be at point P3 and trading 
along II' allows the combination of goods X2. Compared with 
the free trade position, the total loss of goods in terms of 
B is now R2I on the vertical axis.
Figure 1-5.2 Total costs of protection: allowing for rent 
-seeking and incentive effects
Units of 
good B
Qi Q
Units of good A
Trade liberalization in a protected economy can lead to 
both an outward shift in the frontier, if it creates genuine 
dynamic benefits, and an inward shift, if it results in the 
closure of some inefficient industries. This situation can be
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demonstrated in Figure 1-5.3, where a new frontier Q2Q2 is 
created with production of Good A expanding while B 
contracting. This implies that the country's comparative 
advantage has changed and now lies in A. Production under 
semi-reformed trade system is at point P4 and trading along 
II' allows a combination of goods X3, which is above the 
original free trade combination of X. Thus the gain from trade 
reform in a protected economy in terms of Good B is R3I on the 
vertical axis. What is significant here is that a higher 
frontier has been achieved.
Figure 1-5.3 Gains from trade liberalization under protection
Units of 
good B
Units of good A
Thus, Neoclassical authors see market liberalization and 
moves towards freer trade as critical to improvement in the 
efficiency of industry. Liberalizing markets means, among 
other thing, the removal of government controls on prices and 
an end to government direct interference in enterprise 
businesses. Freer trade, on the other hand, could bring 
greater competition with resulting productivity gains as 
producers are forced to compete internationally. The authors 
may disagree among themselves on the exact details of reform 
policy, but they generally have same views on the overall 
outline of reform. It includes the following main aspects:
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- deregulation of factor markets and the removal of price 
and other controls on enterprises;
- a major reduction in government expenditure and the 
general role of government in economic activity through 
privatization programmes or by phasing out subsidies to 
unprofitable state-owned enterprises (SOEs);
- removal of quantitative barriers to trade and the 
rationalization and reduction of tariffs on imports;
- devaluation of exchange rate;
- encouragement of foreign direct investment.
In addition, it has also been recommended, based on the 
reform experiences in the Latin America, that the timing and 
sequence of reforms be influenced by the current condition of 
an economy, such as whether it is suffering from inflation, in 
recession, or vulnerable to external shocks. It has been 
widely accepted, for example, that the liberalization of the 
capital account of the balance of payments should be phased to 
follow trade liberalization with a substantial time lag. This 
is designed to avoid the possibility of major capital inflows 
leading to an appreciation of the real exchange rate, which 
could jeopardise the fundamental goal of such reforms by 
penalizing new export industries. Also, the question of the 
appropriate mix of macro-economic policies accompanying market 
reform has been noticed. It involves complex issues of 
coordinating various aspects of macro-economic management, 
such as price stabilization, adjustment of interest rate and 
exchange rate, and credit control.
Trade Reform Policy The Neoclassical discussions of 
patterns of trade specialization contain a simple descriptive 
sequence of stage illustrating alternative trade strategies: 
primary import-substitution; primary export-substitution; 
secondary import-substitution; and secondary export- 
substitution. The school generally favours the strategy of 
export-substitution, where the share of new manufactured 
exports increases in total exports. The Neoclassical view on
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trade strategy is not that developing countries should remain 
as permanent exporters of labour-intensive goods, but that it 
may become economically beneficial on a certain stage of their 
development to diversify the structure of their exports. For 
example, if a country has already set up a relatively 
comprehensive and sophisticated industrial base, export of not 
only primary but, more importantly, secondary products should 
be encouraged.
Having realized that the level of protection in most 
developing countries was both excessive in absolute terms and 
highly discriminatory in its impact on other sectors, 
Neoclassical authors generally agree that levels of protection 
should be both reduced substantially and made more uniform 
between different activities.12 Specific reform measures 
include:
- reduction in both the level and the variability of 
import tariffs;
- abolition of import quota protection;
- introduction of export subsidies where necessary to 
offset the effect of whatever import protection remains;
- devaluation of exchange rate;
continuation of some modest protection for key 
activities, which can be phased out gradually.
The experience of the four East Asian NICs, argued by 
some Neoclassical authors, has demonstrated the potentiality 
of the export-substitution strategy, which is associated with 
the removal of incentives biased against exports. Indeed, the 
four NICs' export-led growth based on labour-intensive 
manufactures at a relatively early stage of industrialization 
has, in their view, become a model for other developing 
countries to follow (e.g. Krueger, 1985).
12. Balassa, for example, has been one of leading 
advocates of trade reform along Neoclassical lines. Others 
include Little, Corden and Krueger. For their representative 
works, see Footnote 10.
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Relevance of the Theory In recent years, the
Neoclassical economic theory has come to be linked with 
stabilization and adjustment programmes introduced in 
developing countries. These reform efforts were designed not 
only to reduce the share of the state in economic activities 
so as to allow the market to function more freely, but also to 
control inflation primarily through monetary policy. Many 
powerful international organisations, such as the World Bank 
and the IMF, have been influenced by the Neoclassical 
position. Indeed, the policy advice they offered to
governments and the reform programmes they imposed on 
countries as loan conditionality have been based largely on 
the "market paradigm" emerging from the Neoclassical tradition 
of development economics (Little, 1982).
Of course, this does not mean that the Neoclassical case 
for economic reform can simply be seen as the blueprint for 
reform. In fact, few reform packages introduced so far really 
followed the theoretical recommendation precisely. While its 
concern over the lack of prices and the functioning of the 
market in many industrial programmes remains valid, reforms 
emphasizing on the dismissal of the role of direct government 
intervention are not necessarily an adequate basis for 
successful industrialization. Indeed, the empirical experience 
of the NICs casts a doubt over the claim made by some 
Neoclassical authors that the success of their economies could
been seen as a example of reducing government role
significantly and allowing the market to function more freely 
(e.g. Little et al., 1970; Balassa, 1981; Lai, 1983; Linder, 
1986, cited in Nolan, 1993: 57).13 Experiences in many other 
countries also suggest that market forces alone should not be 
left to determine the size, composition and characteristics of
13. In fact, quite a number of authors argue that the 
success of NICs is a "special case" in terms of both supply 
and demand side conditions, which rend their experiences of 
little value as models for other developing countries (e.g. 
Lewis, 1980; Streeten, 1982; Cline, 1982; Hamilton, 1983, 
cited in Nolan, op cit.: 57) . For a brief summary of these 
arguments, see Nolan, op cit., pp 60-5.
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| a country's industrial sector. In other words, most
| governments in developing countries ought to pursuit an active
industrial policy to influence industrial development process 
and indeed "intervene strongly in the workings of the market," 
using both price and non-price policy instruments, "if 
socially desirable outcomes are to be achieved" (Nolan, op 
cit.: 197).
None the less, this weakness will not in any way nullify 
the Neoclassical school's profound contribution to the debates 
of industrial and trade policy in developing countries. In 
fact, many of its arguments for introducing market-based 
reforms are applicable not only to developing countries with 
market or mixed economy but also to those with Soviet-style, 
centrally planned economy, such as China's. As a developing 
socialist country, China shares many common characteristics in 
the economic system with other developing countries, 
particularly those with the combination of a weak private 
sector, political monopoly, heavy policy-induced distortions 
and macroeconomic imbalance. Also, much of the Neoclassical 
critique of inward-looking industrialization strategy is also 
relevant to the Chinese development experience prior to the 
reform. Indeed, the current Chinese economic reform is, 
according to Perkins (1988), "in many respects similar in 
nature to" the economic liberalization under way in a number 
of developing countries in 1970s and 1980s. They share the
same fundamental objective  "to reduce the hold of the
government bureaucracy over the economy and to replace 
bureaucratic direction with the impersonal forces of the 
market." The main difference between China and other 
developing countries is "the distance it must travel to reach 
some form of a market system. " This is due to the fact that 
the "Soviet-style central planning involves more or less 
complete bureaucratic control over industry and even much of 
agriculture, while most developing countries have a mixture of 
centralized planning, bureaucratically manipulated markets, 
and markets that are free of bureaucratic manipulation (p. 
603) .
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At least three of Neoclassical fundamental positions seem 
to be particularly instrumental to the Chinese reform and the 
"open-door" policy. First, the importance of reducing the role 
of government in directing economic activities and increasing 
the effectiveness of policy intervention through price 
mechanisms instead of administrative means. Second, the 
importance of increasing export possibility and of granting 
equal incentives to both exporters and import competing 
producers. And third, the importance of encouraging foreign 
investment where it provides either capital, technology, 
management or marketing network, that would otherwise be 
lacking or available at higher costs.
1-5-2. Development of Export Processing Zones
Since the late 1960s and early 1970s the export-led 
growth policy has increasingly been adopted by developing 
countries and regions as their principal industrialization 
strategy. Many of them have established various export- 
oriented enclaves, usually referred to as Export Process Zones 
(EPZs), in the drive to stimulate their exports, especially 
manufactured exports. The creation of China's SEZs is widely 
seen as the attempt by the Chinese authorities to emulate the 
success of the EPZs and free trade policy in the NICs and 
other Southeast Asian countries. Thus, in view of the growing 
trend of EPZs being used as instruments of the trade and 
industrial policy in developing economies, it is important to 
examine the characteristics of EPZs, analyze their performance 
records in terms of the contributions made to export and 
industrial development, identify the problems arisen from 
their development process, and to draw lessons from the past 
experiences.
Characteristics
The EPZ can be defined as "an administratively and 
sometimes geographically delimited area, enjoying special
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| status allowing for the free import of equipment and other
i
| materials to be used in the manufacture of goods earmarked for
export. The special status generally involves favourable legal 
provisions and regulations pertaining mainly to taxation, both 
of which constitute incentives for foreign investment."14 
Hence, it generally has four main characteristics:
- It is an "enclave" enjoying a status that does not 
extend to the whole territory of the country;
- Time-consuming customs procedures on import into it and 
export from it are kept to a minimum;
- Enterprises set up there must export their products;
- Foreign investment is generally expected to provide the 
main impetus.
The first EPZ was established at Shannon airport in
Ireland in 1959, at a time when Ireland's industrialization
policy underwent a change from import substitution to export- 
led expansion. By the late 1980s there had been about 13 0 EPZs 
and EPZ-type economic zones (including the SEZs) in some 40 
developing countries and regions. The EPZ is therefore a 
relatively recent variant of the widely used Free Trade Zone 
(FTZ) .15 But in some countries EPZs and FTZs are combined in 
the same industrial estate, and thus the terms EPZ and FTZ are 
often used interchangeably.
EPZ basically represents a second-best type solution for 
a country wanting to benefit from a greater and more efficient
14. This definition is based on UNIDO (1980) and UNCTAD 
(1985) .
15. The FTZ, on the other hand, can be defined, according 
to the World Bank, as "a designated area, usually in or next 
to a port area, to and from which unrestricted trade is 
permitted with the rest world. Merchandise may be moved in and 
out of FTZs free of customs, stored in warehouses for varying 
periods and repackaged as needed. Goods imported from the FTZ 
into the host country pay the requisite duty; their prior 
storage in FTZ warehouses permits rapid delivery to order, 
meanwhile saving interest on customs payments" (Goderez, 1981: 
7-8) .
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integration into the world economy without subjecting the 
country's entire economy to trade liberalization and 
deregulation. By removing tariffs and most other distortions 
(i.e. regulations) it is hoped that the factor intensity of 
production in zones will correspond more closely with the 
factor endowment of the host country, and thus that 
comparative advantages in this country can be exploited more 
efficiently (Spinanger, 1984: 65).
For foreign investors, mostly from industrialized 
countries, the major factor influencing their investment 
decision is the consideration of the cost and productivity of 
the labour force available in EPZs. For most developing 
countries, on the other hand, the objective of establishing 
EPZs tends to be multi-faceted. It generally includes: 1)
attracting foreign capital and advanced technology; 2) 
acquiring and improving economic management know-how; 3) 
generating foreign exchange earnings; 4) creating employment 
opportunities; and 5) developing linkages between EPZ 
industries and the domestic economy.
According to Spinanger (1984), the general analysis of 
the impact of EPZs consists of two essential aspects: static 
and dynamic effects. The former effects, which can generally 
be measured, cover the costs and benefits directly emanating 
from an EPZ or from the linkages between an EPZ and the host 
country (or the foreign sector), while the latter effects, 
which can basically only be broadly outlined, refer to 1) the 
impact of an EPZ on the efficient allocation of the factors of 
production in the EPZ, and 2) the profound impulses created by 
the EPZ for the industrialization process of the host country 
as a whole in the form of linkages.
Thus, the static effects of an EPZ generally includes the 
development of employment, sales (exports), purchases (either 
from host country or imports), and the remuneration of factors 
of production. Obviously, a positive foreign balance, where 
exports exceed imports plus the transfer of profits or 
interest payments, is seen as a net benefit to the EPZ. At the 
same time, a positive balance vis-a-vis the domestic economy
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is generally interpreted as a net benefit to the economy. In 
other words, the investment in infrastructure has been 
compensated by rents, wages and local purchases of capital or 
intermediate goods as well as services. The dynamic effects of 
an EPZ, on the other hand, basically include the changes in 
the structure of employment, production (value added) and 
exports as well as the factor intensity of production in both 
the EPZ and the host country as a whole for a certain period. 
As the comparative advantage for most developing countries 
lies in the use of the relatively more abundant factor of 
production - labour forces, the level of development 
(expressed as e.g. per capita income) can therefore be assumed 
as being negatively correlated with the labour intensity of 
production. Normally, linkages between the an EPZ and the host 
economy are expected to develop over time as the country's 
development level increases.
Performance Record16
While a few EPZs and EPZ-type zones/territories can be 
regarded as successful, particularly Singapore, Hong Kong, 
Kaoshiung (Taiwan), Masan (South Korea), Sungei Way, Bayan 
Lepas and Penang (Malaysia), and Mauritius, the overall 
performance of most EPZs in developing countries has, 
according to UNCTAD (1985) , been "disappointing" (p. 4) . Their 
contribution to the further economic development of the host 
economies has been insignificant, at least falling far below 
the rather ambitious objectives pursued by many of the 
governments. An OECD study criticize EPZs for having "many 
notable failures," accusing them of "leading to the wastage of 
already scarce resources in the host countries concerned" 
(Basile and Germidis, 1984: 22).17
16. The data used in this section draw, unless cited 
otherwise, from UNCTAD (1985) and Rondinelli (1987).
17. It is therefore not surprising that international 
organisations such as UNCTAD and UNIDO, after warmly 
encouraging developing countries to set up EPZs on their
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The contribution of foreign investment in EPZs to the 
capital stock of the host economies has been small. The 
capital investments made by foreign firms in EPZ production 
sites do not normally exceed $1 million and are, in many 
cases, below $500,000 (such as those made by Taiwan investors 
in mainland China). More frequently, investments made by the 
host governments and domestic sectors in EPZs, including both 
the construction and maintenance of major infrastructure 
projects and manufacturing activities, are far greater than 
those from the foreign source, though which is supposed to 
play a major role in the development of EPZs. The small scale 
of foreign investment also reflects the "footloose" character 
of foreign firms in EPZs.
Most EPZs have attracted non-complex industries which are 
usually vertically integrated into transnational corporations. 
Foreign firms are inclined to relocate labour-intensive stages 
of their production processes and/or operations involving 
mature or standardized technology in EPZs, reflecting their 
response to labour-cost differentials between developed and 
developing countries. As a result, major sectors of production 
in EPZs tend to be electronics, clothing, footwear, leather 
products, domestic electrical appliances, plastics, toys, 
sporting goods, optical goods, car parts, and minor transport 
equipment.
Recent studies indicate that EPZs and EPZ-type zones have 
provided about 3.5 million jobs, accounting for less than 3 
percent of the total officially registered workforce in 
manufacturing industries, in all developing countries and 
regions. The majority of these jobs are offered to low-skilled 
manpower performing simple manual operations which can be 
mastered in a comparatively short time. Hence, their effects 
on improving the quality of the labour force have been 
minimal. Moreover, it is alleged that the job creation costs 
in EPZs tend to be high compared with those generated in 
agriculture or small- and medium-scale domestic industries.
territory, subsequently became much more reserved and even 
extremely cautious in several cases (ibid: 23).
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The foreign exchange earnings generated for the host 
economies by EPZ exports are the amount earned on domestic 
value added and, thus, generally limited to the EPZ wage bill 
and some additional charges paid by EPZ firms for purchases of 
local goods and services. In most cases, the share of EPZ 
exports in total manufactured and semi-manufactured exports is 
below 5 percent, while the share of domestic value added in 
EPZ exports does not exceed 25 percent. Of the domestic value 
added, the wage bill accounts for more than three quarters. 
Although tax revenue from EPZ firms would represent foreign 
exchange earnings for host economies, it does not accrue in 
many cases since host countries tend to offer foreign 
investors tax holiday for protracted periods, let alone the 
loss of taxable revenue, where taxes are paid, due to the 
manipulation of transfer price by the firms. Further, most 
foreign investors repatriate their profits earned in EPZs, 
instead of reinvesting in EPZs. As a result, apart from those 
in Taiwan and South Korea, few EPZs have managed to earned 
more than $10 million in foreign exchange.
EPZs have by and large maintained their enclave character 
and have not established any substantive linkages with the 
industrial sector of the local economies. Procurement of local 
tradeable production inputs by EPZ firms tend to be 
insignificant. The industrial activities in zones have not 
created a trained workforce which would be available for work 
in the domestic industrial sector when it leaves the zones. In 
particular, the differences between production processes in 
EPZs and in domestic sectors have further constrained the 
development of learning and demonstration effects in the host 
economies. Nevertheless, some aspects of foreign enterprise 
management ethics, such as discipline in production, respect 
of deadlines, striving for quality and spirit of innovation, 
have certainly exerted a propulsive influence on the local 
workers in EPZ firms.
It is generally very difficult to evaluate technology 
transfer, if it ever takes place at all, because, inter alia, 
of the various forms it takes. However, there are reasons to
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be sceptical as to the effectiveness and significance of the 
technology transfer made both within EPZs and between EPZs and 
the host economies. The first reason is the strong vertical 
integration of the production process in the export-oriented 
industries, which generally favour routine activities, often 
highly automated, and hence offering little chance of 
improvement for the labour forces involved. The second reason 
is non-complex sectoral structure in EPZs. The industries most 
likely to bring about technology transfer are those producing 
capital goods and intermediate products, such as machinery, 
electrical and transport equipment, industrial chemicals, 
metallurgy and rubber. But, as described above, very few of 
these industries have EPZs managed to attract and develop so 
far. Thus, it is fair to say that the effects of technology 
transfer on both EPZs and the host economies have been very 
limited.
Lessons
Several important lessons can be drawn from the 
experience of the development of EPZs:
First, the location of EPZ is important not only for the 
development of the linkages but also for the macro-economic 
profitability of the venture itself (Spinanger, 1984: 84). In 
general, EPZs should be established in agglomerated areas 
(such as Penang in Malaysia), where agglomeration economies 
can be tapped and complementary infrastructure facilities are 
readily available.
Second, EPZs must be embedded in an appropriate national 
macro-economic policy framework in order to be used 
successfully as an efficient instrument in the 
industrialization process (ibid). The success of the EPZs in 
Taiwan and South Korea can be attributed largely to the sound 
policy environment created by the host governments. Of course, 
the availability of entrepreneurs and political stability is 
equally crucial.
Third, the tax and financial incentives offered by EPZs
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to foreign investors are in many cases unnecessary. It is 
important for EPZ authorities to find an ideal balance between 
granting advantages regarded as adequate from the investor's 
point of view and minimising the costs in terms of revenue 
lost by the host authorities. In fact, simple and speedy 
administrative procedures and comprehensive and effective 
legal provisions are often more attractive to foreign 
investors than financial incentives.
Fourth, the device of EPZ in a predominantly inward- 
oriented economy are neither a panacea nor a sufficient 
measure to promote the efficient integration of the economy 
into the international division of labour (ibid: 85).
And finally, EPZs should be set only one principal
objective, and should not be saddled with several any
contribution they make to other objectives should be regarded 
as desirable externalities (Wall, 1976: 489).
1-5-3. Reforms in the Formerly Socialist Economies
The 1980s is an epoch of crisis and reform for almost all 
socialist economies. Countries like former Soviet Union, 
former East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Czech, Slovak, Bulgaria, 
Romania, and Albania have, after political revolutions, 
decisively embarked on the road to a free market or market- 
based economy. Others such as China and Vietnam have, while 
preserving the state monopolies on political power, social 
ownership and the savings-investment process, instituted 
varying degrees of radical economic reforms. However, China's 
economic reform, both past and present, shares many 
similarities with those carried out by the Soviet bloc 
countries during their pre-revolution period. Thus, it is 
important to examine the essential features of the Soviet-type 
economic system, the history of and the lessons drawn from the 
economic reforms in the former Soviet Union and East European 
countries during the communist era in order to put the 
understanding of China's present reform in an appropriate 
international and historical context.
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Characteristics of the Soviet-type Socialist Economic System
The traditional socialist economic system, or centrally 
planned system, generally refers to the allocation of 
resources through a central plan: that is, the setting by
government officials of mandatory production, exchange and 
distribution goals, and the procedures for attaining those 
goals, which are normally expressed in physical, technical and 
financial terms and enforced primarily by administrative 
methods. All significant means of production and distribution 
are government-owned, either directly (nationalization) or 
indirectly (collectivization) (Prybyla, 1990: 59). It was
first set up in the USSR in the 193 0s and adopted by the East 
European countries and China in the late 1940s and early 
1950s. It had once produced impressive achievements in these 
countries: the rapid industrialization of the backward
economies, the build-up of military power, survival in a 
hostile environment, victory in wars; substantial improvements 
in standards of education, health, social and private 
consumption; full employment of labour; price stability; and 
the development of natural resources, science and technology 
(Nuti, 1981).
At the macro-level, the hierarchy of a typical Soviet- 
type central planning has the State Planning Commission (SPC) 
at its apex, branch ministries at its intermediate level and 
enterprises at its base. The Communist Party plays, as in 
other walks of life, a crucial role in formulating and 
implementing policies and plans. The SPC receives instructions 
about basic economic magnitudes from the Party (especially the 
Politburo). These instructions are relayed via the state 
apparatus (especially the Council of Ministers) and the SPC 
combines these with the information flowing upwards from the 
hierarchy to draw up plans of varying duration by means of 
"material balance."
Prices for goods and services are set administratively 
and changed now and then to facilitate plan elaboration and 
help monitor plan implementation. Basic wages and salaries are
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regulated by fixed wage scales set up for different categories 
of skill and effort. Industrial producer prices are fixed on 
a branch-wide cost-plus basis. Capital is centrally allocated 
and investment funds are normally provided in the form of 
grants. The exchange rate plays insignificant role in domestic 
price formation. Foreign trade is conducted by special export- 
import firms, and domestic prices are separated from 
international prices by a plethora of taxes and subsidies.
At the micro-level, a typical industrial enterprise is 
owned by the state, operating on the principle of "one-man 
responsibility and control" by a director appointed by the 
state or the Party. Enterprises generally interact vertically 
through their respective hierarchies rather than horizontally 
through markets. Their basic function is to fulfil their 
production plans. They are seldom liquidated as a result of 
inefficient production. By and large, competition is limited 
only to efforts at plan fulfilment. Thus, there is little 
incentive to innovation. Enterprises producing goods for 
exports or using imported commodities were shielded from the 
world market by the state monopoly of foreign trade and 
payments.
But this traditional Soviet economic system has many 
serious inherent defects. First, it has chronic shortages of 
both consumer and producer goods. The system has failed to 
provided people with increasing quantities and qualities of 
goods and services that the people want at prices they are 
willing to pay. Second, it results in enormous waste. The 
system fails to supply goods and services efficiently, or in 
other words, is statically inefficient. Third, it leads to 
stagnant innovation, both technologically and socially. The 
system fails to promote economic growth by improvements of 
factor productivity, or in other words, is dynamically 
inefficient (Prybyla, 1990: 18-21).
As a result, impressive production figures were often 
achieved at the expense of huge costs and the periods of 
reported high growth were normally followed by a stagnation or 
even decline in the rate of growth. In short, the socialist
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economic system has never achieved the efficiency, 
productivity and related performance levels expected of it in 
the original socialist conception (Lee and Nellis, 1990: 2-3). 
By the 1980s, the performance of most of the socialist 
economies, except China, had by and large deteriorated.18
Reform Experiences
Attempts to reform the socialist economic system in fact 
began as early as the 1950s and have continued since that 
time. Although the reforms vary from one country to another in 
their timing, intensity, breadth and persistence, they do have 
certain elements in common. They were "conceived by the Party 
leadership as changes in the economic mechanism only, any 
impact on wider issues, especially the political system, was 
to be prevented" (Brus, 1979: 258). The planners sought to 
improve operational efficiency in their economies "by 
substituting market or market-like mechanisms for the command 
mechanisms of plan fulfilment and central physical allocation 
of inputs and outputs" (Lee and Nellis, 1990: 3). Thus, the 
invariant essence of the reforms was to decentralize some 
decision-making to the levels of the regional government and 
the enterprise. It was hoped that the devolution of economic 
authority would facilitate the transition, as the reformers 
saw it, from "extensive" to "intensive" growth (Knight, 1983: 
11) .19
The first country to make fundamental changes in the 
traditional model was Yugoslavia, after its expulsion from the 
Cominform in 1948. The economic reform within the Soviet bloc,
18. For more details of the Soviet-type economic system 
and its defects, see further Wiles (1962), Nove (1969), Kaser 
(1970) and Knight (1983).
19. Knight classifies the decentralization into three 
types: administrative, economic and intra-firm. For more 
details, see Knight (1983), pp. 23-4.
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however, did not start until the 1950s.20 It took place in 
three waves: the 1953-60 period, the 1964-70 period, and from 
the late 1970s to the late 1980s. As the first wave of reform 
was relatively weak, the following discussion will focus only 
on the latter two.
Apart from the Yugoslav self-management movement and the 
Hungarian New Economic Mechanism, which represent a radical 
departure from the traditional Soviet economic system, there 
was a strong trend towards organisational concentration in 
other Soviet bloc countries during the second wave of the 
reform. Enterprises were amalgamated into larger-scale 
production units (often termed as "associations" and so on) in 
order to reap economies of scale, encourage technological 
progress and streamline the planning system by reducing the 
number of production units directly controlled by central 
planners.
In the GDR, in addition to the W B  (associations of 
nationalized enterprises), in which the functions of the 
supervisory body were interlined with that of enterprises, 
another amalgamated unit, the Kombinat (Combine), closer in 
status to an enterprise, came into being. In Hungary, 
amalgamated units took over the name of enterprises, which 
underlined the fact that the enterprise function, with all its 
enhanced autonomy, became vested in these units. In Poland, 
the whole idea of increased autonomy of industry was based on 
associations of enterprises, reorganised in such a way as to 
enable not only horizontal (branch) but also vertical 
integration. In Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia, the devolution of 
economic authority was accompanied by a substantial reduction 
in the number of intermediate units, i.e. by further 
concentration; a similar process took place in Romania, where 
the number of industrial associations (centralele) was reduced 
from 195 to 102. In Yugoslavia, the concentration took place 
in the form of mergers, with similar consequences.
20. The following information is based largely on Brus 
(1979), Knight (1983), Section III, and Jeffries (1992), pp. 
5-6.
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At the same time, the number of indicators assessing 
enterprise performance was reduced and the emphasis put on 
profit and sales. Improved incentives included retaining a 
greater proportion of enterprise net revenue (for personal 
bonuses and investment) and applying more stable rules and 
parameters. Increased importance was attached to indirect 
steering of the economy via "economic levers," such as prices, 
the cost and availability of credit, and taxes. Wholesale 
prices were raised in order to reduce subsidies and tiered 
prices (fixed, range, and free categories) introduced. A 
closer link between internal and external economic activities 
was established, with foreign trade sector undergoing a series 
of reorganization.
However, the "second wave" was short-lived. The economic 
reforms soon lost their momentum and in most cases showed 
signs of retreat. The reasons included the Prague Spring 
(cracked down by the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact troops) and strong 
resistances from domestic powerful vested interest groups 
(like branch ministries) in each country. The piecemeal and 
modest changes proved inadequate to cure the deep-rooted 
problems.
The "third wave" was largely a decade of retrenchment. 
Further attempts were made at piecemeal reforms, with emphasis 
being put on making central planning more efficient. At the 
same time, planning techniques were improved, involving, e.g. 
integrated, computerized information and control systems to 
aid planning decisions. Gorbachev's accession to the Soviet 
leader in 1985 brought a new hope to the reform, but failed to 
solve any serious economic problem.
The major reason for the unsatisfactory result of the 
reform can be explained by the words of Zdzislaw Sadowski, 
former chairman of the Polish State Planning Commission: "All 
previous attempts to introduce reforms proceeded largely on 
the assumption that you could change part of the system 
without changing the whole" (Prybyla, 1990: 121-2). It only 
took the revolutions in East Europe in 1989 and the breakup of 
the USSR in 1991 to set course for a fundamental change in the
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old Soviet-style economic system.
Lessons
The difference in the national experiences, plus the 
complexity of reforms involving entire economic, political and 
social systems, make it difficult to generalize the lessons of 
the reforms. But a few points can be made about factors which 
might be relevant to China's current economic reform.
First, "piecemeal" or partial reforms, incorporating some 
efficiency-promoting mechanisms of the market without changing 
the essential features of socialist economy, have generally 
not been successful. Indeed, according to Balassa (1982b), 
they may even have reduced economic efficiency by combining 
the negative features of centralized and decentralized systems 
(p. 3 08). That is why a World Bank study calls for
"simultaneous implementation of an internally consistent and 
comprehensive (reform) package" (Knight, 1983: 107). In other 
words, "a linear sequence of individual policy change is not 
the right concept" and the issue of reform sequencing should 
be seen as "one of the packaging of reforms" (Fischer and 
Gelb, 1990: 29).
Second, as economic reforms inevitably affect the 
distribution of powers and incomes, they always encounter 
strong resistance from vested interest groups. Thus, a 
successful reform demands a powerful and persistent political 
backing. In particular, as reforms may temporarily lead to 
inflation and unemployment, without continued political 
backing and popular support they may not survive long enough 
to provide measurable benefits in terms of improved economic 
efficiency and living standard.
Third, enterprise reform is at the "heart" of socialist 
economic transformation (ibid: 22). The past partial reforms 
short of ownership change have proved insufficient to tackle 
the fundamental problems in SOEs, notably "soft budget 
constraints." A radical ownership reform requires 
privatization, which should be conducted in an orderly,
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equitable and politically acceptable fashion. Joint ventures, 
involving private-private, private-public or domestic-foreign 
partnerships, have increasingly become a popular form of 
privatization in socialist countries (Lee and Nellis, 1990: 
5) .
Fourth, price reform is crucial to the overall success of 
economic reform given the important interdependence between 
the former and other aspects of the latter. It is widely 
agreed that the best way to rationalize the price system is to 
open the economy to foreign trade, thus exposing domestic 
producers and traders to world prices and foreign competition 
(Fischer and Gelb, 1990: 20). An appropriate price system is 
essential not only to trade liberalization but also to the 
hardening of budget constraints, since profits and losses are 
not necessarily good indicators of efficiency under distorted 
prices.
Fifth, the success of domestic economic reform in 
socialist countries depends heavily on the extent of opening 
their economies to foreign trade, capital, technology, and 
management. It is therefore important for the governments to 
develop a systematic approach to foreign investment and 
ownership, creating favourable administrative conditions and 
-effective legal framework, as well as providing financial 
incentives, for foreign investors (ibid: 35).
And finally, the reform in socialist countries has been 
made more difficult by the fusion of the economy and polity. 
The Soviet-type economy is identical with politics. Thus, 
structural economic changes will inevitable demand concurrent 
changes in political structure, particularly the "leading 
role" (monopoly) of the ruling Communist Party (Prybyla, 1990: 
121) . A political reform is thereby needed to prevent the 
economic reform from being stalled by an entrenched 
bureaucracy, to bring about the recognition of the value of 
diversity and individual initiative, and to build up a 
substantial social and political consensus (Fischer and Gelb, 
1990: 2; 13) .
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1-6. Structure of This Thesis and Explanation of Data
This thesis sets out to examine the reform and 
development of the Xiamen SEZ, its relationship with the 
domestic economic reform, and the effects of FDI, especially 
TDI, on the local industrial transformation during its first 
decade of the 1980s. Chapter 2 provides a detailed description 
of China's prereform, Soviet-style economic planning and 
management system; and Chapter 3 discusses China's present 
industrial and foreign trade reforms. The first two sections 
of Chapter 4 survey the utilization of foreign capital 
(especially FDI) and the development of the SEZs, while the 
third section characterizes the Xiamen economy, covering both 
before and after the 1949-revolution periods. Having provided 
the necessary theoretical and historical contextual 
background, this thesis starts dealing with the three 
important subjects in the following three core chapters. 
Chapter 5 examines the enterprise reform in Xiamen with an 
emphasis on the latest reform programme of the Separation of 
Tax and Profits; Chapter 6 analyses the utilization of FDI, 
especially TDI, in conjunction with the local industrial 
transformation; and Chapter 7 investigates the relationship 
between the trade liberalization and the price reform in 
Xiamen, with a special exploration on the relationship between 
trade development and inflation. And finally, Chapter 8 ends 
this thesis with summary and conclusions.
As actual experience with the Xiamen SEZ is relatively 
short, data about it are understandably scarce, fragmentary 
and sometimes even inaccurate. This of course prevents the 
author from making a more detailed survey on it. The study has 
therefore to be confined largely to the available official 
data, published mainly by the Xiamen authorities, such as 
statistical yearbooks, official survey reports, and a variety 
of development plans. It is widely agreed that the Chinese 
official data can be used with reasonable confidence, provided 
that one exercises adequate caution and, where necessary, 
rectifies some obvious bias or distortions. Some additional
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information obtained from two field trips (in 1988 and 1991) 
will be used to complement, or provide a contrast to, the 
official data.
49
CHAPTER 2 
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PREREFORM 
CHINESE ECONOMIC PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
The establishment of the SEZs in China in the early 1980s 
was not only a pioneering event among the centrally planned 
economies, but also the boldest step taken by the Chinese 
leadership in its bid to reform China's Soviet-type economic 
system since it launched the reform and "open-door" in the 
late 1970s. Obviously, the SEZs, especially the Xiamen SEZ, 
have to develop a new, market-oriented and outward-looking 
economic system on the basis of the old, centrally planned and 
inward-looking regime. Thus, a radical restructuring of the 
old system is vital for the success of the new one.
To comprehend the immensity and complexity of the Chinese 
economic reform and hence the nature of the problems faced by 
the SEZs in the process of their development, it is necessary 
to have a sound understanding of the old, prereform economic 
system. This chapter is, therefore, intended to feature the 
important aspects of it, with a view to providing a historical 
background for the detailed discussions of the present reform 
and "open-door" in China in general and the Xiamen SEZ in 
particular. Thus, Section 2-1 examines the origins and 
essential characteristics of the old industrial planning and 
management system, at both the macro and micro levels; Section
2-2 investigates the old foreign trade system; and finally 
Section 2-3 explores the major causes which eventually led to 
the present reform and openness.
2-1. The Industrial System
China's command economic system was basically established
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in the mid-1950s under a particular historical circumstance. 
From 1949 to 1957, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), with 
assistance of Soviet Union, brought about the rehabilitation 
of the economy, transformed the country's ownership of 
producer goods, and fulfilled the first Five-Year Plan (FYP). 
These events, together with some historic experiences of the 
CCP, had all contributed to shape the system.
2-1-1. The Origins of the System
In general, there are six important factors which had had 
direct bearing on the formation of the system:
1. Imperative of Restoring- Economic Law and Order The 
economy the CCP inherited from the previous Nationalist 
(Kuomintang) government in 1949 can be best described as 
chaotic. Two decades of war destroyed much of the pre-existing 
industrial capacity, with production running only at 56 
percent of its prewar peak level; while grain output, though 
less interrupted, was also estimated at only 70-75 percent of 
its previous best (Riskin, 1987: 33). Supply shortages led to 
chronic hyper-inflation and rampant corruption, which made the 
maintenance of normal economic transactions and daily life 
almost impossible.1
In short, the very severity of the chaos and depth of 
economic crises posed a severe test for the incoming 
government. In order to consolidate its military and political 
controls, it was vital for the new regime to swiftly 
rehabilitate production, stabilize prices and put an end to 
the deterioration of state finances. To accomplish these 
overriding tasks, the new communist government had, among 
other things, to acquire substantial physical and financial 
resources.
However, the resources directly controlled by the 
government in 1949 were extremely limited, and although it had 
seized a large quantity of assets owned by powerful
1. For more details about the economic chaos in the late 
1940s, see Liu Suinian and Wu Qungan (1986), Chapter 1.
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capitalists hostile to the revolution and the new regime, the 
bulk of the economy was still in the private sector. Thus, it 
was imperative to put considerable resources under the direct 
control of the central government. Chen Yun, a veteran leader 
of the CCP in charge of economic affairs, put it explicitly: 
"the more acute the shortage of materials is, the more 
necessary it is for us to concentrate materials and use them 
to the best advantage" (Liu and Wu, 1986: 102) .
Under this circumstance, the CCP drastically changed its 
economic management policy, from "unified leadership and 
decentralized operation" (Tongyi Lingdao, Fensan Jingying) , 
developed in the communist-occupied areas during the wartime, 
to "unified leadership and centralized operation" (Tongyi 
Lingdao, Jizhong Jingying). The new policy contained "three 
centralization's: "
1) . Centralization of state fiscal revenues and 
expenditures. All tax revenues, including agricultural taxes 
or public grains, tariffs, salt taxes, excise taxes, business 
taxes, and part of local taxes, had to be handed over to, and 
then allocated by, the central government.
2). Centralization of material distribution. All stocks 
of key raw materials in the country could be dispatched only 
by the Financial and Economic Committee or the Trade Ministry 
of the central government.
3). Centralization of cash management. Cash owned by all 
governmental and military organizations and public-owned 
enterprises had to be deposited in the People's Bank of China, 
the central bank, while rate-setting and allocation of foreign 
exchanges were also handled by the Bank.
The effect of this policy change was that from then on 
"the essential aspects of economic decision-makings were 
basically controlled by the Centre" (Zhou Taihe et al., 1984: 
15).2 As a result, the centralized policy had played a crucial
2. Some localities were reported to express their doubt 
on the appropriateness of this highly centralized policy, and 
indeed the central government also admitted that the new 
policy could cause "numerous difficulties" to localities. See 
Liu and Wu (1986), pp. 101-2.
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part in restoring economic law and order and, more 
significantly, laid a foundation for establishing the central 
planning system.
2 . Development Strategy of the New Leadership As soon as 
it took power in mainland China, the CCP firmly committed 
itself to two main objectives: 1). industrialization, and
especially the development of heavy industry; and 2) . 
elimination of the worst aspects of poverty. In the first 
case, the CCP leadership recognized that it could be attained 
only by building up an independent and comprehensive 
industrial capacity, which further necessitates a substantial 
increase in the rate of investment. Thus, centralized economic 
institutions were perceived as the only viable mechanism to 
achieve the required growth rate in overall investment and 
favourite allocation of a large portion of resources for heavy 
industry.
In the second case, the leadership pursued this objective 
by focusing on realigning the geographic distribution of 
industry and ensuring a more equitable distribution of 
government services. The communists considered the inherited 
pattern of industrial development, in which industrial output 
capacity was concentrated in the Northeast and a few major 
coastal enclaves, to be the result of over a half-century of 
foreign domination of the Chinese economy. Such regional 
disparities in the level of development were regarded as 
politically unacceptable in the long run.
Also, there was a virtual absence, in large areas of the 
country in 1949, of health care facilities, educational 
institutions, and other important social services. 
Accordingly, a centralized economic system was seen as the 
only effective means for redistributing resources to meet the 
government's goals to balance between the interior and coastal 
industrial development and improve distribution of public 
social services.
3. Strong Influence of the Soviet Model As the first 
communist state, the USSR was in many respects the only model 
for the PRC to follow. However, an even more compelling reason
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for China to accept the Soviet assistance was that the USSR 
stood ready to support China in its industrialization. Soviet 
aid was especially effective because it was to be received in 
the form of plants, machinery, and systems of organization and 
management, which "inevitably resembled their counterparts at 
home" (Riskin, 1987: 59).
What appealed to the CCP leadership most was that the so- 
called "Stalinist Development Approach, " i.e. the preponderant 
stress on the development of large-scale and capital-intensive 
producer goods industries, coincided with China's top priority
at that time --  fast development of heavy industry. In
addition, the organisational dimension of Stalinism, the 
highly centralized mode of command planning, the hierarchical 
"one-man management" system, and the highly articulated 
structure of individual material incentives in industry, were 
also relevant to China's acute needs.
As a result, China leaned to one side, and absorbed both 
the positive and negative aspects of Soviet experiences. In 
particular, the Soviet approach exerted a great influence on 
China's industrial and transport development pattern, planning 
and statistical systems, capital construction management 
system, material allocation system, and labour and wage 
management systems.
4. Legacy of Wartime Practices Before the founding of 
the PRC, the CCP had already developed an economic management 
system in their occupied areas, or "liberated areas"
(Jiefanqu) . Because these areas had long been surrounded by 
"enemy troops" and separated from each other during the 
decades of war, they adopted the policy of "self-reliance" 
and "self-determination" in economic affairs. They also 
developed a kind of communist supply system (Gongjizhi) , in 
which provision of basic necessities for life was practised 
among military and administrative personnel. Obviously, the 
essence of the system, egalitarianism, had had a powerful 
influence on the formation of China's economic system.
Moreover, by the end of the Civil War, the CCP had become 
experienced in handling the problems of coordinating and
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organizing military and logistic operations on a grand scale. 
In other words, the CCP's top policy-makers had been 
accustomed to working an enormous, complex and centralized 
organization. Deng Xiaoping testified that there had been an 
overall tendency towards centralization of power within the 
CCP since 1941 (Deng, 1984: 27-9).
In addition, there was also personnel factor. In general, 
the high-level administrators of the CCP came largely from, or 
had connection with, Northeast China, where a framework of a 
command economy, together with an infrastructure of a modern 
industrial complex, had taken shape one decade prior to the 
CCP's take-over in 1948.3 The "colonization" of the planning 
and managerial sections of the top leadership by the Northeast 
Group (who had been associated with the building of the early 
version of the command economy) "sheds considerable light on 
the perpetuation of the administrative approach in subsequent 
periods" (Peter Lee, 1987: 44).
The Chinese admitted that their agricultural, financial, 
monetary, price (especially, those for agricultural and light 
industrial products) systems were established "on the basis of 
experiences gained in liberated areas, combined with 
considerations on the new situation after the liberation" 
(Zhou Taihe et al., 1984: 61).
5. Inheritance of Certain Measures Taken in the 
"Socialist Transformation" Before the CCP could build up a 
Soviet-type economic system, there was still an important
"prelude" for it to go through --  "socialist transformation
of the private ownership of the means of production, " that is, 
turning various private-owned sectors into public-owned ones 
(either state- or collective-owned) through nationalization or 
collectivization. The campaign was initiated at the end of 
1952 and largely completed in 1956. Although a fairly positive 
policy towards existing industrial and commercial firms were
3. These people included Gao Gang, the first director of 
the SPC; Li Fuchun, who succeeded Gao; Wang Hefeng; Jia Tofu; 
Ma Hong; and, above all, Chen Yun, who chaired the powerful 
Financial and Economic Commission later. See Peter Lee (1987), 
pp. 43-4.
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adopted to ensure the speedy and steady recovery of the 
economy, some mistakes were also made due primarily to Mao's 
radical approach towards the pace of the transformation.
In order to push the nationalization and collectivization 
forward at a faster speed, the leadership took some 
extraordinary steps. These included violating the principles 
of "voluntariness1 and "mutual-benef it" by resorting to 
administrative measures or coercive means to force people to 
accept its arrangements; blindly pursuing high growth rates 
and large-sized enterprises by excessive merging and 
regrouping of existing ones; and practising absolute 
egalitarianism in distribution. Indeed, many of the problems 
plaguing China's post-Mao economy can be traced to the shift 
in 1955-6 from a policy of gradual transformation to the one 
promoting "massive and quick" change.
Furthermore, after the completion of the transformation, 
the central control, which was imposed on SOEs and joint 
public-private ventures during the transformation in order to 
concentrate limited resources to combat capitalists, was not 
removed or even reduced. Instead, it was enhanced and enlarged 
as the public-owned sector was expanding rapidly (Zhu Rongji 
et al., 1985: 46-7) . For example, after the completion of the 
nationalization in 1956, the number of manufactured products 
directly under the control of the SPC increased from 115 in 
1953 to 3 80, making up about 60 percent of total industrial 
output value, while the number of the industrial enterprises 
directly under the jurisdiction of the central government went 
up from 2,800 in 1953 to 9,3 00, accounting for 16 percent of 
total enterprises and producing 49 percent of total output 
value (Liu and Wu, 1986: 173-4) . At the same time, state-owned 
trading companies, which had exclusive control over the 
domestic market, also followed the old track of state monopoly 
of purchase and marketing of light industrial goods and 
general merchandise, a method used to restrict capitalists' 
speculative activities in the process of the transformation.
In fact, as Chen Yun pointed in September 1956, many 
measures taken during the transformation (including
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centralized planning, production, allocation, procurement, and 
marketing) , were not suitable to the development of the 
national economy in the long-run, and should therefore cease 
to operate after the completion of the transformation (ibid). 
However, this call was apparently ignored.
6. Effects of Implementing the First FYP The principal 
task for the first FYP, which officially started in 1953 and 
ended in 1957, was to carry out the construction of 694 large- 
scale industrial projects, of which, 156 were Soviet-aided key 
projects.
As China's financial, physical and technical personnel 
resources were extremely scarce in relation to the huge 
demands of these strategic projects, it was neither possible 
nor sensible to ask local authorities to organize the 
construction. Thus, in order to strengthen centralized 
leadership over the implementation of the fist FYP, in 1954 
the central government in Beijing abolished the six Greater 
Administrative Regions, each of which had commanded several 
provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions, and acted as 
the highest administrative authority in the region since 
1949.4 Instead, many industrial ministries and economic 
management organizations were set up in the central government 
to take over the responsibilities of running the country's 
economy (Zhu Rongji, 1985: 43).
As a result, a vertical and hierarchical system of 
ministerial control (Bumen Guanli), stretching from Beijing to 
various localities and enterprises, was established. The 
central ministries were increasingly able to translate 
centrally determined policies into effective actions at the 
microeconomic level. They directly controlled capital 
construction (in fact, many of ministries had their own 
construction forces), while local governments focused mainly 
on developing agriculture, stabilizing prices and caring for 
people's welfare. In addition, the ministries were also
4. These six regions were the Northeastern, Northern, 
Northwestern, Eastern, Southwestern, Central and Southern 
China Regions.
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empowered to direct all financial, physical and human 
resources necessary for the construction. For example, the 
central government controlled 80 percent of the total fiscal 
revenues, 75 percent of the expenditures; and more than 1,000 
varieties of materials during the period of the first FYP. At 
the same time, the government also transferred more than 
10,000 administrators and a large number of engineering 
professionals from various places and sectors to the key 
proj ects.
As these vertically centralized approaches had proved to 
be quite effective for capital construction, they were also 
adopted by other sectors in their economic management later 
(ibid: 44-5) .
2-1-2. Characteristics of the System
The essential elements which distinguish China's Soviet- 
style economic system from other systems may be highlighted as 
follows:
1. Predominance of Public Ownership The public ownership 
of producer goods in China generally consists of the State 
Ownership (Guojia Suoyouzhi), or the Whole-People Ownership 
(Quanmin Suoyouzhi) , and the Collective Ownership {Jiti 
Suoyouzhi) . The former came into being mainly through the 
outright confiscation and nationalization of the key, large- 
scale industries and commerce (or the "bureaucratic-capitalist 
industries and commerce," as classified by the CCP); while the 
latter was created by the collectivization of agriculture, the 
small- and medium-sized industrial and commercial businesses, 
and scattered handcrafts.
The campaign of the Socialist Transformation from 1952 to 
1957 was intended to eliminate private ownership and rapidly 
expand public one. As a result, by 1957 the national economy 
had been almost completely dominated by the public sector (see 
Table 2-1.1). There was not much difference between the state 
and the collective ownership in terms of planning management. 
In fact, as the pervasive involvement of the government in
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almost every aspect of the economy, both of them were 
virtually controlled and operated by the government.
Table 2-1.1 Composition of the national 
economy by type of ownership (1950 - 57)
(%)
1950 1957
Gross value of industrial output:
The state-owned sector 45.3 68.2
The state-private joint venture 17.8 31.7
Subtotal 63.1 99.9
The private sector 36.9 0.1
Commercial sales:
Wholesales:
The state-owned 23 .2 71.5
The co-operative 0.6 23 .8
The state-private 0.1 4.6
Subtotal 23 .9 99.9
The private 76.1 0.1
Retails:
The state-owned & co-operative 14.9 65.7
The state-private 0.1 31.6
Subtotal 15.0 97 .3
The private 85.0 2.7
Handcraft:
Employment:
In co-operatives (public) ---- 90.2
In individual (private) ---- 9.8
Gross value of output:
Co-operatives 0.8 95.2
Individual 99.2 4.8
Agriculture:
Households collectivized (public) 10.7 97.5
Sources: Zhou Taihe et.al. eds. (1984), pp. 26 & 28-9.
2. Central Planning System The reason for the 
establishment of the public ownership was to develop a Soviet- 
style central planning system in the Chinese economy. The 
outstanding feature of this system is the centralization of
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economic decision-makings. For example, during the period of 
the first FYP period, the state drew up plans in 17 fields, 
namely, agriculture, industry, transportation, post and 
telecommunications, commerce, foreign trade, education, health 
services, scientific and technological researches, city public 
utilities, geological prospecting, capital construction, 
labour and wages, circulation expenses, material supply, state 
reserves, and overall financial balance.
Targets in these plans covered various areas, including 
the volumes of major industrial and agricultural products, the 
scope of investment in capital construction, the allocation of 
important materials, the state financial budget, the number of 
workers to be recruited and total payroll, purchase and 
marketing of major commodities, categories and quantities of 
exports and imports, the issuance of currency, and the prices 
of major industrial and agricultural products. At micro-level, 
the central government controlled 9,3 00 big or key 
enterprises, whose output value made up 49 percent of the 
country's total value of industrial outputs.
This highly centralized system made China capable of 
mobilizing limited physical, human and financial resources to 
achieve an ambitious and clearly defined goal. Through the 
central control over resources, the government could generate
very high rates of saving and, at the same time, provide a
reasonably secure basic level of consumption for all
population ---  an especially difficult task in a low-income
country such as China.
3. Vertical Command Structure The centrally planned 
economy was dominated by a strictly vertical, or ministerial, 
authority line, as opposed to horizontal, or territorial,
linkages. This can be best indicated by the principle of
planning management, i.e. "centralized planning and management 
at different levels" (Jizhong Jihua, Fenceng Guangli) . Indeed, 
as shown in Figure 2-1.1, China's planning system in 1950s was 
a well-organized, multi-levelled structure, closely integrated 
with the political structure of the country from the Centre 
down to enterprises. It clearly depicts a picture of authority
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orientation, in contrast to the market orientation in the 
Western economy.
Figure 2-1.1 The structure of China's planning organizations
in the 1950s
The State Council
The State Planning Commission
Central ministries 
Planning departments
Provincial-level localities 
Planning commissions
Cities and counties 
Planning commissions
Enterprises 
Planning sections
Source: Based on Zhu Rongji et. al. eds. (1985), p. 45.
Thus, in production planning, for example, the State 
Council established overall goals which, in turn, were broken 
down into specific physical production quotas for each sector 
or branch of the economy. These, in turn, were dis-aggregated 
by each central ministry into production targets for specific 
enterprises under direct ministerial management. Provincial 
governments nominally carried out a similar planning process 
for enterprises under local control. Hence, the national 
economic plan was an aggregation of the plans of each ministry 
and each provincial-level locality. However, this does not 
mean that provincial governments were equal to ministries in
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the planning process. In fact, their role was severely 
circumscribed since they only controlled one-fourth of the 
SOEs, most of which were either small or in low priority 
sectors.
4. Application of the Method of Material Balances In 
working out the cross-sector or comprehensive plan, the 
Chinese adopted the Soviet method of Material Balance (Wuzi 
Pingheng Fa), whereby tables are prepared to indicate how the 
output of each industry or sector is to be distributed, given 
existing technology, among all producing industries or 
sectors, plus final demands.5 With such tables of inter­
sectoral balances, it is then possible to project the pattern 
of demand for each sector's output that will be generated by 
a given planned rate and pattern of growth, and to compare it 
to the supplies likely to be made available by existing 
capacities and their planned expansions. If balance between 
anticipated supply and demand is lacking, the plan is adjusted 
and the possibility of using foreign trade to fill the gaps is 
explored.
One important consequence of this method is that a 
disproportionate attention is given to output volume. Indeed, 
in any system based on physical commodity flows, one has every 
reason to doubt the adequacy of leaders's attentions toward 
costs, assortment and quality.
5. Exclusive Application of Administrative Means 
Administrative means, characterized by the mandatory or direct 
plans, was widely used in the implementation of plans, as 
opposed to the use of market mechanisms. Indeed, 
administrative means became almost the only means for the 
government to secure the fulfilment of plans. They serve as a 
responsibility system, in the sense that failure to realize 
them normally results in disciplinary action against personnel 
concerned from the superior party or governmental 
organizations.
Modelled on the Soviet system, the administrative
5. For a brief description of the procedure of 
constructing a table, see Howe (1978), pp. 53-4.
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approach represents the ideal of planner's sovereignty in the 
process of development. It presupposes that the central 
planners are able to formulate a rational comprehensive plan, 
imposing full control over every phase of implementation. In 
addition, it relies heavily on instruments such as mandatory 
or direct plans, rules and regulations, experts, and material 
incentives to enforce policies. For example, during the period 
of the first FYP, all SOEs and state-private joint 
enterprises, representing a overwhelming majority of Chinese 
enterprises at that time (see Table 2-1.1), were placed under 
direct planning, with mandatory targets issued by the state. 
This means that their major producer goods were supplied by 
the competent higher authorities according to plan and their 
outputs were purchased and allocated for particular use by the 
commercial or material departments of the authorities.
6. Principle of Self-Reliance and Fragmentation of the 
Economy The development policy in the prereform China rested 
upon the principle of self-reliance. The central government 
promoted local self-reliance by decentralizing decision-making 
authority to local governments, in order to encourage the 
development of independent local industrial systems.6 Local 
authorities, on the other hand, tried to maximize local 
interests and reduce their dependence on inflows from other 
regions by engaging in vertical integration and building the 
systems which could insulate their enterprises from supply 
shortfalls. This led to the bureaucratic systems moving toward 
"localism" and "departmentalism."
As a result of this development model, the Chinese 
economy was so fragmentary that it could be described as a 
"cellular" economy. The whole industry was compartmentalized 
by tens of thousands of small-scale, autarkic enterprises, or 
as Audrey Donnithorne put it, "composed of a myriad of small
6. In fact, the aesthetic of independence and self- 
reliance in China is one of an inherited peasant outlook that 
shaped Maoist decision-making. This predisposition was 
undoubtedly reinforced by the personal experiences of Mao and 
his associates in the isolated base areas during the war 
years.
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discrete units" (Donnithorne, 1967: 605).7
Both the hierarchical and cellular modes have a built-in 
tendency toward autarky. In the hierarchical system, each 
ministry strives for self-sufficiency, or departmentalism, 
which is commonly associated with the Soviet-type economy, in 
the cellular system, each geographical planning unit tries to 
be self-contained, or localism, which appears to be a 
distinctively Chinese phenomenon (Tidrick, 1987).
7. Politicization of Economic Decision-Makings In 
addition to the public ownership and central planning system, 
what stands out about the Chinese economic system is the 
ideological and political dominance of economic decision­
making (indeed along with virtually all other kinds, as well). 
In China, the CCP plays a dominant role in formulating, and 
overseeing the execution of, basic economic policies.8 The 
principle is that the CCP provides leadership for the state 
(the administrative organs of government) , and the state 
manages the economy. Party organizations exercise their 
leadership by running parallel to entire administrative 
structure, both centrally and locally.
It is therefore not surprising to find that both party 
and governmental positions were occupied by the same persons.9 
Because of the mingling of the Party and the government 
(Dangzheng Bufen) , and the government administration and the 
enterprise business. (Zhengqi Bufen) , a public-owned enterprise 
in China was in fact owned by the government, directly 
manipulated by the Party. The essence of this politicization 
is to concentrate the resource allocation power in the hands 
of the Party, as a power backing to ensure its political
7. For more discussions on the fragmentation of the 
Chinese economy, see Thomas P. Lyons (1987).
8. Howe (1978) provides an excellent analysis of what he 
refers as "the pervasiveness of political control" in the 
Chinese economic system, see Howe (1978), chiefly Chapter 2.
9. Howe argues that the CCP was more active in the day- 
to-day administration of economic organization than the Soviet 
Communist Party. See Howe (1978), p. 32.
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control. In practice, this politicization means three things: 
1). the prevalence of political criteria in the economic 
decision-making, that is to say, "ideological values come to 
be substituted for objective engineering or economic stands of 
choice" (Riskin, 1987: 84); 2). heavy reliance on political 
mobilization, in mass scale, through intensive party political 
propaganda in the implementation of plans; and 3). extensive 
use of general criteria of choice, often expressed in slogan 
form (e.g. "walk on two legs," "both redness and expertise," 
and "go all out, aim high, strive to build socialism faster, 
better and more economically," etc.).
The consequences of this politicization were: 1). the
confusion of the patterns of authority and responsibility in 
the Chinese economic management system, and 2). more 
profoundly, making the economic development extremely 
vulnerable to the power struggles within the Party, which took 
place from time to time, in other words, planting the seeds of 
periodical fluctuations and turmoil in the economic 
development.
2-1-3. Management of Enterprise
The enterprise (Qiye) is the basic organisational unit in 
the Chinese economy. By 1979 the total number of various
industrial enterprises had reached 355,013, of which 23.62 
percent were state-owned while the rest collective-owned. 
SOEs, though less than a quarter of the total, generated 
nearly 82 percent of the total national net output, compared 
to only 18.14 percent coming from collective-owned enterprises 
(COEs) (World Bank, 1983, vol. II: 128).
SOEs were generally classified into four types according 
to their competent authorities: those managed directly by a 
central ministry; those by both a central ministry and their
local authorities with the former assuming the chief
responsibility; those by both a central ministry and their 
local authorities with the latter assuming the chief
responsibility; and those by their local authorities only. On
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the other hand, COEs, divided into urban- and rural-collective 
ones, were controlled largely by local authorities (Ma Hong, 
1990: 220). This separation of enterprises into vertical
systems under central ministries and territorial blocks under 
local authorities, with weak horizontal links among them, had 
created the compartmentalization. In other words, the 
combination of the Soviet-type vertical system with the 
Chinese regional structure had led to the fragmentation of the 
economy into pieces controlled separately by vertical
(ministerial) and horizontal (regional) lines of command --
the hallmark of China's centrally planned economy.
From the mid-1950s to the late 1970s, there were several 
changes in the delineation of management authorities in SOEs 
and urban COEs, placing more power at the hands of enterprises 
at one time, and re-centralizing the power into central 
ministries or local governments at another. But by and large, 
the management system had been centralized throughout the 
period.
Enterprises, especially SOEs, had to strictly follow the 
state's unified plans: primary materials needed in production 
were supplied by the state; products could only be sold to the 
state procurement or commercial department; profits should be 
delivered in most, if not all, to the state treasury through 
their competent bodies; additional fixed assets and working 
capital had to be appropriated by the state financial 
department; and workers and staff were assigned only by the 
state labour bureau, and their welfare and reward funds were 
drawn according to a fixed percentage of the wage bill and 
included into the costs of enterprises (Ma Hong, 1990: 121).
Relationship with the State Budget In terms of their 
financial interaction with the state, the Chinese industrial 
enterprises were divided into in-budget enterprises (Yusuan 
Nei Qiye) and extra-budget enterprises (Yusuan Wai Qiye) . The 
number of the first group reached about 40,000 in 1979-80, 
accounting for 47.71 percent of SOEs. Their profits (or 
losses) and tax payments (industrial and commercial tax) were
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included in government budget revenues under "enterprise 
incomes." The second group, including over half of total SOEs, 
remitted their profits either to extra-budgetary funds of 
local governments or to accounts of ministerial systems, 
bypassing the budget.
By definition, all COEs belong to the second group since 
their financial interaction with the state took the form of 
tax payments rather than profit remittance. They paid a 
graduated profit tax, which amounted to 55 percent of their 
profits after indirect taxes, such as industrial and 
commercial tax. The remainder of the profits was divided on a 
basis of the formula that varied in detail according to the 
trade of enterprise and the locality.
Enterprises were also required to hand over their Basic 
Depreciation Funds for Fixed Assets to the state treasury. The 
funds was drawn according to the pre-set depreciation rate on 
all fixed assets in use except the land, on the basis of the 
original value of the assets and the service period. 
Enterprises must submit their applications for any addition to 
plant, equipment, and even improvement for existing equipment. 
After the approval of the higher authorities, the treasury 
would allocate special funds to them.
Norms for Examination There were a few changes in the 
number of the norms whereby the government assessed the 
performance of enterprises. But generally speaking, the 
following twelve norms were to be essential: total output
value, output of major products, trial-production of new 
products, major economic and technological quotas, use of 
capital, cost reduction rate, total amount of costs reduced, 
number of workers and staff at the end of year, total payroll, 
average wages, labour productivity, and profits (Liu and Wu, 
1986: 174). All these targets were obligatory for SOEs, but 
few were able to achieve all of them.
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2-2. The Foreign Trade System
Having established the command industrial planning and 
management system, the CCP moved swiftly to set up its own 
foreign trade system, which was also modelled after the Soviet 
practices. By 1956, the government had either taken over or 
nationalized all key foreign trade corporations left over by 
the previous regime. The state trading system had remained 
basically unchanged until the late 1970s.
The fundamental policy for China's foreign trade was to 
strengthening national "independence and self-reliance" (Liu 
Chaochin, 1978: 3-6). In pursuing the policy, the government 
believed that foreign trade and other international 
transactions should follow the principle of "equality, mutual 
benefits and supplying each other's needs" (ibid: 6-12).10
Accordingly, the objective of foreign trade was to import 
only goods necessary to compensate for unexpected domestic 
production shortfalls and goods that could not be produced 
domestically in sufficient quantities, if at all. On the other 
hand, exports were promoted mainly to generate foreign 
exchange to pay for imports (World Bank, 1983, vol. I: 139). 
Clearly, this objective was designed to reduce the dependence 
of the Chinese economy on imports, with a view to developing 
domestic industries whose output would eventually substitute 
for imports. Such trade regime definitely represents the 
strategy of import substitution.11
10. This attitude stemmed from the perception that trade 
had been used by the imperial powers before 1949 to gain 
political dominance in China, and reinforced by the bitter 
experiences of the Western embargo against China, the new 
communist regime's international isolation, and the sudden 
withdraw of Soviet aid in the 1950-60s.
11. N. R. Lardy argues for this view and sees the Chinese 
prereform trade regime as "an extreme example of import 
substitution". See Lardy (1992a), Chapter 2.
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2-2-1. The Role of Foreign Trade
As a result of the above policy, principle and objective, 
plus the large size of the country, the diversified resource 
endowments, and the inward-looking tradition of the people, 
the role played by China's foreign trade in the national 
economy was therefore very limited. Table 2-2.1 shows that 
China's trade to GNP ratio in 1978 remained one of the lowest 
in the world, even with the rapid growth of trade in the 
1970s. The shares of exports and imports in China's GNP were 
only 4.5 percent and 4.7 percent, in sharp contrast with 11.1 
percent and 12.4 percent, respectively, for all low-income 
developing countries. Even comparing with other big developing 
countries such as india, Indonesia and Brazil, China's shares 
are still markedly lower than theirs.
Table 2-2.1 Shares of exports and imports in GNP for 
several selected countries (average for 1977-78)
(%)
Country Exports/GNP Imports/GNP
China 4.5 4.7
India 6.1 6.9
Indonesia 26.2 15.1
Bangladesh 7.1 17.0
Turkey 4.0 10.3
Brazil 7.3 8.2
Mexico 6.0 8.0
Japan 11.2 10.0
U.S.A. 6.5 8.5
U.S.S.R. 5.6 5.2
Low-income Developing
Countries (1978)
Middle-income Developing
11.1 12.4
Countries (1978) 16.5 21.2
All Developed Countries(1978) 15.5 16.0
Source: The World Bank (1983), vol. I, p. 140.
However, in the long run foreign trade had played a 
significant role in China's economic growth (Eckstein, 1966;
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Hsiao, 1977). Through trade China obtained much needed raw 
materials and technologically advanced machinery and equipment 
to expand its production capacity.12 In the short run, trade 
served as a channel to transfer resources from agriculture to 
industry and from consumption to investment. In other words, 
through trade agricultural goods, minerals, and industrial 
products were exported in exchange for the imports of those 
industrial machinery, equipment, raw materials which were 
unavailable at home.
2-2-2. The Planning of Foreign Trade
The state monopoly of foreign trade in the prereform 
China was achieved through a highly centralized organisational 
framework. The Ministry of Foreign Trade (MOFT) was the 
executive body responsible for planning, supervising and 
conducting foreign trade. In conjunction with the SPC, it drew 
up the annual and long-term foreign trade plans and drafted 
laws and regulations concerning foreign trade. Only the MOFT 
and its overseas missions were authorized to hold economic and 
trade talks, and to sign agreements and protocols, with 
foreign countries. The state's foreign trade plans were 
implemented by a number of foreign trade corporations (FTCs) 
that specialized in trade in defined product groups.13
There was a Foreign Trade Bureau (FTB) in each province, 
autonomous region, and municipality. They were vertically 
under the MOFT but also received guidance, supervision and 
assistance from the regional government, with the former 
assuming the chief responsibility. In parallel, the FTCs also 
had their branches in most province-level regions and offices
12. China-USSR trade was very unusual in this s e nse--
trade was more than exchange of goods.
13. These FTCs included China National Cereals, Oils and 
Foodstuffs; Native Produce and Animal By-Products; Textiles; 
Light Industrial Products; Arts and Crafts; Chemicals; 
Machinery; Complete Plant; Technical; Medicine; and Metals and 
Minerals Import and Export Corporations; plus China National 
Export Commodities Packaging Corporations.
70
in some major ports. Similarly, these branches and offices 
were under "dual leadership" of their respective FTCs in 
Beijing and the FTBs in the regions and ports concerned.
The planning of foreign trade was an integral and 
essential part of China's central planning system. Foreign 
trade plans included the plans for the flow of goods, 
transportation, accounting, foreign exchange, capital 
construction, labour and wages, etc. Of them, the plan for the 
flow of goods was the most important one. It covered 
procurement, export and import, the appropriation of export 
goods, and the acquisition and use of foreign exchange, etc 
(Liu Chaochin, 1978: 13).
The plans were worked out through the method of Material 
Balance. In June-July of the preceding year, all central 
ministries, FTCs and FTBs in the provinces, autonomous regions 
and municipalities were requested, in the light of the 
directives of the SPC and the MOFT, to estimate goods 
available for export and their import requirements for the 
coming year. Then preliminary discussions were held between 
the regional FTBs and the SPCs to coordinate and balance all 
supplies and demands within the local economy. The balanced 
regional plans, together with those of central ministries, 
were submitted to the head office of the FTCs in Beijing. The 
MOFT and the central SPC did the final and overall balancing 
through convening a national foreign trade planning conference 
in September-October. The purpose of the conference was to try 
to meet import requirements of one locality by the proposed 
exports from another in order to determine the national net 
import requirements and exports. The revised foreign trade 
plan was then submitted to the State Council by the end of the 
year for ratification.
Thus, China's foreign trade planning was firmly embodied 
in its central planning system. Because of this, the level of 
foreign trade tended to fluctuate closely with the level of 
domestic economic development. As shown in Table 2-3.1, when 
national output grew rapidly, as during the periods of 1957- 
59, 1962-66 and 197 6-78, the scale of investment increased,
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raising the demand for imports. Conversely, when the economy 
declined, as during the periods of 1960-62 and 1966-68, the 
scale of investment decreased, lowering the demand for 
imports. As the import demand increased or decreased, exports 
also increased or decreased in response to the increase or 
decrease in the demand for foreign exchange.14
2-2-3. The Pricing in Foreign Trade
It is clear from the above description that prices had 
little chance to serve the functions of allocation and 
stimulation, if at all, under the foreign trade planning 
system. In fact, the State Price Bureau under the State 
Council fixed prices for both domestic and foreign goods. All 
trading agencies had to follow the prices set by the state. 
The fundamental objective of the price fixing was to insulate 
China from the influence of price fluctuations in the world 
market. In doing so, the Chinese authorities hoped to maintain 
domestic prices stable and to protect domestic industries 
(World Bank, 1983, vol. II: 445).
Of course, the selling prices of exports and purchasing 
prices of imports were determined by the world market 
conditions. The price fixing was applied mainly to the 
determination of domestic procurement prices of export goods 
and the domestic selling price of imported goods.
In general, trading agencies purchased export goods pre­
specified by the state plan from domestic producers at either 
ex-factory prices in the case of manufactured goods or 
procurement prices in the case of agricultural goods. That is 
to say, producers were paid the same price for a goods they 
produced regardless of its destination, be the domestic market 
or the overseas market. Furthermore, they received none of 
foreign exchange income from the sale of their goods abroad, 
nor did they have any right to use that foreign exchange to 
import goods for their own use. As a result, they had little
14. Hsu (1989) has elaborated discussions on this causal 
link. See chiefly Chapter 1.
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incentive to export or to increase exports.
On the other hand, the domestic prices of imported goods 
were generally made comparable to similar, domestically 
produced goods. This means that imported goods were sold at 
either ex-factory prices, in the case of manufactured goods, 
or national supply prices, in the case of agricultural goods, 
of similar domestic goods. If uniform ex-factory prices or 
national supply prices did not exist, the announced wholesale 
prices of similar domestic goods in the country's major 
trading ports were applied.
However, about 20 percent of the prices of imported goods 
could not be determined in this way because the imported goods 
were either not produced domestically or were produced 
infrequently. In these cases, prices were fixed by converting 
the import price (C.I.F.) valued in foreign exchange to 
Renminbi at the prevailing official exchange rate. As the 
official exchange rate was significantly overvalued, the 
conversion caused the domestic prices of imported goods to be 
substantially lower than they would have been at an 
equilibrium exchange rate. This means that the end users of 
the imported goods actually received implicit subsidies from 
the state.
This pricing policy, coupled with the official exchange 
rate, had created a distorted picture of profits and losses in 
foreign trade. As we know, in order to maintain a low and 
stable living costs on the one hand and raise sufficient 
revenue to finance industrialization programmes on the other, 
the Chinese authorities pursued a differential pricing policy
  keeping the prices of primary goods, especially daily
necessities low vis-a-vis those of manufactured goods.15 This 
resulted in the situation, as illustrated in Figure 2-2.1, in 
which the prices of primary goods in China were generally 
lower while the prices of manufactured goods higher than those
15. This policy is known in China as the policy of 
"scissors differentials" (Jiandao Cha).
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in the world market.16
Figure 2-2.1 The price differential between the domestic 
and world markets in the prereform China
Price
Chinese domestic 
market
World market
> Goods
Primary Manufactured
Under this circumstance, the trading companies in China 
generally made accounting profits on exports of primary goods 
and on imports (after tariffs) of manufactured goods, but 
losses on exports of manufactured goods and on imports (even 
before tariffs) of primary goods. The profits and losses were 
then evened out within the entire state trade system, which 
tried to use profitable trade to finance the loss-making or 
unprofitable trade in order to earn badly needed foreign 
exchange.17
In short, the planning and pricing systems of foreign 
trade, together with the overvalued exchange rate, had enabled 
China to avoid balance of payments deficit, to isolate the 
domestic market from the instability of the world market, and 
to control the level and composition of exports and imports. 
As a result, from the mid-1950s to the late 1970s China had 
been able to have an almost inflation-free economy and its
16. For example, in 1980 a ton of imported wheat costs 
about ¥390 at the official exchange rate, compared with only 
¥3 00 of its domestic selling price. On the other hand, the 
cost of an imported 12" black and white TV set was merely 
¥300, in contrast with ¥500 of its domestic price. See the 
World Bank (1983), Vol. II, pp. 447-8.
17. For a more elaborated analysis of the differential 
pricing policy and its consequences in the Xiamen SEZ, see 
Chapter 7.
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inefficient industries had been well protected.
2-3. The Causes of the Present Reform and Openness
The prereform Chinese economy had on the whole made 
fairly impressive achievements, especially in terms of gross 
growth figures. As can be seen from Table 2-3.1, except the 
sharp fall in the second FYP period due to the Great-Leap- 
Forward campaign, natural disasters and the sudden withdrawal 
of Soviet economic assistance, China's national income, gross 
value of industrial output (GVIO), exports and imports had 
managed to grow at remarkably high speeds in most of the other
Table 2-3.1 China's national income, gross value of 
industrial output, exports and imports (1952-1978)
National income GVIO Exports Imports
(¥100 m. in 1952 prices) U.S. $100 million
1952 589 349 8.23 11.18
1953 671 455 10.22 13 .46
1954 710 529 11.46 12 .87
1955 756 559 14.12 17.33
1956 862 715 16.45 15.63
1957 901 798 15.97 15.06
1958 1,100 1 235 19.81 18.90
1959 1,190 1 681 22.61 21.20
1960 1,173 1 870 18.56 19.53
1961 825 1 154 14.91 14.45
1962 771 963 14.90 11.73
1963 853 1 045 16.49 12.66
1964 994 1 250 19.16 15.47
1965 1,163 1 580 22 .28 20.17
1966 1,361 1 910 23.66 22 .48
1967 1,262 1 647 21.35 20.20
1968 1,180 1 565 21.03 19.45
1969 1,408 2 101 22.04 18.25
1970 1,735 2 785 22.60 23 .26
1971 1, 857 3 194 26.36 22.05
1972 1,910 3 414 34.43 28.58
1973 2, 069 3 739 58.19 51.57
1974 2, 092 3 761 69.49 76.19
1975 2,266 4 344 72.64 74.87
1976 2,206 4 449 68.55 65.78
1977 2,378 5 099 75.90 72.14
1978 2, 671 5 790 97.45 108.93
cont'd/..
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Annual average rates of growth (%)18
1st FYP period
(1953-1957) 7.65 15.08 11.81 2.85
2nd FYP period
(1958-1962) -8.50 -6.03 -6.87 -11.24
Readj us tment
(1963-1965) 16.77 22.96 16.24 26.22
3rd FYP period
(1966-1970) 6.26 9.89 -1.14 0.86
4th FYP period
(1971-1975) 5.10 7.99 28.84 35.75
1976 -- 1978 10.04 14.08 19.23 26.68
1952 -- 1978 5.99 11.41 9.97 9.15
Sources: 1). National income and GVIO: SSB (1991), pp. 32-3; 54-5;
2). Exports and imports: The ACFERT Editorial Board (1991), p. 317.
periods, with the average annual growth rates for the 
prereform period (1952-78) standing respectably at 5.99 
percent, 11.41 percent, 9.97 percent, and 9.15 percent, 
respectively.
What accounted for the industrial growth? Table 2-3.2 
breaks GVIO into two factors: inputs (workers and capital) and 
input productivity (output per worker and per 100 Yuan of 
capital) and shows the underlying reason for the growth from 
1952 to 1978. It reveals that the industrial development had
18. The annual average rates of growth in percentage terms 
given in this thesis are uniformly calculated by the use of 
the compound interest formula:
r = ( I----- - 1 ) 100
f Po
where r = the required annual average rate of growth over 
n time periods;
P0 = the first value of the original data;
Pn = the nth value of the original data.
This formula, though different from that used by the 
Chinese authorities, is used by the official publications of 
many international organisations, such as the UN and IMF. For 
more explanation of this formula, see, e.g. Bowers (1982), 
pp. 66-7.
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been sustained largely through the injection of inputs, 
reflecting the Maoist strategy of "extensive" (as opposed to 
"intensive") growth. Although labour productivity increased by 
4.01 percent per annum, it was heavily outstripped by the 
growth of workforces (7.11 percent per annum). What is more, 
the injection of capital increased even faster than the growth 
of industrial output (12.58 percent vs. 11.41 percent per 
annum), and this of course resulted in the decline in output- 
capital ratio (negative 1.13 percent per annum).19
Table 2-3.2 Growth rates of output per worker and per 
100 yuan of capital in Chinese industrial enterprises
(1952 - 1978)
(1952 = 100)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
No. of Fixed & Output per Output per ¥100
GVIO workers working worker of capital
(year end) capital [ (1)/(2) ] [ (1)/ (3) ]
1952 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
1957 228.65 146.67 227.93 155.90 101.62
1965 452.72 242.75 708.45 186.51 64.07
1978 1659.03 596.27 2175.34 278.24 74.41
Average annual growth rates (%)
52-57 17.99 7.96 17.91 9.29 0.32
57-65 8.91 6.50 15.23 2.27 -5.60
65-78 10.51 7.16 9.01 3 .12 1.16
52-78 11.41 7.11 12.58 4.01 -1.13
Sources: 1). GVIO: Table 2-3.1;
2). Workers & capital: SSB (1985a), pp. 71 & 84.
Table 2-3.3 presents a rough estimate of the change in 
output per unit of combined inputs, i.e. total factor
19. The decline in the output-capital ratio was in fact 
larger than shown here if capital had been valued in fixed 
prices (like GVIO), the index would have grown still faster 
and output per 100 Yuan of capital fallen father.
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productivity (TFP).20 It demonstrates that, however the 
separate factors are weighted in aggregating them, the 
aggregate factor grows much faster than the TFP. When labour 
is given a greater weight of 0.6, the growth of TFP is higher, 
1.16 percent per annum for the period of 1952-78 and 0.27 
percent per annum for 1957-78. But when labour is given a 
smaller weight of 0.4, the former rate drops to 0.28 percent 
while the later is even negative 0.40 percent.
Table 2-3.3 Growth rates of industrial output, total 
factor input and total factor productivity 
(1952 - 1978)
(1952 = 100)
Total factor input 
index assuming 
labour share of:
GVIO
index
Index of output per unit 
of combined inputs at 
assumed labour share of:
0.6 0.4 0.6 0.4
1952 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
1957 179.17 195.43 228.65 127.62 117.00
1965 429.03 522.17 452.72 105.52 86.70
1978 1227.90 1543.71 1659.03 135.11 107.47
Average annual growth rates (%)
1952-78 1.16 0.28
1957-78 0.27 -0.40
Source: Table 2-3,.2.
Although the above estimates are derived from crude data, 
it seems safe to conclude that most of the industrial growth 
had come from the increases in production factors, 
particularly fixed capital, supported by high levels of 
savings, and that very little of it was due to more efficient
20. For the explanation of this methodology, refer to 
Dwight H Perkins (1988), pp. 628-9. Many other similar 
studies, such as Rawski (1986), Dernberger (1988), and Chen 
Kuan, et al. (1988), apply more or less the same method. Woo,
et al. (1993), however, argues that this method tends to
"overstate" the growth of TFP due to the "incorrect treatment 
of intermediate inputs."
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use of inputs. This indicates that productivity gains from new 
technology, improved education, and the accumulation of 
industrial experiences had been totally offset by the cost 
increases arising from other causes.
On the other hand, despite the fact that China's exports 
and imports had enjoyed more than 9 percent of average annual 
growth rate between 1952 and 1978, their shares in GNP were, 
as shown in Table 2-2.1, still among the lowest in the world 
in 1977-78. Furthermore, China's share and ranking in world 
total exports had fallen substantially. Table 2-3.4 reveals 
that, after surging to 1.95 percent and the twelfth place in 
1959, China's share and ranking slipped back steadily, 
dropping to only 0.75 percent and the thirty-second place in 
1978.
Table 2-3.4 China's share and ranking 
in world's total exports (1952-78)
World's total 
exports
(U.S. $100 :
China's 
exports
million)
China's share 
(%)
Ranking
1952 809 8.23 1.02 20
1957 1,123 15.97 1.42 15
1959 1,159 22.61 1.95 12
1965 1, 872 22.28 1.19 18
1970 3,153 22.60 0.72 29
1976 9,933 68.55 0.69 34
1977 11,269 75.90 0.67 30
1978 12,988 97.45 0.75 32
Sources: 1). 1952: The ACFERT Editorial Board (1987), p. 396;
2). 1957-78: The ACFERT Editorial Board (1991), p. 322.
The flagging performance in the economy had also affected 
the improvement of people's lives. Indeed, from 1952 to 1978 
the living standards in China had almost stagnated and in some 
areas fallen. Whereas the national income grew by nearly 6 
percent per annum during that period, the national income per 
capita only managed to rise by 3.87 percent per annum (from 
¥104 in 1952 to ¥279 in 1978) (SSB, 1985b: 7). Not
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surprisingly, the index (1952=100) of real wage for the state- 
owned sector dropped markedly from 13 0.3 in 1957 to 115.2 in 
1978. While the per capita consumption of meat increased 
modestly from 7.27 kg per year in 1952 to 8.86 kg in 1978 and 
eggs from 1.02 kg to 1.97 kg, basic food grain fell from 198 
kg to 195 kg, and cooking oils from 2.1 kg to 1.6 kg. At the 
same time, the ratio of city dwellers's consumption level to 
peasants' increased from 2.39:1 in 1952 to 2.90:1 in 1978, 
suggesting the widening of the gap of living standard between 
cities and rural areas (Social Statistics Sector, 1990: 75; 82 
& 84) .
To sum up, in the first three decades (1949-78) of the 
PRC as a centrally planned economy, only in the first FYP 
period (1953-57) did the Chinese succeed in fulfilling the 
Plan. In the other periods, the planning processes were 
consistently interrupted by recurrent political upheavals and 
consequent economic fluctuations. Although most quantitative 
indicators were generally on the up-trend, some important 
qualitative targets, such as productivity and living 
standards, stagnated or even deteriorated.
At the macro level, the fragmentation of the economy and 
the lack of horizontal links among various regions and 
economic entities resulted in massive inefficiencies and 
wastes in resource allocation. The dominance of small-sized 
enterprises in the industry entailed the failure to exploit 
the economies of large-scale production.
The foreign trade planning and pricing systems, by 
insulating the domestic market from the world market, had 
seriously dampened the initiative and creativeness of regions 
and enterprises to increase their exports and improve product 
quality. They had also reduced the effectiveness of technology 
transfer and the competitive pressure from abroad, thus 
depriving China of benefitting from the dynamism of the world 
economy.
At the micro level, the paternalistic role played by the 
state toward the enterprise had discouraged the latter to
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innovate to raise productivity. It also led to the problem 
known as "soft budget constraints" (Kornai, 1980) . Other 
phenomena, such as the "expansion drive," "investment hunger," 
and "bonus abuse," were all associated with the fundamental 
defect.
In the final analysis, there existed both allocative 
inefficiency and X inefficiency on a grand scale in the 
prereform Chinese economy (Perkins, 1988: 602). No wonder the 
Chinese authorities described the state of the Chinese economy 
in 1976-77 as "at the brink of collapse." It was therefore 
imperative for the post-Mao leadership to make a fundamental 
change to China's Soviet-type, centrally planned economic 
system.
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CHAPTER 3
THE CHINESE INDUSTRIAL AND FOREIGN TRADE REFORMS
The Third Plenum of the Eleventh Congress of the Central 
Committee of the CCP, held in December 1978, is widely- 
regarded as a "turning point" in China's contemporary economic 
development. At the Plenum, the post-Mao leadership announced 
that the focus of the Party's work would shift from the 
ideological emphasis on "class struggle," that had plunged 
China into turmoil in the previous decade, to the goal of 
"socialist modernization." At the same time, it was decided 
that a programme of "readjustment and reform" should be 
carried out in order to "resolve the serious imbalances in the 
national economy" (Ma Hong, 1990: 27). Since then China has 
embarked on the course of what is now known as the "second 
revolution" --- reform and "open-door" (Gaige he Kaifang).
In general, the reform is intended, at the macro level, 
to replace direct control with indirect control through 
introducing market mechanisms and, at the micro level, to 
increase enterprise autonomy. The "open-door" policy is 
designed to open China to the outside world. It includes three 
major components: expansion of foreign trade; utilization of 
foreign capital; and development of the SEZs and other open 
areas. Both the reform and "open-door" policy have been 
implemented in an incremental manner but already have had 
profound effects on both the structure and performance of the 
Chinese economy.
I The purpose of this chapter is to examine the reform that
! took place in the industrial and foreign trade sectors. The
other two important components of the "open-door" policy --
the utilization of foreign capital and the development of the
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SEZs will be discussed in the next chapter. Clearly, it is
very difficult, if not impossible, to cover every area of the 
reform and openness in a limited space. So all subjects chosen 
to be examined in this and the next chapters are pertinent to, 
and thereby intended to provide a necessary contextual 
background for, the further discussions of the reform and 
development in the Xiamen SEZ in subsequent chapters.
3-1. The Industrial Reform1
According to Liu Guoguang, a leading Chinese economist, 
the industrial reform, or urban reform (as opposed to the 
rural reform), can be divided into two phases. In the first 
phase, from 1979 to 1984, the reform, focused mainly on 
increasing local and enterprise autonomy, was implemented in 
some pilot cities and enterprises. The adoption of the 
historic decision concerning the reform of China's Soviet- 
style economic structure (hereafter the Reform Decision) by 
the CCP in October 1984 marked the beginning of the second 
phase (see Appendix A),2 in which the reform has been centred 
by the invigoration of enterprises and carried out in full 
scale and all over the country (Liu, 1987c) .
The Essence of the Reform
As described in the preceding chapter, the fundamental 
weakness of China's Soviet-type industrial system has been low 
efficiency of resource use, difficulty in administrative 
coordination and a bias against innovation. As a result, the
1. For a detailed and all-round discussion of the Chinese 
industrial reform, see, for example, the World Bank (1983), 
(1985) and (1990) ; JEC (1986) and (1992) ; Tidrick and Chen 
(1987); Riskin (1987); Liu Guoguang (1987b); Ma Hong (1990); 
Nolan and Dong (1990); and Singh (1992).
2. Thomas G. Rawski argues that it is an unique document 
in the history of the economic reforms in socialist countries 
as nothing similar had happened in the former Soviet Union and 
eastern European countries. See Rawski (1986).
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TFP stagnated and, in some years, even declined. Thus, how to 
eliminate those crucial problems, raise the TFP, and, 
ultimately, people's living standards should be the main 
objective of the Chinese industrial reform.
In terms of the reform strategy, however, the Chinese 
authorities saw the "invigoration of enterprises, particularly 
the large- and medium-sized enterprises owned by the whole 
people" as the top priority of the reform. At the same time, 
they also identified price reform as "the key to the success 
of the overall economic reform" (Central Committee, 1984) . By 
and large, the industrial reform includes two essential 
aspects: policy changes and organisational changes. The
important reform policies and changes can be featured in the 
following sections.
3-1-1. The Planning Reform
Central planning is at the core of the socialist economic 
management system, controlling and influencing other aspects 
of the system. The planning system reform thus plays a vital 
role in the overall economic reform.3 The central planning 
system can be divided into macro- and micro-planning systems. 
The former includes national plans, ministerial plans and 
regional plans, while the latter is primarily associated with 
an enterprise's allocation of its human, physical and 
financial resources.
Having discarded the traditional idea that a socialist 
economy would ipso facto entail a planned economy, and that 
the confrontation between socialism and capitalism is equated 
with planning economy versus market economy, the new pragmatic 
leadership was anxious to introduce some market mechanisms to 
mitigate its seriously distorted economy.4 Two important
3. For a general discussion of the reform in the Chinese 
planning system, see Tidrick (1987), Chen Jiyuan (1987) and 
Naughton (1986).
4. For more about the fundamental change in the Chinese 
economic theory, see Liu Guoguang (1987d).
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developments have taken place:
First, from 1984 to 1989, the number of products 
controlled by the mandatory plan had been cut down from 126 to 
60 and their share in the total industrial output value had 
dwindled from 40 to 20 percent (Liu Guoguang, 1989) . The 
proportion of mandatory planning in the economy in some 
relatively more developed provinces, such Guangdong, Jiangsu 
and Zhejiang, had reduced to 5-10 percent (Ma Hong, 1991) .
At the same time, the Chinese has increased the range of 
guidance planning, whereby various economic levers, such as 
price, tax, interest rate, exchange rate, wage and government 
subsidy, are applied. Many more economic activities, 
particularly those in light industry, commercial and service 
sectors, have simply been left to market regulation.5 In 1988, 
for instance, the shares of the industrial output value 
subject to the guidance plan and to market regulation reached 
42.9 percent and 40.9 percent, respectively (ibid).
Second, as a result of increasing use of the guidance 
plan and market regulation, the planning contract 
responsibility system has gradually replaced the mandatory 
plan. For example, some planning departments have begun to 
choose competent enterprises to implement plans through public 
bidding, and this is particularly true in the case of capital 
construction. By the late 1988, 44 percent of the national
large- and medium-scale construction projects, numbering
11,000, had been contracted out. At the same time, several 
central ministries, such as those of Petroleum, Coal, 
Metallurgy, and Railway, have also started to implement a 
variety of planning contracts.
On the other hand, to support the increasingly important 
role of central city, the economic development plans for ten 
cities, including Wuhan, Shenyang, Dalian, Guangzhou, Xi'an 
and Xiamen, had been contracted out during the period of 1983- 
88. In addition, these pilot cities had also been granted
5. For the definition and range of mandatory planning, 
guidance planning and market regulation, see Naughton (1986), 
pp. 619-20.
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provincial-level planning powers (Gao Shangquan, 1989: 11-40), 
with a view to speeding up the dismantlement of the
compartmentalization by ministries and localities and
integrate all economic activities along economic lines.
Planning in the form of contract, seen by the Chinese 
reformers, provides restraints against the direct interference 
from governmental departments, since contracts are based on 
the recognition of each's economic interests. and
responsibility and therefore can only be implemented through 
legal procedures. It is also conducive to bring up contracted 
units' self-motivating and self-restricting mechanisms so as 
to make the units behave rationally. Thus, the system creates 
a possibility for the state to incorporate those important 
economic activities into its plan through contracts, and 
develops a better combination of market regulation with an 
appropriately modified planning system.
3-1-2. The Price Reform
As introduced above, the implementation of the mandatory 
plan is chiefly relied on two other compulsory plans: material 
supply plan and financial plan, whereas the guidance plan is 
basically realized through economic levers, prices in 
particular. As price reform will inevitably cause 
redistribution of economic interests among various social 
groups and between producers and consumers, and hence affect 
every aspect of the national economy, it is the most difficult 
and risky reform in a command economy.6
Nevertheless, the Chinese price reform has resulted in 
some tangible changes. In addition to the adjustment in the 
prices of some major agricultural goods, raw materials and 
energy in line with their relative scarcity, a few steps have 
also been taken to restructure the over-centralized price
6. For a general discussion of China's price reform, 
refer to Xue Muqiao (1985) ; the World Bank (1985) ; Barry 
Naughton (1986); Wang Jiye and Zhu Yuanzhen (1987); and Zhu 
Ming (1989).
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control system in parallel with the changes in the planning 
system. First, the single state-fixed-price system has been 
replaced by a multiple-price one, with the fixed price, 
floating price and free price coexisting.
Second, the scope of the fixed price has been 
substantially reduced, while the range of the floating price 
and the free price enlarged.7 Consequently, some producer 
goods, whose prices were traditionally controlled by the 
state, are now allowed to be sold by enterprises, if they 
fulfil the state plan, at the price not exceeding the ceiling 
one set by the state.
And third, price control over small commodities had been 
lifted by October 1986 (Wang and Zhu, 1987: 837). As a result, 
the ratio of the products and services subject to the fixed 
price to those subject to the floating and free prices dropped 
to 50:50 in 1985, and further changed to 25:75 in 1990 (Ma 
Hong, 1991).
This decontrol of prices, by giving market demand and 
supply a greater role in price determination, has contributed 
to correct accumulated distortions. The multiple-price system 
for producer goods, has enhanced the flexibility of supply 
through providing incentive to expand production of goods in 
short supply and leading scarce resources to users with great 
need, as reflected by ability to pay.8 For example, 
Shijiazhuang, the capital city of Hebei province, failed to 
import any extra-plan materials from the other parts of China
7. Barry Naughton argues that the most important 
component of China's price reform is the toleration of a 
market fringe in which prices are governed to a large extent 
by market forces. If planners are successful in implementing 
their intention that aims at expanding the marketized sector 
of the economy, this change will automatically imply 
significant price reform. See Naughton (1986).
8. There are several prices for key producer goods (in 
ascending order): the centrally controlled allocation price; 
the floating price for self-marketed output; the locally 
controlled allocation price; and the negotiated price in the 
markets of varying legality. Tidrick, on the other hand, 
argues that the multiple-price system is run at a high cost, 
though it did improve supplies. See Tidrick (1987).
87
in early 1984 because of implementing the old single state- 
fixed-price system. Since the multiple-price policy was 
introduced in August of the same year, the situation changed 
completely. By the end of the year, 50,000 tones of steel, 
41,000 cubic metres of timber, 774 vehicles and 70,000 tones 
of cement had been imported (Wang and Zhu, 1987: 954) .
Obviously, the easier access to extra-plan materials has 
enabled enterprises that could not obtain, or could not obtain 
enough materials from the planned channel for varied reasons 
to get critical inputs. Thus, the multiple-price system has to 
some extent weaken the central control over resource 
allocation and, as a result, enhanced enterprise ability to 
organize economic activities by responding to needs in the 
market.
3-1-3. The Material Supply System Reform
In correspondence with the planning and price reforms, 
some important changes have also taken place in the material 
supply system.9 First, the number of goods subject to the 
planned allocation was reduced from 256 in 1979 to 27 in 1989 
(Liu Guoguang, 1989) . Even those 26 goods are not all 
allocated through the plan. For instance, only 50 percent of 
the total output of steel, 40 percent of coal, 25 percent of 
timber, and 15 percent of cement are subject to the planned
allocation. At the same time, the number of enterprises
acquiring inputs through the state supply has been decreased 
as well. In Shenyang alone, for instance, the number dropped
from 30,000 in 1984 to 12,000 in 1987 (Wang and Zhu, 1987:
854) .
Second, the single channel of centrally planned 
allocation has been diversified. As many enterprises are 
allowed to sell some above-quota products, an elementary and 
scattered market network of input factors has emerged. There
9. For a general discussion of the reform of China's 
material supply system, refer to Byrd and Tidrick (1987) ; Gene 
Tidrick (1987), Tang Zhongkun (1987); and Liu Suinian (1991).
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have been some 500 material trade centres now in big cities, 
such as Shanghai, Wuhan and Haerbin etc., apart from 900 
county-level ones. The centres in Shanghai, for instance, have 
imported various goods valued at ¥1.1 billion for more than 
3 0,000 enterprises since they were set up in 1979. In 1990, 
the aggregate turnover for all sorts of material trade centres 
in the country reached ¥41.9 billion, up by nearly 19 percent 
over 1989 (Liu Suinian, 1991: 11-47).
Third, instead of through central supply system, many 
centrally controlled enterprises and key construction projects 
acquire their inputs increasingly from local cities, where the 
enterprises or projects are located. This new material flow 
route, while largely shortening transport distance, reducing 
inventory and thus speeding up good turnover, has given a 
greater role to cities in organizing local economic 
activities. Shanghai, Chongqin, Changzhou and Shashi took a 
lead in setting up such new input supply model. As a result, 
trading and cooperations among cities and regions have rapidly 
expanded. In Jiangsu province alone, for example, three 
material cooperation zones, Suzhou-Wuxi-Changzhou, 
Ningpo-Zhenjian-Yangzhou, and Nantong-Huaibei-Yancheng, have 
emerged. According to Mr. Liu Suinian, the minister for the 
Ministry of Material Supply, the total value of the materials 
organized through such regional cooperation in the country in 
1990 amounted to ¥90 billion, up by 16.3 percent over 1989 
(ibid).
Thus, it becomes clear that China's material supply 
system is shifting from a mode of single channel with many 
links to one of multiple channels with few links, This change 
has increased the flexibility of material supply and reduced 
enterprise's dependence on the centrally planned allocation, 
thus providing a possibility for enterprises to freely enter 
into or withdraw from an economic activity.
3-1-4. The Relationship between the Centre and the Locality
According to the Reform Decision, the industrial reform
89
is in fact to restructure three important relationships: the 
one between the Centre and the locality; the one between the 
state and the enterprise; and the one between the enterprise 
and its workers and staff. Because of the country's large 
size, a problem in China's economic system that has been more 
difficult to resolve than in any other centrally planned 
economy is the relationship between the Centre and the 
locality.
The relationship actually contains two issues: the
financial relationship between the central government and the 
local government and the planning relationship between the
central ministry and the local region, or between Tiaotiao
(sectoral "lines") and Kuaikuai (regional "blocks"). The 
latter has proved to be more difficult to tackle than the
former (Liu Guoguang, 1984).
First, the post-Mao leadership has taken a series of 
steps to reform the financial relationship, especially the way 
of apportioning revenues and expenditures, between the central 
government and the local government so that responsibility in 
particular sphere can be firmly attached to one level or 
another.10 Under the principle that the central government 
should control most of financial (including foreign exchange) 
resources while the local government may own the rest. Three 
major changes have taken place: 1). each province-level
locality (including those independent planning cities), 
instead of the central government alone, has to be responsible 
for the balance of its own budget once the particular arrange 
is made with the central government.
2). the ratios of apportionment of revenues and 
expenditures will not change within five years, instead of one 
year, once they are fixed.
3) . six differentiated budgetary policies, instead of one 
uniform policy, are applied to different localities according 
to their financial situation. For example, affluent Guangdong
10. For more about China's current financial reform, see 
Audrey Donnithorne (1981); Wang and Zhu (1987), pp. 844-7; and
the Reform Department of the Ministry of Finance (1989) .
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province has to deliver a fixed amount of its profit and tax 
revenues (¥1.5 billion) annually to the central government,
! while relatively poor Fujian province receives a fixed amount
! of subsidy (¥100 million) per year (Reform Department, 1989)11
i
! The reform has increased financial resources at the
| disposal of local governments, and hence their decision-making
i
I power and accountability to their budgets. However, due to the
[
lack of adequate coordination among various areas of the 
economy, the reform has to some extent encouraged the regional 
self-sufficiency tendency, and caused overlapped productions 
and constructions throughout the country.
Second, ever since the present reform started the Chinese 
leadership has, based on the lesson learned from previous 
reforms, made a great deal of efforts to search for an 
equilibrium to balance power between the sectoral "line" and 
the regional "block," or a substitution for the central 
government and the local government in organising economic 
activities on behalf of the state. This new substitution 
should be conducive to break down the long-standing 
compartmentalization by sectors and regions, and hence to free
China from the vicious circle of centralization --
decentralization --  chaos --  re-centralization,
characterized by previous reforms. It seems clear that many 
big and medium industrial and commercial cities have 
increasingly assumed this role.12
The essence of the new role is to coordinate various 
functions previously performed by ministries and local 
governments, organise economic activities in line with local 
comparative advantages, and hence to rationalize local
11. The delivering amount for Guangdong was reduced to ¥1 
billion and the subsidy amount for Fujian increased to ¥150 
million later, because of the extra financial burden brought 
to the two provinces by the increases in the procurement 
prices of agricultural goods and in wages of urban workers and 
staff.
12. For more about the new functions performed by Chinese 
cities in the current reform, see Li Zhongfan et al. (1984); 
Dong Jialan (1984); and Liao Jili (1987).
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industrial structure. The city reform has therefore been 
concentrated on restructuring city's economic planning and 
management system through separating government function and 
enterprise business. This is designed to cut off the close tie 
between ministries and local governments on the one hand and 
their subordinate enterprises on the other, and eventually to 
replace ministries and local governments with central cities 
to exercise macroeconomic management. As a result, three major 
changes have taken place (Zhou Taihe et al., 1984; Wang and 
Zhu, 1987):
First, most central ministries, except those of Railway, 
Civil Aviation, and Post and Telecommunication, have no longer 
directly involved in enterprise operations. Instead, emphasis 
is put on making sectoral plan and long-term development 
strategy, enhancing R & D, providing technological training 
and advice, and coordinating utilization of equipment and 
input among related enterprises. The Ministry of Textile took 
a lead in this reform.
Second, many local governments have also relinquished or 
relaxed their control over enterprises. More affluent 
provinces, such Jiangsu and Liaoning, have devolved their 
powers to central cities, such as Nanjing, Suzhou, Shenyang 
and Dalian. At the same time, most central cities have been 
allowed to widen their jurisdiction to surrounding counties in 
order to increase their role in organising the local economy. 
For instance, Nanjing now includes seven neighbouring counties 
while Shenyang covers three.
Third, cities themselves, on the other hand, are 
strengthening their new role and intensifying their 
"radioactivity" and "attractiveness." In order to avoid the 
central city becoming a new centralized control body, all 
original economic planning and management departments have 
been regrouped. Consequently, macro-management functions have 
been shifted from comprehensive governmental bureaus to 
specialized sectoral companies. Sixteen cities, including 
Dangdong, Weifan and Xiamen, were reported to have completed 
this reorganisation swiftly and successfully.
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At the same time, a variety of economic zones based on 
regional growth have emerged. All these zones are centred by 
one or more key industrial cities. For example, the Shanghai 
Economic Zone, focused on Shanghai, includes Shanghai 
municipality and Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui and Jiangxi four 
provinces. The Northeast China Economic Zone, supported by 
Shenyang, consists of Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang three 
provinces. In addition to these interprovincial zones, some 
provinces have also set up intra-provincial zones, such as the 
Southern Fujian Economic Zone, backed by Xiamen, Quangzhou and 
Zhanzhou three cities, and the Pearl River Delta, centred by 
Guangzhou. By 1989, the number of all kinds of economic zones 
in China exceeded 100 (RMRBh, 10/5/89: 3).
As a result, central cities, ‘together with their 
associated economic zones, have formed a new economic network 
in China, as against the vertically organised, ministerially 
directed development model of the previous command economy. 
Indeed, central cities are increasingly taking place of 
ministries and local governments and becoming a new 
intermediary level between the central government and 
enterprises. The pattern of macroeconomic planning and 
management has therefore shifted from:
The central s, central ministries____________
government / \ V  enterprises
(State \,„\ local  ^  industrial  v secondary I '
Council) governments bureaus companies
to
The central _____________\ central _____________^enterprises
government 'cities '
Without doubt, the sectoral and regional segregation and 
autarky, which had plagued China's economy for more than three 
decades, has to a large extent been dismantled. It is in this 
sense that the emergence of central cities and economic zones 
can be regarded as a significant breakthrough in the present 
industrial reform (Tong Dalin, 1984).
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3-1-5. The Relationship between the State and the Enterprise
Since China regards the invigoration of enterprises as 
the key link of the industrial reform, restructuring the 
relationship between the state and the enterprise naturally 
occupies the central position in the reform programme. All 
previous economic reforms concentrated on dividing 
administrative powers between the Centre and the locality and 
hence neglected to set up an appropriate relationship between 
the state and the enterprise (Liu Guoguang, 1980). In view of 
the lack of vitality in Chinese enterprises, the Reform 
Decision declares that "socialism with Chinese characteristics 
should, first and foremost, be able to instill vitality into 
enterprises" (Central Committee, 1984).
As the first attempt of the enterprise reform, 8 key 
SOEs, selected from Beijing, Shanghai and Tianjing, began to 
experiment on the scheme of increasing enterprise autonomy in 
May 1979. Then starting in 1981, a variety of economic 
responsibility systems were introduced in many enterprises. 
After June 1983, a new scheme that substitutes tax payment for 
profit remittance started to be implemented. These initial 
reform measures, mostly on a trial bias, were primarily 
designed to provide material incentives for enterprises and 
their workers and staff to pursue greater profits. They 
included: retention of a proportion of profits for workers' 
bonuses and welfare expenditures; special funds for 
small-scale investment; some freedom for enterprises in 
selling part of their outputs and in securing inputs; some 
flexibility in setting prices; and increases in managerial 
authority over production decision and personnel matters.
However, the crucial problem inherent in SOEs, the 
inseparability of government function and enterprise business, 
remained largely unsolved. Most SOEs were still appendages of 
their superior departments, and far from becoming independent 
producers. In fact, this inseparability is precisely the root 
of what Kornai identified as the most distinctive problem in 
SOEs --  "soft budget constraint" (Kornai, 1980) . The
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insatiable "hunger for investment" and the unproportionate 
increase in workers' welfare funds, both of which tend to 
intensify chronic shortage and inflation, are all caused by 
the fundamental problem.
By the late 1986 and early 1987, the Chinese economic 
circle seemed to have reached a consensus that the essence of 
the enterprise reform is to separate government function and 
enterprise business, or in other words, separate ownership and 
management, so as to make enterprises becoming an independent 
producer with both motive and constraining mechanisms.13
The principal way that China has tackled the 
inseparability since 1987 seems to be the so-called Contract 
Responsibility System (CRS), which is, in fact, a system 
similar to that operated in French SOEs. The essence of the 
CRS is to draw up the responsibilities, rights and interests 
for both the owner and the manager through a contract, which 
normally lasts for 5 years. Under the CRS, higher 
administrative authorities define specific tasks or 
responsibilities for enterprises and at the same time grant 
them all necessary managerial powers. Enterprises signing the 
contract must bear the responsibility for meeting production 
quotas, taxation and profit targets. The authorities on the 
other hand are responsible for ensuring that the market 
environment and other production conditions remain basically 
stable during the period of contract (Zhou Xiaochuan, 1988).
As a result, the close ties between the authorities and 
their subordinate enterprises have, to a large extent, been 
restructured, with the enterprises being given greater 
decision-making power. The CRS also safeguards enterprises 
against strong social reactions or political risks that price 
and tax reforms may bring about. Under the CRS, the failure of 
an enterprise to fulfil the targets set by the state will mean 
that the difference must be made up from its own funds. This 
helps strengthen financial disciplines on it and encourage it
13. Many papers discussing the necessity to reconsider the 
reform strategy emerged in the late 1986 and early 1987. See, 
typically, Wu Jinlian (1987).
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to behave rationally.
By the end of 1988, over 90 percent of the in-budget 
enterprises in the country had instituted a variety of CRSs. 
While 95 percent of large and medium SOEs had been involved in 
the system, about 46 percent of small SOEs had either been 
contracted out or leased to other organisations or even 
private (including foreign) individuals (ACE Editorial Board, 
1989: III-4-6). Most of enterprises implementing such scheme 
have achieved better economic performances. By the end of 
1990, 85 percent of enterprises had renewed their contracts 
after previous one matured (ibid, 1991: 11-16).
In addition, many more enterprises in other parts of 
China have established a variety of joint-stock companies. 
According to a survey carried out in 20 provinces in 1988, the 
number of enterprises experimenting the reform stood at 3,800, 
of which 85 percent issued shares only to their own workers 
and staff, 13.5 percent attracted investment mainly from other 
organisations, and only 1.5 percent raised funds from the 
general public. At the same time, several prominent cities, 
such as Shenzhen, Shanghai, Shenyang and Wuhan, have set up or 
reopened their stock exchange (ibid, 1989: III-56).14
3-1-6. Reorganisation of Industrial Enterprises
As central cities have increasingly become the 
alternative to ministries and local governments in organizing 
macroeconomic activities, the integration of various economic 
activities has become an inevitable tendency. At the same 
time, the development of economic zones, backed by central 
cities, have made it necessary to increase specialization and
14. The economic reform has also created a booming and 
dynamic non-state sector, especially township and village 
enterprises (TVEs), in China. Their share in the country's 
GVIO soared from 16 percent in 1984 to 31 percent in 1991. 
Indeed, some observers even argue that the creation and 
subsequent explosive expansion of TVEs has been the biggest 
achievement of China's present enterprise reform (Woo, et al. 
1993: 19). As this thesis deals mainly with the reform of
SOEs, the development of TVEs will not be discussed.
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cooperation among sectors and regions, since the zones were 
set up primarily in the light of local comparative advantages.
W. Brus, an outstanding economist of centrally planned 
economy, noted that horizontal links between enterprises would 
play an important role in integrating plans at different 
levels in a decentralizing economy (Brus, 1973: 9). Liu
Guoguang further argued that the inter-enterprise relationship 
is one of the most important relationships in the Chinese 
industrial reform (Liu, 1984: 48). As a matter of fact,
economic development generally entails increasing 
interdependency and the emergence of a "circular flow" of 
goods and services linking, directly or indirectly, sectors 
and regions within a national economy. Thus, a growing number 
of horizontal economic associations (HEA) (Henxiang Jingji 
Lianhe) have emerged in China as a logical result of the 
sustained industrial reform.
Development of Horizontal Economic Associations
In China's present industrial reform, HEA refers to 
fusion and/or cooperation among enterprises in different 
sectors, regions and ownerships in order to improve economic 
efficiency, by increasing specialization and rationalizing 
organizational structures of industry and enterprise (Wang and 
Zhu, 1987: 979-80). Most associated entities are centred
around one particular product or product group, especially, 
with famous brand(s). There are several motives for 
enterprises to form a HEA: 1). to secure the supply of scarce 
energy and/or raw materials; 2). to overcome severe space 
constraints on existing site(s); 3). to strengthen the 
competitiveness in marketing; 4). to even the imbalances in 
capacity at different stages of production; and 5) . to gain 
access to the latest domestic or foreign technology and 
managerial know-how. So the HEA in China entails much wider 
range of economic activities than the horizontal merger in the
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Western economy does.15
By 1988, the total number of HEAs in China had exceeded
10,000, involving more than 28,000 enterprises, which 
accounted for nearly 3 0 percent of the industrial enterprises 
above the county level, 55 percent of the country's total 
GVIO, and 63 percent of industrial profits and taxes for the 
same year. They achieved a high labour productivity of ¥22,200 
per person per annum, almost 20 percent higher than the 
average level for all SOEs in China (RMRBh, 10/5/89: 3; BR, 
Feb. 23, 88). At the same time, many more agreements
concerning economic and technological cooperations among 
enterprises all over the country have been signed each year, 
generating considerable amounts of GVIO, profits, and taxes. 
Table 3-1.1 below demonstrates these achievements.
Table 3-1,1 Number of cooperation agreements signed among 
Chinese industrial enterprises and economic results generated
(1981 - 1990)
1981-88 1989 1990
No. of agreements signed 
Capital involved (¥ billion) 
GVIO generated (¥ billion) 
Profits and taxes 
generated (¥ billion)
410,000 
76.00
74,000 
18.66 
44.38
7.60
52,560 
21.24 
43.00
8.60
Sources: 1). 1981-88: RMRBh, 10/5/1989, p. 3;
2). 1989: RMRBh, 28/5/1990, p. 1;
3). 1990: the Research Society (1991), p. 105.
The effects of the development of HEAs on the Chinese 
economy may be featured as follows:
First, perhaps the most obvious gain has been sharp 
increases in industrial output and profits due primarily to 
economies of scale and more efficient use of input factors.
15. In Western economies, horizontal merger is generally 
defined as the combining of activities at the same level of a 
vertical sequence of production (while vertical merger 
referring to the combining of successive production stages 
under one ownership) . For details, see Jervis (1971) .
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For instance, it was estimated that about 60 percent of the 
increased GVIO and 70 percent of the increased profits and 
taxes in Jilin in 1986 came from the newly formed industrial 
corporations and associations in the province (GYJJ, 7/87:
79) .
Second, the proliferation of HEAs has accelerated the 
breakdown of the compartmentalization of "regional blocks" and 
"sectoral lines" and facilitated the formation of the new 
network of horizontal-linked and market-oriented economic 
zones and central cities. By 1989, almost every province in 
mainland China, except Tibet, had set up inter- and/or intra­
provincial economic zones, which numbered more than 100 in 
total (Research Society, 1991: 105).
Third, the formation of HEAs is an effective way to 
ensure the enterprise to become an independent producer. By 
forming a HEA with enterprise(s) in other sector(s) or 
region(s), an enterprise can to a large extent extricate 
itself from the control of and hence the interference from its 
former superior administrative bodies. The relationship 
between the state and the enterprise would then become merely 
that of registration and taxation.
Furthermore, HEAs have expedited the restructuring of 
China's sole state-ownership system. The integrations between 
SOEs and COEs, between public-owned and private-owned 
enterprises, and between Chinese and foreign enterprises have 
resulted in a variety of forms of mixed ownerships, creating 
the embryo of a mixed economy in China.
Fourth, HEAs have served as catalyst in the 
organisational restructuring of Chinese enterprise. Indeed, 
the flourish of HEAs nationwide has led to the expansion of 
the size of Chinese enterprises. More and more large-scale 
integrated organisations, such as enterprise groups and 
consortia, consisting of from a dozen to more than a hundred 
small and medium enterprises, have emerged. By 1990, the 
number of such group and consortia had reached 1,63 0, 14 of
which are known as "Industrial Giants" in China today. Indeed, 
they so vital to the Chinese economy that they have been
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granted the privilege of "independent planning" (RMRBh, 
10/5/89 : 3) .
Fifth, HEAs have greatly increased the mobility of 
factors of production and speeded up the development of factor 
markets in China. In 1990 alone, for example, a total amount 
of ¥21.24 billion capital was involved in various cooperation 
projects in China. At the same time, professional people and 
skilled labours have more freedom to move among associated 
plants, especially from more advanced to less advanced one, 
and twenty-one exchange fairs were held nationwide in 1990 to 
promote such free movement of human resources (Research 
Society, 1991: 106).
And finally, HEAs have immensely facilitated the inflow 
of FDI and promoted the development of the SEZs. In 
particular, the five SEZs and fourteen open costal cities have
forged a new type of HEA --  the interior-local-foreign
partnership. As a distinctive Chinese way of developing EPZ- 
type zone, this kind of cooperation has played a crucial role 
in strengthening the SEZs' industrial and technological 
capacities, improving their infrastructures, and raising their 
economic efficiency of transferring foreign advanced 
technology and management expertise into the interior.16
3-1-7. Performance and Problems
The above discussions suggest that the industrial reform 
is transforming the old, centrally planned economy into a new, 
mixed economy, with growing shares of private elements and 
market-oriented horizontal economic activities. As can be seen 
from Table 3-1.2, China's GVIO, national income and its per 
capita level have all registered a higher growth rate in the 
reform period of 1978-90 than in the prereform one of 1952-78 
(8.39%, 12.00% and 12.33% vs. 5.99%, 11.41% and 4.35%,
respectively). Indeed, the Chinese economy has been among the 
fastest growing economies in the world in the last decade or
16. For more about the introduction of FDI in China and 
the development of the SEZs, see Chapter 4.
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so, and China's incremental or gradual approach towards the 
reform has increasingly been judged as appropriate, especially 
compared with the "big-bang" strategy adopted by the former 
Soviet Union and Eastern European countries.
Table 3-1.2 Growth of China's GVIO, national income 
and national income per capita (1952 - 1990)
National income GVIO National income per capita
(¥100 m., in 1952 prices) (¥/per yr, in current prices)
1952 589 349 104
1978 2, 671 5,790 315
1979 2, 857 6,300 346
1980 3,041 6, 883 376
1981 3,189 7,179 397
1982 3,450 7,740 422
1983 3,794 8, 606 463
1984 4,311 10,007 545
1985 4,892 12,148 668
1986 5,269 13,565 737
1987 5,806 15,965 859
1988 6,463 19,284 1, 066
1989 6,698 20,930 1,178
1990 7,019 22,555 1,271
Annual .average rates of growth (%)
1952-■78 5.99 11.41 4.35
1978- 90 8.39 12.00 12.33
1952-•90 6.74 11.59 6.81
Sources: 1). National income and national income per capita: SSB (1991), 
pp. 32-3.
2). GVIO: SSB (1991), pp. 54-5.
However, in order to achieve a sustained growth of the 
economy it is vitally important to raise industrial 
productivity. In the preceding chapter, we have shown that it 
was the persistent stagnation and, in some cases, even 
deterioration of the TFP of the industry during the prereform 
period which had led to the present reform (see Table 2-3.2 
and 2-3.3) . After more than a decade of reform, one would 
inevitably wonder what has happened to the crucial economic 
indicator?
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Table 3-1.3 is an extension of Table 2-3.2, including the 
reform period of 1978-90. It shows that the pace of the 
increase in labour input has slowed down noticeably in the 
reform period, with the annual growth rate dropping to 3.06 
percent from 7.11 percent in the prereform period of 1952-78. 
At the same time, the speed of capital injection has also gone 
down slightly, with the rate declining from 12.58 percent to 
11.69 percent. This shift of the development strategy from 
"extensive growth" to "intensive growth" has led to a massive 
increase in the labour productivity, from 4.01 percent to 8.68 
percent, and a fundamental improvement in the capital 
productivity, from negative 1.13 percent to positive 0.48 
percent.
Table 3-1,3 Growth rates of output per worker and per 
100 yuan of capital in Chinese industrial enterprises
(1952 - 1990)
(1952 = 100)
(1)
GVIO
(2)
No. of 
workers 
(year end)
(3) 
Fixed & 
working 
capital
(4)
Output per 
worker 
[ (1)/ (2) ]
(5)
Output per ¥100 
of capital 
[(1)/(3 ) ]
1952 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
1978 1659.03 596.27 2175.34 278.24 74.41
1990 6462.75 855.69 8199.46 755.29 78.82
Average annual rates of growth (%)
52-78 11.41 7.11 12.58 4.01 -1.13
78-90 12.00 3.06 11.69 8.68 0.48
52-90 11.59 5.81 12.30 5.46 -0.62
Sources: 1). 1952-78: Table 2-3.2;
2). 1990: GVIO: Table 3-1.2; Workers & Capital: SSB (1991), 
pp. 105 & 410.
Similarly, Table 3-1.4 is an extension of Table 2-3.3, 
including the reform period. It reveals a corresponding change 
in the TFP: regardless of which of two labour weights is
applied the productivity has registered a marked growth in 
both cases. In the case of the greater weight of 0.6, the 
growth rate of the productivity goes up from 1.16 percent per
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year in the prereform period to 1.95 percent per year in the 
reform period; while in the case of the smaller weight of 0.4, 
the rate climbs from 0.28 percent per year to 1.12 percent per 
year. Without doubt, this crucial achievement suggests that 
the economic efficiency of China's industry is improving and 
the industrial reform is producing tangible and positive 
results.17
Table 3-1.4 Growth rates of industrial output, total 
factor input and total factor productivity
(1952 - 1990)
(1952 = 100)
Total
index
labour
factor input 
assuming 
share of:
GVIO
index
Index of output per unit 
of combined inputs at 
assumed labour share of:
0.6 0.4 0.6 0.4
1952 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
1978 1227.90 1543 .71 1659.03 135.11 107.47
1990 3793.20 5261.95 6462.75 170.38 122.82
Average annual rates of growth (%)
1952-78 1.16 0.28
1978-90 1.95 1.12
1952-90 1.41 0.54
Sources: 1). 1952-78: Table 2-3.3;
2) . 1990: Table 3-1.3.
On the other hand, one cannot ignore the fact that the 
contribution from the growth of the TFP to that of GVIO is 
still disappointedly small, only ranging from 5 to 15 percent. 
For example, the contribution for the whole period of 1952-90 
was 1.41 percent, in the case of the weight of 0.6, or 0.54 
percent, in the case of the weight of 0.4. However, the growth 
rate of GVIO for the same period is 11.59 percent per year. 
This implies that the increase in the total factor input
17. Woo, et al. (1993) suggests that the growth of the TFP 
in the Chinese industry during the reform period came largely 
from fast-expanding COEs and TVEs, instead of SOEs (p. 3) .
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accounts for the rest 10.18 percent (= 11.59%-l.41%), in the 
case of the weight of 0.6, or 11.05 percent (= 11.59% -
0.54%), in the case of the weight of 0.4.
Table 3-1.3 tells the reasons for the obviously 
dissatisfactory performance during the whole period of 1952- 
90. The principal cause has been the long-standing negative 
growth of the capital productivity (-0.62% per annum). This 
can be explained by the fact that the growth of capital 
injection was faster than that for GVIO (12.3 0% vs 11.59%) . At 
the same time, although the labour productivity has achieved 
an overall increase of 5.46 percent per annum, it was 
outweighed by the even higher growth of labour input (5.81% 
per annum) . As a result, the overall growth of the TFP 
naturally remained sluggish. This suggests that the industrial 
reform has still some way to go to rejuvenate inefficient 
enterprises, particularly large- and medium-sized SOEs.
On the whole, the industrial reform has so far been
piecemeal and uncoordinated, with much experimentation and 
modification to cope with unforseen problems. Many new 
indirect regulatory mechanisms cannot be applied, or applied 
effectively, due to the lack of appropriate microeconomic 
conditions. On the one hand, the state has either lifted or 
relaxed its direct control over enterprises. On the other 
hand, enterprises have yet become cost-sensitive and been able 
to behave rationally and responsibly, since much of
distortions in the economic system remains largely 
uncorrected.18 That is to say, a "vacuum" has been created in 
the Chinese macroeconomic management. As a result, the 
economic development in the recent years has been consistently 
troubled by the following three major problems:
First, recurrent boom-bust cycles caused by the
18. Kornai argues that both enterprise behaviour and state 
economic management possess dualistic features in the period 
of the coexistence of new and old economic systems. The 
enterprise would, he describes, keep one eye on the market and 
the other on the state; the state, on the other hand, has to 
use some market mechanisms as well as direct administrative 
means to regulate the enterprise. This seems to be the 
situation currently existing in China. See Kornai (1980) .
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overheating of the economy and the subsequent implementation 
of austerity measures. Inflation in many years approached 
double-digit level.
Second, imbalance development between infrastructures and 
basic industries, on the one hand, and light and processing 
industries, on the other, due largely to the overexpansion of 
the latter. As a result, the traditional "bottleneck" has been 
intensified.
And third, little improvement in the economic efficiency 
of many SOEs, especially large ones, owing to the reluctance 
of the state to apply tougher financial disciplines to them.
3-2. The Foreign Trade Reform19
By the late 1970s, the PRC had been isolated from the 
rest of the world for more than two decades. The new, 
pragmatic post-Mao leadership, led by Deng Xiaoping, realised 
that an isolated China would remain poor and week, and that an 
autarkic strategy of development would prevent China from 
absorbing advanced technology of other countries. As a result, 
in addition to the industrial reform, the Third Plenum has
also made another important strategic decision --  open China
to the world economy --  in order to achieve its ambitious
modernization programmes. Zhao Ziyang, then Chinese premier, 
explained the importance of implementing the "open-door" 
policy:
By linking our country with the world market, 
expanding foreign trade, importing advanced 
technology, utilizing foreign capital, and entering 
into different forms of international economic and
19. N. R. Lardy (1992a) has provided the most 
comprehensive and detailed study so far on China's present 
foreign trade reform and hence is the major source of 
information for this section. Apart from it, the ACFERT 
Editorial Board (1985), (1986), (1987), (1988) and (1991); JEC 
(1992), chiefly Chapter V; Lardy (1992b); the World Bank 
(1988a) and (1990); the Topic Group (1987); Panagariya (1991); 
Ross (1987) and (1988); Xue Muqiao (1986); Imai (1985); Clarke 
(1984); and Morino (1982) have also provided some important- 
accounts on the reform.
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technological cooperations, we can use our strong 
points to make up for our weak points through 
international exchange on the basis of equality and 
mutual benefit (Zhao, 1982a: 47).
Thus, the open door policy, as an integral part of 
China's new development strategy, represents the greatest 
policy shift in China since 1976. Its impacts on the economy 
have been, in magnitude, almost as profound as the development 
in agriculture after 1978 (Riskin, 1987: 316).
3-2-1. Reform Policies and Changes
The foreign trade reform started in July 1979, with the 
introduction of a flexible foreign trade policy in Guangdong 
and Fujian provinces. However, an all-round and radical 
restructuring did not start until September 1984, when the 
State Council approved the report submitted by the newly 
created Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade 
(MOFERT) on Reform of China's old Foreign Trade System (see 
Appendix B) .20 The Report, representing the most update form 
of decentralization ever proposed in a centrally planned 
economy, has laid a solid foundation for subsequent trade 
reforms in China. The general thrust of the Report was toward 
a devolution of power from the centre to lower levels of 
administration. Many reform measures recommended by it have 
been implemented and they have resulted in a lot of remarkable 
changes in the foreign trade system.
1. Decentralization and Proliferation of Trading Firms 
One of the earliest steps taken by the Chinese government to 
decentralize its foreign trade system has been to devolve the 
power to conduct foreign trade transactions from the central 
government to local governments, industrial ministries and 
some key manufacturing enterprises. This means that the 
central government has in effect given up the monopoly on 
foreign trade it had exercised since the mid-1950s. In
20. For a Western interpretation of the Report, best see 
Satoshi Imai (1985).
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addition to Guangdong and Fujian, many other provinces have 
also enjoyed autonomy in importing and exporting a lot of 
goods through their own, newly established trading firms.
At the same time, some central ministries have also 
established their own trading corporations to specialize in 
the trade of their own manufactured goods. Furthermore, more 
than 13 0 large and key manufacturing enterprises have also 
been allowed to conduct foreign trade directly. As a result, 
the number of trading entities in China soared, from less than 
a hundred before the reform to 1,200 at the end of 1986 (Topic 
Group, 1987: 33) and to 5,000 in 1990 (Lardy, 1992a: 39).
2. Implementation of Foreign Exchange Retention Scheme 
In order to encourage exports, since 1979 the Chinese 
government has instituted an elaborate system of foreign 
exchange retention (Waihui Liucheng Zhi), which entitles both 
export-producing enterprises and their superior authorities 
the right to use a part of foreign exchange earnings from 
their exports. This represents a significant diminution for 
the Chinese authorities in the monopoly control of foreign 
exchange.
The rate of retention varies by region and industry and 
changes from time to time. According to the 1991 regime, for 
most goods, 20 percent retention rights are allocated to the 
central government, 10 percent to provincial and local 
governments, 10 percent to enterprises, and 60 percent to FTCs 
(Panagariya, 1991: 14) . For the SEZs and other open areas, the 
rate is 100 percent, while for those priority sectors, such as 
machinery and electrical goods, the rate goes as high as 70 or 
even 100 percent. Foreign exchange acquired under this way can 
be either used to import materials and equipment for further 
production or to carry out marketing surveys abroad, or sold 
for specific purposes in a Foreign Exchange Adjustment Centre 
(FEAC). By 1988, retained foreign exchange totalled US$18.5 
billion, over 40 percent of China's total export earnings 
(Lardy, 1992a: 57) . Clearly, the system has to some extent
offset the negative effect of the overvalued exchange rate and 
the low Renminbi prices paid by FTCs on exports.
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3. Separation of Governmental Functions and Business 
Operations A central task of the reform is to separate 
government administration and enterprise business by confining 
the MOFERT and its subordinate committees to administrative 
affairs and thus refraining them from intervening in day-to- 
day trading businesses of enterprises directly. The main 
responsibilities of the MOFERT have been defined as those of 
making policy, working out long-term trade strategy and plans, 
setting targets for annual exports and imports and supervising 
their implementation, examining applications for and issuing 
export and import licences, and allocating export and import 
quotas.
4. Introduction of the CRS Under the CRS, all 
provincial-level localities are required to sign annual 
contracts with the MOFERT, specifying their projected total 
export value, foreign exchange earnings, costs of earning 
foreign exchange, basic amount of renminbi subsidy needed, and 
overall profits (or losses). To meet these targets, provincial 
MOFERT commissions sign similar contracts with their 
subordinate bodies, provincial FTCs, municipal and county 
commissions, which, in turn, sign contracts with FTCs in the 
cities and counties under their jurisdiction. Finally, all 
FTCs sign export or import contracts with manufacturing 
enterprises or end-users.
5. Rationalization of Foreign Trade Planning On the 
export side, the old mandatory plan has been largely replaced 
by a "guidance plan," which merely lists the value indices of 
total exports and foreign exchange earnings. Although a few 
strategically important items remain in the quantitative, 
mandatory plan, the number of them has fallen all along time, 
from some 3,000 in the prereform period to 199 in 1982 and to 
112 in 1988 (ibid: 40) . At the same time, procurement and 
allotment plans have been abolished. On the import side, the 
government has stopped compiling the category of importing 
commodities. Trading companies and manufacturing enterprises 
which have the authority to conduct foreign business directly 
are allowed, in principle, to import approved goods, provided
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they can balance their own foreign exchange accounts. As a 
result of the above changes, the shares of both planned 
exports and imports fell from about 90 percent for both in the 
late 1970s to 45 percent for exports and 40 percent for 
imports in 1988 (ibid: 40-1).
6. Establishment of Export- and Import-Agency System 
Under the system, which was introduced since 1985, export or 
import operation is conducted, on a consignment basis, by a 
trading company which receives a commissions for its efforts 
from the manufacturer, in the case of exports, or the user, 
in the case of imports. That is to say, enterprises 
themselves, instead of trading companies, bear the 
responsibility for all profits and losses of the transaction. 
As domestic prices of both export and imported goods are 
linked to international prices via the exchange rate under 
this system, the most critical component of the traditional 
"airlock system," which had insulated China from the world 
economy over years, has virtually been eliminated.
7 . Reform of Foreign Trade Pricing The liberalization of 
foreign trade pricing accelerated in the mid-1980s when the 
use of the agent system in export and import was introduced. 
On the import side, goods imported under the agent system are 
subject to "foreign trade agent price formation" {Waimao Daili 
Zuojia). This means that the import price multiplying the 
exchange rate forms the basis of the domestic price, to which 
are added the customs tax, product tax or value added tax, 
bank charges, and the handling fee of the agent. The share of 
imported goods priced on the basis of the import costs rose 
from around 20 percent in 1984 to 90 percent in the mid-1990. 
(ibid: 74 & 76) . This reform has resulted in a substantial 
erosion of the import substitution character of China's old 
trade regime, and made users of imported goods to pay higher 
domestic prices and hence more sensitive to the world prices 
of goods they use.
On the export side, however, the picture of change seems 
less clear. Depending on the product, procurement prices for 
exports in terms of Renminbi are set differently. For category
109
one exports specified in the foreign trade plan,21 traditional 
pricing appears to still be applied. That is to say, FTCs 
continue to purchase planned quantities of these export goods 
from domestic producers at the same state-fixed price as 
comparable goods sold on domestic markets. For category two 
goods, containing 91 products, which were covered under the 
guidance plan, some of them were priced in the old fashion,
i.e. at ex-factory prices, while others, especially the above­
plan portion, were subject to more flexible regime. Finally, 
for category three goods, accounting for 55 percent of total 
exports, the agent system is widely applied and hence prices 
are set largely on the basis of the international market 
conditions.
8. Restructuring of Foreign Exchange Rate and Management 
System To implement its export promotion strategy the Chinese 
government has consistently reviewed its exchange rate policy 
and relaxed exchange control ever since the reform started. 
From 1980 to 1990 Renminbi had been devalued several times 
with the result that the exchange rate changed from the ratio 
of ¥1.53 0 to one dollar to that of ¥5.222 to one dollar (see 
Table 3-2.1) . At the same time, many measures were taken to 
relax foreign exchange control, including allowing other 
Chinese banks, apart from the Bank of China, to engage in 
foreign exchange dealings.
Table 3-2.1 China's exchange rates (1980 - 1990)
Yuan per US dollar
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986-88 1989 1990
1.530 1.746 1.923 1.981 2.796 3 .202 3 .722 4.722 5.222
sources The ESCAP (1991), p 87.
But the most important development in the area of foreign
21. They included crude oil, refined petroleum products, 
coal, tungsten, antimony, tea, tobacco, rice, corn, beans, 
bean products, cotton yarn and grey goods, cotton-synthetic 
yarns and grey goods, raw silk, and cloth, etc..
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exchange control in recent years has been the establishment of 
FEACs, or swap centres. By August 1989, there were as many as 
90 of them in operation (Panagariya, 1991: 8). The primary
function of FEACs is to facilitate purchase and sale of 
retained foreign exchange at more or less market clearing rate 
albeit for specific purposes within the rules laid down by the 
centres. In 1988 alone, a total of US$6.26 billion, making up 
33.85 percent of foreign exchange retained by enterprises, was 
traded at these centres (ibid) . By 1990 the transaction volume 
reached staggering US$13.2 billion (Lardy, 1992a: 61).
9. Imposition of Export and Import Licensing System 
Apart from generally controlling the volume and commodity 
composition of trade, the licensing system, which was 
introduced in June 1980, is intended to restrict unplanned 
imports financed through retained foreign exchange earnings 
and stem the flow of "parallel goods," i.e. goods being sold 
through unofficial channels at lower than state prices to the 
outlets mostly in Hong Kong and Macau.22 Both export and 
import licenses are divided into three categories according to 
the importance of commodity concerned.23 By 1989, the number 
of export commodities requiring licenses had risen from 24 in 
1981 to 173 while import goods from 21 in 1982 to 53. At the 
same time, the share of exports under license reached 55 
percent whereas imports 46 percent (ibid: '44) . The adoption of 
licensing in China should be regarded, according to N. R. 
Lardy, as a progress of transition from Krueger's stage one to 
stage two in the process of liberalizing an import 
substitution trade regime (ibid: 43).24
22. See the Provision of Export Licence System, issued by 
the State Council in June 1980, in the ACFERT Editorial Board 
(1984) .
23. For more about the classification and explanations of 
the three categories, see Panagariya (1991), pp. 8-10.
24. Krueger (and Bhagwati as well) divides a developing
nation's foreign trade liberation into five stages --  highly
administrative management and quantitative control; 
introduction of elaborate controls by economic levers; 
rationalization of exchange rate; all-round replacement of
111
10. Promotion of Linkage between Industry and Trade A 
great deal of effort has been made to encourage direct 
contacts between export manufacturing enterprises and trading 
companies in order to improve efficiency of foreign trade. As 
a result, many foreign-trade-oriented HEAs have emerged in the 
country since the early 1980s. Some big enterprises even set 
up their own trading companies. China Jinshan Allied Trade 
Corporation in Shanghai and Yanshan General Petrochemical 
Corporation in Beijing are examples of this practice.
11. Development of Export-Production Networks In order 
to raise competitiveness of Chinese exports, some key, 
advanced enterprises and farms within target industries or 
areas have, since 1979, been chosen as "specialized production 
bases for export. " They are encouraged to move into higher 
value added exports, improve quality and increase varieties.
China has decided to target the following three product 
groups as its major export goods in the next 10-20 years: 
machinery and electrical goods, light industrial and textile 
goods, and agricultural and sideline products. By the end of 
1987, exports of the first group of products had already hit 
US$100 million or more (Panagariya, 1991: 12).
12. Diversification of Foreign Trade Forms To promote 
exports the Chinese government has also actively promoted 
other forms of trade, in particular compensation trade 
(Buchang Maoyi) and export processing (Chukuo Jiagong) . Under 
the former arrangement, a foreign firm supplies technology or 
equipment to a Chinese enterprise in exchange for goods 
produced with that technology or equipment. This makes it 
possible for Chinese enterprises to acquire foreign capital 
goods without access to foreign exchange. The latter 
arrangement includes both the processing of imported raw
unnecessary administrative means with economic and price 
mechanisms, and full convertibility of domestic currency. See 
Krueger (1978), pp. 24-6. On the other hand, Zhou Xiaochuang
(1988) roughly agrees that China's reform is in the process of 
transition from the first stage to the second. For more about 
the differentiation of the reform's stages, also see Sung Yun- 
wing (1987) .
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materials for export, the assembly of imported components to 
produce exportable final goods, and certain other type 
exports. From 1981 to 1987, for example, compensation trade 
had grown by 3.8 times, while export processing by 14 times, 
far exceeding the 42 percent growth in normal trade {BR, Oct. 
10-16, 88: 24).
13. Other Export Promotion Measures Export credits has 
played an increasingly important role in promoting China's 
exports since the early 1980s, especially helping insulate 
exporting firms from the effect of recurrent economic 
austerity programmes. In 1988 and 1989 domestic currency loans 
outstanding to export-oriented enterprises and trading 
companies reached ¥100.8 billion and ¥120 billion, 
respectively, two times more than the figure of 1984 (Lardy, 
1992a: 80).
At the same time, China has also actively made used of 
tariff and tax as trade policy instruments. In 1985 the 
various import and export tariffs that had been announced in 
the previous five years were published in the first 
comprehensive tariff schedule released since 1951. This was 
followed by the release of a comprehensive customs schedule in 
September 1989, the first in several years. With the growing 
volume of trade, China's tariff revenues soared, totalling 
¥49.7 billion in the period of 1980-85. This figure, more than 
twice the entire amount collected during 1953-79, accounted 
for 15 percent of the total import value for the same period, 
compared with only 11 percent in the prereform era (ibid: 47) .
The most important change in China's domestic tax 
structure was that the State Council approved a system in 1985 
to rebate to producers a portion of the indirect taxes paid on 
export goods. As a result, the amount rebated increased 
sharply from ¥1.8 billion in 1985 to staggering ¥12 billion in 
1988, making up about 7 percent of the total export value of 
the year (ibid: 50). Clearly, the reform of tax structure has 
brought China's foreign trade system into greater conformity 
with the GATT charter.
Thus, there can be no doubt that the foreign trade reform
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in the 1980s has profoundly transformed the structure of 
China's foreign trade and foreign exchange management systems, 
and to some extent improved the efficiency of external 
dealings. Indeed, foreign trade has ceased to be a residual 
but become the most dynamic sector of the economy, catalyzing 
the national economic development.
3-2-2. Performance and Problems
The foreign trade reform has brought about a profound 
change in China's trade performance since the late 1970s. As 
can be seen from Table 3-2.2, in 1990 the total trade value
Table 3-2.2 Growth of China's foreign trade 
during the reform period of 1978-90
(US$100 million)
Year
Total trade % over 
volume previous 
year
Exports
% over 
previous 
year
Imports
% over 
previous 
year
1978 206.38 97.45 108.93 . . . .
1979 293 .33 42.1 136.58 40.2 156.75 43.9
1980 378.22 28.9 182.72 33.8 195.50 24.7
1981 403.75 6.8 208.93 14.3 194.82 -0.3
1982 392.97 -2.7 218.19 4.4 174.78 -10.3
1983 407.27 3.6 221.97 1.7 185.30 6.0
1984 497.72 22.2 244.16 10.0 253 .56 36.8
1985 602.46 21.0 259.15 6.1 343.31 35.4
1986 600.97 -0.2 270.14 4.2 330.83 -3.6
1987 681.10 13 .3 347.11 28.5 333.99 1.0
1988 804.90 18.2 406.40 17.1 398.50 19.3
1989 825.83 2.6 434.40 6.9 391.43 -1.8
1990 851.18 3.1 520.67 19.9 330.51 -15.6
Annual average rates of growth (%)
1952--78 9.52 9.97 9.15
1978 -90 12.53 14.99 9.69
1952--90 10.46 11.53 9.32
Source: The ACFERT Editorial Board (1991), pp. 317 & 319.
hit US$85,118 billion, more than 3 times greater than that in 
1978. This has resulted in a high annual average growth rate 
of 12.53 percent between 1978 and 1990, compared with only
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9.52 percent for the prereform period of 1952-78. Exports, in 
particular, has played a key role in boosting the trade growth 
by expanding at the speed of nearly 15 percent per year, with 
five percentage points ahead of the rate for the prereform 
period (9.97%). More significantly, export growth in most 
years of the reform period has been substantially higher than 
import growth, with the annual average rate of growth leading 
by more than 5 percent (14.99% vs. 9.69%). As a result, 
China's trade surplus soared, reaching US$19,016 billion in 
1990 alone.
At the same time, like other liberalizing import 
substitution regimes, expanded foreign trade has promoted, or 
at least coincided with, an exceptionally fast growth of the 
Chinese economy. As exhibited in Table 3-1.2, the annual 
average rate of growth for China's national income in the 
reform period registered 8.39 percent, compared with 5.99 
percent for the prereform period.
Table 3-2.3 shows a comparison of average annual rates of 
growth of foreign trade between China and several selected 
countries or regions during the period of 1978-90. By the IMF 
calculation, China's total trade volume grew by more than 15 
percent per year,25 not only substantially higher than the 
average levels of developing countries, developed countries 
and the world as a whole (7.56%, 9.09% and 8.67% respectively) 
but also slightly higher than that of world's most successful
exporting economies --  the NICs (15.05%). Indeed, only
Thailand and Hong Kong grew faster than China in that period. 
More spectacularly, China has achieved the second fastest 
growth in terms of exports (16.35%), only behind Hong Kong.
Not surprisingly, the degree of openness of the Chinese 
economy has increased drastically, with its share of total 
trade volume in GNP has jumped sharply from 9.95 percent in 
1978 to 23.38 percent (ACFERT Editorial Board, 1991: 323), or 
according to the IMF calculation, 3 0.78 percent (IMF, 1992:
25. Compared with the data from other sources, the data 
compiled by the MOFERT, are generally biased downward. For the 
explanation of this difference, see Lardy (1992a), pp. 12-3.
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281), in 1990.26 The IMF ratio in 1990, though lower than 
those of developing countries with export-oriented economies, 
the four NICs and some Western market economies, compares
Table 3-2.3 Foreign trade performances in 
several selected countries/regions (1978 - 90)
(%)
Average annual rates
of growth (1978-90) Shares of total trade
------------------------ volume in GNP (1990)
Total Exports Imports
China (MOFERT) 12,.53 14..99 9..69 23 .38
(IMF) 15,.08 16,.35 13..80 30..78
Brazil 5,.69 7 ,.84 3..39 30,.21
India 9,.16 8..61 9..61 13 .86
Indonesia 8,.26 6,.81 10..36 47,.81
Malaysia 13 ,.14 12,.17 14..23 144,.78
Philippines 7,.83 7 .46 8..06 49..13
Thailand 16,.07 15..52 16..47 81,.84
All developing
countries 7,.56 7..49 7..63
Hong Kong 17..07 17 .85 16.,35 231..80
South Korea 14..11 14..57 13..69 55..66
Taiwan 14..61 14..89 14.,28 83 .84
Singapore 14..16 14..74 13 .69 318..42
The four NICs 15..05 15..58 14..56
Japan 9..39 9..37 9..42 17 ,.57
Australia 8..65 8,.84 8..47 29..19
Germany 9,.16 9,.21 9..10 50,.10
U. K. 9..09 8,.72 9..41 41..58
U. S. A. 8,.77 8..62 8..89 16,.48
All developed
countries 9,.09 9..16 9..11
Asia 13,.38 13 ,.56 13 ,.22
The world 8,.67 8,.62 8,.71
* The share of total trade volume in GDP.
Sources: 1). China's figures in the top line: the ACFERT Editorial Board 
(1991), pp. 317; 323;
2) . Hong Kong's share of total trade volume in GDP: Hong Kong Monthly 
Digest of Statistics, Nov. 1991, pp. 1; 19; 105;
26. There have been different views on the calculation and 
accuracy of China's trade ratio. See chiefly Lardy (1992a), 
Appendix B.
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3). Taiwan's share of total trade volume in GNP: Caijing Jishi (The 
Databank Review), Nov. 1991, pp. 13-4;
4). The rest of the data: IMF (1992).
favourably with those of similar large-size countries or 
countries with a huge domestic market, such as India, U.S.A., 
Japan, Australia and Brazil.
The rapid and sustained growth of foreign trade has 
significantly increased China's role in the world economy. The 
share of China's exports in the world's total exports rose 
from 0.75 percent in 1978 to 1.80 percent in 1990, while its 
ranking as an exporting nation jumped from the thirty-second 
to the fifteenth place (ACFERT Editorial Board, 1991: 322).
Table 3-2.4 Commodity composition of China's imports
(1979 - 1990)
(By SITC system)
(US$100 million)
Primary goods Manufactured goods
Yr._____________________________________________________________________________
Total % (1)FS. % (3)Nf.I . % Total % (l)H.C. % (2)L.T. %
79 44.22 28.2 22.64 14.4 18.49 11.8 112.53 71.8 105.42 67.3 7.11 4.5
80 69.20 35.4 31.41 16.1 33.70 17.2 126.30 64.6 110.58 56.6 15.72 8.0
81 78.63 40.4 38.46 19.7 37.47 19.3 116.19 59.6 96.88 49.6 19.51 10.0
82 73.25 41.9 39.07 22.4 30.31 17.3 101.53 58.1 87.92 50.3 13.61 7.8
83 54.33 29.3 28.44 15.3 23.52 12.7 130.92 70.7 117.03 63.2 13.89 7.5
84 56.76 22.4 20.42 8.1 33.95 13.4 196.80 77.6 176.66 69.7 20.14 7.9
85 58.59 17.1 15.63 4.6 37.58 11.0 284.72 82.9 251.43 73.2 33.29 9.7
86 49.28 14.9 16.39 5.0 25.27 7.6 281.55 85.1 238.73 72.2 42.82 12.9
87 70.92 21.2 23.14 6.9 36.03 10.8 263.07 78.8 220.44 66.0 46.63 12.8
88 80.88 20.3 32.73 8.2 36.51 9.2 317.62 79.7 259.26 65.1 58.36 14.6
89 101.34 25.9 38.67 9.9 44.96 11.5 290.09 74.1 273.39 69.8 16.70 4.3
90 89.41 27.1 32.48 9.8 42.32 12.8 241.10 72.9 221.86 67.1 19.24 5.8
Note: The total imports/exports normally consist of primary products and 
manufactured goods. The former includes: (1) Foodstuffs (short for
"FS."); (2) Beverages and tobacco; (3) Non-food items ("Nf.I."); (4)
Mineral fuels (for "M .F . ") ; and (5) Animal and vegetable oils and fats. 
The latter, on the other hand, contains: (1) Heavy industrial and
chemical products ("H.C."); and (2) Light industrial and textile 
products ("L .T .").
Sources: 1). 1979-83: The ACFERT Editorial Board (1984), p. 831;
2). 1984-90: The ACFERT Editorial Board (1991), p. 329.
In terms of commodity structure, China's imports have not 
experienced any significant change during the reform period of 
1979-90 due largely to the inelasticity of demand in the 
domestic market for the import goods, such as grains, 
industrial raw materials and capital equipment (see Table 3-
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2.4) . On the export side, however, a fundamental change in 
export structure has taken place. As shown in Table 3-2.5, 
from 1978 to 1990, the share of primary goods declined 
steadily from 53.5 percent to below one-third while that of 
manufactured goods rose steeply from 46.5 percent to over two- 
third. Also, it can be seen from the table that from the late 
1970s to the mid-1980s exports of mineral fuels (shown in the 
table as "M.F."), or more precisely petroleum, played an 
important role in boosting the export growth, accounting for 
28.3 percent of China's total exports in 19 8 5 . 27 After 1985 
this pattern began to change and exports of manufactured 
goods, in particular light industrial and textile products 
("L.T."), became the major source of China's exports, reaching 
an all-time high in 1989 (43.8%). The changing commodity
composition of China's exports reflects China's increasing 
sensitivity to, and ability to adapt to, the changes in the 
world market conditions.
Table 3-2.5 Commodity composition of China's exports
(1979 - 1990)
(By SITC system )
(US$100 million)
Primary goods Manufactured goods
Yr. _____________________________________  _____________________________________
Total % (1)FS. % (4)M .F . % Total % (1>H.C. % (2)L.T. %
78 52,.16 53 ,.5 23 ,.16 23,.8 13 ,.45 13 ,.8 45,.29 46,.5 10,.10
79 73 ,.15 53 ,.6 27 ,.01 19..8 26,.54 19,.5 63 ,.43 46,.4 14,.97
80 97,.62 53 ,.4 31,.54 17 ,.3 45,.88 25,.1 85..10 46,.6 23 .57
81 103 ,.60 49 ,.6 30 ,.71 14,.7 50,.54 24,.2 105,.33 50 .4 37,.98
82 104,.63 48,.0 30,.94 14,.2 53 ,.53 24,.5 113 ,.56 52,.0 49,.11
83 102,.65 46,.2 32,.24 14,.5 47,.01 21..2 119 ,.32 53 .8 48,.71
84 121,.79 49,.9 35,.09 14,.4 60,.62 24,.8 122 .37 50 .1 46,.99
85 140 ,.34 54,.2 40,.27 15,.6 73,.34 28,.3 118 .81 45 .8 36,.05
86 117 ,.92 43 ,.7 49,.86 18,.5 35,.82 13 ,.3 152 .22 56 .3 55,.29
87 134,.52 38,.8 50,.54 14,.6 48,.34 13 ,.9 212,.59 61,.2 72 ,59
88 144,.53 35,.6 62,.79 15,.5 40,.14 9,.9 261,.87 64,.4 99..70
89 150,.86 34,.7 63 ,.07 14,.5 46,.15 10,.6 283 ,.54 65,.3 93 ,.15
90 167 ,.95 32,.3 67,.90 13 .1 58,,93 11,.3 352,.72 67,.7 137,.48
35
48
61
67
64
70
75
82
96
9 140 
5 162 
5 190 
4 215
19 36.1 
46 35.5 
53 33.7 
35 32.2 
45 29.5 
61 31.8 
38 30 
76 31 
93 35 
.00 40 
.17 39 
,39 43 
24 41
Source: The ACFERT Editorial Board (1991), pp. 326-7.
27. In fact, from 1977 to 1985 China's exports of crude 
oil and refined petroleum products grew from 12 to 3 6 million 
metric tons and the value of petroleum exports rose by almost 
$6 billion. See Lardy (1992b), p. 698.
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All these changes, paralleling the situation in most of 
the NICs in the early 1970s, clearly indicate that China's 
trade liberalization has made significant progresses, and that 
the economy is gradually moving from the closed, import- 
substitute system to an open, more export-oriented mode.
However, it is obvious that the trade reform has not 
solved all the old problems inherited from the previous trade 
regime. At the same time, new problems have emerged as a 
result of the reform. These problems include:
First, the CRS does not stipulate how quantitative 
targets, such as the annual amount of foreign exchange 
earnings which each local government is required to remit to 
the Centre, should be met. To fulfil the target, many local 
governments and the trading companies under their jurisdiction 
were inclined to increase export earnings by maximizing the 
volume of exports, rather than by improving the quality and 
upgrading commodity structure of exports, since it is easier 
to achieve the former than the latter. That is to say, during 
the reform period the growth of China's foreign exchange 
revenues still relied heavily on the increase in the 
quantities of exports, and this inevitably led to the 
downfalls of exporting prices and hence contributed to the 
deterioration of the trade terms for most Chinese exports in 
the international market. Table 3-2.6 shows that the indexes 
of export volume for the period of 1978-90 are persistently 
and substantially higher than the value indexes while the 
price indexes remain well below a hundred.28 Thus, the old 
problem of the low efficiency of China's export transactions 
remains largely unsolved.
Further, the CRS, making the local government responsible 
for the implementation of the contract, has enhanced its 
powers and reinforced its tendency to interfere in 
enterprise's business operations, making the enterprise even
28. Mr. Li Langqin, the minister of the MOFERT, has 
confirmed the seriousness of this problem. See Li langqin 
(1991).
119
more subservient to it (Chen Xin, 1989: 312).
Table 3-2.6 Indexes of value, volume and price 
of China's exports (1978 - 1990)
(1980 = 100)
Value index Volume index Price index
1978 53.3 71.7 74.3
1979 74.7 87.1 85.8
1980 100.0 100.0 100.0
1981 114.3 110.9 103 .1
1982 119.4 123 .2 96.9
1983 121.5 140.6 86.4
1984 133 .6 151.3 88.3
1985 141.8 172.5 82 .2
1986 147.8 206.1 71.7
1987 189.9 249.5 76.1
1988 222.4 267.3 83 .2
1989 237.7 266.5 89.2
1990 284.9 315.5 90.3
Source: The ACFERT Editorial Board (1991), p. 321.
Second, because of the semi-reformed nature of China's 
price, foreign exchange, tariff and taxation systems, 
differentiated rates of foreign exchange retention, tax, and 
cost targets for earning foreign exchange apply to different 
regions, sectors and trading companies. Failing to provide a 
level playing field for all companies, this discriminatory 
policy, coupled with the defects of the CRS mentioned above, 
have triggered off a spiral of fierce internal price 
competitions. Indeed, the "persistent trade wars" and hence 
the "ever increasing costs of export goods" has become the 
most serious problem in China's foreign trade reform in recent 
years (Zhao Tiecheng, 1989: 340-1) .29
Third, China's primary and labour-intensive manufacturing 
sectors, though considered to be less urgent for technological 
upgrading, produced more than 70 percent of the country's 
exports (see Table 3-2.5), but most technology-intensive
29. For details of the "trade wars" among trading 
companies in Xiamen, see Chapter 7.
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industrial sectors, considered to be more suitable and urgent 
for introducing advanced foreign technology, have found it 
hard to export their outputs. This means that under the 
current foreign exchange retention system the latter is in an 
extremely unfavourable position to obtain adequate foreign 
exchange to carry out technological innovations in comparison 
with the former, thus undermining the overall efficiency of 
the technological transformation in the Chinese industry.
With regard to imports, China has admitted that it spent 
too much foreign exchange in importing raw materials and left 
little for the introduction of advanced foreign technologies, 
know-hows and other software (Li Langqin, 1991) .
And finally, the conflict between decentralized operation 
and irrational competition has not been settled yet (Zhou 
Xiaochuang, 1988) . That is to say, the MOFERT, in light of the 
reform principle, gradually devolved business decision-making 
powers to various ministries, localities and even some key 
enterprises, but this immediately leads to the fierce internal 
price competitions, despite a decade of the reform.
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CHAPTER 4
CHINA'S UTILIZATION OF FOREIGN CAPITAL AND 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES
Apart from vigorously reforming its old, centralized 
industrial and foreign trade systems, China has also actively 
carried out two unprecedented missions in the foreign economic
front --- utilizing foreign capital and developing the SEZs.
In fact, these two new tasks are the clearest indication of 
China's determination to break with its past foreign economic 
policy.
For nearly three decades since its founding in 1949, the 
PRC has rejected any inflow of foreign capital (except for 
minor amounts of Soviet aids in the early 1950s) and the 
government, bound by its old doctrine of Self-Reliance, had in 
fact been proud of having no internal and external debt. Over 
the past twelve years (1979-90) , however, the world has 
witnessed a dramatic change in the Chinese foreign
economic scene. Today, foreign capital is no longer seen as 
"evil," but as a "necessary and beneficial complement to 
China's socialist economy" (Central Committee, 1984). By the 
end of 1990, China had signed some 29,693 contracts on the use 
of foreign funds involving a total amount of US$1,020 million, 
of which US$680.75 million had actually been used (see Table 
4-1.1). At the same time, the five SEZs, Shenzhen, Zhuhai, 
Shantou, Xiamen and Hainan, have now become the nation's focus 
of foreign investment and centre of rapidly expanding 
industrial exports. Thus, a new dimension of reform and 
development in a centrally planned economy has been created.
The purpose of this chapter is, therefore, to examine 
this new development in China's foreign economic sector. 
Section 4-1 investigates the Chinese official policy,
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performance record, and problems and issues regarding the 
utilization of foreign capital, especially FDI; Section 4-2 
examines the development of the first four SEZs, and Section 
4-3 surveys the Xiamen SEZ in greater detail in order to 
provide a solid historical and contextual background for the 
more systematic analyses in the following chapters.
4-1. The Utilization of Foreign Capital1 
4-1-1. Objectives and Principles
Since the beginning of the present reform and openness, 
China has consistently declared that it would make use of 
foreign capital to accelerate its modernization programme. 
Foreign capital is expected to supplement domestic resources 
in the process of economic and technological transformation. 
Thus, the main objectives for China to use foreign capital may 
be summarized as follows:
First, it is to compensate for the shortage of capital 
caused by modernization programmes, especially to meet the 
huge investment demands created by the construction of 
infrastructures and public utilities.
Second, it is to be used as an effective means to obtain 
advanced foreign technology, equipment, management expertise 
(especially in modern, large-scale specialized production), 
and international marketing skills in order to improve 
economic performance in existing Chinese enterprises.
Third, it is to generate foreign exchange to enable China 
to make further imports and carry out more surveys on the 
overseas market.
Thus, the principles guiding the use of foreign capital, 
though subject to changes and adjustments from time to time,
1. For a general discussion of China's utilization of 
foreign capital, see Ho (1984); Huan Guocang (1986); Liu 
Guoguang, et al. eds. (1987a), Chapter 23; Riskin (1987),
Chapter 13; Robinson (1987); UNCTC (1988); Kojima (1988); the 
State Council Research Group (SCRG) (1992); and JEC (1992), 
Chapter V.
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include the following four points:
First, the main emphasis is to be put on attracting FDI, 
particularly, Sino-foreign joint equity ventures (JEVs) and 
wholly foreign-owned enterprises (WFOEs). There are at least 
four reasons for this preference: 1). in the case of JEVs and 
WFOEs, China generally assumes little or no responsibility for 
the risk with foreign investors; 2). the Chinese believe that 
foreign investors, especially in the case of JEVs, will not 
only contribute capital but also bring with them technology 
and managerial skills in order to make the investment 
successful; 3) . some of FDI projects may provide China with an 
unique chance to open up its international market; and 4) . 
many forms of FDI can also make use of existing production 
capacities and facilities.
Second, the seventh FYP gives the first priority of 
foreign investment to such infrastructures as energy, 
transport, telecommunication, raw and semi-finished materials, 
and technological renovation of machinery and electronics 
industries.
Third, while making more efforts to attract FDI, China 
has also stressed the need to diversify its channels of 
obtaining foreign funds, especially to maximize the use of 
official development aids and the loans provided by foreign 
governments and international financial institutions, such as 
the World Bank, IMF and the Asian Development Bank, to finance 
large projects characterized by long gestation period, low 
profit return, and poor foreign exchange repayment capacity.
And finally, the scale of foreign capital attracted 
should be limited by the domestic capacity to absorb and 
supplement it. It is generally believed in China that it is 
appropriate to maintain the Debt Service Ratio (DSR) under 15 
percent, 5 percent lower than the internationally accepted 
warning line (RMRBh, 3 0/4/1987: I)2.
2. DSR is the ration of the annual repayment amount of 
currently due interest and principal (in terms of foreign 
exchange) to the annual revenues of exports (in terms of 
foreign exchange). It is widely regarded as an chief indicator 
to measure the appropriateness of the scale of foreign capital
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4-1-2. Performance Records
China started introducing foreign capital soon after the 
historic Third Plenum in December 1978, indicated by the 
promulgation of the first ever law concerning the use of
foreign capital since 1949   the Law of the People's
Republic of China on Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign
Capital --  in July 1979 (see Appendix C) . Table 4-1.1,
showing the general achievement over the period of 1979-90, 
reveals a rapid, though with
Table 4-1.1 China's utilization of foreign capital
(1979 - 90)
(US$100 million)
Total Foreign loans FDI Others
Year Item Value Item Value Item Value Item Value
Contracted
1979-82 949 205.48 27 135.49 992 60.10 9.89
1983 522 34.30 52 15.13 470 17 .32 1.85
1984 1,894 47.91 38 19.16 1,856 26.51 2 .24
1985 3,145 98.67 72 35.34 3,073 59.31 4.02
1986 1, 551 117.37 53 84.07 1,498 28.34 4.96
1987 2,289 121.36 56 78.17 2,233 37.09 6.01
1988 6, 063 160.04 118 98.13 5,945 52 .97 8.94
1989 5,909 114.79 130 51.85 5,779 56.00 6.94
1990 7,371 120.86 98 50.99 7,273 65.96 3 .90
1979-90 29,693 1,020.78 644 568.33 29,049 403.60 48.85
Used
1979-82 124.57 -- 106.90 11.66 6.01
1983 19.81 -- 10.65 6.36 2.80
1984 27.05 -- 12.86 12.58 1.61
1985 46.47 -- 26.88 16.61 2.98
1986 72 .58 -- 50.14 18.74 3 .70
1987 84.52 -- 58.05 23 .14 3 .33
1988 102 .26 -- 64.87 31.93 5.46
1989 100.59 -- 62.86 33 .93 3 .81
1990 102.89 -- 65.35 34.87 2.68
1979-90 680.75 -- 458.55 ----- 189.82 32.38
Used (%) 66.69 -- 80.68 47.03 66.28
Source: SSB (1991), p. 629.
fluctuations, expansion in terms of both contracted and used 
amounts. For example, the total number of projects and amount
a nation borrows.
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of capital attracted in 1990 are more than 14 times and 3.5 
times of the corresponding figures for 1983, with an average 
annual growth rate of 45.97 percent and 19.66 percent 
respectively. Indeed, China's introduction of foreign capital 
over the decade of the 1980s had exceeded the records of all 
other Asian countries/regions. In terms of average annual 
inflow of FDI, China even outperformed Brazil and Mexico, the 
two developing countries which had attracted most of foreign 
investment in the 1980s. Also, the ratio of the used amount of 
FDI to the total used amount of foreign funds (27.88%) is one 
of the highest in developing countries (SCRG, 1992: 6-7).
As this thesis deals mainly with FDI in the Xiamen SEZ 
the following discussions will therefore focus on FDI only. In 
general, there are several important features to be noted in 
China's utilization of FDI over the period of 1979-90:
First, Hong Kong and Macau have always been the largest 
investor, accounting on average for 61.6 percent, with the 
U.S.A. numbering the second (8.42%) and Japan the third 
(5.47%). Since the late 1980s, Taiwan has emerged as an 
increasingly important investor in the PRC (ibid: 6).
Second, in terms of industrial structure of investment, 
the share of so-called "productive sectors" (including the 
primary and secondary sectors) increased steadily, from 45.04 
percent in the period of 1979-88 to 86.28 percent in 1990, 
while the share for the "non-productive sector" (i.e. the 
tertiary sector) declined firmly, from 54.96 percent to 13.72 
percent. Among the "productive sectors," the share for those 
manufacturing/processing/assembling light industrial and 
consumer goods dropped markedly, from 75.87 percent in the 
period of 1979-87 to 69.74 percent in 1990, while the share 
for basic industrial sectors and infrastructures rose 
noticeably, from 24.13 percent to 30.26 percent (ibid: 8).
Third, with respect to the form of investment, JEVs has 
become increasingly popular, with their share in the total FDI 
invested amount increasing remarkably, from 42.33 percent in 
the period of 1979-83 to 54.09 percent in 1990. WFOEs also 
expanded rapidly, moving up from just over 3 percent in the
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period of 1979-82 to the staggering 21.1 percent in 1990. 
Contractual management enterprises (CMEs) seemed to lose 
ground steadily, dropping from 78.7 percent in the period of 
1979-82 to 19.33 percent in 1990 (ibid: 10; ACFERT Editorial 
Board, 1984: 1092; 1991: 49).
Fourth, FDI has been concentrated mainly on the eastern 
and southeastern coastal areas, where most of China's SEZs, 
ETDZs and a variety of open areas are located. For example, in 
1990 Guangdong, Fujian and Liaoning provinces and Shanghai 
municipality were the four largest recipients of FDI, taking 
40.78, 17.61, 7.49 and 5.68 percent, respectively, of US$6,596 
billion of the nation's total FDI contracted amount in that 
year (ibid: 586-7).
And finally, the introduction of FDI has greatly promoted 
the rapid development of China's export manufacturing 
capacity. Exports from foreign-involved enterprises (FIEs) in 
China increased sharply3, from US$ 320 million in 1985 to US$ 
6.021 billion in 1990, with an average annual growth rate of
79.85 percent --  far exceeding 14.97 percent for the total
national exports over the same period. At the same time, their 
share in the country's total exports jumped from one percent 
in 1985 to 11.56 percent in 1990 (BR, Mar. 6-12, 89: 25;
ACFERT Editorial Board, 1991: 50).
4-1-3. Problems and Issues
Although the rapid expansion of FDI projects in recent 
years has widely been regarded as the most successful 
achievement of the "open-door" policy, several serious 
problems still exist in China's utilization of FDI.
First, the central problem faced by China has been the 
lack of domestic inputs to supplement foreign capital, and 
this problem has become the "bottleneck" to the further 
introduction of FDI. The shortage of domestic supplemental 
cash (including RMB and foreign exchange) was particularly
3. FIEs (Waizi Qiye) in China generally include JEVs, 
CMEs and WFOEs.
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acute.4 Despite the fact that the RMB loans to FIEs in 1990 
increased by 110 percent over 1988, many of them still had to 
suspend or even scrap their operations due to the lack of 
adequate funds. Besides, the shortage of power supply, 
transport and communication facilities, raw materials, and 
competent managerial personnel has also hindered the further 
expansion of FDI. Some regions had to cut back those supplies 
to local Chinese enterprises in order to secure the normal 
operation of FIEs (SCRG, 1992: 7-8).
Second, the sectoral structure of FDI did not match the 
priority and plan of China's industrial transformation. This 
can be reflected primarily in three aspects: 1). as high as 
31.64 percent of FDI contracted amount over the period of 
1979-1988 went to non-productive areas, such as hotel, leisure 
and entertainment centre, and real estate business; 2) . nearly 
three-quarters of that amount was invested in lower-end 
labour-intensive sectors, such as textiles, building and 
decorative materials, food processing and electronics 
assembling, with few Chinese domestic components; and 3) . the 
scale of investment became smaller and smaller, dropping 
sharply from US$3.53 million per project in the period of 
1979-87 to US$1.29 million per project in 1990. According to 
the Chinese standard, 99.4 percent of all FDI projects in 
China in 1990 can be classified as small-scale enterprises and 
only 0.6 percent as medium- and large-scale ones (ibid: 8-10) .
Third, the Chinese authorities have apparently failed to 
work out a long-term plan for utilizing FDI, which is based on 
detailed analyses of the domestic needs and the dynamics of 
the world economy. In other words, they have failed to 
integrate FDI into the national economic development plan. As 
a result, instead of "seeking money for projects," they often 
were "seeking projects after getting money" (Liu Guoguang et 
al., 1987a: 510). Needless to say, the economic efficiency of 
such projects tends to be very low.
4. It is estimated that for every one US dollar of 
foreign investment eight or nine Yuan will be needed as 
supplemental funds (SCRG, 1992: 7).
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Fourth, the Chinese authorities often used "foreign 
exchange earning capability" as the chief criterion in 
assessing the viability of FDI projects, instead of "the 
overall and long-term interest of the national economy." As a 
result, many projects which either are beneficial to the all­
round development of the national economy or have a long-term 
potential of earning foreign exchange, have been turned down 
simply because they may increase foreign exchange expenditure 
either in a particular sector/enterprise or for a short period 
of time (Huan Jianping, 1988: 38).
And finally, FDI development in China has been very 
vulnerable to the Chinese domestic economic boom-bust cycle5. 
This is particularly true when the austerity policy is imposed 
nationwide in order to cool off the overheated economy. Many 
FIEs have to curtail, suspend or even cancel their operations 
altogether because of the abrupt stoppage or cutback of the 
Chinese input supplies and/or the imposition of tight monetary 
policy. For example, the retrenchment policies implemented in 
the late 1985 and the period of 1988-89 have led to various 
degrees of declines in the number of FDI contracts signed 
(indeed the total size of foreign capital inflow as well) in 
1986 and 1989 (see Table 4-1.I).6
4-2. The Development of the Special Economic Zones
In order to accelerate the progress and increase the 
effects of the "open-door" policy, the Chinese government, 
tempted by the success of the EPZs in neighbouring countries 
/regions, decided to set up four similar zones in China's
5. Lin Shenmu and Xu Li (1986) argues that FDI in China 
is far more sensitive to Chinese domestic economic changes 
than to the world's economic waves and hence concludes that 
most of the variables affecting the utilization of FDI in 
China are "endogenous." See Lin and Xu (1986), p. 15.
6. Of course, the reduction in foreign capital inflow 
into China in 1989 can also be attributed to the sanction 
imposed by many Western governments in the aftermath of the 
Tiananmen Square Incident.
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southeastern coastal areas in the early 1980s and one in the 
Hainan Island in 1988. As these zones are generally more 
comprehensive and expected to have a greater role to play in 
the Chinese economy than EPZs, they are called as Special 
Economic Zones. Obviously, to build up an enclave economy 
significantly incompatible with the host economy on such large 
scale is unprecedented in socialist countries. The SEZs could 
therefore be seen as the microcosm of China's effort to 
develop a capitalist-style economy.7
After successive expansions of their territories, the 
first four SEZs now have a total area of 526.2 6 sq km, with 
Shenzhen having 327.5 sq km, Shantou 52.6 sq km, Zhuhai 15.16 
sq km, and Xiamen sq 131 km. The fifth one, the Hainan Island, 
with an area of 34,000 sq km, is undoubtedly the largest zone 
of its kind not only in China but also in the world.
Thus, the SEZs, together with fourteen Open Coastal 
Cities (OCCs),8 three Economic Development Zones (EDZs)9 and 
all areas along China's eastern and southeastern coastline,10 
form four tiers of China's open areas (see Figure 4-2.1). In 
all, these areas cover about 300,000 sq km, with a population 
of around 200 millions.
7. For excellent English-language publications on the 
SEZs at different stages, see Footnote 1 in Chapter 1, while 
for the Chinese-language analyses, see chiefly Liu Guoguang 
(1985) and (1987b).
8. They are Dalian, Qinhuangdao, Tianjin, Yantai, 
Qingdao, Lianyungang, Nantong, Shanghai, Ningbo, Wenzhou, 
Fuzhou, Guangzhou, Zhangjiang and Beihai. Opened in April
1984, they are encouraged to increase their foreign economic 
activities chiefly through setting up Economic and 
Technological Development Zones (ETDZs).
9. They are the Yangtze River Delta, the Pearl River 
Delta and the Southern Fujian Triangle. Set up in January
1985, they are encouraged to develop agricultural export 
resources.
10. They were declared as Open Areas in February 1988.
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4-2-1. Functions of the SEZs and the Special Policy
The purposes of setting up the SEZs are to expedite the 
expansion of exports and the introduction of foreign capital, 
technology and management expertise; and to experiment some 
radical economic reforms in these areas. The last function 
implies that the SEZs are to act as a "laboratory" for the 
ongoing domestic economic reform and "open-door." Of course, 
the SEZs can also serve the political purpose of reflecting 
China's foreign policy towards Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan.
Deng Xiaoping, the Chinese paramount leader, summarized 
the functions of the SEZs as "four windows," i.e. the SEZs are 
China's windows of technology, management, knowledge and 
foreign policy (Chen Zaobin, 1986). The Chinese government 
expected the development of the SEZs to exhibit "four 
characteristics." They include: 1). the economic development 
of the SEZs should be powered mainly by foreign capital; 2). 
SEZ outputs should, in principle, be exported; 3). FIEs should 
become the mainstay of SEZ industry; and 4) . SEZ economy 
should be regulated primarily by market forces.
To provide a business environment different from that 
existing in the rest of the country, the Chinese government 
has allowed a special policy (Teshu Zhengce) , or "flexible 
policies" (Linghuo Zhengce), to be implemented in the SEZs. 
According to Mr. Lu Zufa, a Deputy Secretary-General of the 
Shenzhen SEZ Government, the Special Policy means economic 
policies and management systems in the SEZs can be different 
from those implemented elsewhere in the country (Lu, 1987: 
140). It includes a package of financial concessions, 
administrative and legal simplifications offered by the 
Chinese authorities to foreign investors, and, more 
significantly, the special privilege granted to the SEZs to 
carry out radical economic reform without being subject to the 
restriction applied to elsewhere.
The financial concessions in the SEZs are basically 
similar to those found in EPZs or EPZ-type economic zones
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worldwide11. However, the special reform privilege is 
definitely unique to the SEZs. It is crucial to the 
development of the SEZs because "only a radical economic 
reform can bring vitality, flexibility and potential to the 
SEZs," as argued by Mr. Li Hao, the former mayor of Shenzhen 
(Li Hao, 1986: 86).
4-2-2. Performance Records12
It must be pointed out that data regarding the 
performance of the SEZs are normally scattered, incomplete and 
sometimes self-conflicting. Hence, adequate cautions should be 
exercised in both using and understanding them. Table 4-2.1 
shows a generally increasing trend in several major indicators 
for China's first four SEZs, although three indicators 
(national income per capita, exports, and number of contracts 
of introducing foreign capital) started levelling off or even 
declining in the period of 1989-90. In particular, the average 
annual growth rates for all indicators are much higher than 
the national rates. For example, the national income per 
capita for the SEZs grow by 22.47 percent per annum between 
1980 and 1989, GVIO by 30.18 percent between 1980 and 1990, 
exports by 26.07 percent between 1982 and 1990, and invested 
amount of foreign capital by 10.26 percent between 1986 and 
1990, compared with only 13.53 percent, 12.64 percent, 11.13 
percent, and 9.10 percent, respectively, for China as a whole 
over the same periods.
The most prominent achievement for the SEZs, however, has 
been the rapid expansion of manufactured exports. In 1990, 
more than 60 percent of exports from Shenzhen and Shantou were 
manufactured goods, while exports of radio cassette, colour TV
11. For more details about the concessions, best see 
MOFERT (1983); China International Economic Consultants Inc 
(1984); and Chu Baotai (1986).
12. In order to make data comparable, the Hainan SEZ, set 
up only in 1988, is not included in the discussion of this 
section.
133
sets and bicycles from Shenzhen and Xiamen accounted for more 
than half of the nation's total exports of those products (He 
Chunlin, 1991: 6).
Table 4-2.1 Performances of the first four SEZs (1980-90)
1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1989 1990
National income 
per capita (¥) 801 1,055 1,968 2, 676 4,969 4,967
% of national 
total (%) 213.12 249.99 361.14 363.11 466.16 421.68
GVIO (in 1980 
prices, ¥ b. ) 1.93 2.30 4.22 7.54 17.33 22.31 26.92
% of national 
total (%) 0.28 0.30 0.42 0.56 0.90 1.07 1.19
Exports 
(US$ million) --- 710 830 1, 845 4,109 7,041 4,530
% of national 
total (%) --- 3 .18 3.18 5.96 8.65 13 .40 8.72
No. of contracts 
of introducing 
foreign capital --- 1,347 1,516 1,368
% of national 
total (%) --- __ ___ ___ _  _ 86.85 25.00 23 .15 _____
Contracted amount 
(US$ million) --- ____ _ __  _ 669 1,110 1,454 .. __ _ _
% of national 
total (%) --- ____ 5.70 6.93 12.67 „  .. , _
Invested amount 
(US$ million) --- _ _ _ _ ____ _  _ 654 861 960 967
% of national 
total (%) --- ---- ---- 9.01 8.42 9.54 9.40
Sources: a). 1980-89: He Chunlin, ed. (1991), pp. 525-32;
b). 1990: The ACFERT Editorial Board (1991), p. 84, but excluding 
the amounts for the Hainan SEZ.
In the meantime, the SEZs, Shenzhen in particular, have 
carried out a series of economic reforms. Tangible changes 
have taken place in planning, financial, monetary, investment, 
foreign trade, employment, and wage systems (RMRBh, 5/4/89: 
3). These include independent planing (Jihua Danglie) , 
allowing foreign banks to set up branches in the SEZs, 
adopting a public bidding for carrying out capital 
constructions and replacing state investment funds with bank 
loans, introducing a contract system in the employment of
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workers and a public advertising or democratic election system 
for the appointment of some senior personnel, practising a 
floating wage system, and, more recently, selling land rights 
to public or private (including foreign) institutions or 
individuals. Some of these experiments have been transplanted 
to some parts of the country. Furthermore, factor markets, 
such as capital, labour, producer goods, and foreign exchange 
markets, have been established, while those for technology, 
information and property were also emerging (RMRBh, 5/4/89:
3) .
Another important development in the SEZs has been the 
rapid growth of HEAs, which are different from those found in 
elsewhere of China due to the Special Policy implemented in 
the SEZs. They are either inward-linked (Neilian Qiye) or both 
inward- and outward-linked enterprises (Neilian Waiyin Qiye) . 
In the former case, they are generally formed between local 
enterprise(s) and interior partner(s). In this way, the 
interior enterprise(s) can take advantage of the Special 
Policy to export their products (and retain more foreign 
exchange earnings) and import some scarce or restrictive 
foreign goods; while zone partner(s) can get the technical 
assistance and supply of some crucial raw materials from the 
interior. By 1990, for example, about 40 central 
ministries/commissions and 29 provinces/municipalities/ 
autonomous regions had set up some 3,900 inward-linked 
enterprises in Shenzhen, financing 15.9 percent of capital 
constructions, supplying 60 percent of physical resources and 
600 thousands of labour forces, and contributing 17.4 percent 
of the SEZ's GVIO. At the same time, Xiamen had established 
1,090 similar enterprises and received funds of ¥770 million 
from interior partners (He Chunlin, 1991: 7-8).
In the latter case, the associations are usually composed 
of three sides, interior, local and foreign partners. Hence, 
they are in fact FIEs. By the end of 1989, about 3,3 00 FIEs 
had been set up in the SEZs, exporting more than 80 percent of 
their products. They had contributed more than 60 percent of 
GVIO for Shenzhen and Shantou, 41 percent for Xiamen, and 25
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percent for Zhuhai. Around 20 percent of their projects are 
considered to be in the advanced level in their fields (ibid: 
7) . Thus, the HEAs in the SEZs, as a major mechanism to 
promote linkages between the interior China and the SEZs and 
between China and the outside world, have created profound 
impacts on the development of the SEZs and indeed China's 
industrial transformation.
4-2-3. Problems and Issues
Many people, especially Chinese officials, praise the 
SEZs by referring to the "miracle" achieved by them, Shenzhen 
in particular. However, they neglect an important factor
behind the phenomenal success --  the huge cost incurred by
the national economy in supporting the development of those 
small areas. Unfortunately, a formal cost-benefit analysis of 
the SEZs is impossible because of the unavailability of data 
regarding the factor movement between the SEZs and interior 
regions. Furthermore, in many cases, the gains or costs of the 
SEZs are not exclusively of economic nature and hence are 
intrinsically immeasurable13. Nonetheless, the opportunity 
costs can still be indicated partly by the increasingly 
generous financial concessions offered to foreign investors; 
and partly by the fact that the SEZs are guaranteed to get 
almost any inputs they need at favourable terms.14 Indeed, 
many interior enterprises have offered their most advanced 
technologies/products and/or most competent personnel to zone 
partners as a condition of forming HEAs with them. All this 
has explained why the SEZs could manage to achieve the 
spectacular development in a relatively short period of time.
Several serious problems and issues have emerged from the
13. For more comments on this issue, see Richard D. 
Robinson (1987), pp. 169-71; Joseph Battat (1987), pp. 156-7; 
Liu Guoguang, et al. eds (1987a), p. 497; and Pu Shan (1987), 
p. 178.
14. For example, Shenzhen and Xiamen enjoy a provincial 
status in arranging their annual physical, financial and human 
resource plans (Jihua Danlie) .
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process of development and may be highlighted as follows:
1. Irrational Investment Structure Despite a marked 
improvement in recent years, FDI projects in the SEZs are 
still dominated by the characterized by quick and high returns 
and low risk, such as real estate, leisure facilities, hotel 
and tourism. This kind of projects, still accounting for 
nearly 3 0 percent of the total FDI projects in 1989 (Chen and 
He, 1989: 10), bears little congruence with the long-term goal 
of China's industrial development.
On the other hand, due to social, economic and geographic 
reasons the SEZs generally have far higher concentration of 
investments from Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan, and Southeast Asian 
countries. These investment projects, accounting for as high 
as 90 percent of the total FDI projects in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s, are largely confined to small- and medium-sized 
labour-intensive projects, with an average capitalization of 
less than HK$840,000 per project (ibid: 9).
2 . Poor Performance in Technology Transfer As described 
above, most of FDI projects in the SEZs are small-sized 
labour-intensive ones manufacturing light industrial or 
consumer goods and hence tend to have very low ratios of 
capital/technology:labour. Some foreign investors, especially 
the Taiwanese, even use some traditional methods and a large 
number of second-handed equipment, maximizing the utilization 
of local cheap labour forces. During the decade of 1980s, the 
SEZs spent as high as 65 percent of their budget on importing 
complete set of equipment, 2 0 percent on joint development, 
and only 15 percent on license, lease and franchise 
arrangements (Chen and He, 1989: 10). What is more, the SEZs 
have failed to study systematically and hence make full use of 
most of imported technologies (China Market, 2/89: 32), let 
alone to modify and adapt them into the local conditions.
3. Balance of Payment Problem in FIEs About 63 percent 
of FIEs in the SEZs have various degrees of balance of payment 
problem because, having imported a large quantity of raw 
materials and equipment, they failed to export adequate amount 
of their finished products (SCRG, 1992: 12). A dozen of them,
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for example, went bankrupt between 1986 and 1988 (He Jiashen 
et al., 1988). As a result of this problem, foreign exchange 
debts for FIEs in 1987, 1988 and 1989 accounted for 29.7
percent, 32.4 percent and 35.6 percent, respectively, of the 
foreign exchange earnings for all FIEs in the SEZs in the 
three years (ibid). Without doubt, this poor performance will 
seriously undermine foreign investors' confidence in investing 
in the SEZs.
4. Problems in Administration and Infrastructures All 
the four SEZs, except Xiamen, are situated in remote rural and 
border areas15. Although enormous efforts have been made to 
build and improve the physical, administrative and legal 
environments in the zones, there is still a long way to go 
before they become acceptable. What foreign businesses have 
complained most seems to be the low efficiency of 
administration, caused by bureaucratic bungling and/or 
incompetence of local officials, and the high investment costs 
resulting from inflation and imposition of a variety of 
unreasonable charges. In addition, inadequate legislation, 
ambiguous attitude towards contracts, unpredictable political 
climate, poor quality of local inputs have all contributed to 
deter foreign investors from making further investment in the 
SEZs.
5. Widespread Malpractice and Corruptions The SEZs have 
long been accused of being a "breeding ground" for official 
corruptions in China. Incidents involving briberies, 
speculations in foreign exchange and property business, inside 
dealings in stock markets, smuggling, and tax evasions have 
been reported frequently in the Chinese media and press.
There are numerous reasons for the above problems. Two 
important relationships seem to be crucial to the 
understanding of them. The first one is the conflict between 
China's wish to develop technology-intensive industries and
15. This is also due to the Chinese leadership's intention 
to minimize the "negative effects" of market-oriented economy 
in the SEZs on the domestic economy.
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foreign businesses' intention to set up labour-intensive 
projects (in order to maximize the use of the Chinese cheap 
labours). In fact, this conflict has created a dilemma for 
China of choosing either the quality or quantity of FDI.
The second one is the structural conflict between China's 
wish to export all, or a large part, of SEZ outputs and 
foreign businesses' interest in opening up the Chinese 
domestic market (potentially the largest one in the world). 
Similarly, this conflict has also resulted in a dilemma for 
China of either exposing infant and inefficient domestic 
industries to foreign competition or undermining the 
attractiveness of investing in the SEZs.
In the final analysis, the development of the SEZs over 
the last decade or so could be seen, at best, as a local 
success, which has been achieved at a huge cost to the 
national economy, when one considers the massive and endless 
influx of financial, physical and human resources from all 
over the country into those small areas ever since they were 
set up. At the same time, they have often been used by the 
different factions within the Chinese leadership to serve 
their political, instead of economic, purposes.16 The multiple 
objectives they have been asked to pursue are in fact a 
mixture of political and economic goals and often 
contradictory to each other. As introduced in Chapter 1, an 
EPZ-type zone should be set only one prime objective, and any 
contributions it makes to other objectives should be regarded 
as desirable externalities. The Chinese government has 
apparently failed to realize the interactions among various 
objectives. Instead, it put equal stress on all of them and 
pursued them indiscriminately. The result is that none of the 
objectives has been clearly achieved.
16. For more details of SEZ politics, see Crane (1992), 
pp 851-7.
4-3. The Xiamen SEZ17
Located on the southeastern coastal area of China 
(118°04'04''E longitude and 24°26/46//N latitude), the Xiamen 
Municipality {Shi) is backed by a hinterland, borders on 
Zhangzhou and Quanzhou two municipalities, and faces Taiwan 
across the Taiwan (Formosa) Straits (see Figure 4-2.1). It 
consists of the Xiamen Island, Gulangyu Islet and the coastal 
part of the northern bank of the Jiulongjiang River, with a 
total area of 1,516 sq km. The Gaoji Causeway built in 1955 
connects the Xiamen Island with the mainland (see Figure 4- 
3.1) .
Xiamen is under the jurisdiction of Fujian province and 
composed of six districts {Kaiyuan, Siming, Gulangyu, Huli, 
Jimei and Xinglin) and one county {Tong'an) . It had a 
population of 1.12 million at the end of 1990, of which 60 
percent were classified as urban residents.
Xiamen lies just north of the Tropic of Cancer, enjoying 
the southern, sub-tropical monsoon climate. It is mild and 
rich in rainfall, with an annual mean temperature of 2 0.8°C 
and precipitation of 1,200 mm. Typhoon normally takes place 5 
or 6 times each year.
In July 1980, the State Council approved the proposal 
presented by the Fujian Provincial Government to open up an 
area of 2.5 sq km in the Huli District, situated in the 
northwestern Xiamen Island, as the Xiamen SEZ.18 In March 
1984, the central government decided to expand the Xiamen SEZ 
into the whole Xiamen Island (including the Gulangyu Islet), 
with a total area of 131 sq km (blue-coloured area in Figure
4-3.1) and population of 360,000.
17. This section draws extensively on the Research Office
(1989), pp. 16-25. The data and facts cited here are, unless 
specified otherwise, extracted from it.
18. However, the formal construction of the SEZ did not 
start until October 1981.
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Figure 4-3. 1 The Sketch Map of the Xiamen SEZ
Sketch Map o f Xiamen Special Economic Zone
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4-3-1. The Economy before 1949
A Treaty Port
Acting as a link between the rich Yangtze floodplain and 
the Pearl River delta and serving as a bridge between mainland 
China and Taiwan, Xiamen became a major seaport in Southeast 
China as early as the 16th century. Not surprisingly, Xiamen, 
together with Tianjing, Shanghai, Ningbo, and Guangzhou 
(Canton), was designated as a Treaty Port in November 1843, 
according to the Nanking Treaty signed between the Chinese and 
British governments after the Opium War.
In fact, the rise and continual development of the Xiamen 
economy was closely linked to overseas trade. In 1844, the 
British Plenipotentiary in China, Sir John Francis Davis 
(1795-1890), visited Xiamen while touring south China and 
described it as an "old European port." He noticed that "the 
natives there are familiar with foreigners, and not only trade 
with, but emigrate in great number to the colonies of the 
Indian archipelago" (Davis, 1852, vol.l). In his report to the 
British government, Davis reckoned that Xiamen, together with 
Shanghai, had a great potential to become a thriving trading 
port in the Far East. Indeed, Xiamen soon witnessed a boom of 
its foreign trade with the West. The total volume of exports 
and imports soared from 93,262 taels in 1844 to 6,5 million 
taels in 1870.
The opening of the treaty port and the subsequent 
expansion of external trade had attracted many European 
merchant ships to call on the Xiamen coast frequently and 
induced inflow of 20 foreign banks, including the Standard 
Chartered Bank (U.K.), the Hong Kong-Shanghai Banking 
Corporation (U.K.), and the Overseas-Chinese Banking 
Corporation Ltd. (Singapore) , making Xiamen the foreign trade 
and financial centre in Southeast China (see Figure 4-3.2).19
19. Even today this number of foreign bank has not been 
exceeded (only reached 11 at the end of 1990) .
142
Th
e 
Am
oy
 
Ha
rb
ou
r 
in 
th
e 
se
co
nd
-h
al
f 
of
 
th
e 
19
th
 
ce
nt
ur
y 
(s
ou
rc
e 
un
cl
ea
r)
Close Links with Taiwan and Overseas Chinese
Xiamen has a close historical, political, social, 
economic, and lineage ties with Taiwan. When Taiwan was first 
incorporated into China in 1683, it was under the same 
administrative jurisdiction of the Fujian government and the 
command of Taixia Military District as Xiamen was. Since 
Taiwan became a separate province in 1728, Xiamen had been the 
only authorized seaport in the mainland open to Taiwan for
over a century, playing a crucial role in maintaining and
developing the mainland-Taiwan link.
From the 16th century, many mainland merchants, mostly 
from southern Fujian, started trading with Taiwan. The 
distance between Xiamen and the ports in the western Taiwan
ranges from 13 0 to 150 nautical miles. For centuries, the
merchants travelled between the two sides of the Straits, 
exporting such products as tea, ceramics, cloth, silk and 
sugar to Taiwan and importing goods like spices, pepper, 
precious metals and rice, etc. to the mainland. At its peak, 
the trading involved 1,500 merchant ships each year.
In 1662, tens of thousands of Chinese troops, led by 
Zheng Chengong, invaded Taiwan to expel the Dutch colonists. 
After defeating the Dutch, many soldiers, especially those 
from southern Fujian, did not return to the mainland but 
settled down in Taiwan. They joined the native Gaoshan 
Nationality, to exploit and develop Taiwan generation by 
generation. Today, about 70 percent of the Taiwanese 
population are Southern Fujianese (Min Nan Ren) by origin. On 
the other hand, about 30 percent of Southern Fujianese have 
relations in Taiwan. Thus it is not surprisingly that 
Taiwanese and Southern Fujianese speak the same dialect (Min 
Nan Hua) , share the same customs, and feel intimate toward 
each other.
Without doubt, these factors explain why the resumption 
and indeed expansion of the economic and trade links between 
the two sides in 1980s have developed so smoothly and rapidly.
At the same time, Xiamen is also a major hometown of many
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overseas Chinese. It was estimated that more than four million
overseas Chinese --  roughly one-fifth of the world's total
overseas Chinese population --  have roots in Xiamen and the
neighbouring southern Fujian regions (Li Si-ming and Zhao 
Ling-xun, 1992: 235) .20 For centuries, they have played a
crucial role in Xiamen's development, especially in the first 
half of the twentieth century. The earlier emigrants from 
Xiamen were largely merchants and went abroad to develop their 
trading businesses. Later, especially after the Opium War, 
more and more people went abroad and worked as coolies, mostly 
in Southeast Asia and America. During the 1840s and 1850s an 
average of 50,000 workers a year were sent abroad, with the 
number exceeding 100,000 in some years (ibid: 226).
The most visible and important contributions made by 
overseas Chinese to Xiamen has been the huge and sustained 
inflow of foreign exchange remittance sent back to Xiamen and 
the large-scale direct investment they made in 
infrastructures, public utilities, and real estate in Xiamen. 
In 1913, the Xiamen Customs Commissioner, J. H. Hacoun, 
estimated in his Ten-Years Report (1902 - 1911) that the
remittance reached 16-18 million taels each year, and that 
about 80 percent of the families in and around Xiamen were 
supported at least partly by the remittance.
At the same time, the Zhang-Xia railway, the Xiamen Light 
and Power Company, the Xiamen Waterworks Supply Company, the 
Xiamen Bus Company, the Xiamen Telephone Company, and many 
modern buildings, high streets and parks in the downtown areas 
were all built by the overseas Chinese. It was estimated that 
up to 70 percent of the investments in public utilities and 
real estate during that period came from them (ibid: 227).
The overseas Chinese also pioneered the development of 
Xiamen's modern manufacturing industries, commerce, and 
financial services. For example, the first food and canning 
factory, the ceramic plant, the electric appliance factory, 
the glassware workshop, the textile mill, the department
20. Another account actually puts this figure as high as 
over 6 million, see Wong Pui-Yee (1989), page 30.
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store, and the bank were all set up by the overseas Chinese.
It was estimated that the total number of the various 
enterprises founded by the overseas Chinese in Xiamen during 
the first half of this century was 2,658, involving total 
capital of ¥87.48 million, which accounts for 62.88 percent of 
the total direct investment by the overseas Chinese in Fujian 
over the same period.
By the late 1940s when the Nationalist government 
collapsed in the mainland, Xiamen had already developed into 
a bustling commercial seaport, with a population of 263,400. 
It had 6 deep water harbours, with a handling capacity of 
32,600 ton per year. The annual volume of foreign trade 
reached more than US$1.3 million, which placed it as the 9th 
largest trading city in the country, though the value of 
imports was about ten times bigger than that of exports. 72 
percent of Fujian's exports and imports went and came through 
it, compared with only 28 percent through Fuzhou, the capital 
city of the province.
4-3-2. The Economic Development from 1949 to 1980
The Chinese Communists took over Xiamen in October 1949 
after defeating the Nationalists. Due to its proximity to 
Taiwan which was occupied by the Nationalists after they fled 
mainland China, Xiamen was declared as the "frontline of 
coastal defence" {Haifang Jianxian) from 1949 to 1979. Indeed, 
the distance between Xiamen and Jinmen (Quemoy), one of 
Taiwan's islets, is so close (about 2,000 metres) that both 
sides were able to exchange artillery shells from time to time 
during the three decades of hostility. Consequently, Xiamen 
was never given the priority in economic development, and 
capital constructions and normal economic activities had to be 
kept at the minimal level. However, the construction of the 
Gaoji Causeway in 1955 and the Ying-Xia Railway in 1957 have, 
though largely for the military purpose, greatly benefitted 
Xiamen's economic development, by linking Xiamen with the 
mainland and indeed with the country's railway network.
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Several distinct features have emerged from the economic 
development during the pre-SEZ period and can be highlighted 
as follows:
1. Transformation from the Commercial Seaport into A 
Costal Industrial City Because of the expansion and upgrading 
of other ports in Fujian, such as Fuzhou, Quanzhou, Hangjiang 
and Xaiqi, the importance of the Xiamen port and its share of 
cargoes in the province declined steadily. Table 4-3.1 shows 
that Fuzhou had outstripped Xiamen and become the leading port 
in Fujian, with its share increasing from 24.08 percent in 
1965 to 34.69 percent in 1980 while Xiamen's dropping from 
46.08 to 27.38 percent.
Table 4-3.1 The volume and share of cargoes handled 
by the Fuzhou and Xiamen ports (1965 - 80)
(10,000 ton)
Fujian's Total
Of which: Fuzhou % Xiamen %
1965 239.87 57.75 24.08 110.53 46.08
1970 211.23 59.26 28.05 102.94 48.73
1975 284.26 120.00 42.21 104.27 36.68
1978 392.41 172.00 43 .83 150.01 38.23
1979 557.79 194.58 34.88 150.38 26.96
1980 602.11 208.89 34.69 164.87 27 .38
Source: The AFE Editorial Board (1986), p. 495.
On the other hand, industrial and agricultural 
productions expanded rapidly. Table 4-3.2 demonstrates that 
from 1950 to 1980 GVIAO grew on average by 10.17 percent per 
annum, compared with 8.16 percent for Fujian and 7.92 percent 
for China as a whole over the same period.21 In 
particular, industry expanded more than twice as fast as 
agriculture (12.86% vs 5.62%). As a result, the share of
21. The average annual growth rates for Fujian and China 
are calculated from the data published in the AFE Editorial 
Board (1986), p. 486 and SSB (1982), p. 17, respectively. All 
original data were converted into 1957 prices in order to make 
them comparable.
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industry in GVIAO jumped from merely 40.31 percent in 1950 to 
overwhelmingly 83.14 percent in 1980, indicating a decisive 
structural transformation in which industry had undoubtedly 
become the cornerstone of Xiamen's economy.
Table 4-3.2 Growth of the Gross Value of Industrial 
and Agricultural Outputs in Xiamen (1950 - 80)
(¥10,000, in 1957 prices)
GVIAO
Of which:Industry Share(%) Agriculture Share(%)
1950 6 210 2 503 40.31 3 707 59.69
1951 6 789 2 639 38.87 4 151 61.14
1952 8 018 2 926 36.49 5 092 63 .51
1953 9 279 4 103 44.22 5 176 55.78
1954 8 674 3 905 45.02 4 769 54.98
1955 9 589 4 288 44.72 5 301 55.28
1956 12 374 6 309 50.99 6 065 49.01
1957 15 376 7 991 51.97 7 385 48.03
1958 22 211 14 526 65.40 7 685 34.60
1959 29 971 21 342 71.21 8 629 28.79
1960 41 869 33 354 79.66 8 515 20.34
1961 26 965 20 500 76.02 6 465 23 .98
1962 20 844 14 539 69.75 6 305 30.25
1963 20 494 13 746 67.07 6 748 32.93
1964 26 896 18 879 70.19 8 017 29.81
1965 32 281 22 895 70.92 9 386 29.08
1966 39 126 28 919 73 .91 10 207 26.09
1967 36 720 24 323 66.24 12 397 33.76
1968 24 557 12 489 50.86 12 068 49.14
1969 43 618 30 843 70.71 12 775 29.29
1970 48 974 35 183 71.84 13 791 28.16
1971 53 284 38 648 72.53 14 636 27.47
1972 59 431 43 767 73 .64 15 664 26.36
1973 62 192 48 081 77.31 14 111 22.69
1974 61 656 46 843 75.97 14 813 24.03
1975 66 716 51 291 76.88 15 425 23 .12
1976 71 826 56 161 78.19 15 665 21.81
1977 78 165 61 540 78.73 16 625 21.27
1978 91 327 72 927 79.85 18 400 20.15
1979 99 020 80 544 81.34 18 476 18.66
1980 113 420 94 298 83.14 19 122 16.86
AAGR* 10. 17% 12 .86% 5. 62%
* Average annual growth rate.
Source: The AXSEZ Editorial Board (1986), pp. 110-5.
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2. Establishment of A Small but All-Embracing Industrial 
System By 1980 Xiamen had already got 490 industrial 
enterprises (excluding rural and township ones). But of these, 
478 were small-sized ones which generated 63.85 percent of the 
annual GVIO; 9 were medium-sized ones and produced over 22.35 
percent of the GVIO; and only 3 were big-sized ones and 
contributed 13.80 percent of the GVIO (seen Table 4-3.3).22 
This illustrates that the industry in Xiamen, as in many other 
Chinese cities, was basically small in scale and fragmentary.
Table 4-3.3 Composition of the industrial enterprises
in Xiamen by size (1980)
Number Share (%) % of GVIO produced
Small 478 97.55 63 .85
Medium 9 1.84 22 .35
Large 3 0.61 13 .80
Total 490 100.00 100.00
Source: XS5 (1982), p. 38.
On the other hand, the industry, though small,
encompassed almost all major sectors or branches --  a legacy
of the segmented and self-sufficient economy characteristic of 
the industry in the Maoist era. The 1985 Industrial Survey 
reveals that Xiamen had 33 of the 40 major industrial sectors 
identified in China (Research Office, 1989: 124). Of the 33 
sectors, the food processing, chemical and pharmaceutical, 
machinery, textile, paper and stationery, and building 
material industries had over years emerged as key sectors. 
Table 4-3.4 shows that in 1981 the seven sectors took more 
than 83 percent of the GVIO of the year, with the food 
processing industry being the leading sector.
22. By the Chinese standard, an enterprise with less than 
50 employees is generally defined as small-sized one, with 
between 51 and 999 as medium-si zed one, and with more than 
1,000 as big-sized one.
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Table 4-3.4 Composition of Xiamen's industry by sector
(1981)
(¥10,000, in 1980 prices)
GVIO Share (%)
Food Processing 26,477 25.52
Chemical & Pharmaceutical 19,772 19.06
Machinery 18,874 18.19
Textile 12,882 12.42
Paper & Stationery 4,488 4.33
Building Material 3,711 3.58
Sub-total 86,204 83.09
Others 17,543 , 16.91
Total 103,747 100.00
Source: The AXSEZ Editorial Board (1986), p. 72.
3. Low Level of Capital Investment As a victim of the 
military confrontation, Xiamen had received less funds than 
other cities from the central and provincial governments for 
capital investment, which includes infrastructure 
constructions, the purchases of capital equipment and the 
major technological renovations in enterprises. Table 4-3.5 
shows that the periodic growth rates for the funds allocated 
to Xiamen over the seven periods (from 1950 to 1980) were 
markedly slower than those for Fuzhou, with the average growth 
rate being almost four percent behind (111.90% vs 115.89%). As 
a result, Xiamen's shares in Fujian's total capital investment 
funds had been persistently and noticeably smaller than those 
for Fuzhou, with the average share being nearly two percent 
smaller (6.63% vs 8.60%). Without doubt, this neglect of 
capital investment has been responsible, to a large extent, 
for many problems faced by Xiamen in the present development 
of the SEZ.
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Table 4-3.5 Growth of capital investment in Xiamen and 
Fuzhou in seven different periods of economic development
(1950 - 1980)
Fuj ian Xiamen Fuzhou
rcriou
Amount 
(¥10,000)
Amount G . R .a 
(¥10,000) (%)
Share
(%)
Amount G .R .a 
(¥10,000) (%)
Share
(%)
Rehabilitation
(1950-52) 
1st FYPP
7, 987 343 4.29 432 5.41
(1953-57) 
2nd FYPP
85,470 4,362 1171.72 5.10 4,828 1017.59 5.65
(1958-62)
Adjustment
235,224 20,488 369.69 8.71 22.856 373.44 9.72
(1963-65) 
3rd FYPP
72,522 4,100 -79.99 5.65 5,166 -77.40 7.12
(1966-70) 
4th FYPP
103,702 3, 001 -26.80 2.89 4,092 -20.79 3.95
(1971-75) 
5th FYPP
256,119 10,336 244.42 4.04 14,367 251.08 5.61
(1976-80) 349,563 31,048 200.39 8.88 43,738 204.43 12.51
Total 1,110,587 73,678 111. 90b 6.63c 95,479 115.89b 8.60c
Notes: a: Growth rate over the previous period; b: Average periodic growth 
rate; and c : Average share.
Sources: 1). Fujian: FSB (1989), p. 223;
2). Xiamen: The AXSEZ Editorial Board (1986), pp. 116-7;
3). Fuzhou: FZSB (1985), p. 275.
4. Low Level of Technology in Enterprise As a result of 
neglect and under - inves tment, plus the effect of the over­
centralized control of the depreciation funds, most industrial 
enterprises in Xiamen were characterized as those with "four
old's" (Silao) --  old buildings, old equipment, old
production techniques, and producing old products. Indeed, 86 
percent of the equipment and production techniques in the 
enterprises in the early 1980s were classified, by the Chinese 
standard, as those of the 1950s and 1960s (see Table 4-3.6). 
Not surprisingly, the overall level of the industrial 
technology in Xiamen lagged far behind the national average 
(Du Qiang, 1988: 58).
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Table 4-3.6 Composition of the industrial technologies in 
Xiamen's enterprises in the early 1980s by level (%)
1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s Total
Equipment 76.0 10.8 8.2 5.0 100.0
Production Technique 63.0 23.0 14.0 0.0 100.0
Source: The YCSEZ Editorial Board (1987), p. 253.
5. Reduced Importance of Exports Equipped with out-of- 
date technology, Xiamen was unable to produce competitive 
export goods. Table 4-3.7 reveals that from 1962 to 1980 
Xiamen's exports grew on average by mere 12.20 percent per 
year, compared with 18.54 percent for Fujian's total (both 
figures include inflationary elements). In particular, during 
the peak time of the Cultural Revolution Xiamen's exports
Table 4-3.7 Growth of Xiamen's exports (1962 - 1980)
Fujian's Total Exports Xiamen's Exports
Volume G. R.a Volume G.R.a Share in Total 
(¥10,000) (%) (¥10,000) (%) (%)
1962 2,538 1,485 58.51
1963 3,181 25.33 1,986 33 .74 62.43
1965 6,270 97.11 4,350 119.03 69.38
1966 7,728 23.25 3,504 -19.45 45.34
1970 8,705 12.64 3,011 -14.07 34.69
1971 9,702 11.45 2,565 -14.81 26.44
1975 23,695 144.23 5,316 107.25 22 .44
1976 21,887 -7.63 5,874 10.50 26.84
1980 54,185 147.57 11,783 100.60 21.75
AAGRb -----  18.54   12.20
Notes: a: Growth rate over the previous figure; and b: Average annual growth 
rate over the period of 1962-80.
Sources: 1). Fujian: The FSB Editorial Board (1990), p. 108;
2). Xiamen: The AXSEZ Editorial Board (1986), pp. 122-3.
suffered a steep decline, from ¥43.5 million in 1965 to ¥25.65 
million in 1971, despite the steady growth of the total export
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volume for Fujian over the same period. This led to a drastic 
reduce in its contribution to Fujian's exports, from 69.38 
percent at the height time (1965) to only 21.75 percent in 
1980, illustrating the declining importance of exports in 
Xiamen's pre-SEZ economy.
6. Big Fluctuations in Economic Growth Since the 
establishment of the centrally planned economy, Xiamen's
economy experienced three upswings and two downswings in the 
three turbulent decades (1950 - 1980). Table 4-3.8 and Figure 
4-3.3 demonstrate that Xiamen's economy fluctuated in line 
with, but with greater amplitude than, the general trend of 
the national economy in the six different periods. Thus, 
Xiamen witnessed upsurges of its economy in the 1st FYP 
period, the Adjustment period and the 5th FYP period, but 
experienced sharp downfalls during the campaigns of the Great 
Leap Forward (the 2nd FYP period) and the Cultural Revolution
(the 3rd and 4th FYP periods). This suggests that Xiamen's
economy had been fully integrated into China's central
planning and management systems and would therefore be 
responsive fully to the domestic economic cycle.
Table 4-3.8 The average annual growth rates of GVIAO in 
Xiamen and China in six different periods (1953 - 1980) (%)
Xiamen China
1st FYP period (1953 - 1957) 13 .5 10.9
2nd FYP period (1958 - 1962) -1.6 0.06
Adjustment period (1963 - 1965) 25.5 15.7
3rd FYP period (1966 - 1970) 5.8 9.6
4th FYP period (1971 - 1975) 5.8 7.6
5th FYP period (1976 - 1980) 12.1 8.1
Sources: 1). Xiamen: Table 4-3.2;
2). China: SSB (1989), p. 53.
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Figure 4-3.3 The average annual growth rates of GVIAO in 
Xiamen and China in six different periods (1953 - 1980)
Growth Rate (%)
A
25 Key:
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Source: Table 4-3.8.
To sum up, after three-decades of development under the 
centrally planned economic system, Xiamen had built a 
comprehensive but under-developed industrial system. Its 
industry grew on average by 12.86 percent per annum during the 
period of 1950-80, the labour productivity by 4.53 percent, 
and the people's living standard by 1.46 percent, compared 
slightly favourably with 12.46 percent, 4.17 percent and 1.41 
percent for the corresponding national figures.23
However, its economic development was constantly 
handicapped by the restrictions imposed on it by the central 
government because of its potential vulnerability to the 
military confrontation with Taiwan. As a result, its industry 
and basic infrastructures were chronically under-invested and 
severely under-developed. Industry was small, fragmentary and
23. The indicator of the People's Living Standard is 
represented by the Index of the Real Average Wage of Urban 
Workers and Staff.
For Xiamen's figure, see Table 3-3.2 and The AXSEZ 
Editorial Board (1986), pp. 112-3 and pp. 130-1; for the 
national figures, see SSB (1983), p. 216 and (1990), p. 65.
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showed little signs of interdependence and linkages among 
various sectors. The combination of the industrial problems 
and the rigid planning and management system made Xiamen's 
industry chronically inefficient and lacking in dynamism.
4-3-3. The Reform and Development since 1980
As a result of the establishment of the SEZ in 1980, 
Xiamen faced the unprecedented challenge of combining the 
reform of the old economic system with the development of a 
new, open one. The expansion of the SEZ to the whole Xiamen 
Island in 1984 has not only increased the SEZ territory from 
2.5 to 131 sq km but, more profoundly, embedded its 588 
existing enterprises situated in the urban areas of the Xiamen 
Municipality, apart from the 180 already established in Huli 
District since 1981. As a result, it became clear that the 
performance of the mainstay of the SEZ's economy, i.e. the 588 
old enterprises, would be vital to the success of the SEZ. 
This means that the restructuring of the old command economic 
system and the revitalization of the outmoded enterprises, in 
the light of the new development strategy, had to be put on 
the top agenda of reform and development.
Accordingly, immediately after the expansion, the Xiamen 
Municipal Government, now an effective SEZ government, 
declared that "the economic structural reform is the top 
priority" for the SEZ, and that the reform direction was to 
"turn the closed, inward-looking economy into an open, 
outward-looking one" (ACE Editorial Board, 1985: VII-36) .
The central government understood the unique situation of 
the SEZ and the national significance of its reform to the 
ongoing industrial reform. Consequently, Xiamen became the 
only SEZ which was chosen, together with other 16 cities, as 
a pilot city for comprehensive industrial reform in early 1986 
(Wang Luolin, 1986: 10). In April, the State Council took
another decisive step by granting the Xiamen SEZ the right of 
Independent Planning. This meant that the SEZ would, from 
1989, be treated as a province-level unit in the country's
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planning system, and thereby be able to bypass the Fujian 
provincial authorities to directly participate in all of 
national economic activities (RMRBh, 31/8/88: 3). These steps 
show clearly the Chinese authorities' intention to turn the 
Xiamen SEZ into a "laboratory" for the concurrent national 
economic reform.
Reforms and Changes
Mr. Zou Erjun, the mayor of Xiamen, has summarized the 
major reform measures and subsequent changes! that took place 
in Xiamen's industrial and trade systems*:
1. The closed, segmented and hierarchical economic system 
has gradually been replaced by an open, dynamic and 
horizontally connected one. Indeed, the rapid proliferation of 
various kinds of HEAs among foreign, interior and the zone 
partners has been the single most noticeable feature of the 
development in the SEZ in recent years. By the end of 1990, 
the number of various HEAs had reached 1,090, involving a 
total investment of ¥1,017 million, of which ¥818 million came 
from interior regions (AXSEZ Editorial Board, 1991: 116) .25 
At the same time, the SEZ had established economic and 
technological cooperation links with 26 provinces/ 
municipalities/autonomous regions, 25 central ministries and 
22 universities/colleges/research institutes. On the other 
hand, 110 local governments in the interior had set up their 
representative offices in Xiamen (ibid, 1990: 46).
2. Macroeconomic management has been improved, with the 
substitution of the indirect regulation through economic and 
legal levers for the direct control via administrative means. 
A key feature of this reform has been the drastic reduction of
24. See Zou Erjun (1988). In order to illustrate Zou's 
points, data from other official sources, as indicated, are 
also used.
25. The Xiamen authorities have specifically encouraged 
the development of inward-linked economic associations 
(Neilian Qiye) in the SEZ. For details of the relevant policy 
and regulations, see Appendix D.
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the scope of the mandatory plan and the establishment of 
factor and product markets. Today, more than 70 percent of 
inputs needed by enterprises come from, and about 90 percent 
of products produced by local enterprises go to, unregulated 
or free markets.
3. The single-public-ownership system has been replaced 
by a multiple-ownership one. As a result of the rapid 
proliferation of various kinds of HEAs, the share of the 
industrial outputs produced by non-public sectors had climbed 
steadily from nothing in 1981 to 56.25 percent in 1990, while 
that for the public sectors declined firmly from 99.98 percent 
to 43.75 percent (ibid, 1991: 44) . That is to say, by 1990 the 
non-public economy, most of which were the mixture or 
associations of various public and private (including foreign) 
sectors, had already become the dominant economic force in 
Xiamen. Obviously, this has laid down a good foundation for 
the further development of a market-oriented economy in the 
SEZ.
4. Most enterprises have been restructured through the 
far-reaching decentralisation of decision-making powers 
(Jianzheng Fangquan) in the light of the principle of 
separating ownership and management. Since the early 1980s 
they have experienced a variety of reform programmes, 
including the removal of price subsidies, the substitution of 
taxation for profit delivery, the contract-responsibility- 
system and, more recently, the separation of tax and profits.
In addition, a dozen of COEs have become joint-stock 
companies by issuing shares to their workers and staff, and 11 
small and unprofitable public plants have been sold or leased 
to other organisations or private individuals, including 
foreigners (Research Office, 1989: 220; Su Yanhan 1989). All 
these measures were intended to increase the autonomy of 
enterprises and make them accountable to their own 
operations .26
5. The price reform has been characterized by the
26. For detailed analyses of the enterprise reform, see 
Chapter 5.
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replacement of the traditional single-fixed-price system by a 
three-tier system of fixed, floating and free prices. The 
numbers of commodities controlled by the Provincial Price 
Committee had dropped from 712 in 1979 to 48 in 1988. While 
most enterprises have been allowed to set prices for their 
products (excluding those subject to the state direct 
control) , the major effort was put on stabilizing the 
aggregate level of prices (Zhu Guanghua, 1988).27
6. The foreign trade reform has produced two major 
achievements. 1) . The decentralization of the right of dealing 
in foreign trade had resulted in the increase in the number of 
trading entities from 8 to 139 by 1988, thus creating certain 
degree of competition among the state-controlled trading 
corporations, local smaller trading companies and key 
manufacturers. 2). The introduction of the CRS, which links 
the total amount of foreign exchange earned and the level of 
profits/losses to all-levelled sections and individuals in a 
trading company, has significantly improved the efficiency of 
business operations. For example, in 1988 the average costs of 
earning one US dollar went down sharply, ¥0.37 less than the 
target fixed by the provincial government. As a result, ¥3.96 
million has been saved (AFE Editorial Board, 1988: 91).28
7. The radical financial and monetary reform has led to 
the establishment of a new, open and multiple-layer monetary 
system, which is centred by the People's Bank of China, 
dominated by the state specialized banks, and supplemented by 
foreign banks, Chinese-foreign joint banks, local monetary and 
credit cooperatives. Indeed, Xiamen has made a lot of efforts 
to diversify the channels of raising funds and the means of 
business credit. Xiamen is particularly proud of the fact that 
China's first Chinese-foreign joint bank, the Xiamen 
International Bank, was set up in Xiamen in 1987.
8. The employment reform has been carried out in full
27. For the further discussion of the price reform, 
especially in relation to the trade reform, see Chapter 7.
28. For more detailed analyses of the trade reform and its 
relationship with the price reform, see Chapter 7.
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swing. Instead of being offered lifelong jobs, many people in 
Xiamen are now employed on contract base through the newly 
established labour markets and the professional exchange 
agencies. Enterprises have the right to recruit or dismiss 
their workers and staff, and to hire technical and managerial 
personnel from home and abroad. By 1988 some 21,600 contracted 
workers and professionals had been employed in Xiamen (Zheng 
Jinmu and Huang Shengzhi, 1988).
Performance of the Economy
Xiamen has made a great deal of effort to improve its 
infrastructure ever since becoming a SEZ. Of most significant 
concern was the strengthening of its connections with the 
outside world. Four deep-water berths (two for 50,000-dwt 
ships and two for 100,000-dwt ships), one of which was 
designed for container traffic, have been built in the Dongdu 
Harbour. In 1983, the Xiamen International Airport was opened, 
linking it with some 25 major domestic and foreign cities. In 
the same year, the 220-km Yongan-Xiamen power transmission 
line (220,000 volts) was completed. In addition, a digitized 
telephone exchange was introduced and a microwave 
telecommunication system installed.
At the same time, Xiamen has been able to speed up its 
economic development as the reform accelerated. The national 
income grew on average by 16.74 percent per annum from 1981 to 
1990, compared with only 9.40 percent for the pre-SEZ period 
of 1950-1980. This has pushed up the national income per 
capita to ¥3,850 in 1990, 206.77 percent more than that in
1980 (AXSEZ Editorial Board, 1991: 250) .29
The industrial and export sectors have made an impressive 
progress. The average annual growth rates for them during the
29. According to Perkins (1988), the most convincing 
figure for showing positive or negative impacts of the reform 
on the economic performance is "the growth rate of what the 
Chinese call 'national income' but which Western economists 
usually refer to as Net Material Product (NMP)". See Perkins 
(1988), pp. 627-8.
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period of 1981-90 were 23.24 percent and 21.94 percent 
respectively, all substantially higher than the national rates 
over the same period (13.56% and 10.68%) and their record for
the pre-SEZ period (12.86% and
Table 4-3.9 The industrial
(1950
16.88%) (
and export 
- 1990)
see Table 4-3.9). 
growth in Xiamen
Year GVIO Exports
(¥10,000, in 1980 prices) (US$10,000)
1950 2,503 130.41
1980 94,298 14,027.38
Average annual growth rate (%) 12.86 16.88
1981 103,885 13,112.19
1982 113,180 12,401.68
1983 120,211 12,380.90
1984 150,855 15,584.66
1985 218,522 16,527.49
1986 246,864 16,374.25
1987 328,567 26,107.17
1988 481,600 57,607.00
1989 565,400 64,678.00
1990 681,627 78,148.16
Average annual growth rate (%) 23.24 21.94
National average annual growth
rate (%) (1981-90) 13.56 10.68
Sources: 1). 1950-85: AXSEZ Editorial Board (1986) pp. 112-3 & 122-3;
2) . 1986: XSB (1987), pp. 13
3). 1987: XSB (1988), pp. 13
4). 1988-89: AXSEZ Editorial
& 350;
& 328;
Board (1990) pp. 154 Sc 324;
5). 1990: AXSEZ Editorial Board (1991), pp. 221 & 227;
6). The national rates: calculated from the data in Table 2-3.1 and
Table 3-1.2.
Based on these achievements, Mr. Zou proudly announced 
that "the industrial reform has achieved a huge success and
the outward-looking economy has basically been built up" in
the Xiamen SEZ (RMRBh, 14/10/89: 2).
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4-3-4. Summary30
Xiamen is blessed with a variety of location advantages, 
which could greatly expedite the development of the SEZ if 
they are utilized properly. They can be highlighted as 
follows:
1. Favourable Geographical Conditions As a port, Xiamen 
is located right between the two most dynamic and affluent
areas in today's China --  the Yangtze and Pearl valleys --
and on many of the southern and eastern China coastal traffic 
routes, which means that entrepot trade will be an important 
part of its economic activities. Furthermore, Xiamen's 
harbour, which is protected by a series of islands along the 
43 km of deep-waster coastline, is the best among all the 
SEZs.
In addition, Xiamen's climatic conditions are ideal for 
the development of an export-oriented agriculture and fishery 
industry.
2. A Long History of Overseas Trade With a history of 
more than 600 years of foreign trade, Xiamen's experience in 
dealing with foreign trade is undoubtedly of immense value to 
its present drive to develop an export-oriented economy.
3. A Special Link with Overseas Chinese and Taiwanese The 
unique link is an important asset for Xiamen because it not 
only represents an important source of foreign exchange 
remittance and direct investment but also exerts a profound 
impact on the future shape of the SEZ.
4. A Relatively-Developed Industrial and Commercial Base 
This advantage enables Xiamen to develop and improve its 
export manufacturing, financing, distributing, and marketing 
capacities more quickly and efficiently than other SEZs.
5. A Sizable Pool of Professionals and Skilled Workers 
Xiamen has the highest density of higher education 
institutions and university graduates among all SEZs. It was 
estimated that 40 out of every 1,000 people have received
30. This section draws extensively on Li Si-ming and Zhao 
Ling-xun (1992).
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higher education, a ratio six times higher than the national 
average.
6. Rich Tourist Resources Dubbed as "a garden on the 
sea, " Xiamen attracted more than one and half million of 
domestic and foreign tourists annually in the late 1980s,31 
and indeed had the highest revenues from tourism among all the 
SEZs.
On the other hand, Xiamen's further development could be 
constrained by several geographical, economic and political 
factors. They include:
1. A Limited Hinterland Xiamen's hinterland only covers 
the neighbouring southern and southwestern Fujian regions, 
with a total areas of 67,000 sq km and a population of 14 
millions. The combined GVIAO for these regions in the mid- 
1980s was about ¥10 billion, which is only equivalent of a 
medium-sized city's level. Compared with the hinterland the 
three SEZs in Guangdong have (the Pearl River valley, some 
parts of Hunan and Guangxi provinces), Xiamen's is far too 
small and less developed.
2. Chronical Shortage of Power and Water Supplies This 
shortcoming has for years served as the "bottleneck" to 
Xiamen's further development, deterring foreign investors from 
making further or bigger investment.
3. Over-Strained Surface Transportation The capacity of 
the Causeway and the Ying-Xia Railway is too small to meet the 
growing traffic demands. Every year an estimated 5-6 million 
tonnes of goods needed by Xiamen cannot be transported to the 
city because of the inadequate rail capacity.
4. A Large Number of Small-Sized, Inefficient Enterprises 
These old, mostly public-owned enterprises, some of which are 
still making losses now, form the majority of the industrial 
enterprises and employ about 70 percent of the total workforce 
in Xiamen. Hence, to restructure them is clearly a daunting 
task.
31. The number of foreign tourists (including Taiwanese) 
in 1990, for example, reached 210,800 (AXSEZ Editorial Board, 
1991: 114).
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5. Potential Threat of Military Confrontation Although 
the atmosphere in the Taiwan Straits has become more and more 
relaxed in recent years, the threat of using forces by one 
side against the other has never been removed. As a result, 
the economic integration and further cooperation between the 
two sides have been circumscribed considerably.
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Chapter 5 
THE ENTERPRISE REFORM IN XIAMEN
After the enlargement of the Xiamen SEZ from the original 
Huli District to the whole Xiamen island (including the 
Gulangyu Islet) in 1984, the SEZ authorities seized the 
opportunity to upgrade the development goal of the SEZ from an 
EPZ-type zone to a comprehensive, industrial-oriented economic 
zone. The new development objective states that:
"In the long run, the Xiamen SEZ should be built 
into a comprehensive and outward-looking economic 
zone with characteristics of a Free-Trade-Port. It 
will mainly develop industry but at the same time 
also manage tourism, commerce and real estate" 
(AXSEZ Editorial Board, 1986: 1).
Facing the reality that the bulk of the SEZ's economy was 
588 small and medium-sized, mostly public-owned, outmoded 
industrial enterprises, the authorities sorted out development 
priorities and formulated a short-term policy in the light of 
the long-term objective. They identified the rejuvenation of 
the existing enterprises, by radical economic management 
reform and technological innovation, as the key to the 
development of a competitive export-oriented industry. In 
terms of the economic reform, the policy stipulates two 
priorities:
"The present economic reform should focus on, at the 
micro level, rejuvenating industrial enterprises, 
especially big- and medium-sized ones, and, at the 
macro level, restructuring the price system both for 
goods and services. This is intended to create a 
sound macroeconomic environment and force the 
enterprise to increase its operational efficiency 
and international competitiveness" (ibid: 12-3).
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This chapter will examine the economic reform at the 
micro level, i.e. the enterprise reform, in the Xiamen SEZ. 
The macro reform, namely the price reform, will be dealt in 
conjunction with foreign trade reform in Chapter 7; while 
technological innovation will be examined in connection with 
the utilization of FDI in Chapter 6.
As the term industry is used in a variety of different 
ways in the Chinese economic literature, it is necessary 
therefore to strictly define the types of the activities to 
which the term is limited. In this thesis, the term industry 
refers only to manufacturing, i.e. the major division 3 in the 
International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC).1
Most industrial enterprises in Xiamen (especially in the 
urban area) are in the public-owned sector, i.e. either SOEs 
or COEs. Therefore, the discussion in this thesis will focus 
on the public-owned enterprises, especially SOEs. A SOE, 
according to a World Bank publication, is defined as:
" (a) a government owned productive organization that 
(b) is expected to earn a significant portion of its 
revenues from the sale of the goods or services it 
produces, (c) possesses an accounting system 
separate from any government agency that controls or 
supervises it, and (d) is a distinct legal entity" 
(Shirley, 1983: 2).
Thus, Section 5-1 is to explain the significance and 
policy of the enterprise reform in Xiamen; Section 5-2 
examines the first stage of the reform; Section 5-3 presents 
three major different perceptions of the reform problems; 
Section 5-4 goes on to analyze the second stage of the reform; 
and finally Section 5-5 concludes this chapter.
5-1. The Significance and Policy of the Reform
As introduced in the proceeding chapter, 588 old 
industrial enterprises in Xiamen have proved to be a major
1. For more information about the ISIC system, refer to 
Kirkpatrick, et al. (1984), pp. 2-4.
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obstacle to its ambition to build up a dynamic exporting 
industry. In particular, the old, Soviet-style management 
system of these enterprises have been most problematic.
Since the implementation of the economic reform and 
"open-door" policy in Xiamen, many TVEs have operated with 
much greater autonomy from the framework of central planning 
and are thus able to avoid many problems stemming from that 
system. On the other hand, individual private businesses and 
FIEs have operated almost totally free of bureaucratic 
restriction and have achieved faster growth.
As a result, the local SOEs were losing share in the 
market daily and, indeed, faced the danger of being swallowed 
by the fast expanding private (including foreign-owned) 
economy. Thus, a enterprise reform aimed at rejuvenating the 
rundown local enterprises, especially the SOEs, is both 
inevitable and imperative.
The Significance of the Reform
Reform of SOEs is the cornerstone of the economic reform 
programme in almost all socialist and formerly socialist 
economies, and it is also an important component of the 
economic liberalization policy carried out by many developing 
countries in the last two decades or so. Thus, the enterprise 
reform in Xiamen is not only crucial to the success of the SEZ 
but also has profound implications for the economic reform in 
China and indeed for other reforming socialist, former 
socialist and developing countries as well. This is because:
1) . Since 1984 China has constantly and unequivocally put 
enterprise reform at the centre of the industrial reform. This 
can easily be verified in almost every official reform 
document. The essence of enterprise reform in China is "to 
separate government function and enterprise business, or 
enterprise management and ownership." This is intended "to 
give bigger decision-making power to enterprises in their 
daily businesses and force them to be responsible to their own 
profits or losses" (Central Committee, 1984). Yet the reform
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has, as shown in Chapter 3, not achieved the goal yet.
With the implementation of the Special Policy in the SEZ, 
however, the reform in Xiamen, a typical small and medium 
industrial city in China, has the potential to add fresh 
impetus to the almost stagnant domestic enterprise reform. 
Indeed, the fact that Xiamen was designated as a pilot city 
for comprehensive economic reform in 1986 clearly shows the
important role Xiamen is expected to p l a y  acting as a
laboratory for the ongoing domestic economic reform. Thus, the 
enterprise reform in Xiamen is not only crucial to the 
development of its export-led industrial economy but also has 
a great bearing on the domestic economic reform.
2) . As in China, the SOE in most socialist and the 
formerly socialist countries is the dominant sector in the 
economy and has generally not performed well. Most socialist 
economies have lengthy histories of enterprise reform, in 
which they tried to increase operational efficiency of their 
SOEs by substituting market-like mechanisms for the command 
mechanisms of plan fulfilment. However, as introduced in 
Chapter 1, they have failed to improve the efficiency, 
productivity and related performance levels of their SOEs, 
many of which are now either deteriorating or even collapsing.
With the vigorous introduction of foreign capital, 
especially the rapid development of FIEs side by side with 
SOEs, the enterprise reform in Xiamen presents a dimension new 
to the reform of socialist and the formerly socialist 
economies, and may thus be able to answer, at least partly, 
the question why the previous reforms have never been 
successful.
3). China's enterprise reform, particularly in terms of 
increasing enterprise autonomy and raising productivity, is, 
as described in Section 1-5-1, "in many respects similar in 
nature to" the economic liberalization carried out in a number 
of developing countries. The essence of this liberalization is 
to "reduce the hold of the government bureaucracy over the 
economy and to replace bureaucratic direction with the
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impersonal forces of the market" (Perkins, 1988: 603).2 Thus 
the enterprise reform is by no means unique to the Xiamen SEZ 
or, indeed, to any socialist economy, but is an important 
component of industrialization policy for all developing 
countries.
4). In view of the Xiamen SEZ's task to attract foreign 
capital to develop an export-oriented industry, the enterprise 
reform is actually an important step for the SEZ government to 
take to improve its economic policy environment, or "soft 
infrastructure," as it is called locally, for foreign 
investment.
Experience in many EPZs throughout the world has shown 
that the soundness of the general economic policy pursued by 
host countries, rather than the policies relating specifically 
to foreign investment, is a major factor determining the net 
gains or losses of foreign investment.3 Indeed, the foreign 
observers who attended the international seminar held in 
Xiamen in 1987, clearly pointed out that "a market-oriented 
and open policy environment is crucial" if Xiamen and other 
SEZs are to be successful. They argued that "no amount of 
interest and support from the national and zone authorities 
would be able to counterbalance the negative impact of an 
inappropriate policy and institutional environment" (Brogan, 
1988: 8).
That is why many western investors have recommended 
developing countries to reform their domestic economic system 
before introducing foreign capital.4 Thus Xiamen's enterprise
2. Janos Kornai has a splendid analysis of the nature of 
this type of liberalization. See particularly Kornai (1986) .
3. For more about the importance of the general economic 
policy of the host country in attracting foreign investment, 
see Moran, et. al. (1986), pp. 95-6; James, et. al. (1987),
pp. 22, 27 and 101; Chenery, et. al. (1986), p. 358; and
Reuber, at. el. (1973), pp. 243-8.
4. For more details of the policy reform in the 
developing countries/regions which pursued export-led 
industrialization, see chiefly Linnemann, et al. (1987); 
Moran, et al. (1986) and Balassa (1977).
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reform, involving the introduction of market forces into 
enterprise operations and hence creation of an environment 
sympathetic and compatible to private economy, undoubtedly 
represents such important initiative, apart from being an 
integral part of the Chinese domestic economic reform.
The Reform Policy
The enterprise reform in China contains, according to the 
Reform Decision, two important and interrelated issues: first, 
the relationship between the state and the enterprise, and 
second, the restructuring of the internal operational 
mechanism of enterprise. Based on this official line, the 
Xiamen SEZ authorities worked out their own reform policy, 
which, they claimed, had taken Xiamen's development objective 
into account. This reform policy was unveiled in an officially
published book --  Xiamen Socio-Economic Development
Strategies for 1985 - 2000. It calls for carrying out an 
"unprecedentedly radical economic structural reform" in order 
to "create sound micro- and macro-economic environments 
conducive to the development of an export-oriented outward- 
looking economy." The reform should, it declares, "focus on 
rejuvenating existing enterprises by applying market 
mechanisms to them and forcing them to operate in the light of 
international business rules" (Research Office, 1989: 129).
As a first step to the enterprise reform, the authorities 
decided to abolish the huge financial subsidies they had over 
years put into inefficient and loss-making enterprises. This 
was intended, on the one hand, to "reduce the government's 
financial burdens and readjust the relationship between the 
state and the enterprise" and, on the other hand, to 
"strengthen financial discipline or harden budgetary 
constraints on enterprises and thus restructure their 
operational mechanisms." In the meantime, the authorities also 
stressed that removal of subsidies on the enterprises must be 
carried out "in close coordination with price, wage, tax, 
credit, and financial reforms" (ibid; Zhu Guanghua, 1988).
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5-2. The First Wave of the Reform: Removing Price Subsidies
As described in Section 4-3, Xiamen, like hundreds of 
China's small and medium industrial cities, possessed an 
outmoded but all-embracing industry, which had no obvious 
leading sector based on its own comparative advantages and the 
market conditions. A typical characteristic of this type of 
industry is that the costs of production tend to be very high. 
With the implementation of the reform and "open-door" policy, 
the financial position of SOEs became increasingly precarious. 
For example, Xiamen Biscuit Factory, the pillar of the food 
processing industry in the SEZ, mainly relied on manual 
operations to produce its products. At the same time, it had 
to pay high prices to get raw materials due to the fierce 
competition from rapidly developing TVEs. As a result, the 
costs of its production were much higher than those of its 
counterparts in neighbouring Guangdong province. Indeed, the 
whole Xiamen biscuit market was facing the danger of being 
taken over by Guangdong (Du Qiang, 1988).
However, the food processing industry was one of Xiamen's 
key industries, employing several thousands of workers, making 
up 17-20 percent of the SEZ's total GVIO, and providing 35-40 
percent of total exports (Research Office, 1989: 125).
Clearly, the authorities could not afford to let it go 
bankrupt. Instead, they rescued it by putting a huge subsidy 
on the prices of its outputs5. Xiamen Tinned-Food Factory and 
Xiamen Bicycle Factory faced the similar situation (ibid).
A local economist disclosed that every year the 
authorities had to spent about ¥60 million on such price 
subsidies in order to bail inefficient and loss-making 
enterprises out (Zhu Guanghua, 1988). This huge financial 
burden severely handicapped the authorities' ability to carry 
out key infrastructure constructions, central to the
5. Of course, the subsidies sometimes also went to the 
purchase of inputs. Many enterprises facing the crisis often 
received inputs with "reasonable prices" from government 
agencies. See the Research Office (1989), p. 177.
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development of the SEZ. Consequently, they had no option but 
to choose the elimination of the subsidies as the first 
priority of the enterprise reform.
The authorities originally planned to eliminate all kinds 
of price subsidies outright and divert the subsidy fund 
totally to wages of all workers and staff in local enterprises 
and governmental establishments to compensate for the imminent 
price rise in the market. This would, in their words, turn the 
"invisible subsidies" (on prices) into "visible subsidies" (on 
wages). They estimated that the price level would go up by 
about 3 percent due to the removal of the subsidies, and the 
share of wage in the costs of production up to about 10 
percent (from previously 7-8 percent) because of the increase 
in wages.
Based on this estimation, the authorities confidently 
predicted that the increase in prices would be met by the 
simultaneously increased wages, while the extra costs of 
production could be absorbed by most enterprises through an 
improvement in productivity. Even if some enterprises might 
fail to achieve that and hence suffer a reduction in their 
profits, the pressure on the total financial revenues of the 
SEZ government would be fairly minor, since the government 
would no longer have to increase the price subsidies annually 
as it used to (Zhu Guanghua, 1988).6
Unfortunately, this first reform programme was soon 
hampered by a few obstacles and made little headway. The 
authorities clearly underestimated the extent of the price 
increase and over-estimated the capacity of enterprises to 
absorb the extra costs of production. As shown in Table 5-2.1, 
in 1985, when the removal of subsidies was carried out in full 
scale, the People's Living Costs Index, composed of the retail 
price indexes for both consumer goods and services, suddenly 
jumped to 22 percent, compared to 7.4 percent in the previous
6. In fact, Mr. Zhu Guanghua, a scholar in the Fujian 
Academy of Social Sciences, claimed that the reduced amount of 
the profits of those enterprises was equal to the annual 
increasing amount of the price subsidies the government would 
otherwise have to put on the enterprises. See Zhu (1988).
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year, then to nearly 29 percent in 1988 and indeed had never 
come back to the original level since.7
Table 5-2.1 The people's living costs index (PLCI) in Xiamen
(1981 - 1989)
(previous year as 100)
Year 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89
PLCI 104.3 102 .2 102.3 107.4 122.0 109.4 112.1 128.9 124.0
Of which:
Goods 104.7 102.6 101.9 107.2 123.1 109.8 111.9 130.1 124.8
Serv. 100.6 100.5 107.1 109.5 112.2 104.8 114.3 114.7 115.2
Sources: 1) 1981-85: the AXSEZ Editorial Board, (1986), p. 91;
2) 1986: XSB (1987), pp. 340-1;
3) 1987: XSB (1988), pp. 320-1;
4) 1988: XSB (1989), pp. 352-4;
5) 1989: XSB (1990), pp. 305-6.
While consumers suffered from the high inflation, most 
manufacturers also endured substantial losses in their 
profits. This was because they, on the one hand, failed to 
improve their productivity to absorb the extra input costs, 
and, on the other hand, could not pass on the extra costs to 
the consumers due to the restriction imposed by the 
government. It was reported that about 50-60 percent of SOEs 
suffered, to various degrees, such losses (Luo Huiming, 1988) .
As a result, the call for a drastic cut in their profit 
tax became increasingly strong among SOEs, which had to pay 
the tax at 55 percent rate. Indeed, the need for tax reduction 
became more pressing as the government had been accused of 
organising an unfair competition, since all foreign-invested 
and domestic-associated enterprises in the SEZ only pay 15 
percent in the light of the Special Policy.8 Why then was the 
government reluctant to cut the tax rate of its own
7. There are no accurate data available about the extent 
of price increase in producer goods, but nor is there any 
reason to suggest that the extent was lower than that of 
consumer goods.
8. See Article 6, Appendix D.
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enterprises?
As described above, the government finance in the SEZ was 
under an intense pressure due to the fact that financial 
revenues had grown slower than the economic growth, on the one 
hand, and that the demand for a greater financial expenditures 
for capital construction had become ever stronger, on the 
other.
As can be seen from Table 5-2.2, the growth rates of the 
total financial revenues were markedly lower than those of the 
national income from 1985 to 1989, reflecting the difficult 
situation of the government finance. Also, the profit tax paid 
and the profit deliveries made by the local enterprises 
accounted for nearly 87 percent of the total financial 
revenues in 1985, indicating the crucial role played by them 
in raising government revenues.9
Table 5-2.2 Annual growth rates of national income, total 
government financial revenue, and the share of enterprise 
contribution in the Xiamen SEZ (1985 - 1989)
(¥100 million, in current prices)
Year 85 86 87 88 89
National income 8.69 13.52 17.23 28.69 38.96
Annual growth rate (%) ---- 55.58 27.41 66.51 35.78
Total financial revenue 4.41 5.65 7.01 10.43 13 .47
Annual growth rate (%)
Of which:
Enterprises' profit tax
28.12 24.07 48.79 29.15
and deliveries 3.83 4.54 4.92 6.12 7.79
Annual growth rate (%) ---- 18.54 8.37 24.39 27.29
Share in total revenue(%)86.82 80.35 70.19 58.68 57.83
Sources: 1). 1985: XSB (1986), pp. 70 & 401;
2). 1986: XSB (1987), p. 363;
3). 1987: XSB (1988), pp. 12 & 339;
4). 1988: XSB (1989), p 377;
5). 1989: XSB (1990), pp. 166-8.
9. In China, the total government financial revenues is 
composed of budgetary and non-budgetary revenues. The first 
group, making up about 80 percent of the total, comes mainly 
from the profit tax and the profit delivery of local 
enterprises, while the second primarily from the revenues of 
the local governmental administrative departments.
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However, despite strong growth of the total financial 
revenue over years, the share contributed by the enterprises 
dropped steadily: from 86.82 percent in 1985 to 57.83 percent 
in 1989. This can be explained by the fact that the annual 
growth rates of the enterprise contribution from 1985 to 1989 
were substantially lower than those of the total financial 
revenue over the same period, manifesting a declining position 
of the enterprises as a major contributor to the government 
coffers.
Table 5-2.3 Growth of the total financial revenue and 
capital construction in Xiamen (1984 - 1989)
(¥100 million, in current prices)
Year 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Financial revenues 3.62 4.41 5.65 7.01 10.43 13 .47
Growth rate(84 as 100) ---- 21.82 56.08 93 .65 188.12 272.10
Capital construction 4.61 11.72 9.89 10.65 13.37 17.73
Growth rate(84 as 100) --- 154.23 114.53 131.02 190.02 284.60
Sources: 1). Financial revenue: Table 5-2.2;
2). Capital construction:
a). 1984-85: the AXSEZ Editorial Board (1986), pp. 83 & 95;
b). 1986: XSB (1987), p. 187;
c). 1987: XSB (1988), p. 131;
d). 1988: XSB (1989), p. 159;
e). 1989: XSB (1990), p. 256.
In contrast to this relative stagnation of revenue, the 
demand for more funds from the government had accelerated. 
First, compared to 1984, capital construction in Xiamen from 
1985 to 1989 consistently outpaced the growth of the 
government financial revenues (see Table 5-2.3).10 As a 
result, the pressure exerted on the government finance is 
enormous, despite the fact that the government appropriations
10. Capital construction, mainly including the citywide 
infrastructure construction and technological innovation in 
existing enterprises, has always been the biggest spending 
item, accounting for more than half of the government 
expenditures.
Other main items are health care, culture, education, 
scientific researches, and governmental administration, etc..
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normally accounted for only 50-60 percent of the total costs 
of capital construction. It was estimated that total costs 
during the period of 1985-90 would be ¥5 billion, but the 
government could only be able to provide ¥2 billion, thus 
leaving a gap of more than ¥3 billion (Research Office, 1989: 
216).n
Second, additional pressure arose from some exceptional 
elements. Starting from 1986-87, Xiamen entered the peak 
period of debt repayment for the huge bank loans borrowed in 
early 1980s when the SEZ was created. In 1986 alone, for 
example, the total payment of interest and principle accounted 
for 38 percent of the government expenditure budget in the 
year (ibid: 211).
Third, the government had to pay a substantial amount of 
compensation to some overseas Chinese and Taiwanese for 
occupying their original premises in Xiamen, with an area of 
more than 200,000 sq metres being involved (He Lifeng, 1986) .
In short, there was a big gap between what the government 
finance could offer and what the public projects demanded. 
Given the fact that the demand for big and key capital
constructions deemed as crucial to the improvement of the
SEZ's investment environment in Xiamen would remain strong
until the early 1990s, the government finance is bound to have 
a very difficult time to come. "As the financial revenue is 
hard to increase sufficiently and the expenditures to reduce 
significantly in a short time," admitted by the authorities, 
"the government has no alternative but to exert a tight 
control over the public-owned enterprises and take away most 
of their profits" (Research Office, 1989: 211). That is why 
the Xiamen authorities were so reluctant to reduce the local 
enterprises' profit tax rate and the amount of profit 
deliveries.
As a result, the first wave of the enterprise reform, 
aimed at to restructuring the operational mechanism of
11. Capital construction was also financed by bank loans, 
enterprise' self-raised funds, and foreign capital, etc., 
apart from the government appropriations.
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enterprises by removing the price subsidies, failed to proceed 
further because of what the authorities described as 
"exceptionally severe financial difficulties."
5-3. Different Perceptions of the Problem
Faced with the setback of the enterprise reform in 
Xiamen, local academics and experts debated the problem from 
different perspectives and some of them even put forward their 
policy recommendations.
Three major arguments have emerged from the discussion. 
The first, represented chiefly by Mr. Guo Zheming, the 
director of the SEZ Research Institute of Xiamen University, 
and Mr. Luo Huiming, a deputy director of Fujian Centre of 
Economic Studies, attributes the problem to "the failure to 
fully make use of the Special Policy" granted by the central 
government (Guo Zheming, 1988; Luo Huiming, 1988) . The second, 
contended mainly by Mr. Du Qiang, a research fellow of the SEZ 
Research Institute of Fujian Academy of Social Sciences, 
blames the problems squarely on "the established economic 
management system" (Du Qiang, 1988). The third, argued 
principally by Mr. Su Yanhang, the director of the SEZ 
Research Institute of Fujian Academy of Social Sciences, 
identifies the "lack of a coherent coordination between the 
development objective of the SEZ and the specific policy 
measures" as the prime reason (Su Yanhang, 1989).
The Xiamen SEZ authorities apparently agreed with much of 
the first and second views. The official book, Xiamen Socio- 
Economic Development Strategies for 1985 - 2000, clearly
states that "the deep reason for failing to push the 
enterprise reform ahead lies in our established institutions 
and the failure to understand and utilise the Special Policy 
properly." It argues that "while on the whole following the 
general reform policy of the country, Xiamen should explore 
and open up its own way of reform by freeing itself from the 
constraints of the established system." "To achieve this," it 
goes on, "we must bring the existing Special Policy into full
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play and ask the Centre, if necessary, to grant us more 
autonomy." "Only with an effective Special Policy," it 
concludes, "can the old and rigid system be smashed and a new 
and open one established" (Research Office, 1989: 127).
The central government seemed to accept the conclusion 
reached by the SEZ authorities. In early 1988, the SEZ was 
granted a provincial status in the national economic planning, 
i.e. Independent Planning. That is to say, the SEZ can now 
bypass the Fujian provincial government and negotiate directly 
with the central government in terms of financial and physical 
arrangements. This latest policy initiative taken by the 
Centre has undoubtedly given the SEZ a big push in its drive 
to restructure the enterprise management system. Soon, a new 
reform strategy, claimed to be "quite different from the 
national reform plan," was formulated and the second wave of 
the enterprise reform launched in the Xiamen SEZ.
5-4. The Second Wave of the Reform: the Separation of Tax and 
Profits.
The second wave of the enterprise reform was centred on
a new idea the Separation of Tax and Profits (STP) (Shuili
Fenliu) . Like other SEZs and pilot cities in China, Xiamen has 
carried out some radical reforms in most of its COEs and some 
small-sized SOEs. By the end of 1989, a dozen enterprises had 
become joint-stock companies by issuing shares to their
employees and the general public. Four small SOEs were
converted into collective ownership. While eleven failing
factories were either taken over by or merged with more
dynamic local TVEs, seven profitable ones set up joint 
ventures with foreign investors. Some private individuals, 
both local and foreign, were reported to have taken over the 
management of several enterprises, mostly loss-making, through 
a variety of contractual agreements (XMRB, 8/9/91) . But for 
the majority of SOEs which still constituted the backbone of 
Xiamen's economy, the STP scheme was their principal reform 
programme.
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Background
As introduced in Chapter 2, prior to the present economic 
reform, a SOE in China was required to hand over all of its 
profits to the responsible government department, whether at 
the national or local level. Its capital expenditures in turn 
were approved and totally funded by the department. There was 
virtually no incentive to exceed production targets, since an 
efficient enterprise could find itself starved of capital 
while its profits were diverted to finance investment in a 
less successful enterprise. Thus profitable and unprofitable, 
efficient and inefficient enterprises were all "eating from 
the one big pot."
Before the mid-1980s, Xiamen basically followed the 
national reform policy in carrying out its enterprise 
reform.12 In the late 1970s and early 1980s, a series of 
experiments were introduced, whereby the enterprise management 
was given greater control over production decisions once the 
basic production targets were fulfilled, and enterprises were 
allowed to retain a proportion of its profits in excess of 
"planned" profits, which were to be turned over to the state.
Later, an Profit Tax on the profits of all SOEs was 
introduced to replace profit delivery (Li Gai Shui). All 
enterprises keeping "independent economic accounts" were 
subject to the tax.13 The rate of tax varied from enterprise 
to enterprise, being calculated according to complex formulae. 
In general, large- and medium-sized enterprises paid tax at a 
flat rate of 55 percent while small enterprises were taxed 
according to a progressive scale, beginning at 7 percent and
12. The following information regarding the reform 
programmes implemented nationwide are based on Liu Suinian and 
Wu Quangan (1986), A.J. Easson (1990), Plasschaert (1990), and 
The Reform Centre (1989).
13. The Profit Tax is calculated annually on the basis of 
profits earned during the fiscal year, but is payable in 
advance on a daily, ten-daily or monthly basis. Normally it is 
paid to the local tax bureau of the Finance Department.
For more discussions of China's tax reform, especially 
the programme of Li Gai Shui, see Prime (1992) .
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rising to 55 percent (with an average rate of 40 percent) 
where annual profits exceed ¥80,000.14
At the same time, indirect taxation also underwent a 
radical reform. The previous Industrial and Commercial Tax 
(Gongshang Shui), was replaced by three taxes:
1). Product Tax (Chanpin Shui), payable by all 
enterprises engaged in the production or importation of 
taxable products and calculated on the basis of sale price at 
a rate ranging from 3 to 60 percent. It is China's chief 
economic regulator and hence the most important tax.
2). Business Turnover Tax (Yingye Shui), payable by all 
units and individuals engaged in trades other than 
manufacturing industry.
3). Value-added Tax (Zengzhi Shui), applicable only to a 
limited range of products, mainly manufactured goods.15 This 
tax, which rates varying from 6 to 16 percent, was intended to 
avoid the cumulative effects of multi-stage turnover taxes and 
the distortions characteristic of a single stage tax imposed 
at the manufacturer level.
To reduce those profit disparities between enterprises 
which are the result of differences in physical conditions, a 
special Regulatory Tax (Tiaojie Shui) was applied to 
"unearned" profits made by some "well-endowed" enterprises. In 
addition, a Resource Tax (Ziyuang Shui) was levied as a form 
of excess profits tax on the exploitation of crude oil, 
natural gas and coal; an Oil Burning Tax (Nanyou Shui) was 
designed to encourage the use of coal instead of oil and to 
regulate the profits made by enterprises from using cheap oil. 
A Land Use Tax (Yuangdi Shui) was proposed to regulate 
differential incomes due to geographical location and to 
promote the economic use of land; and a Bonus Tax (Jiangjing
14. Small enterprises are defined as those industrial 
enterprises whose fixed assets do not exceed ¥1,500,000 in 
value and whose annual profits do not exceed ¥200,000.
15. They include agricultural machinery, bearings, 
mechanical equipments, rolled steel, bicycles, cars, electric 
fans, and sewing machines, etc..
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Shui) was introduced to deter the payment of excessive bonuses 
to employees.
Admittedly, the performance of most of the SOEs in Xiamen 
has somewhat improved because of those reform programmes, 
especially the substitution of tax for profit delivery. Data 
in Section 4-3 and this chapter have all suggested that 
industrial outputs, capital construction, the government 
revenues, and workers' earnings all increased appreciably 
since the introduction of the programmes
However, the tax-for-profits reform has failed to address 
the following issues:
First, the reform, though enhancing the government's role 
as a tax collector, neglected the government's right to 
receive profits made by SOEs. This has not only confused the 
government function of managing the economy with the ownership 
but also jeopardized the management of state assets.
Second, different rates of tax, applicable to different 
enterprises according to the type of ownership, have created 
inequality and unfairness among the enterprises in the SEZ. As 
described before, the foreign-involved and domestic-associated 
enterprises only paid 15 percent, plus various financial 
concessions in the light of the Special Policy, COEs and TVEs 
paid on average 40 percent, and the rest of enterprises, 
mostly SOEs, had to pay 55 percent, plus various regulatory 
taxes.
Third, under the reform, enterprises were still allowed 
to repay their loans for capital construction out of their 
pre-tax profits, and thereby the investment burden still fell 
on the shoulders of the state. As a result, the "hunger" for 
capital construction continued, and the economic efficiency of 
investment was hard to improve.
Fourth, because of the confusion and ambiguity of the new 
tax regulations, tax fraud took place in a large scale.
And finally, lack of coordination among other economic 
reforms, especially price reform, severely discounted the 
result of the tax reform.
Faced with these problems, the Xiamen authorities found
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it hard to carry out the tax reform alone. Also, as discussed 
in Section 5-2, the reluctance of the authorities to cut the 
rate of profit tax of the local SOEs, due to the severe 
financial constraints, brought the enterprise reform in the 
SEZ to almost a standstill. At the same time, the enterprises, 
increasingly resenting their disadvantageous financial 
position, rushed to form economic associations with foreign or 
interior partner(s) in order to enjoy a lower tax rate (15 
percent). This not only brought an unnecessary financial loss 
to the authorities, but also seriously disrupted the 
readjustment of industrial structure and the re-organisation 
of enterprises in the SEZ. Thus the severity of the problem 
forced the Xiamen authorities to find a new solution urgently.
Reform Policies and Changes
In 1988, the enterprise reform in China as a whole 
focused on implementing the CRS. The Xiamen authorities, on 
the other hand, decided to try out the scheme of STP in all 
enterprises within the government financial budget (Yusuanlei 
Qiye) in the SEZ.16 With the approval of the State Council, 
the new scheme included: 1) cutting down the rate of profit 
tax from 55 to 15 percent; 2) abolishing the regulatory tax;
3) handing over after-tax-profits on a contract basis; and 4) 
repaying loans out of after-tax-profits, instead of pre-tax 
profits.
  Cutting down the rate of profit tax. This means that
there is only one unified rate of profit tax operating in the 
SEZ. In other words, all enterprises in the SEZ, regardless of 
the type of their ownership, are now paying the same rate of 
profit tax, i.e., 15 percent. At the same time, the regulatory 
tax was abolished. The authorities claimed that this was 
intended to "regularize the distributive relationship between 
the state and the SOE."
16. The majority of enterprises in this category are SOEs. 
Later in the year 6 large SOEs in Shanghai also started 
experimenting this scheme.
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  Fixing the amount of after-tax-profits delivery on a
basis of "one rate for one unit." Based on the amount of 
profits made in 1987, each enterprise hands the profits over 
at certain rate, ranging from 1 to 35 percent, with an average 
rate of 12 percent for the whole SEZ. This is designed to 
"regulate the difference in the after-tax-profits among SOEs."
  Enterprises repay bank loans from after-tax, instead
of pre-tax, profits. In addition, they are given freedom to 
decide when and how much they are to repay. As this change has 
shifted the financial burden of capital construction from the 
state to enterprises, it is hoped that it would harden the 
"budgetary constraint" on them.
As this new reform scheme implies a radical shake-up of 
the financial, fiscal and budgetary managements of the Xiamen 
government and the local enterprises, several important issues 
are inevitably raised:
First, is this new STP scheme better than the Tax-for- 
Profits programme or the CRS in serving the purposes of the 
enterprise reform?
Second, can the government financial revenue be 
guaranteed to grow in proportion to the growth of industrial 
production with this new arrangement?
Third, what rate of the after-tax-profit delivery is 
appropriate for enterprises?
Fourth, do enterprises have the ability to repay their 
loans and, at the same time, carry out all necessary internal 
investments out of their after-tax-profits?
Fifth, is this new reform plan conducive to the 
development of an export-led outward-looking economy in the 
SEZ?
And finally, is the system be transferable to the 
domestic enterprise reform?
Analyses of the Reform Performance
After two years of implementation of the STP scheme, the 
Xiamen authorities have surveyed 66 SOEs experimenting this
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reform scheme and revealed the results (see Table 5-4.1)
Table 5-4.1 Changes in economic performances of 66 
SOEs implementing the STP scheme (1987 - 1989)
(million yuan, in current prices)
1987 1988 1989 88/87
(%)
89/87
(%)
GVIO 1,049.2 1,196.8 1,264.7 114.1 120.5
Total profits 122.1 156.6 177.3 128.3 145.2
Sale taxes 84.9 102.8 72.1 121.1 84.9
Profit tax & delivery 
Profits retained
48.1 43.9 49.8 91.3 103.5
by enterprises 32.2 112.8 130.3 350.3 404.7
Loan Repayment 63.0 79.2 105.2 125.7 167.0
Welfare & Bonus Funds 
Total Value of
---- 164.7 107.0
Fixed Assets 441.0 509.6 573.5 115.6 130.0
Sourcess 1). JJGZZYJZL, 33/91, p. 12;
2). Welfare & bonus funds: JJTZGG, 4/90, p. 55.
As can be seen from the table, the GVIO, profits, total 
value of fixed assets, and loan repayment made by the 
enterprises grew steadily during the two years of the reform. 
The workers and staff's welfare and bonus funds also showed a 
big increase. The profits retained by the enterprises, in 
particular, was three to four times bigger than it was before 
the reform.
As to the drop of 15.1 percent in sale taxes in 1989, the 
authorities attributed it to the replacement of the product 
tax by the value added tax (Jiang and Lu, 1990: 55) . Although 
the profit tax and deliveries suffered a significant fall in 
1988, and failed to make any substantial increase (over 1987) 
in the following year,."the government financial revenue on 
balance actually increased," the authorities stressed, 
"because it saved more from expenditures than lost on 
revenues" (ibid).
Based on these achievements, the SEZ authorities claimed 
that the STP scheme had kept the revenues of the state, the 
enterprise and the individual "in balanced growth" and made 
the enterprise "accountable to its own operations." "It
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represents a new relationships between the three parties and 
a new mode of enterprise management." Thus, they declared that 
"the reform had achieved success" (AXSEZ Editorial Board, 
1991: 124).
However, if we widen the scope of survey to all SOEs 
implementing the scheme, extend the time period to five or 
more years, thus including the previous period of the Tax-for- 
Profits reform, and examine more economic indicators, a 
different picture will emerge.
As the enterprise reform is centred by the adjustment of 
the relationships between the state, the enterprise and the 
individual, our examination is to be conducted from these 
three perspectives.
Changes in the Government Revenues The government 
financial revenues in Xiamen, just like everywhere in China, 
consist of budgetary (Yusuannei Shouru) and non-budgetary
(Yusuanwei Shouru) revenues. The former includes various tax 
revenues, profits and other payments delivered by enterprises 
(short for "enterprise deliveries"), and other revenues, 
accounting for 60-70 percent of the total revenues.17
Likewise, the government financial expenditures are composed 
of budgetary (Yusuannei Zhichu) and non-budgetary expenditures 
(Yusuanwei Zhichu). The former contains funds of capital
construction, technological innovation, and R and D in
enterprises, making up 80-90 percent of the total 
expenditures.18
The essence of the STP scheme, in the context of the 
relationship between the state and the enterprise, is that the 
growth of the government financial revenues in proportion to 
that of industrial production should be guaranteed while
17. While the latter contains revenues from SOEs and their 
responsible governmental departments, administrative 
establishments, and local financial departments, etc..
18. While the latter includes urban maintenance costs, R 
and D funds, and the payments of energy and transport funds, 
etc. .
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enterprises are allowed to pay less tax and retain more 
profits to finance their internal investments.
Table 5-4.2 Changes in the government financial revenues 
and expenditures in Xiamen (1981 - 1989)
(million yuan, in current prices)
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Budgetary revenues 210.2 229 .5 231.8 286.7 391.2 450.6 482.9 594.7 810.9
% over previous year 109.2 101.0 123 .7 136.4 115.2 107.2 123 .2 136.3
Of which:
Various tax revenues 138.0 150.2 166.6 204.6 315.5 362.6 400.3 500.7 727.4
% over previous year 108.8 110.9 122 .8 154.2 114.9 110.4 125.1 145.3
Enterprise deliveries 53 .4 55.6 62.8 80.6 67.3 77.0 71.9 80.6 51.9
% over previous year 104.1 112.9 128.3 83.5 114.4 93.4 112.1 64.4
Budgetary expenditures 75.2 93 .8 117.0 140.9 291.2 375.9 352.9 433.4 695.4
% over previous year 124.7 124.7 120.4 206.7 129.1 93.9 122.8 160.5
Of which:
capital construction 113.7 135.9 110.4 107.4 178.6
% over previous year 119.5 81.2 97.3 166.3
Tech. innovation 26.9 47.5 52.9 54.4 112.9
% over previous year 176.6 111.4 102 .3 207.5
R & D 4.6 6.1 5.1 7.4 8.6
% over previous year 132.6 83.6 145.1 116.2
Note: ---- Data are not available.
Sources: 1). 1981-85: the AXSEZ Editorial Board (1986), p. 127;
2). 1986: XSB (1987), p. 363;
3). 1987: XSB (1988), p. 339;
4). 1988: XSB (1989), p. 377;
5). 1989: the AXSEZ Editorial Board (1990), p 168.
As revealed from Table 5-4.2, it is true that government 
financial revenue continued to grow during the two years of 
the reform, with annual growth of 23.2 percent for 1988 and 
36.3 percent for 1989 (including inflationary factor). This 
was due almost entirely to the steep increase in the "various 
tax revenues" (25.1% in 1988 and 45.3% in 1989), resulting 
from the enhancement of the taxation policy brought about by 
the reform. These growth rates are relatively high, compared 
to those for the previous years, except that for 1985, when 
the reform of Tax-for-Profits was being implemented.
However, it is also clear from the table that the Xiamen 
authorities were still paying out for the capital 
constructions, technological innovations, and R and D of some 
enterprises, if not all or most, in 1988 and 1989, rather than 
cease the payment, as required by the reform. What is more,
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the amounts they paid out in 1989 soared, growing by 66.3 
percent for the capital construction, 107.5 percent for 
technological innovation, and 16.2 percent for R and D 
(including inflationary factor) . In view of the essence of the 
reform, such an increase in the three expenditures, which were 
supposed to be financed by the enterprises themselves, is 
hardly justifiable.
This continuous and indeed increasing payment has a 
serious implication for the STP scheme. First, if we subtract 
the amounts of the three payments from the total government 
budgetary revenue, we find that the revenues for 1988 and 1989 
were actually ¥425.5 million (= 594.7-107.4-54.4-7.4) and 
¥510.8 million (=810.9-178.6-112.9-8.6), respectively. They 
are in fact only 88.1 percent and 105.8 percent of the 1987 
level (¥482.9 million). This result is close to the findings 
in the survey of the "profit tax & delivery" of 66 SOEs in 
1988 and 1989 (91.3% and 103.5%, see Table 5-4.1). It
indicates that the survey results largely reflect the true 
state of the government finance in Xiamen, and thus cast doubt 
over the official claim that the reform has been largely 
successful.
Second, with the adjusted figures of the "budgetary 
revenues" for 1988 and 1989, Table 5-4.3 shows that the two 
years of the reform actually registered a marked decline in 
the growth rate of the government financial revenues in 
Xiamen, compared to the previous two reform periods (1981-85 
and 1986-87) . At the same time, the table also demonstrates 
that the growth of the financial revenue lagged far behind 
that of the industrial output value, with 88.1 and 105.8 
percent against 110.3 and 122.8 percent, respectively.
All these indicate that the STP scheme has, at very 
least, failed to keep the growth of the government financial 
revenues in proportion to that of industrial production, as 
intended by the reform. Indeed, one local official disclosed 
that the average percentage of the government financial 
revenues in the total profits made by the enterprises dropped 
from 39 percent in 1987 to an average 28 percent in 1988 and
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1989 (Liu Shuren, 1991: 5).
Table 5-4.3 The GVIO of all SOEs and adjusted budgetary 
revenue in Xiamen (1981-1989)
(million yuan, in 1980 prices)
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
GVIO
Growth 
rate (%)
792.0 874.4
110.4
986.6 1,104.5 1, 
124.6 139.5
306.5
165.0
1,502.
115
,4 1,639.8 
.0 125.5
1,808.5 2,014.3 
110.3 122.8
over 1981 over 1985 over 1987
Budgetary
revenue
Growth 
rate (%)
210.2 229.5
109.2
231.8 286.7 
110.3 136.4
391.2
186.1
450
115
.6 482.9 
.2 123.4
425.5 510.8 
88.1 105.8
over 1981 over 1985 over 1987
Sources: 1). 1981-85: the AXSEZ Editorial Board (1986), p. 71;
2). 1986: XSB (1987), p. 32;
3). 1987: XSB (1988), p. 30;
4). 1988: XSB (1989), p. 32;
5). 1989: the AXSEZ Editorial Board (1990), p. 186.
Third, the fact that the state continued to put a large 
amount of funds into the enterprise internal investments 
clearly contradicts the principle of the reform, and hence 
raises several serious questions: why did the Xiamen
authorities have to continue to invest in the enterprises 
under the reform? is the new after-tax-profit delivery rate 
appropriate for the self-development of the enterprises? and 
how could the authorities afford to lose the financial 
revenues in carrying on this "reform"?
Changes in the Enterprise Finance and Behaviour The STP 
scheme is designed to stimulate enterprises to increase their 
production and efficiency by hardening their "budgetary 
constraints." Table 5-4.4 reveals three important points. 
First, the reform has apparently accelerated the development 
of industrial production, with two consecutive higher growth 
rates (25.3% and 25.0%) of the net output value in 1988 and 
1989. It has also fostered a strong and steady rise in export 
production, with growth rates being more than 3 0 percent for 
the same two years.
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Table 5-4.4 Changes in key indicators of the SOEs in Xiamen
(1985 ---  1989)
(million yuan, in current prices)
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Net Output Value 475.9 556.1 599.5 750.9 938.9
% over previous year 116.9 107.8 125.3 125.0
Output value for exports 112.4 151.9 176.8 239.0 313 .6
% over previous year 
Total taxes & profit
135.1 116.4 135.2 131.2
deliveries payable 215.9 141.3 236.2 564.8 691.5
% over previous year 
Total taxes & profit
65.4 167.2 239.1 122.4
deliveries paid 209.6 120.7 197.9 257.6 340.8
% over previous year 57.6 164.0 130.2 132.3
% of completed payment 97.1 85.4 83 .8 45.6 49.3
No.of loss-making firms 3 7 16 29 41
% over previous year 233.3 228.6 181.3 141.4
Total amount of losses 0.5 3.0 9.3 23.1 57.6
% over previous year 600.0 310.0 248.4 249.3
Profits retained 35.6 40.7 44.6 120.9 145.4
% over previous year 114.3 109.6 271.1 120.3
Repayment of loans 29.6 37.4 65.3 83 .4 112.7
% over previous year ----- 126.4 174.6 127.7 135.1
Value of fixed assets 551.9 766.3 1077.5 1178.3 2102.8
Annual increasing value ----- 214.4 311.2 100.8 924.5
Sources: 1). 1985: XSB (1986), pp. 76, 84, 85, 88 & 226;
2). 1986: XSB (1987), pp. 46, 47, 51 & 188;
3). 1987: XSB (1988), pp. 44, 45, 48, 49, 57 & 132;
4). 1988: XSB (1989), pp. 47, 48, 49, 53, 57 & 160;
5). 1989: the AXSEZ Editorial Board (1990). pp. 182, 183, 186 & 256.
Second, although the total amount of taxes and profit 
deliveries demanded by the state went up substantially in 1988 
and 1989, the enterprises seemed to be increasingly unable to 
meet that demand. This led to a sharp decline in the 
percentage of completed payment, dropping from 83.8 percent in 
1987 to 45.6 percent in 1988 and to 49.3 percent in 1989.
There might be two reasons for this large proportion of 
arrears: 1). some enterprises, particularly those inefficient 
or loss-making ones, were unable to pay; and 2) . others might 
deliberately hold up part of their payments and divert the 
money to other purposes in their own benefits, now that they 
have freedom to choose when and how much to hand over their 
after-tax-profits.
It is clear from the table that the number of loss-making 
enterprises went up from 16 in 1987 to 29 in 1988 and to 41 in 
1989, with total losses jumping from ¥9.3 million to ¥23.1 
million and to ¥57.6 million, respectively. This shows that 
the reform did not help reduce but actually increased losses, 
which certainly were responsible, at least in part, for the 
large arrears.
Third, the table also reveals that the after-tax-profits 
retained by the enterprises soared from ¥44.6 million in 1987 
to ¥120.9 million in 1988 and to ¥145.4 million in 1989, 
expanding by 171.1 percent in 1988 and 20.3 percent in 1989. 
A survey found that most enterprises in Xiamen tended to first 
consider their internal needs, such as repayment of loans and 
welfare funds, when deciding the distribution of the after- 
tax-prof its, and put the least priority on the profit delivery 
to the state (Lin Zhengzhong, 1991: 11).
Table 5-4.4 shows that the enterprises spent most of 
their retained profits on repaying their loans (69.0% in 1988 
and 77.5% in 1989) . In order to get new loans from banks, the 
enterprises apparently put the repayment of old loans as their 
priority. This means that they had left little money for 
internal investments, such as capital construction, 
technological innovation, and R and D. As a result, the state 
had no alternative but to put a considerable part of the tax 
revenues and delivered profits back into them. From the 
increasing amounts of fixed assets (¥100.8 million in 1988 and 
¥924.5 million in 1989), it is clear that such increasing 
scale certainly could not be met by the enterprises' retained 
profits.
In short, the STP scheme had enhanced the role of the 
government taxation policy through imposing a single, unified 
rate of profit tax, thus creating a fair environment of 
competition for all kinds of enterprises in the SEZ. Together 
with the strong and steady growth in export production, the 
reform has certainly promoted the development of an export-led 
outward-looking economy in the SEZ.
On the other hand, it instituted a complex and sometimes
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confusing rate system for the after-tax-profit delivery, which 
could not be strictly enforced among the enterprises and thus 
enabled them to dodge the payment. The above analysis also 
proves that this rate system was somewhat inappropriate to the 
self-development of the enterprises, since it failed to give 
them adequate retained profits to make internal investments. 
As a result, "budgetary constraints" were not completely
hardened the enterprises might have to repay the loans
they had borrowed, but key internal investments were still 
paid by the state.
Changes in the Individual Remuneration and Performance 
Under the STP scheme, an enterprise has the right to decide 
how much of its retained profits would be designated as the 
Welfare and Bonus Funds in order to provide an appropriate 
incentive for its workers and staff. Table 5-4.5 shows that 
the Funds for the enterprises in Xiamen went up steeply by 
42.8 percent in 1988 and 73.8 percent in 1989 over the 
previous year. However, the labour productivity for the same 
period increased only by 20.7 and 13.3 percent, respectively. 
Clearly, this pay award was not linked with labour performance 
and hence unjustifiable.
Table 5-4.5 Changes in the welfare and bonus funds and labour 
productivity in Xiamen (1985-1989)
(¥10,000, in current prices)
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Welfare & bonus funds
% over previous year 
Productivity (¥/person) 
% over previous year
2,522
20,816
3,064
121.5 
22,817
109.6
3,571
116.5
25,577
112.1
5,098
142.8
30,882
120.7
8, 860 
173 .8 
35,001 
113 .3
l) . 1985: XSB (1986), pp. 53 & 92;
2) . 1986: XSB (1987), pp. 49 & 51;
3) . 1987: XSB (1988), pp. 53 & 57;
4) . 1988: XSB (1989), pp. 49 & 57;
5) . 1989: the AXSEZ Editorial Board (1990), pp. 183 & 198
An unduly high rise in the pay award is a typical 
characteristic of the "soft budgetary constraints," commonly
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observed in the SOEs in socialist economies, and it would 
normally fuel inflation spiral. Unfortunately, this was 
exactly the case in Xiamen during the period of 1988-89.19 
Thus it once again proves that the reform has failed to 
harden the "budgetary constraints" on the local enterprises.
5-5. Conclusions
The STP programme is the latest attempt made by the 
Xiamen authorities to break the deadlock of the enterprise 
reform in the SEZ. It was designed to rejuvenate hundreds of 
inefficient local enterprises, particularly the SOEs, in order 
to build up a dynamic, export-oriented industry, central to 
the success of the SEZ. Based on the above analyses, several 
important conclusions can be drawn as follows:
First, in terms of the relationship between the state and 
the enterprise, the reform has not only failed to keep the 
state financial revenue growing in proportion to the 
industrial production, but also confused the ownership with
the management function of government the very problem the
Tax-for-Profits reform had failed to solve. Although the tax 
and profits were paid and delivered separately under the STP
scheme, they eventually went to the same destination --  the
local Finance Department, because there was no a special body 
in charge of state-owned assets to take the delivered profits. 
Consequently, the scheme could hardly be seen as a better 
alternative to the previous enterprise reform programmes.
Second, with regard to the restructuring of the internal 
operational mechanism of the local enterprises, the reform has 
enhanced the taxation policy but failed to set up an 
appropriate stimulative mechanism within them. Under the 
scheme, the rate of the after-tax-profit delivery is 
negotiated, on an ad hoc basis, between the state and the 
enterprises and hence subject to endless bargaining and 
various manipulations. The profitable enterprises generally
19. For more about the inflation in Xiamen in 1988 and 
1989, see Chapter 7.
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had a higher rate to pay than the less profitable, while loss- 
making ones did not have to pay, in other words, the "ratchet 
effect" still existed.
Third, the rate of after-tax-profits was actually served 
as an "adjustment tax" to regulate "excess profits." In the 
absence of consistent price reform, such adjustment is 
certainly justifiable. But, apart from the high degree of 
subjectivism involved in fixing the rate for individual 
enterprises, there is the problem of the delivery being used 
to achieve a high degree of profit equalization among the SOEs 
independent of their underlying performance. This principle 
may be consistent with an egalitarian social philosophy, but 
it contradicts the principle of the market economy. 
Furthermore, the combination of enterprise "profit tax" and 
the delivery of after-tax-profits often made the enterprises 
not having adequate retained profits to carry out all 
necessary internal investments, as intended by the reform.
Fourth, the STP scheme, designed to provide positive 
incentives for the enterprises, was diluted by the lack of 
well-coordinated supports from other economic reforms, 
especially the price reform. The Xiamen authorities failed to 
understand that greater financial autonomy of enterprise would 
be ineffective unless the price system is rationalized and an 
appropriate balance between the central and local controls of 
revenues is established. The remark made by a World Bank study 
about the potential problems of granting financial autonomy to 
enterprises when other aspects of system reform lag behind 
seems relevant to the situation in Xiamen:
"... inappropriate motivation and distorted prices 
may lead enterprise managers to make bad investment 
decisions, and profits intended for enterprise 
saving may be divided into bonus and benefits for 
workers" (World Bank, 1985: 146).
Thus, the price reform is essential to the success of the 
enterprise reform.20 Though paying tax and delivering "excess
20. For more discussions of the relationship between the 
two reforms, see Perkins (1992) .
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profits" may to some extent mitigate the effects of irrational 
pricing, it cannot in the long run be regarded as a substitute 
for price reform. Without price reform, the STP scheme in 
effect makes all rates of after-tax profit delivery 
negotiable, and hence ad hoc. Only after price distortions are 
removed, will enterprises no longer make excessive profits or 
be compelled to run at a loss because of the prices 
established for their products. Consequently, an unified tax 
rate would be truly appropriate and fair for all enterprises, 
and the rate of the after-tax-profit delivery could be 
simplified or even abolished since it would no longer be 
required to play a regulatory function. It is in this sense 
that the Xiamen authorities should continue to push the price 
reform ahead.
Fifth, the STP scheme is actually a converted form of the 
CRS, which is widely implemented in other parts of China, and 
thus represents a retreat from more radical reform plans, such 
as ownership reform and privatization. Like the reform in the 
China as a whole, the enterprise reform in Xiamen was intended 
to improve the performance of the SOEs by restructuring, i.e. 
by introducing a partial reform that falls short of ownership 
change. This clearly reflects the Chinese authorities' 
intention of keeping the big or key industrial enterprises in 
public ownership, while allowing the sale or liquidation of 
small or inefficient ones.
Experiences in many developing countries show that 
economic decentralization and privatization "ought to be 
employed in tandem wherever possible," though the former 
normally should precede the latter. A reform policy which does 
not lead to privatization "tend to be half-hearted" and cannot 
"generate the necessary competitive pressure" (Borrmann and 
Wolff, 1991: 105) .21 Also, lessons from the previous
enterprise reforms in the formerly socialist economies suggest
21. The same also applies to any privatization programme 
which is not supported by the further deepening of the 
decentralization, because the privatization programme "will 
soon become bogged down and may even be reversed at the 
earliest opportunity" (ibid).
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that partial reforms aiming at restructuring operational 
mechanism, instead of ownership system, were insufficient to 
tackle the fundamental problems embedded in SOEs and produce 
enduring benefits.22 Most of these countries are now opting 
for more radical measures, including privatization and 
liquidation (Lee and Nellis, 1990) . Dong Fureng, in view of 
the Chinese experience, concludes that "ownership reform is 
essential if the shortcomings of SOEs are to be eliminated" 
(Dong, 1990: 67). Some Western observers echoed this view and 
warned the Chinese authorities of the "disastrous results" 
likely caused by "further decentralization without some 
ownership reforms designed to introduce real hard budget 
constraints" (Singh, 1992: xv). Thus, as long as the
enterprise reform in Xiamen remains partial, the local SOEs 
can never be really revitalized and hence able to compete with 
the local private- and foreign-owned sectors, let alone to 
meet challenge from the international market.
And finally, the Special Policy has, to some extent, 
distorted the results of the STP scheme. Despite the marked 
drop in the growth of the financial revenue, the Xiamen 
government still claimed the success of the reform and showed 
no sign of worrying about the relative decline of its revenue. 
The reason for this is that Xiamen had won an important 
financial concession from the central government since it was 
granted the right of "Independent Planning" in 1988. Under 
this new arrangement, Xiamen is no longer responsible for 
financing the budget of the Fujian provincial government and 
thereby saved its annual contribution, which stood at ¥150 
million in 1987. Thus, it was the Special Policy which had 
allowed the Xiamen authorities to carry out the STP scheme 
without necessarily increasing the government financial 
revenue.23
22. For more about the reform in East Europe, see Brus and 
Laski (1989), Chapter 6 and 8, and Kornai (1990).
23. No wonder, as observed by Dr. Zhang Jun, that there 
is "a similarity" between SEZ firms enjoying "preferential 
treatment(s)" (i.e. the Special Policy) and those "facing
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Clearly, this is not a real reform but exploitation of 
the Special Policy. In fact, the Xiamen authorities have 
exaggerated the achievement of the economic reform by 
attributing many effects of implementing the Special Policy to 
the reform. They seemed to be keener on implementing the 
Special Policy than on reforming the old economic system, 
because the former is easier to carry out and quicker to 
produce results than the latter. In other words, the 
authorities tended, intentionally or unintentionally, to 
substitute the real economic reform with the implementation of 
the Special Policy.
However, the Special Policy is basically designed to 
facilitate the reform and attract more foreign investments. It 
is vulnerable to the changes in domestic and world economic 
conditions. Also, it contains many distortions caused by the 
semi-reformed economic variables and hence is open to various 
forms of manipulation or abuse. That is why the Policy has 
long been criticised for being "volatile, " "unpredictable" and 
"lack of transparency." Thus, as far as the relationship 
between the economic reform and the Special Policy is 
concerned, it is the confusion of the two, in particular the 
substitution of the former with the latter, which has led to 
the problem of policy inconsistency, ambiguity and 
unpredictability in the Xiamen SEZ.
Clearly, most SOEs in interior China cannot experiment 
such "radical" reform since the Special Policy is not operated 
in their regions. There is no way for them to have the rate of 
profit tax cut from 55 to 15 percent, as they are still by far 
the largest contributor to the revenue of the central and/or 
their local governments. This implies that the transferability 
of the Xiamen experience for promoting the enterprise reform 
in other parts of China is very limited, and this casts doubt 
over the effectiveness of the SEZ serving as a "laboratory" 
for the domestic economic reform.
'soft budgetary constraint(s)'" in the typical, prereform 
economic system. See Zhang (1993), p. 18.
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CHAPTER 6 
THE FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND 
INDUSTRIAL TRANSFORMATION IN XIAMEN
Having examined the enterprise reform in Xiamen in the 
preceding chapter, we now turn to another important dimension
of the industrial reform -- the utilization of FDI in
connection with the transformation of the local industry. Like 
most EPZs around the world, Xiamen has always put the
introduction of FDI at the heart of its development plans. It
is the principal, if not only, way for the SEZ to obtain 
foreign capital, technology and equipment, management
expertise, and the access to the international market.
On the other hand, like most Chinese industrial cities, 
Xiamen faces a daunting task to transform its outmoded and 
rundown industry in the process of introducing foreign 
capital. Indeed, restructuring the irrational industrial 
structure and rejuvenating the 588 old enterprises are 
essential to the development of a competitive and dynamic 
exporting industry in the SEZ.
As a result, Xiamen sets itself the unique and formidable 
mission of combining the central role of an EPZ with the 
primary task of industrial reform in a socialist economy, more 
specifically, combining the introduction of FDI with the 
transformation of the old, centrally planned industrial 
system. Experience in the EPZs which generally had no or 
little established industry, shows that FDI projects have been 
quite successful in creating jobs and exporting earnings for 
local people, but achieved little in facilitating the transfer 
of technology and management know-how, let alone helping 
transform local existing industry.
Thus, Xiamen's experiment with utilizing FDI is
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unprecedented, challenging and for-reaching. The question is, 
Is Xiamen's attempt realistic and feasible? Will foreign 
investors be interested in helping rejuvenate the local 
industry? Are the Xiamen authorities able to devise a policy 
framework that will succeed in both encouraging a greater 
inflow of FDI and ensuring that it makes the maximum 
contribution to Xiamen's industrial transformation?
A new development in this issue is the growing 
involvement of Taiwan capital in Xiamen since the late 1980s.1 
Today, TDI has become a predominant foreign economic force in 
Xiamen and is playing a decisive role in shaping its future.
Inevitably, one must ask: Are there any similarities and 
differences between TDI and other FDI? What effects has TDI 
exerted on the Xiamen economy? and What implications does the 
involvement of TDI in Xiamen for the wider development of the 
economic cooperation between the PRC and Taiwan?
This study is, therefore, unique and important because it 
examines the new experiment being carried out in Xiamen. It 
should be of interest both to development economists who may 
want to find out how a developing country can transform its 
inefficient industry with the help of FDI, and to scholars of 
comparative economic systems who may look into the way of 
capitalism and socialism accommodating each other within a 
particular policy enclave. Of course, this chapter is of 
practical importance to foreign (including Taiwanese) 
businessmen who have invested or are planning to invest in 
Xiamen and, indeed, China as a whole, either in the short term 
or potentially for long-term development.
Thus, this chapter will start with an survey on the 
general characteristics of FDI in Xiamen in Section 6-1; 
Section 6-2 continues exploring the problems arising from the
1. The term Taiwan direct investment (TDI) refers only to 
the form of Taiwan investment in the PRC, as opposed to 
another form of investment, portfolio investment. As Taiwan 
still bans direct business contacts with the mainland, all the 
cross-strait investments have so far been conducted on an 
indirect basis.
For technical reason, TDI is seen as a part of FDI in 
this thesis.
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utilization of FDI in relation to the local industrial 
transformation; Section 6-3 turns to discuss the trend and 
special features of TDI in Xiamen; Section 6-4 analyses major 
effects of TDI on the Xiamen economy; and finally Section 6-5 
ends this chapter with conclusions.
6-1. Characteristics of FDI Projects in Xiamen
Experience in many developing countries indicates that 
industrial transformation generally involves structural 
adjustment to the changing world economic environment, which 
may require not only substantial investment in new lines of 
production but also deep-going renovation of existing 
industries.2 However, how to make use of FDI to transform 
local existing industry, especially Soviet-type industrial 
system, remains largely untried and hence represents a 
historic challenge to Xiamen.
The Xiamen authorities' have formulated a series of 
Special Policy improving Xiamen's investment environment, in 
order to attract more FDI projects (see Appendix E) . Their 
policy and strategy for the local industrial transformation 
are:
"... to rationalize the industrial structure and 
upgrade technology in enterprises through forging 
close economic and technological links between the 
local industry and FDI. As a SEZ, Xiamen should make 
maximum use of the Special Policy to introduce as 
many as possible advanced foreign technologies and 
management experiences. ... From the strategic 
point of view, electronics should be chosen as the 
leading sector because it not only represents the 
modern advanced technology but also has a great 
bearing on technological transformation in other 
sectors" (Research Office, 1989: 139).
The introduction of FDI in Xiamen started as soon as it 
was designated as a SEZ in the early 1980s. By the end of 
1989, as shown in Table 6-1.1, Xiamen had concluded 679
2. This is particularly true in the case of the four East 
Asian NICs. For their experiences, see James, et al., (1987).
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contracts covering the major forms of FDI --  JEVs, CMEs and
WFOEs. These contracts committed foreign investors to make 
investments in cash (usually foreign exchange), equipment, 
machinery and technology totalling US$1,227.02 million. Of 
this amount, $350.88 had actually been delivered, resulting in 
358 firms under operation.
Table 6-1.1 Development of FDI in Xiamen (1983 - 1989)
(US$ million)
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 Total
No. of contract
signed 24 86 105 34 50 180 201 679
Annual growth rate(%) 258.33 22.09 -67.62 47.06 260.00 11.67 42.51a
Foreign pledged
amount 37.15 149.67 242.02 27.59 56.71 155.64 514.49 1227.02
Annual growth rate(%) --- 302.88 61.70 -88.60 105.55 174.45 230.56 54.97a
Foreign invested
amount 7.75 40.44 73 .28 33 .93 17.53 47.96 129.80 350.88
Annual growth rate(%) --- 421.81 81.21 -53.70 -48.33 173.59 170.64 59 .95a
% of the pledged
amount 20.86 27 .02 30.28 122.98 30.91 30.81 25.23 28.60b
No. of operated
projects0 <---- -- 146 ----- > 150 183 263 358 358
Annual growth rate(%) ---- 2.74 22.00 43.72 36.12 25.14a
Notes: a. Average annual growth rate; b. Average share; c. This is an 
accumulated figure.
Sources: 1). 1983-85: the AXSEZ Editorial Board (1986), p. 92;
2). 1986-89: the AXSEZ Editorial Board (1990), p. 327.
From the provincial perspective, although taking only 
25.55 percent of 2,658 contracts signed by Fujian with foreign 
investors, Xiamen had successfully attracted 57.17 percent of 
US$2,146.25 million of the total foreign commitments, and
46.64 percent of US$752.33 million of the actually invested 
amounts in Fujian from 1983 to 1989 (FSB, 1989: 364; 1990: 
294) . In other words, the average capitalization of the FDI 
projects in Xiamen (US$1,807 million per project) was 2.24 
times higher than Fujian's average level (US$0,807 million per 
project).
From the national perspective, from 1983 to 1989 Xiamen's
average annual growth rate for the number of contracts signed
(42.51%) was lower than that for China as a whole (51.92%), 
but the rates for the total foreign commitments and the
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actually invested amounts (54.97% and 59.95%) were higher than 
those for the whole nation (21.60% and 32.18%) (Table 6-1.1; 
SSB, 1990: 653).
Several basic characteristics have emerged from the 
development of FDI in Xiamen and may be highlighted as 
follows:
1. Three-Stage Development The introduction of FDI in 
Xiamen in the 1980s went through three different stages of 
development. As shown in Table 6-1.1, from 1983 to 1985 the 
size of FDI, both in terms of the number of contracts and 
foreign capital involved, increased steadily owing to the 
setting-up and then enlargement of the SEZ. During the period 
of 1986-87, however, the inflow of FDI dropped sharply because 
of the implementation of the austerity policy in the Chinese 
domestic economy to combat the rampant inflation. This 
indicates that the SEZ is very vulnerable to the cycle of the 
domestic economy.
From 1988 to 1989, Xiamen witnessed an explosive 
expansion of FDI, with the numbers of contracts concluded and 
put into operation, and the foreign committed and actually 
invested amounts all exceeding their totals for the previous 
5 years (see Table 6-1.I).3 This was caused largely by the 
sudden influx of TDI.
2. Predominance of TDI As described above, since 1988 
Taiwan investors started "invading" Xiamen in growing numbers. 
In 1988, Taiwan investors contributed, for the first time, 
more than half of total foreign committed capital. By 1989, 
the number of TDI contracts accounted for over three-quarters 
of the total FDI contracts (see Table 6-3.1). This suggests 
that Taiwan capital will play a decisive role in shaping 
Xiamen's economic development in the future, just like the 
relationship between Hong Kong and the Shenzhen SEZ.4
3. This contrasts sharply with the drastic decline in the 
general inflow of FDI in China as a whole in 1989, caused 
mainly by the Tiananmen Square Incident.
4. For more details of TDI in Xiamen, see Section 6-3 and
6-4.
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3. Domination of Manufacturing Investment Unlike other 
SEZs, which have been criticised for attracting too many non­
manufacturing investments, Xiamen, as an old industrial city 
itself, has introduced a large number of industrial 
manufacturing projects. Table 6-1.2 shows that over the period 
of 1980-89 the FDI in manufacture, both in terms of the number 
of contracts concluded and the amounts involved, accounted for 
60-70 percent of total investments, indicating that Xiamen has 
a big potential to develop an export manufacturing industry.
Table 6-1.2 Composition of FDI in Xiamen by industry
(1980 - 1989)
No. of contracts Share
(%)
Pledged amounts 
(US$10,000)
Share
(%)
Agriculture 36 5.33 3,649 2.97
Manufacture 478 70.71 73,783 60.13
Construction 21 3 .11 637 0.52
Transportation 14 2.07 822 0.67
Commerce 28 4.14 1,247 1.02
Real estate 91 13.46 33,174 27.04
Others 8 1.18 9,390 7.65
Total 676 100.00 122,702 100.00
Source: the AXSEZ Editorial Board (1990), p. 329.
4. An Important Manufacturing and Exporting Force Table 
6-1.3 reveals that, since 1982, the GVIO of FIEs (short for 
"fgvio") in Xiamen had been growing at an average growth rate 
of 11.56 percent per year (its annual growth rate short for 
"fgr"), raising its share in Xiamen's total GVIO (short for 
"TGVIO") from mere 1.28 percent in 1982 to 48.54 percent in
1989. On the hand, exports from FIEs grew even faster, at an 
average rate of 98.26 percent per year, pushing up their share 
from almost nothing (0.49%) in 1984 to well over a quarter 
(28.10%) in 1989. Judged by this trend, it is perfectly 
conceivable that FIEs will become a dominant manufacturing 
force and major exporter in Xiamen in next 2-3 years.
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Table 6-1,3 Growth of GVIO and exports of FIEs in Xiamen
(1981 - 1989)
TGVIO fgvio fgr Share TEX fex fgr Share
(¥10,000, in 1980 prices) (%) (%) (US$10,000) (%) (%)
1981 100,747 13,112
1982 110,079 1,410 --- 1.28 12,402 — ---- ---
1983 117,662 1,422 0.85 1.21 12,381 ----- ---
1984 147,547 7,541 430.31 5.11 15,584 77 0.49
1985 214,070 40,461 436.55 18.90 16,527 1,817 2259.74 10.99
1986 246,864 43,521 7.56 17.63 16,374 1,516 -16.57 9.26
1987 328,566 97,901 124.95 29.80 26,107 4,184 175.99 16.03
1988 481,571 206,245 110.67 42.83 57,607 8,428 101.43 14.63
1989 550,998 267,443 29.67 48.54 64,678 18,176 115.66 28.10
Total 2,298,104 665,944 111. 56a 28.98b 234,772 34,198 198.26a 14.57b
Notes: a. Average annual growth rate; b. Average share.
Sources: 1). GVIO: 1981-85: the AXSEZ Editorial Board (1986), p. 71;
1986: XSB (1987), p. 31;
1987: XSB (1988), pp. 29 & 92;
1988: XSB (1989), pp. 31 & 40;
1989: the AXSEZ Editorial Board (1990), pp. 173 & 179. 
2). Exports: 1981-84: the AXSEZ Editorial Board (1986), p. 123;
1985-89: the AXSEZ Editorial Board (1990), p. 324.
6-2. Problems in Utilizing FDI to Transform the Local Industry
After several years of development, the industrial 
structure and enterprises in Xiamen have experienced a 
distinct change. However, they have also exhibited serious 
structural problems. Some of these problems were inherited 
from the old, centralized system, while others are new and 
resulted from the rapid expansion of FDI in the SEZ.
1. Lack of Interdependence and Linkages between the 
Leading Sector and Other Sectors Table 6-2.1 shows that when 
Xiamen was designated as a SEZ in the early 1980s there was no 
electronics industry at all. Instead, the food processing, 
chemical and pharmaceutical, machinery, and textile sectors 
formed the backbone of the local industry. By 1985, however, 
the electronics industry had become a predominant sector in 
terms of GVIO. By 1989, it had made up nearly 3 0 percent of 
Xiamen's total GVIO, almost 19 percent higher than its closest 
rival sector (chemical and pharmaceutical). Clearly, this
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development trend seemed to be well in line with the official 
strategy.
Table 6-2.1 Growth and distribution of GVIO of the 
major industrial sectors in Xiamen (1981-1989)
(million yuan, in 1980 prices)
1981 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
GVIO % GVIO % GVIO % GVIO % GVIO % GVIO %
Electronics 0 0 .00 440 20.65 449 18.77 861 27.00 1590 33.96 1616 29.33
Machinery 189 18.76 252 11.84 270 11.29 302 9.47 353 7.54 391 7.10
Food
processing 265 26.30 238 11.17 259 10.83 289 9.06 347 7.41 449 8.15
Chemical &
pharmaceut. 198 19.65 194 9.09 208 8.69 289 9.06 473 10.10 590 10.71
Textile 129 12.80 163 7.68 162 6.77 181 5.68 232 4.95 237 4.30
Rubber 21 2.08 101 4.74 122 5.10 132 4.14 135 2.88 162 2.94
Electric
machinery 20 1.99 66 3 .10 75 3 .13 129 4.05 195 4.16 287 5.21
Building
materials 37 3 .67 64 2.69 64 2.68 71 2 .23 93 1.99 107 1.94
Paper &
stationery 7 0.69 43 2.00 52 2.17 75 2.35 97 2.07 109 1.98
Total 866 85.94 1561 72.96 1661 69.43 2329 73 .04 3515 75.06 3948 71.66
Sources: 1). 1981: the AXSEZ Editorial Board (1986), p. 72;
2) . 1985: XSB (1986), pp. 41-7;
3) . 1986: XSB (1987), pp. 33-7;
4) . 1987: XSB (1988), pp. 31-9;
5) . 1988: XSB (1989), pp. 33-9;
6). 1989: the AXSEZ Editorial Board (1990), pp. 173-6.
Nevertheless, an examination of the breakdown of the GVIO 
of the electronics sector casts serious doubt upon the 
authorities' claim to succeed in developing the leading 
sector. Table 6-2.2 shows that consumer goods, composed of TV 
sets, radio cassettes and video recorders, took the lion's 
share of the total GVIO, ranging from 63 to 72 percent, while 
communication equipment, mainly comprising telephones and 
walkie talkies, accounted for only 22-30 percent. Together 
these two categories of products made up about 93 percent of 
the sector's GVIO for the period of 1987-89.
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Table 6-2.2 Composition of the GVIO of the electronics 
industry in Xiamen (1987 - 1989)
(¥ 10,000, in 1980 prices)
1987 1988 1989
GVIO GVIO GVIO
Consumer goods 54 ,386 63 .14 113, 542 71..42 109, 196 67..57
Conmmuni. equip . 25 ,640 29 .77 35, 345 22..23 41, 801 25..87
Component 5,774 6.70 8, 894 5..59 8, 738 5..41
Computer 22 0.03 1, 008 0 . 63 1, 404 0 . 87
Others 308 0.36 191 0 . 12 458 0 . 28
Total 86 ,129 100 .00 158, 981 100,.00 161, 597 100..00
Sources: 1) . 1987: XSB (1988),- p. 39;
2) . 1988: XSB (1989),- p. 39;
3). 1989: the AXSEZ Editorial Board (1990), p. 176.
What is more, these products, largely made of imported 
components and parts, were assembled mostly by FIEs in the 
SEZ, in other words, they have very low domestic value added. 
Table 6-2.3 shows that the imported contents of the total
Table 6-2.3 Shares of imported contents in total exports, and 
percentages of imports made by FIEs, in the electronics 
industry in Xiamen (1987 - 1989)
(US$10,000)
1987 1988 1989
Total exports 
Of which:
Imported contents:
% of the total exports 
Of which: 
by FIEs:
% of the imported contents:
3,874.67 6,332.62 7,874.09
2,105.50 3,389.09 4,454.37
54.34 53.52 56.57
2,028.53 2,988.74 4,039.67
96.34 88.19 90.69
Sources: 1). 1987: XSB (1988), pp. 331-2;
2). 1988: XSB (1989), pp. 373-4;
3). 1989: the AXSEZ Editorial Board (1990), pp. 90 & 325-6
exports of the electronics industry during the period of 1987- 
89 reached around 55 percent. It also tells us that between 88
and 97 percent of the imports went to FIEs in the SEZ.5 The 
reason for Xiamen to have such high rates of imported contents 
has been that many of its FIEs were wholly owned by foreign 
investors and engaged mainly in enclave export activities.
Experience in other developing countries suggests that it 
is vital for the success of export-led industrialization to 
develop at least one leading industrial sector, which is not 
only compatible with the dynamics of the world market, but 
also capable of generating growth of other sectors though 
extensive output-utilization (or forward linkage effects) and 
input-provision (or backward linkage effects) relationships 
(Meier, 1989: 283-8) . Thus it is very hard to see how Xiamen's 
electronics sector, which mainly assembles consumer goods with 
imported components and parts and then exports most of its 
products, could have any significant linkage effects on other 
sectors.
2. Lack of Breakthrough in Rationalizing the Local 
Industrial Structure Despite the policy to make use of FDI to 
transform the local industrial structure, Xiamen has not made 
any significant progress in this direction. Table 6-2.1 might 
exhibit that the electronics industry was growing sharply and 
had become the leading sector, but Table 6-2.4, which divides 
GVIO of every sector into the local and foreign-involved parts 
(short for "local" and "foreign"), reveals a quite different 
picture.
We see that from 1987 to 1989 the local industrial 
structure remained relatively static, with machinery, food 
processing, chemical and pharmaceutical, and textile remaining 
as major sectors. That is to say, over the period of three 
years the various industrial sectors in Xiamen achieved a more
or less proportionate growth or "a balanced development" --
a typical development pattern observed in the prereform China.
5. An UNCTAD report, surveying 159 FIEs in Jamaica, 
Kenya, India, Iran, Colombia and Malaysia, shows that the 
percentage of imported contents in their total export sales 
ranged from 0 to over 60 percent, with an average level of 
26.18 percent. See Streeten and Lall (1973), p. 9.
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At the same time, the electronics industry, which had been 
designated as the leading sector, declined from 8.29 percent 
in 1987 to 5.35 percent in 1989, in contrast with its 
overwhelmingly dominant position on the.foreign-involved side 
(76.81%) .
Table 6-2.4 Xiamen's Total GVIO divided by the local and 
foreign-involved sectors (1987 - 1989)
(million yuan, in 1980 prices)
1987 1988
TOTAL local % foreign % TOTAL local % foreign %
Electronics 861 120 8.29 741 84. 01 1,590 143 8.25 1,,447 81..25
Machinery 302 300 20.,73 2 0 .23 353 327 18,.86 26 1..46
Food processing 289 258 17 .83 31 3 .51 347 301 17 .36 46 2..58
Chemical & pharm. 289 216 14 .92 73 8 .28 473 321 18 .51 152 8,.53
Textile 181 170 11. 75 11 1 .25 232 190 10,.96 42 2,.36
Rubber 132 123 8. 50 9 1 .02 135 118 6,.81 17 0 ,.95
Electric Machinery 129 127 8 .78 2 0 .23 195 170 9 .80 25 1,.40
Building materials 71 67 4 .63 4 0 .45 93 75 4 .33 18 1 ,.01
Paper & stationery 75 66 4 .56 9 1 .02 97 89 5.13 8 0 ,.45
Total 2,329 1,447 100.00 882 100.00 3,515 1,734 100.00 1,781 100.00
1989
TOTAL local % foreign %
Electronics 1,,616 106 5.35 1,510 76.81
Machinery 391 355 17.91 36 1.83
Food processing 449 365 18.42 84 4.27
Chemical & pharm. 590 423 21.34 167 8.49
Textile 237 206 10.39 31 1.58
Rubber 162 132 6.66 30 1.53
Electric machinery 287 192 9.69 95 4.83
Building materials 107 101 5.10 6 0.31
Paper & stationery 109 102 5.15 7 0.36
Total 3,,948 1,982 100.00 1,966 100.00
Sources: 1). Total GVIO: Table 6-2.1;
2). Foreign-involved GVIO: 1987: XSB (1988), pp. 92-3;
1988: XSB (1989), pp. 40-1;
1989: the AXSEZ Editorial Board (1990), 
pp. 179-80;
3). Local GVIO: deducting the foreign-involved GVIO from the total 
GVIO.
According to the linkage theory, it is crucial for a 
developing country at the initial stage of industrialization
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to follow a policy of unbalanced investment and thereby create 
strategic imbalances that would set up stimuli and pressures 
that are needed to induce investments elsewhere in the 
economy. "If the economy is to be kept moving ahead," pointed 
out Albert 0. Hirschman, "the task of development policy is to 
maintain tensions, disproportions, and disequilibria" 
(Hirschman, 1958: 66). In the context of utilizing FDI, this 
important issue has becomes how, after determining the proper 
sequence of investment decisions, to channel foreign capital 
into the leading sector(s) in order to help create the proper 
amounts of imbalance in the right activities.
However, judging by Table 6-2.4, there was no obvious 
sign of the "imbalance development" or breakthrough appearing 
in the local industrial structure, nor was there any evidence 
of the linkages between the local electronics industry and 
FDI.
3. Lack of Linkage Effects between Manufacturing/
Processing Industries and Basic Industries An examination of 
the growth rate of key industrial products in Xiamen over the 
period of 1981-89 reveals that those growing less than 100 
percent or even negatively were important raw materials,
mostly produced by local, indigenous industries, while those 
expanding over 100 percent or even 9,000 percent were light 
industrial products, largely manufactured, processed or 
assembled by newly emerged FIEs (see Table 6-2.5).
At the same time, the authorities also disclosed that 
from 1985 to 1989 transport capacity grew only by 7.2 percent; 
posts and telecommunications by 3.0 percent; and distribution, 
warehousing and storage facilities by 4.1 percent. Among the 
45 large- and medium-sized enterprises in 1989, only 6 
generated power or produced raw materials and their output 
value (¥188 million) made up only 6.31 percent of the total 
GVIO of the 45 enterprises. The other 39 were all 
manufacturing enterprises and their output value, ¥2.792 
billion, accounted for 93.69 percent of the total GVIO (Wang
Yong and Guo Jiuqiang, 1990: 21).
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Table 6-2.5 Growth rates for some key industrial products
in Xiamen (1989 over 1981)
Product (unit) 1981 1989 G.R. (%)
Electricity (100 m w/hr.) 30, 745 25, 082 -18..42
Steel ingot (ton) 4, 200 (1985) 3, 752 -10..67
Steel product (ton) 1,776 (1985) 2, 516 41..67
Forging equipment (set) 2, 346 2, 201 -6..18
Ball bearing (10,000 set) 190 351 84,.74
Raw salt (10,000 ton) 14 12 -14,.29
Sulphuric acid (ton) 16, 000 31,.600 97,.50
Caustic soda (ton) 5, 251 8,.146 55..13
Cloth (10,000 metre) 3, 218 3,.216 - 0 .06
Television (set) 6, 000 570,.200 9,403,.33
Radio cassette (set) 1, 000 673,,200 67,220,.00
Telephone (10,000 set) 20 (1985) 134 570,.00
Washing machine (set) 167 (1985) 732 338,.32
Bicycle (set) 51, 000 248,,900 388,.04
Refrigerator (set) 118 (1985) 776 557,.63
Canned foods (ton) 13, 000 35,,362 172,.02
Beverage (ton) 6, 000 42,,540 609,.00
Cigarette(10,000 box) 13 34 161,.54
Sources: 1). 1981: the AXSEZ Editorial Board (1986), pp. 73-4;
2). 1985: XSB (1986), pp. 72-7;
3). 1989: the AXSEZ Editorial Board (1990), pp. 44-7.
Thus it becomes clear that the stimulus generated from 
the fast growing manufacturing/processing/assembling 
industries has not been transmitted to the stagnant or even 
declining basic industries, in other words, the "spill-over" 
effects created by the foreign-transplanted sectors has not 
reached to the local, indigenous ones. Indeed, Table 6-2.5, 
together with other previous tables in this section, indicates 
that the development of FDI in Xiamen has basically been of 
the enclave-type and therefore had little linkage effect on 
the local industry as a whole.
The reasons for the lack of the linkages are not 
difficult to find. About 95 percent of the raw materials 
needed by those manufacturing industries came from outside 
Xiamen, mostly abroad (Du Qiang, 1988). What really worried 
the Xiamen authorities was the increasing trend of importing
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raw materials, instead of buying local inputs.6 This has not 
only diminished or even eliminated linkage effects, as 
analyzed above, but also eaten up a great amount of foreign 
exchange, exacerbating the shortage of foreign exchange in the 
SEZ. As a result, the process of importing technologies and 
equipment to renovate the old enterprises in the SEZ has been 
retarded or obstructed.
4. Predominance of Small-Sized Enterprises In spite of 
the enormous effort made by the authorities to attract big FDI 
projects, particularly those from Western multinationals, 
small projects still accounted for nearly 95 percent of all 
FIEs in Xiamen by 1989 (see Table 6-2.6) . This means that FIEs 
in Xiamen still has a long way to go to exploit economies of 
scale in the wider export market, which is crucial to the 
success of export-led industrialization.7
Table 6-2.6 Distribution of FIEs in Xiamen by size (1985 - 89)
Size
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
No % No % No. % No. % No. %
Large 4 0.65 7 1.12 9 1.33 9 1.22 12 1.46
Medium 12 1.95 13 2.08 31 4.57 33 4.48 33 4.00
Small 600 97.40 604 96.80 638 94.10 695 94.30 779 94.54
Total 616 100.00 624 100.00 678 100.00 737 100.00 824 100.00
1) . 1985: XSB (1986), p. 40;
2) . 1986: XSB (1987), p. 33;
3) . 1987: XSB (1988), p. 31;
4) . 1988: XSB (1989), p. 33;
5) . 1989: the AXSEZ Editorial Board (1990), p. 173
5. Upsurge of WFOEs Table 6-2.7 shows that the share of 
WFOEs in the total number of signed contracts rose steadily
6. In his speech to the international seminar held in 
Xiamen in September 1991, Mr. Wu Yongchun, the director of 
Xiamen Economic Information Centre, disclosed that only a few 
FIEs in Xiamen purchased limited amounts of local raw 
materials.
7. For more about the importance of gaining economies of 
scale for export-led industrialization, see James (1987), pp. 
31-4 and Meier (1989), pp. 254-62.
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from 6.58 percent in 1985 to 67.66 percent in 1989. This large 
swing to WFOE was due largely to the sudden influx of Taiwan 
firms since 1988.
Table 6-2.7 Composition of FDI contracts signed in Xiamen 
by type of investment (1985 - 1989)
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
No % No % No % No. % No. %
WFOE 10 6.58 5 14.71 13 26.00 79 43.89 136 67.66
JEV 103 67.76 26 76.47 31 62.00 87 48.33 55 27.36
CME 39 25.66 3 8.82 6 12.00 14 7.78 10 4.98
Total 152 100.00 34 100.00 50 100.00 180 100.00 201 100.00
Source: the AXSEZ Editorial Board (1990), p. 328.
On the other hand, WFOEs had a relatively poor record in 
implementing contracts. Only 38.54 percent of the signed 
projects (153 out of 397) had gone into operation by August 
1990, in comparison with 60.92 percent for JEVs and 61.40 
percent for CMEs at the same time. Likewise, only 12.98 
percent of the agreed investment amounts (US$120 million out 
of US$928 million) had actually been contributed by WFOEs, in 
contrast to 44.94 percent for JEVs and 22.89 percent for CMEs. 
What is more, a considerable number of WFOEs were found to be 
engaged in "transfer pricing" practice (Zhang Fenqing, 1991: 
27-8).
6. Poor Performance in Importing and Utilizing Foreign 
Technology There were some problems in selecting sectoral 
priority for importing foreign technology. From 1984 to 1989, 
about 60 percent of the total imported technologies went to 
the light industry, 12 percent to the chemical and 
pharmaceutical industry, 10 percent to the textile industry, 
and only 2.3 percent to the machinery industry (Li Wei, 1990: 
32) .
The machinery sector has traditionally been seen as the 
cornerstone of any manufacturing industry and played a key
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role in the technological transformation and indeed 
industrialization of many economies. According to the 1985 
Industrial Survey, the machinery industry in Xiamen could 
greatly expedite the transformation in other sectors if it 
could make an improvement in the technologies of hydraulic 
power, gear forming, design, and precision manufacturing 
(Research Office, 1989: 147). However, the machinery sector 
received less advanced foreign technology than other sectors, 
and thus the prospects of the technological progress in Xiamen 
remain in doubt.
In addition, the Xiamen authorities has been seriously 
concerned over the bias in the introduction of foreign 
technology towards hardware. For example, among the 375 items 
imported by Xiamen in 1988, 130 were assembly lines,
accounting for nearly 35 percent, 223 were complete units and 
equipment, making up nearly 60 percent, and only 21, or 5.6 
percent, were software or know-hows. The reason for this 
preference of hardware to software was that many end users 
believed that the former tend to be easier and quicker than 
the latter to increase production and hence economic benefits 
for them (Li Wei, 1990: 34).
As a result, few attempts have been made to study and 
digest the imported technologies thoroughly and indeed to 
modify them in the light of the local conditions. Without 
doubt, if modern technologies designed in the West are 
transferred to developing countries without a proper 
beforehand study and subsequent modification, it would lead to 
serious "distortions and inefficiencies" in recipient
countries" (Stewart, 1977: 3).
Thus it is not surprising to learn that with nearly US$85 
million being spent on importing some 2,000 items of "advanced 
foreign technology" from 1982 to 1988, only US$9 million 
returns had been generated (Li Wei, 1990: 35). This is largely 
in line with the estimation made by the Xiamen Statistics 
Bureau that for every US$100 spent on "technological 
innovation" only US$10.8 had been recovered (AXSEZ Editorial 
Board, 1986: 257).
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As a result of the above problems in the industrial 
transformation, the gap of economic efficiency between the 
local and foreign-involved sectors has become increasingly 
bigger. Table 6-2.8 reveals the changes in the productivity 
between the two sectors from 1985 to 1989. Despite the steady 
growth achieved by the local side, its average annual growth 
rate was only 11.52 percent, more than 5 percent lower than 
that of its foreign rival. Consequently, the gap of 
productivity between them went up from ¥33,657 per person in 
1985 to ¥65,583 per person in 1989.
Table 6-2.8 Changes in productivity between the local and 
foreign-involved industrial sectors in Xiamen (1985 - 1989)
(yuan/person, in 1980 prices)
Local sector Foreign-involved sector
Produc t ivi ty Annual growth 
rate (%)
Productivity Annual growth 
rate (%)
1985 14,954 48,611
1986 16,263 8.75 51,697 6.35
1987 18,324 12.67 75,473 45.99
1988 21,492 17.29 82,083 8.76
1989 23,132 7.63 88,715 8.07
Average ----- 11.52 16.23
Sources: 1). 1985: XSB (1986), pp. 53, 65 & 69;
2). 1986: XSB (1987), pp. 51, 59 & 79;
3). 1987: XSB (1988), pp. 57, 61 & 77;
4). 1988: XSB (1989), pp. 48, 65 & 81;
5). 1989: the AXSEZ Editorial Board (1990), pp. 182, 198-9 & 336.
At the same time, profits and taxes per capita in the 
state-owned sector dropped from ¥12,400 in 1987 to ¥10,900 in 
1989, the ratio of profits and taxes to GVIO from 22.83 
percent to 19.28 percent, and the ratio of profits and taxes 
to capital from 38.32 percent to 21.86 percent. On the other 
hand, the same three indicators for the foreign-involved 
sector over the same period showed a growth in different 
degree, with the first increasing from ¥37,000 to ¥49, 500, 
the second from 23.11 percent to 24.89 percent, and the third
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from 22.54 percent to 23.60 percent (Wang Yong and Guo 
Jiuqing, 1990: 30).
6-3. Trend and Special Features of Taiwan Direct Investment 
in Xiamen
The upsurge of TDI has been one of the most prominent 
developments in the PRC foreign economic scene in recent 
years. By the first quarter 1992, a total of 3,914 contracts 
had been concluded, calling for Taiwan commitments more than 
US$3.7 billion. Of this total, nearly 26 percent, or US$950 
million, had actually been invested (JJRB, 17/6/92: 4). In
1991 alone, Taiwan capital accounted for 13.37 percent of 
total FDI projects in China, 11.59 percent of total foreign 
commitments and 10.68 percent of total foreign invested 
capital (GJMY, 5/92: 60). As a result, Taiwan has now
surpassed Japan and the U.S.A. and become the second largest 
investor (only behind Hong Kong) in the PRC.
Most TDI projects are concentrated in the southeastern 
coastal areas, with Fujian province accounting for about 
three-quarters of the total. The Xiamen SEZ, with its unique 
and close links to Taiwan, has emerged as the frontrunner in 
attracting Taiwan capital in the country, accounting for 
approximately a fifth of total projects and half of total 
pledged and invested capital (BR, Jan.27-Feb.2,92: 17). The 
SEZ authorities have made the use of TDI to transform their 
old industries as the top priority of industrial development. 
According to Xiamen's Eighth FYP (1991-95), Taiwan firms will 
contribute almost 55 percent (or ¥12 billion) of total GNP 
(¥22 billion) by 1995 (ibid: 18) .
Some Western observers have noticed that important 
development and are aware of the profound implication of it 
[e.g. Crane (1992): 842; Frankenstein (1992): 881], but none 
of them has done any serious research on it. Thus, the 
following two sections are devoted to a detailed analysis of 
the characteristics and effects of TDI in Xiamen, while the 
implication of TDI on the future development of Xiamen and
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indeed the Chinese economy as a whole will be discussed in the 
concluding chapter.
It must be pointed out, however, that research on TDI in 
Xiamen (and indeed the whole PRC) is handicapped by two 
difficulties. First, TDI data are generally scare and 
unreliable due to two facts: 1) . the large-scale inflow of TDI 
into China only has a relatively short history, and 2). many 
TDI projects are small and scattered, and were conducted 
either on an indirect base or secretly. Thus, in order to 
cover sufficient observations and data the examination period 
for TDI will extend to the early 1990s. And second, changes in 
the policies and measures of the PRC and Taiwanese authorities 
are so frequent and rapid that research is often outdated 
before publication. However, these problems are certainly not 
sufficient to undermine the validity and relevance of the 
arguments made and the broad conclusions reached in this 
thesis.
Trend
The first Taiwan investor, disguised as a businessman 
from a third territory, arrived in Xiamen in May 1983 and set 
up the first Taiwan-invested enterprise in the following year. 
Since then, the development of TDI in the SEZ has undergone 
three different phases. As can be seen from Table 6-3.1, 
between 1983 and 1987 only 16 contracts were signed and 
US$21.5 million committed, accounting for a mere 5.42 percent 
of total FDI projects and 4.19 percent of total foreign 
pledged capital over the same period.
The situation changed dramatically in 1988. The political 
relaxation in Taiwan and, in particular, the removal of the 
ban on its private citizens to travel to the mainland, 
triggered off a steady stream of visitors to the PRC, 
especially to Xiamen.8 Many visitors combined private visits 
with a search for business opportunity. In response to this
8. It was estimated that the number of Taiwan visitors 
to Xiamen had well exceeded 1.2 million by the end of 1991.
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new development, the Xiamen authorities, apart from 
promulgating a series of laws, regulations and rules to 
encourage TDI, opened up two investment zones (Haicang and 
Xinglin) and one high-tech park (Yazhou) exclusively for the 
Taiwanese. As a result, the inflow of TDI grew at a staggering 
speed. The total annual committed amount peaked in 1989 
(US$454.15 million) and the number of projects in 1990 (172) . 
More significantly, in 1989 TDI projects accounted for 76.62 
percent of all FDI projects and 87.06 percent of all foreign 
committed capital in Xiamen.
Table 6-3,1 Development of Taiwan investment in Xiamen
(1983 - September 1992)
1983-87 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 Total 
(Jan-Sept)
No. of contracts signed 16 57 154 172 94 105 598
% of total FDI contracts 5.42 31.67 76.62 65.65 44.13 39.92 42.29
Capital committed by
the Taiwanese (US$ m.) 21.50 82.19 454.15 370.00 195.68 204.21 1,327.73
% of total foreign
commitments 4.19 52.80 87.06 67.40 37.65 27.73 44.25
Sources: 1). 1983-87: XMTJ, 8/1990, p. 23;
2). 1988: XSB (1989), p. 362;
3). 1989: the AXSEZ Editorial Board (1990), p. 329;
4). 1990: the ACE Editorial Board (1991), p. IV-89;
5). 1991-Sept.92: XSB (1992), p. 13.
From 1991 the influx of TDI dwindled sharply, with both 
the number of contracts and the amount of capital inflow in 
1991 dropping by more than 45 percent over 1990. In the first 
nine months of 1992, the situation only showed a slight 
improvement. The local authorities blamed the decline on the 
opening-up of more areas in the country for the Taiwanese, 
while many foreign observers attributed it mainly to the 
relatively poor transportation links in Xiamen (CBTR, 1/92:
14) .
Despite this setback, Xiamen still has the highest 
density of TDI projects in the country. Today, Taiwan firms 
are playing an increasingly important role in the development 
of export-oriented economy in Xiamen, with more than US$3 00 
million being invested and over 200 projects under operation.
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These projects produced about one-fifth of the SEZ's GVIO and 
nearly 15 percent of total exports (JJRB, 8/1/92: 4).
Motives
The following are the major reasons for the recent 
upsurge of Taiwan capital inflow to the PRC. First and 
foremost, the consistent and steady appreciation of the New 
Taiwan dollar (NT$) over the last decade has seriously 
weakened Taiwan's export competitiveness. Since 1985 the NT$ 
has appreciated by more than 40 percent against US$ to the 
ration of NT$25 to $1 at the mid-1992 (FCJ, 18/8/92: 3).9 As 
the majority of exporters in Taiwan are small and medium 
manufacturing firms, operating in highly competitive 
conditions, the rise of the NT$ has left them unprofitable or, 
at best, only marginally profitable.
Second, other production costs have also risen sharply in 
recent years. The wages have been increasing by about 15 
percent per annum, pushing the latest minimum wage up to 
NT$12,365 (US$494.6) per month, equivalent to NT$51.5
(US$2.06) per hour (ibid). This rate, which applies to both 
native and foreign workers in Taiwan, is about 13-14 times 
higher than that prevailing in most parts of the PRC.10 Rising 
land costs add another problem and pollution-control expenses 
have also gone up steeply (FCR, 6/90: 60). These rises of
costs have made the manufacture of labour-intensive products 
no longer competitive. "To beat competition from producers in
9. According to Osman Tseng, there are four reasons for 
the continued appreciation. The large surplus generated by 
Taiwan's foreign trade, its extraordinarily large sums of 
foreign exchange reserves, and its higher interest rates have 
all created a growing demand for the NT$. Also, the economic 
recession in the U. S. has weakened the US$ and thus further 
raised the NT$. For more details, see Tseng (1992).
10. The average wage in the mainland is only about one 
tenth of that prevailing in Taiwan. For a typical Taiwan 
operation in the mainland, wages account for about 11% of the 
total production costs while in Taiwan it is about 3 6%. See 
JJDB, 9/3/92, (No. 9), p 33.
216
South Korea and Japan," said Mr. Wang Yung-ching, the Chairman 
of Taiwan's leading multinational corporation, the Formosa 
Plastic Group (FPG), Taiwan's industry "urgently needs to 
exploit the mainland's cheap labour" (FCJ, 6/10/92: 7).
Third, social order in Taiwan in recent years has 
seriously deteriorated. Violent political demonstrations, 
various forms of public disorder and, especially, gangland 
extortion of businessmen by threats of kidnapping or other 
criminal actions, had all undermined businessmen' confidence 
in the local investment environment (ibid).
Fourth, many Taiwan firms are using FDI to expand their 
exports in the mainland market, potentially the largest one in 
the world. Expressing the general mood of the Taiwan business 
community, Mr. Wang Chien-shien, Taiwan's then Finance 
Minister, was quoted as saying: "the mainland is a market for 
the Chinese people, and the Chinese people from Taiwan should 
not lag behind Japanese and Koreans in penetrating the 
mainland market" (FCJ, 18/8/92: 3).
And finally, in industries subject to heavy international 
restrictions, some Taiwan businessmen try to make use of PRC 
export quotas, especially to the North American and EEC 
markets (YJ, 5/92: 47) .11
Special Features
The basic pattern of TDI in Xiamen is that investors 
provide capital, technology and management expertise, while 
Xiamen supplies cheap and abundant labour and land. However, 
in contrast to other foreign investors in Xiamen, the 
Taiwanese prefer wholly owned ventures to other forms of 
investment and, in many cases, emphasize their independence by 
supplying their own raw materials and export markets. Local 
people describe such operation as "designing in Taiwan,
11. According to a survey report published in Taiwan in 
1992, the export prices for the products manufactured by the 
Taiwan firms in the mainland, i.e. those "made in China," are 
estimated to be 10 percent cheaper than those "made in 
Taiwan." See YJ, 5/92, p. 44.
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manufacturing in Xiamen, transshipping via Hong Kong, and 
selling abroad." Let us examine these features in greater 
detail:
1. Predominance of Wholly Owned Enterprises There is a 
growing tendency for Taiwan investors to set up wholly owned 
enterprises in Xiamen, instead of JEVs or CMEs. Table 6-3.2 
shows that the share of wholly owned venture in the total 
number of Taiwan firms climbed steeply, from 37.50 percent in 
the period of 1983-87 to 85.47 percent in 1990, with an 
average percentage of 77.52 for the whole period of 1983-91. 
Investment in wholly owned ventures amounted to nearly US$1 
billion, making up 90 percent of the total TDI in Xiamen (BR, 
Jan.27-Feb.2,92: 17). Such a high proportion of wholly owned 
venture is unusual in the history of FDI in developing 
countries.
Table 6-3.2 Shares of wholly owned ventures in the total
number of Taiwan firms in Xiamen (1983 - 1991)
1983-87 1988 1989 1990 1991 Total 
(Jan-Nov)
No. of wholly owned 
enterprises 6 32 
Total No. of Taiwan 
firms 16 57 
Share (%) 37.50 56.14
125
154
81.17
147
172
85.47
59
77
76.62
369
476
77.52
Sources: 1). No. of wholly owned ventures: XMTJ, 8/1990, p. 26 and JJRB, 
8/1/92, p. 4;
2). Total No. of Taiwan firms: Table 6-3.1.
2. Predominance of Labour-Intensive, Light Industries 
Because most Taiwan investors go to the mainland to take 
advantage of the low labour costs there, the industries they 
bring in tend to be those producing light industrial/consumer 
goods, with low capital/technology:labour ratios. About 75 
percent of Taiwan firms in Xiamen used only simple and, in 
many cases, second-handed machines imported from Taiwan, 
manufacturing goods such as footwear, clothing, toys, 
umbrellas, handicrafts, luggage and sports equipment {XMTJ,
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1990: 25). Indeed, some Taiwan firms even used less capital 
per unit of labour than the local state-owned counterparts.12
3. Prominence of Chemical Industry Relocation is crucial 
for Taiwan chemical manufacturers to survive because many of 
their end-product customers have moved to the PRC.13 Thus it 
is not surprising that Xiamen, as the focus of TDI in the 
mainland, have a heavy presence of chemical projects, mainly 
including plastics and textile processing branches. As shown 
in Table 6-3.3, although they made up only 17.27 percent of 
all Taiwan manufacturing projects in Xiamen in 1990, the 
amount involved (US$284.70 million) accounted for a remarkable
48.76 percent --  nearly 37 percent ahead of its closest rival
(the paper & stationery industry). At the beginning of 1992, 
that percentage still remained at 40 percent (BR, Jan.27- 
Feb.2,92: 18).
Table 6-3.3. Composition of Taiwan firms in Xiamen
by industry (1990)
No. of projects % Amounts involved % 
(US$ million)
Chemical 48 17.27 284.70 48.76
Paper & stationery 67 24.10 69.44 11.89
Sewing & leather 49 17.63 66.88 11.45
Electric machinery 26 9.35 61.89 10.60
Textile 21 7.55 38.41 6.58
Building material 23 8.27 30.03 5.14
Food processing 20 7.19 13.37 2.29
Electronics 10 3.60 10.91 1.87
Machinery 14 5.04 8.25 1.41
Total 278 100.00 583.88 100.00
Sources XMTJ, 8/1990, p. 24.
12. One of the findings of the field survey in Autumn 
1991. This is particularly true in the umbrella and luggage 
manufacturing.
13. The plastic footwear industry is a good example. The 
total number of factories in Taiwan dropped from 1,400 at the 
height time to only 700 in 1990, primarily because they had 
moved to the mainland. See FCR, 6/1990, p. 60.
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4. High Ratio of Export As most of Taiwan firms' 
finished goods are placed by their parent corporations in 
Taiwan, they tend to have very high ratios of export.14 For 
example, in 1990 Taiwan firms exported 86.12 percent of their 
total output valued at ¥799.83 million, in contrast with only 
35 percent for non-Taiwanese FDI firms in the same period 
(Kong, 1991: 34). The exports from Taiwan firms accounted for
22.65 percent of Xiamen's total exports. About three-quarters 
of the exports went to Europe and North America and 10 percent 
to Japan (AXSEZ Editorial Board, 1991: 58). A survey carried 
out in 183 Taiwan firms in 1990 reveals that 107 (or 58.47%) 
of them exported more than 80 percent of their outputs, and 
that only 8 (or 4.37%) of them exported less than the half 
(see Table 6-3.4).
Table 6-3.4. Composition of Taiwan firms in Xiamen by
export ratio (1990)
Export ratio (%) Number of firms Share (%)
100 56 30.60
80 - 99 51 27.87
50 - 79 68 37.16
Below 49 8 4.37
Total 183 100.00
Source: Hu Peizhao et al., (1990), p. 16.
5. Diversification of Investment Structure TDI in Xiamen 
tends to concentrate in manufacturing industries, producing 
light industrial/consumer goods. In 1990, for example, 86 
percent of Taiwan firms were engaged in manufacturing 
operations, making up 78 percent of total Taiwan investment 
amounts. Since 1991, service industries, however, particularly
14. R. E. Caves argues that foreign investors having a 
competitive edge in overseas marketing are likely to play an 
active role in the export marketing of their subsidiaries. See 
Caves (1971) .
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real estate, have become the new focus of TDI. At present, 
they account for 12 percent of all Taiwan projects and 20 
percent of investment capital. Indeed, real estate has become 
the second largest investment sector, smaller only than the 
chemical industry (BR, Jan.27-Feb.2,92: 18). Two-thirds of
property developers are known to come from Taiwan, and they, 
together with thousands of contracted builders, have created 
a booming property business in Xiamen (Xu, 1992: 121) .
6. Growing Size of Investment Before mid-1988, Xiamen 
did not have a single TDI project involving more than US$10 
million and average capitalization was only US$73 6,355 per 
project (Hu, 1990: 14). Most TDI projects were the same scale 
as local TVEs. Since the second-half of 1988, however, the 
situation has changed as a result of the political initiative 
taken by the Taiwanese authorities. More than half of Taiwan's 
Top 100 Companies (including the FPG) have sent delegations to 
Xiamen to explore the possibility of investment. As a result, 
a total of 11 big contracts involving US$10 million each had 
been signed by the end of 1990, with the largest investment 
worth US$200 million (BR, Jan.27-Feb.2,92: 17). This has 
increased the average capitalization to US$3,469 million per 
project, compared with only US$1,350 million for the non- 
Taiwanese FDI projects (Zhang Fenqing, 1990: 3).
Furthermore, many existing Taiwan firms have expanded 
their operations in Xiamen by reinvesting their profits. For 
instance, the Sandexing Industry Co. Ltd., set up in 1985, has 
expanded its production capacity 11 fold and is planning to 
build a new industrial park housing 16 other Taiwan firms. 
Also, the Xianglu Chemical Co. Ltd. has, in addition to 
considering the establishment of weaving projects, asked to 
build new plants to produce related high-pressure packaging 
containers {BR, Jan.27-Feb.2,92: 18).
Taiwan investors have shown increased willingness to 
extend the length of their investment term. Table 6-3.5 shows 
that, from July 1987 to June 1989, the shares of the firms 
having an investment term of over 20 years increased 
substantially, while those below the term dropped sharply. By
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the beginning of 1992 some firms had extended their investment 
terms to 70 years (ibid: 17).
Table 6-3.5. Composition of Taiwan firms in Xiamen by 
length of investment term (July 1987 - June 1989)
Length (year)
July 1987 - June 1988 July 1988 - June 1989
No., of firm % No. of firm %
Over 3 0 9 12.68 45 36.00
20 - 29 17 23 .94 35 28.00
10 - 19 43 60.56 45 36.00
Below 10 2 2.82 0 0.00
Total 71 100.00 125 100.00
Source: Hu Peizhao et al., (1990), p. 16.
Thus a new investment pattern has emerged: the first
pattern was of single investment in manufacturing by small or 
medium firms; now this is gradually shifting to a pattern of 
joint investments (or developments) in both manufacturing and 
service industries by several companies, company groups or 
even congrulmerates. There has also been a shift from renting 
workshops or buildings to buying them and, more recently, to 
leasing or buying a piece of land to develop it into an 
exclusive Taiwan investment zone or industrial park.
7. Generally Good Performances In contrast to the rather 
unsatisfactory situation in all FDI projects, the financial 
performance of Taiwan firms appeared good. Since many Taiwan 
firms are small, light and self-equipped manufacturing 
ventures, they have flexibility to plan short gestation 
periods, and are normally able to sign contracts, go into 
operation, and get returns within a year. According to a 
sample survey carried out by the Chinese Academy of Social 
Sciences, about 95 percent of Taiwan firms in Xiamen were 
profitable (JB, 1/92: 79). This ratio is considerably higher 
than the 53 percent for the non-Taiwanese FDI firms. The 
footwear factories, for example, were reported to make 10-15
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percent more profits in Xiamen than in Taiwan (Kong, 1991: 
34). Because of good performance, many firms start playing an 
important role in their parent corporations or their fields. 
Cankun Electric Appliance Co. Ltd., for instance, now produces 
two-thirds of the total output value of its general 
corporation (BR Jan.27-Feb.2,92: 17); while the Sandexing
Industry Co. Ltd. has become the world's second largest
manufacturer of conductive rubber (Xu, 1992: 120) .
6-4. Major Effects of Taiwan Investment on the Xiamen 
Economy
Taiwan capital, as the largest source of FDI in Xiamen,
has played a crucial role in its economic development in
recent years. The most evident contributions made by Taiwan
firms to Xiamen have been the creation of employment, increase 
in exports, and expansion of tourism.
1. Reducing Importance of the State-Owned Sector As in 
other parts of China, Taiwan firms in Xiamen grew much faster 
than local Chinese enterprises, especially SOEs. At present, 
there are several Taiwan firms producing more than US$30 
million worth of GVIO monthly (JJDB, 16/3/92: 10). As a
result, the share of the state-owned sector in the economy has 
declined steadily, while that for the private sector 
(including Taiwan- and other foreign-owned) has risen. By the 
end of 1991, for example, the GVIO and exports of some 200 
Taiwan firms in Xiamen accounted for about one-fifth and 22.65 
percent of the SEZ's totals respectively (JJRB, 8/1/92: 4; BR, 
Jan.27-Feb.2,92 : 17). Together with all other FDI firms, they 
made up about 52 percent and 80 percent of the SEZ's total 
GVIO and exports respectively (JJDB, 1/1/92: 28).
Thus it is clear that the role played by the state-owned 
sector in Xiamen's economy has diminished significantly. 
Facing stiff competition from Taiwan and other foreign firms, 
some inefficient local enterprises, especially SOEs, find it 
hard to survive. For instance, the Xiamen Mechanical 
Engineering Plant, one of leading SOEs in the SEZ, was forced
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to close down in 1991 (Xu, 1992: 120).
2. Overriding the Local Industrial Development Plan In 
the book, Xiamen Socio-Economic Development Strategies for 
1985-2000, the Xiamen authorities (like their counterparts in 
other SEZs) decided to put the development of electronics as 
their top priority in the hope that it would, through FDI, 
become the leading industry by 1995. This decision was made on 
the grounds that "electronics will pioneer Xiamen's industrial 
transformation through its extensive linkage effects" 
(Research Office, 1989: 139). However, the growing influx of 
TDI since 1988 has swept the plan aside. As shown in Table 6-
3.3, TDI in Xiamen was dominated largely by chemical industry 
(48.76% of total investment), and the share of the electronics 
industry was almost negligible (1.87%).
Thus the sectoral structure of TDI did not coincide with 
the Xiamen's own industrial transformation plan. Faced with 
this divergence, the Xiamen authorities abandoned their 
original goal and declared petrochemicals be their new 
"investment emphasis" (BR, Jan.27-Feb.2,92: 19). Indeed, a
great deal of work has been done to accommodate more and 
bigger petrochemical projects from Taiwan.
3. Lack of Linkage Effects Most of the Taiwan firms in 
Xiamen are characterized by what local people call as "five 
self-responsible' s" (Wuge Ziwofuze) , i.e. they are responsible 
for their own capital, technology, raw materials, management 
and export markets. This means that, apart from making use of 
local cheap labour and land, all other inputs are brought from 
Taiwan. For example, more than three-quarters of all raw 
materials, components and parts needed by Taiwan firms in 
Xiamen were imported from Taiwan and about 85 percent of their 
finished products exported to existing overseas markets in
1990. Some midstream factories even invested with upstream 
or/and downstream factories, and formed a self-sufficient, 
self-sustained operational system, almost wholly independent 
of the local economy (XMTQYJ, 3/91: 17-18; Kong, 1991: 34).
Moreover, as most of the Taiwan firms were wholly owned 
(77.52%, see Table 6-3.2), top- and middle-level managerial
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personnel were normally sent from their parent corporations in 
Taiwan and controlled all aspects and stages of their 
operations in Xiamen. Xiamen employees with low-level 
management responsibilities accounted for less than 3 0 percent 
of the total number of managerial staff and played only a 
minor role in the decision-making process (XMTQYJ, 3/91: 17- 
18) .
Clearly, these enclave operations have little linkage 
(forward or backward) and demonstration effect on the local 
economy. As a result, the plan to make use of TDI to transform 
local industrial enterprises and to stimulate the development 
of other related industries is still far from being reality.
4. Limited Technology Transfer According to another 
sample survey, about 65 percent of technologies imported by 
the Taiwanese are judged as appropriate to Xiamen's 
conditions. The Taiwan shoe-manufacturing technology, for 
example, has been carefully studied and then modified by the 
Fujian Mechanical Engineering Bureau, with a view to equipping 
all mainland's shoe-making factories with the same technology. 
Also, several Taiwan firms have brought in some practical 
technical know-hows and/or the Western manufacturing 
standards, e.g. "UL" of the U.S.A., "CSA" of Canada, "JIS" of 
Japan, and "RDEF-TUV" of Germany, to manufacture some products 
with well-known brands, such as "Philips" and "Esars" (Yan, 
1990: 34).
On the other hand, as we have seen, many Taiwan firms are 
small-scale and labour-intensive enterprises, producing light 
industrial/consumer goods. Thus in most cases the technologies 
employed are simple, mature, and standardised. A considerable 
amount of their capital equipment are second-handed directed 
shipped from factories in Taiwan. Of the 200 identified 
technologies introduced so far, "very few" could really be 
regarded as sophisticated (CBTR, 1/92: 14; Yan, 1990: 28).
5. Increasing Employment Opportunity The total number of 
people working in Taiwan firms is now around 45,000. More 
profoundly, in 1990 the number of people engaged in self- 
employed businesses, which flourished due largely to the
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influx of TDI, increased by 92 percent, the highest growth in 
the country (Xu, 1992: 121). The Xiamen authorities spent only 
¥140 million on facilitating these employment opportunities. 
It was estimated that if the jobs had been created solely by 
the authorities it would cost them at least ¥700 million 
(Kong, 1991: 34).
6. Mixed External Effects Apart from taxes, rents and 
charges paid to the local authorities, TDI has created several 
other positive external effects. First, it has stimulated real 
estate business and substantially improved the efficiency of 
infrastructure construction. Before 1988 only about 50 percent 
of a large number of standard factory buildings, which costed 
the authorities ¥420 million to build, had been leased out. 
Since 1988, however, all the empty buildings have been rented 
to or bought by the Taiwanese. Many late arrivals had to 
settle in makeshift buildings or rent empty space in local 
factories. As a result, the authorities claimed that they had 
recovered all constructing costs of those buildings by 1989, 
with a rate of returns of 162 percent (Hu, 1990: 17).
Second, TDI has created a desirable social effect on 
Xiamen and the neighbouring areas by generating employment. 
The average annual salary for a worker in a Taiwan firm is 
about ¥5,000, which is 4 times higher than the local annual 
living costs (¥1,250). Thus a worker employed in a Taiwan firm 
can support other 3 people in his or her family, compared with 
only 0.87 people in the case of a worker employed by a local 
Chinese factory. As 80 percent of the 45,000 employees came 
from poorer rural regions around Xiamen, the beneficial 
effects created by Taiwan firms is indeed immense (Kong, 1991:
34) .
Third, it has promoted the development of tourism in 
Xiamen. During the period of 1989-90, the number of foreign 
tourists visiting the PRC dropped sharply because of the 
Tiananmen Square Incident. In Xiamen, however, the number of 
Taiwan "tourists," many actually looking for business 
opportunity, reached record highs of 73,000 in 1989 and of 
136,000 in 1990 (AXSEZ Editorial Board, 1990: 333). Indeed,
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Xiamen hotels had unusually high occupancy rates at that time. 
Tourist number continued to grow in 1991 when taxes paid by 
the tourist industry to the SEZ authorities were reported to 
"increase substantially" over the previous year (Xu, 1992: 
121) .
fourth, it has induced investment from more than 3 0 
Japanese firms, which are business partners of Taiwan firms 
currently operating in Xiamen (Xu, 1992: 120).
However, the massive influx of Taiwan capital and 
personnel has also brought some unwelcome changes to the local 
population and economy. First, it has contributed to push up 
inflation. In 1988 and 1989, the price index of living costs 
for local people rose by 28.9 percent and 24.0 percent 
respectively, leading to the deterioration of living standard 
for 17 percent of families in Xiamen (XSB, 1989: 352; AXSEZ 
Editorial Board, 1990: 305).
Second, the growing number of immigrants working in 
Taiwan firms has exerted a great pressure on housing, city- 
wide transport, schooling and entertainment facilities. It has 
led to an increase in crimes and other illegal activities in 
Xiamen. This problem has been aggravated by the fact that many 
Taiwan investors bypassed the local Labour Management Bureau 
to employ even cheaper labour from the rural areas around 
Xiamen. The real estate speculation, instigated mostly by the 
Taiwanese, has also pushed up property prices to an unduly 
high level.
And finally, the perceived superiority of employment in 
Taiwan firms has seriously affected the morale of employees in 
local Chinese enterprises, particularly SOEs. The wages and 
salaries of the former are about 2.14 times higher than those 
of the latter. As a result, many talented professionals and 
skilled workers have left their Chinese units for Taiwan 
firms, leaving the Chinese ones further declining (Kong, 1991:
35) .
In short, the effects of TDI on the Xiamen economy have 
been profound, but they are by no means as influential and
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indeed crucial as those of Hong Kong investment on the 
Shenzhen SEZ, where a close economic integration between the 
two economies is taking place. Despite the achievement of 
attracting a greater inflow of Taiwan capital, Xiamen has 
failed to integrate TDI into its economy, in particular to 
make use of TDI in transforming its outmoded industry, through 
establishing extensive economic and technological linkages 
between the local and Taiwan firms.
6-5. Conclusions
The most evident result of the industrial transformation 
in Xiamen, as often proudly claimed by the authorities, has 
been the rapid expansion of industrial output and exports 
during the period of 1981-89, with 23.66 percent and 22.08 
percent of the average annual growth rate, respectively (see 
Table 6-1.3) . As a result, the share of GVIO and exports in 
the SEZ's total GDP went up from 67.02 percent and 30.97 
percent in 1985 to 83.41 percent and 60.73 percent in 1989, 
respectively (AXSEZ Editorial Board, 1986: 70; 1990: 154; XSB, 
1986: 397) . Such big increase in the two shares does represent
a marked advance towards Xiamen's goal --  an export-led
industrialization.15 However, this does not mean that Xiamen's 
old and inefficient industry has been transformed because 
nearly 49 percent of output and over 28 percent of exports in 
1989 were contributed by newly operated FIEs in the SEZ (see 
Table 6-1.3).
Several important issues, emerging from the discussions 
in this chapter, can be further elaborated as follows:
First, Xiamen's present industrial transformation has 
been plagued by the profound lack of interdependence and
linkage effects among various industrial sectors --  a legacy
of the former fragmented and autarky economy and between
15. Experience in many developing countries shows that a 
rapid rise in industrial output and decline in agricultural 
output is a typical feature of industrialization. For details, 
see Meier (1989), pp. 288-93; James, et al. (1987), pp. 33-4; 
and Chenery, et al. (1986), p. ix.
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the foreign-involved and local sectors --  a result of the
enclave-type development of FDI.
Admittedly, lack of interdependence and linkages is the 
most typical characteristic of underdeveloped economies. In 
view of the situation of utilising FDI in China, a senior 
World Bank officer urges the Chinese government to pay 
adequate attention on the development of backward and forward 
linkages and indeed "make them an integral part of its policy 
and strategy for FDI." "Such linkages," he argues, "would not 
only promote development of feeder and downstream industries, 
but would also help to improve the cost efficiency and quality 
of products of industries and, thus, promote their exports" 
(Khan, 1991: xiii).
However, the problem faced by Xiamen is somewhat special, 
in the sense that it has been compounded by the ill choice of 
the leading industrial sector and the accelerated 
proliferation of TDI. Most of the TDI projects in Xiamen were 
engaged in what Hirschman termed as the "antiseptically 
linkage-free" activities. The so-called electronics industry 
in Xiamen has little linkage effect on other sectors and 
cannot catalyze the industrial transformation. Without doubt, 
if the authorities had chosen the longer- and better- 
established machinery sector as the leading industry the 
result would have been quite different.
Second, the Xiamen authorities' policy toward TDI has 
also been responsible for the relatively poor quality of TDI 
projects in Xiamen. They offered more financial incentives to 
Taiwan investors than to non-Taiwanese foreign investors. What 
is more, the local enterprises competed fiercely with each 
other in offering even more concessions to the Taiwanese. That 
is why so many low-level or "sunset" projects have been 
attracted into the SEZ. More importantly, the double standards 
have not only created confusions in the incentive policy but 
also seriously damaged the prospect for non-Taiwanese foreign 
investors, particularly those from the industrialized West or 
with advanced technology, to come to Xiamen.
In fact, it is not necessary to offer extra financial
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concessions to Taiwan investors. Many of them would rather to 
see an increase in the ratio of local sales, relaxation of 
credit controls, and opening more sectors and markets to them 
(.JJDB, 25/5/92: 22).
Third, the enclave-type development of FDI has created
another serious problem in Xiamen a dual economy, with the
fast growing, modern, foreign-transplanted, capitalist sector 
coexisting with the stagnant, backward, indigenous, socialist 
sector. The results of this increasing divergence is that more 
and more scarce resources, especially professional people, are 
drawn into the former sector form the latter one. Clearly, if 
the Xiamen authorities do not take immediate actions to narrow 
the disparity, they will soon face serious economic, 
technological, social, cultural and, eventually, political 
consequences.
And finally, the increasing presence of TDI has not only 
exacerbated the enclave-type development of FDI in Xiamen but 
also created a potential conflict with Xiamen's long-term 
development goal. Clearly, Xiamen is more suitable for 
developing an EPZ-type zone since it has got a considerable 
manufacturing capacity, improving sea and air transport links, 
and abundant labour resources. However, since the economic 
contacts with Taiwan resumed and expanded, the Xiamen 
authorities have apparently become more enthusiastic about the 
goal of building a Free-Trade-Port, rather than "an industry- 
oriented comprehensive SEZ, " on the grounds that Xiamen could 
benefit from the entrepot trade between Taiwan and mainland 
China (Zou, 1988; Wu Yongchun, 1991) . Given the fact that 
there is virtually no prospect of direct trading between the 
two sides in the foreseeable future, it is therefore not clear 
that in making a further change towards the establishment of 
a Free-Trade-Port the benefits would exceed the costs.
Also, as we have seen, when facing the conflict between 
the main interest of TDI (petrochemicals) and the priority of 
the local industrial development (electronics), the 
authorities abandoned the original development priority and 
became in favour of the petrochemical industry. That is to
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say, Xiamen's original industrial development plan has, to a 
large extent, been hijacked by the mighty Taiwan capital. 
Indeed, if Taiwan's petrochemical projects continue to be 
allowed to flood into Xiamen without being subject to a 
stringent scrutiny, the authorities will soon find that Xiamen 
is becoming Taiwan's another petrochemical city, with all its 
unique tourist resources being destroyed by pollution.
Thus, as far as the relationship between the local 
economy and FDI is concerned, it is the increasing domination 
of Taiwan capital in the local economy which has led to the 
Xiamen authorities readjusting their industrial development 
policy and hence contributed to the inconsistency, ambiguity 
and unpredictability in the zone policy.
To sum up, despite the achievement of attracting a 
greater inflow of foreign capital, the Xiamen authorities have 
failed to design a policy framework which would facilitate the 
integration of FDI into the local industry by establishing 
extensive linkages between the foreign-involved and local 
sectors. The integration is vital for Xiamen because it is the 
best way to transfer and diffuse advanced foreign technology 
into the local economy, to safeguard against enclave-type 
development of FDI, and, above all, to stimulate the domestic 
industrial transformation. Clearly, due to the small size and 
high labour-intensity of most of the FDI, especially TDI, 
projects in Xiamen, the transferability of its experience in 
utilizing FDI to transform the local industry for the 
country's industrialization programmes appears to be very 
limited.
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Chapter 7 
THE FOREIGN TRADE LIBERALIZATION 
AND PRICE REFORM IN XIAMEN
Since it was designated as a SEZ, Xiamen has always put 
the reform of its foreign trade system high on its economic 
development agenda. With the increasing expansion of the 
economic contacts with Taiwan in recent years, it has set 
itself the ambitious task of becoming a Free-Trade-Port (FTP) 
by the year 2000 (Research Office, 1989: 4).
In pursuing this task, Xiamen has to deal with problems 
not only resulted from the conflict between the old, centrally 
planned and the new, market-oriented systems, as observed in 
Chapter 5 and 6, but also those caused by the conflict between 
the rigid, largely inward-looking trade regime still 
implemented in interior China and the more flexible, outward- 
looking trade policy conducted in the SEZ. These problems 
include: 1) those typical of China's trade decentralization, 
such as chaos and severe internal price competitions due to 
the interest conflicts between the central ministry and the 
locality, between the state and the trading company, and among 
companies themselves; and 2) those commonly observed in the 
developing countries reforming their trade policy, such as 
large government deficits, chronic shortage of foreign 
exchange, and high inflation.
Thus, Xiamen faces another unprecedented challenge, apart 
from the two discussed in the previous two chapters, of 
transforming the old, import-substitute inward-looking trade 
regime into a new, export-oriented outward-looking system. 
During this process, Xiamen has to deal with an important 
relationship: the one between the domestic economic reform and 
the foreign trade liberalization. Among various domestic
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reforms, price reform is the most important one because it has 
crucial effects not only on industrial reform but also on 
trade reform as well.
In fact, foreign trade reform and price reform are 
closely linked to each other because of their complementary 
effects. The best way to remove price distortions for a 
command economy seems to be to open its economy to the 
international trade and competitions, thus bringing domestic 
prices closer to world prices. On the other hand, the benefits 
of trade reform could be greater when accompanied by a 
fundamental price reform. In other words, decentralized trade 
can facilitate the formation of an appropriate price system 
and vice versa.
The purpose of this chapter is, therefore, to examine the 
relationship between the foreign trade reform and the price 
reform in Xiamen. After identifying the problems emerging from 
the trade reform in Section 7-1, this chapter starts examining 
the interaction between the price reform policy and the 
Special Policy in Section 7-2. Section 7-3 goes on analysing 
the relationship between price distortions and the trade 
problems; Section 7-4 explores the relationship between trade 
expansion and inflation; and finally Section 7-5 concludes 
this chapter with important findings.
7-1. Problems in the Foreign Trade Reform
As a historic trading port, Xiamen has long had an 
ambition to restore and expand its traditional trade links 
with the outside world. It is therefore quite natural for the 
Xiamen authorities to have made greater efforts to reform the 
foreign trade system. The result of the efforts has been that 
242 new trading entities had been created by the end of 1989, 
compared to only 8 in 1980. As shown in Table 4-3.9, export 
volume grew rapidly, with an average annual growth rate of 
21.94 percent for the period of 1981-90, compared to only 
16.88 percent for the prereform period of 1950-80.
However, a series of problems have arisen in the trade
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reform. Some of them are similar to those commonly observed in 
developing countries experiencing the transition from import- 
substitution to export-led industrialization, while others are 
unique to the Chinese SEZs caused largely by the conflict 
between the new, more flexible trade policy and the old, rigid 
approach. The most serious problems appeared to be: 1) the
sharp increases in export costs; 2) the severe shortage of 
export supplies; 3) lack of domestic capital supplemental to 
export production; and 4) rise of trade-induced inflation 
(AXSEZ Editorial Board, 1990: 107; Lin Jianhan, 1990).
1. The increases in export costs have led to heavy losses 
for a large number of exporting firms. This was due largely to 
the rampant inflation in the mid-1980s, which sharply pushed 
up the domestic procurement prices of many raw materials and 
export inputs. To illustrate, the prices of cashmere, goatskin 
and the bark of eucommia (a popular traditional Chinese 
medicine) went up from ¥18,500 per ton, ¥4.8 per piece and 
¥2,667 per ton in 1984 to ¥65,700 per ton, ¥21.1 per piece and 
¥16,308 per ton in 1986, increasing by 255.14 percent, 339.58 
percent and 511.47 percent, respectively (Zhao Tiecheng, 
1989). Undoubtedly, this wild increase in the domestic 
procurement prices of export supplies, especially 
agricultural, animal and native products which constituted the 
bulk of Xiamen's export sources, produced a devastating effect 
on local trading companies. Many previously profitable 
commodities have become unprofitable to export within a short 
time (Zhang Xie and Liu Xinhua, 1986: 35).
This problem was aggravated by the overvalued exchange 
rate, which led to a further loss on the part of exporters 
when they handed over a part of foreign exchange they had 
earned to the Bank of China. Despite a series of depreciations 
of the Renminbi nationwide since the late 1970's, runaway 
inflation has far outstripped the depreciations, rendering the 
country's real effective exchange rate declining.1 As a
1. For more discussions of the patterns, causes and cures 
of China's inflation in recent years, see Naughton (1992).
For changes in China's exchange rate (against US$) since
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result, "more exports," to quote a local official, "often 
means more losses for trading companies and hence bigger 
subsidies from the state" (Chen Guangchong, 1988: 38).
2. The deterioration of the real effective exchange rate, 
combined with the existence of a protected domestic market, 
has made it less profitable for Xiamen to export than to sell 
domestically. In particular, the ever increasing demands in 
the domestic market for consumer goods, which made up the 
majority of Xiamen's exports, have made domestic sales even 
more attractive. As a result, the bulk of the outputs produced 
by the local SOEs was still domestic-market-oriented in the 
almost entire period of 1980s. In 1988, for example, the ratio 
of local sales, interior sales and exports was 30:60:10 (Du 
Qiang, 1988: 58).
3. Fierce competitions between Xiamen and interior 
regions to get limited export supplies has further pushed up 
domestic procurement prices of export supplies in the SEZ. The 
problem is particularly acute for Xiamen since nearly 80 
percent of its export supplies came directly from interior 
regions (Meng Zen, 1989: 52). In order to fulfil their own 
export quotas and hence gain foreign exchange retention, many 
interior regions were reluctant to sell their products to the 
SEZ, which consequently had to offer either extraordinarily 
high purchase prices, or other economic incentives, such as 
forming economic associations whereby the interior partner 
would be entitled to certain tax and foreign exchange 
concessions, to get export supplies. Obviously, this has not 
only increased the costs of export significantly for Xiamen 
but also seriously distorted prices in the domestic market, 
creating a direct conflict of economic interest between the 
SEZ and various interior regions.
4. The "price wars" have pushed up not only the 
procurement prices of exportable goods but also the retail 
prices of almost all consumer goods in the domestic market. In 
1986, for example, Shaanxi Trading Corporation of Native and
1980, see Table 3-2.1.
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Animal Products signed purchase contracts with various 
localities in the province and set the procurement price for 
walnuts at ¥6,100 per ton; but the companies from Xiamen 
offered higher prices and hence attracted more goods. This 
forced the Shaanxi Corporation to raise its price to ¥6,800 - 
7,100 in November of the year, however, the SEZ companies went
further --  increasing the price to ¥8,000 --  leaving the
local Corporation only able to complete 56.52 percent of its 
procurement plan for the year. In 1987, the Shaanxi 
Corporation determined to keep its own export product at all 
costs by increasing the price to ¥7,400 Yuan, and yet it only 
managed to get 17.39 percent of the supply because the SEZ 
companies offered an even higher price (¥10,000) to local 
sellers. An immediate result of this price war was that the 
retail price of walnuts in Shaanxi went up by nearly 250 
percent during the two years, which was of course a 
contributing factor for the 3 0.17 percent of inflation rate 
for the province in the same period (TGXX, 3/89: 45). Thus it 
is not surprising that the Xiamen SEZ (indeed all SEZs) has 
been accused of "causing trade-induced inflationary spiral in 
the interior" (Meng Zen, 1989: 53).
5. The tight monetary policy, imposed nationwide by the 
central government since 1988 in order to cool off the 
overheated economy, has made many trading companies in Xiamen 
run into a cash crisis, interrupting their normal trading 
businesses. In 1989, the number of companies failing to fulfil 
their export contracts increased and, compared to 1988, the 
export volume of the specialized trading companies and the 
local companies fell by 10.9 percent and 11.2 percent, 
respectively (AXSEZ Editorial Board, 1990: 45).
6. Despite the steady increase in the share of labour- 
intensive light industrial products, nearly half of exports in 
1989 were still primary products, including agricultural, 
native and sideline products, and minerals (see Table 7-1.1). 
Most imports, on the other hand, are manufacturing/processing/ 
assembling components and parts mostly bound for FIEs (see 
Table 7-1.2) . This indicates that Xiamen faced the structural
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Table 7-1,1 Commodity composition of Xiamen's exports
(1985 - 1989) (%)
Year 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Foodstuffs & agricul. goods 36.34 38.99 35.66 39.66 30.04
Native & sideline products 32.69 23.04 17.60 14.26 9.27
Light industrial products 4.39 13.33 22.07 18.97 28.55
Metals & minerals 4.58 3 .81 7.07 12.33 8.71
Textile 0.47 3.09 3 .87 4.06 10.52
Machinery & equipment 5.35 5.88 6.55 4.84 4.55
Chemical & medicinal goods 0.25 10.32 5.69 5.12 6.91
Others 15.93 1.52 1.54 0.75 1.52
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Sources: 1). 1985: XSB (1986), p. 397;
2). 1986: XSB (1987), p. 351;
3). 1987: XSB (1988), p. 329;
4). 1988: XSB (1989), p. 371;
5). 1989: the AXSEZ Editorial Board (1990), pp. 6 & 325.
Table 7-1,2 Commodity composition of Xiamen 's imports
(1985 - 1989) (%)
Year 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Foodstuffs & agricul. goods 5.96 6. 63 5.69 16. 16 17 .97
Light industrial products 8.71 9. 80 3 .55 14. 65 21 .01
Textile 8.55 0.31 0.02 0.70 1.55
Medical & chemical goods 1.56 5. 68 19 .52 27. 33 25 .98
Metals & minerals 4.50 3. 69 3 .02 2. 32 9 .12
Machinery & equipment 47.99 63 .39 33 .30 24. 13 11 .15
Precision instruments 0.12 10. 49 14 .75 7. 96 10 .66
Others 22.60 3 .45 6.75 2 .57
Total 100.00 100. 00 100 .00 100. 00 100 .00
Sources: 1). 1985: XSB (1986), p. 398;
2). 1986: XSB (1987), p. 352;
3). 1987: XSB (1988), p. 330;
4). 1988: XSB (1989), p. 372;
5). 1989: the AXSEZ Editorial Board (1990), p. 326.
problem that the foreign exchange needed by rapidly expanding 
manufacturing sectors was largely generated by slowly growing 
exports of primary products and labour-intensive light
industrial products, which generally face stagnant or even 
declining demand in the world market.
7. As shown in Table 4-3.9, despite the rapid growth of 
exports over the period 1981-90, the average annual growth 
rate (21.94%) is still lower than that of industrial 
development (GVIO) for the same period (23.24%), in contrast 
to the pattern often observed in successful EPZs, where the 
former figure is generally higher than the latter one. 
Furthermore, the growth of exports has not been as consistent 
and steady as that of industry and indeed even showed a steady 
decline in the first three years of the period. As a result, 
as shown in Table 7-1.3, the first five years of the SEZ 
(1980-84) witness only 5.96 percent growth of exports per year
  a speed which is even much slower than several previous
FYP periods, despite a sharp increase at the second stage 
(1985-89) .
Table 7-1.3 Average annual growth rates of exports in Xiamen
in eight different periods (%)
Rehabilitation lst-FYP 2nd-FYP 3rd-FYP 4th-FYP 5th-FYP SEZ Period
1950-52 1953-57 1958-62 1966-70 1971-75 1976-80 1980-84 1985-89
Exports 15.00 26.86 -2.10 2.13 27.68 23.33 5.96 47.81
Sources: 1). 1950-80: the AXSEZ Editorial Board (1986), pp. 122-3;
2). Table 4-3.9.
8. The Xiamen SEZ, like other Chinese SEZs, has also 
actively engaged in "parallel trade." For example, in 1985 due 
to the severe internal price competition, Xiamen overstocked 
more than 700 tons of tinned mushroom, exported 30 percent 
more, and thus caused 25 percent fall in exporting prices, 
leading to a loss of over one million U.S. dollars (Zhou 
Yunyuan, 1987: 59). Also, about 70 percent of manufactured 
imports sold by Xiamen to domestic users in 1985 were priced 
at approximately 50-100 percent higher than the original 
import prices (Chen Guangchong, 1988: 38).
One must, therefore, ask why, after ten years of reform 
and development as a SEZ, the above trade problems have not
238
been removed or mitigated? in other words, what role have the 
economic reform, especially the price reform, and the Special 
Policy played in the reform and development of Xiamen's 
foreign trade?
7-2. The Price Reform Policy and the Special Policy
Local economists have persistently emphasized the 
importance of a price reform in Xiamen (e.g. Fang Xiaoqiu, 
1984; He Lifeng et al., 1986; Su Yanhan, 1989). The Xiamen 
authorities also called for a deepening of price reform in 
order to "promote the readjustment of industrial structure and 
the efficient allocation of resources" (Research Office, 1989: 
129) . In particular, they argued that the need for a swift and 
effective price reform was more acute in the zone because of 
the increasing role played by FDI in the zone economy, and of 
the rapid development of economic associations between the SEZ 
and interior regions (Ni Shidao and Wang Yang, 1989: 16-7).
At the same time, some Chinese economists have contended 
that the SEZs are generally more capable of withstanding the 
pressures of inflation brought about by the price reform, on 
the grounds that they have established a preliminary link 
between wage increase and price growth. Therefore, the SEZs 
are, they conclude, the ideal places in China for carrying out 
a radical price reform (Zhu Tiezhen and Zhou Tianyuan, 1989).
The Price Reform Policy
Unlike the Shenzhen SEZ, where the price reform has been 
independent of the domestic economic reform, Xiamen has 
basically followed the policy of the domestic price reform, 
except that a wider floating range is allowed in the prices of 
few commodities (Ni and Wang, 1989: 31) . This was based on the 
consideration that the old, central-planning economic system 
and elements were more deep-rooted in Xiamen than in other 
SEZs. Of course, the failure to build a "second board" to 
isolate the zone from the rest of the country was also a
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reason.
Thus, the price reform policy has been very similar to 
that of Fujian province2. The chief objective of the reform 
was to "realize the adjustment of industrial and product 
structures through adjusting irrational prices on the one hand 
and decentralizing the price management system on the other." 
Based on the principle that "enterprises should have full 
autonomy to decide the price of their products," the new price 
system would be "dominated by the free price and supplemented 
by the planning price" (ibid: 18 & 41).
The price reform in Xiamen can be divided into three 
distinct stages. The first, from 1978 to 1984, concentrated on 
the restructuring of the prices of agricultural products, 
mainly in rural areas. The second, from 1984 to 1986, 
coinciding with the expansion of the Xiamen SEZ into the whole 
Xiamen Island, focused on the reform of the prices and price 
management system of industrial products, primarily in urban 
areas. The third, from 1987 to 1990, was, after suffering a 
setback, at a low ebb.
However, Xiamen did enjoy some bigger autonomy in terms 
of price management. This includes: 1) full autonomy to decide 
the aggregate level of social retail prices; 2) autonomy to 
set prices for goods and services, except for those items 
controlled by the state; and 3) freedom to adjust the prices 
of those items controlled by the state if approved by the 
state (ibid: 18-9).
Perhaps the most significant change brought about by the 
price reform has been the introduction of the so-called "dual­
track system" (Shuanggui Zhi) in the management of the prices 
of producer goods and the establishment of some factor
2. This can also be identified in a series of documents 
issued by the Xiamen authorities or speeches made by their 
leaders. For example, Mr. Wang Jingshui, one of deputy mayors, 
stated in 1986 that "the price management should emphasize on 
controlling the price level and ensuring it relatively stable" 
(AXSEZ Editorial Board 1986: 13). In 1988, Mr. Zou Erjun, the 
mayor, also called for "consolidating and further digesting 
those reform measures already taken in the national price 
reform" (Zou Erjun, 1988).
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markets. Under this new system, all producer goods were 
divided into two portions: the planned (Jihua Nei) and the
unplanned (Jihua Wai) . The first group of goods continued to 
be distributed by the state-controlled material-supply 
channels and their prices set by the state, while the second 
group would normally be distributed through the newly 
established factor markets and their prices set by 
distributors themselves on the basis of market forces.
As a result, factor markets, such as the exchange centres 
for steels, chemicals, vehicles, building materials, and waste 
materials, have been set up. Producers or dealers were 
encouraged to sell their overproduced or overstocked goods in 
these markets. Consequently, the shares of the unplanned 
portion for most physical inputs of production have surpassed 
50 percent, well above the national average levels. For 
example, in 1987 the "unplanned" supply of cement made up 87 
percent of the total supply, steels 80 percent, soda ashes 60 
percent, rubber 69 percent, petrol 65 percent, diesel oil 74 
percent and timber 100 percent (ibid: 69-70).
Important Features With various reform policies and many 
types of prices simultaneously operated in Xiamen, several 
important features have arisen:
1. As can be seen from Figure 7-2.1, while the general 
trends and fluctuations are very similar, the price level in 
Xiamen is generally higher than those of Fujian province and 
the nation as a whole. This indicates that the price reform in 
Xiamen has been conducted largely in parallel to the domestic 
reform.
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Figure 7-2.1 The retail price indexes in China, Fujian 
province and the Xiamen SEZ (1981 - 1989)
(previous year as 100) (%)
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Sources: 1). 1981-87: Ni and Wang (1989), p.47;
2). 1988-89: China: RMRBh, 14/3/91, p. 3; Fujian: FSB (1990), p. 267; 
Xiamen: XSB (1989), p. 352 and the AXSEZ Editorial Board (1990), 
p. 305.
2. The "Two-Ladder-Price" pattern (Liangge Jiage Jieti) 
has emerged, linking the interior, Xiamen and world markets 
together. That is to say, after several years of the price 
reform, the prices for most primary goods in the SEZ have 
become higher than those in interior China though still lower 
than those in the world market (see Figure 7-2.2a). On the 
other hand, the prices for most manufactured goods in the zone 
have become lower than those in interior China though still 
higher than those in the world market (see Figure 7-2.2b). For 
example, in 1988 the world prices and the zone prices for 
grain were 2 0.8 percent and 6.7 percent, respectively, higher 
than the Chinese domestic prices, whereas for chemical 
products the domestic prices and the zone prices were 5.6 
percent and 3.7 percent, respectively, higher than the world 
prices (ibid: 122; XMTQYJ, 3/89: 23 ) 3 . This shows the tendency 
of zone price moving away from domestic prices and toward
3. The comparison between the world prices and the 
Chinese domestic prices is based on the exchange rate of US$ 
1 to ¥5.7, which is the regulated market rate introduced since 
June 1988 (Ni and Wang, 1989: 122).
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world prices --  a situation the reform is expected to bring
about.
Figure 7-2.2 The pattern of "Two-Ladder-Price" among 
the interior, Xiamen and world markets
Price Price
A
Primary
Goods
Manufactured
Goods
>Market >Market
Interior Xiamen World Interior Xiamen World
(a) (b)
Source: Ni and Wang (1989), p. 46.
3. The "Two-Way-SI ope" (Shuangxiang Qingxie) pricing 
policy has been set for exports and imports. The policy 
requires that all exports, such as raw materials, agricultural 
products and light industrial products, be priced higher than 
the domestic prices but lower than the world prices, i.e. 
forming a "outward-looking slope" for exports (see Figure 7- 
2.3a); while all imports, such as machinery, equipment, 
manufactured components and parts, and electrical appliances, 
be priced higher than the world prices but lower than the 
domestic prices, i.e. forming a "inward-looking slope" for 
imports (see Figure 7-2.3b).
The Chinese defended this artificial differential pricing 
policy by claiming that it would not only stimulate the 
development of exports and imports in Xiamen, but also 
encourage both domestic and foreign investors to invest in the 
SEZ. They believed that, by moving prices in the zone closer 
to world prices, this would force enterprises in the zone to 
greatly improve their efficiency and hence be able to 
participate in international competition. This pricing policy 
would also, they hoped, cushion the impact of the changes or 
fluctuations in world prices on the SEZ and domestic economies
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(Ni and Wang, 1989: 21-3 & 86-7).
Figure 7-2.3 The "Two-Way-SIope" pricing policy for exports
and imports in Xiamen
Price
Exports
Imports
>Market >Market
Interior Xiamen WorldInterior Xiamen World
(a) (b)
Source: Ni and Wang, (1989), p. 87.
4. Free and floating prices have played an increasing 
role in regulating the economy, while the role of the state 
price was diminishing. This happened not only in the 
distribution of producer goods but also in the sales of 
consumer goods. From 1978 to 1987, for example, the share of 
goods sold at the state price in the total social retail sales 
dropped from 98.3 percent to 37.8 percent, whereas the 
proportions of those sold at the floating price and the free 
price rose from 0 %3 percent and 1.4 percent to 15.1 percent 
and 47.1 percent, respectively (ibid: 34).
5. Different price levels are applied on different 
currencies. At the moment, there are generally three kinds of 
currency circulating in Xiamen: RMB, the Foreign Exchange
Certificate (FEC) and foreign currency [mainly Hong Kong 
Dollar (HK$), New Taiwan Dollar (NT$) and U.S. Dollar (US$)]. 
Many commodities and services in the SEZ are priced in all 
three currencies, with the RMB being most expensive, the FEC 
moderate and foreign currency the cheapest. Without doubt, 
such discrimination against the RMB can only exert more 
inflationary pressures on it, and therefore push local retail 
prices further up.
6. The price movement in Xiamen is very vulnerable to the
Price
A
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change of domestic economic climate. As can be observed from 
Figure 7-2.1, the overheated domestic economy in the mid- and 
late 1980s, caused mainly by the overexpansion of capital 
construction and the sharp increases in consumer funds, led to 
a steeper rise in the price level in the SEZ. On the other 
hand, the austerity economic policy, imposed by the central 
authorities nationwide to cool down the overheated economy, 
immediately brought down the price level both in the domestic 
economy and the SEZ. This means that Xiamen has not yet 
established a firm and independent economic base and was still 
closely linked with the domestic economy.
7. The price movement in Xiamen has gradually become 
sensitive to the changes in the international market and the 
foreign exchange rate. As basic consumer goods in the SEZ are 
much cheaper than those in the overseas market (see Figure 7- 
2.2a) , the massive inflow of foreign purchasing power, brought 
in by foreign investors and tourists, has significantly pushed 
up the prices of those goods, especially foods. At the same 
time, with the constant devaluation of the RMB and continuous 
appreciation of Japanese Yen, the prices of imported 
manufactured goods, such as electrical appliances which 
constitute a considerable part of the SEZ's imports, have 
become higher and higher (Wang Peiyuan, 1988) . All these have 
certainly exacerbated the inflation in the SEZ.
The Special Policy
In order to attract more foreign capital and encourage 
local enterprises to export more products, a variety of 
Special Policy or preferential treatments have been formulated 
by both the central and the SEZ authorities4. They include:
1. In terms of foreign exchange management, all
4. The following information are based on the AXSEZ 
Editorial Board (1986), pp. 1-2; 238-9 & 302-3; The Xiamen SEZ 
(Supplement to China's Foreign Trade 1989), An Investment 
Guide for the Xiamen SEZ (1989), and Zhao Tiechen (1989).
For details of the Special Policy encouraging foreign 
investment, see Appendix E.
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exporters, be they local, domestic-associated or foreign- 
involved, are entitled to retain all foreign exchange they 
have earned from their exports.5 The foreign exchange retained 
by zone enterprises can either be used for business and/or 
production purposes, or, in case of surplus, sold to other 
firms through the newly established the Foreign Exchange 
Swapping Centre at the so-called adjusted price (Tiaoji 
Jiage), which normally is 20-25 percent higher than the 
official exchange rate. This means that the zone enterprises 
can not only get more foreign exchange through the retention 
scheme but also more RMB by selling their unused foreign 
exchange than their interior counterparts.
2. All exports, be they finished or semi-finished 
products, from Xiamen are exempt from the export tax and 
consolidated (sale) tax. As to those export goods which have 
been subject to various indirect taxes during production and 
distribution, the producers and/or exporters will get full tax 
rebate. Enterprises with a big share of exports in their total 
output can link up the total wage bill with the amount of 
foreign exchange they earned. They are also allowed to use a 
part of retained foreign exchange as bonus to reward their 
workers and staff. In addition, trading companies in the SEZ 
may act as export agents for any interior producer and 
exporter and thereby charge 3-5 percent commission fees. 
Obviously, the zone enterprises generally have strong 
motivations to export more products and to earn more foreign 
exchange.
3. The zone enterprises are generally encouraged to form 
economic associations with interior partners to jointly design 
and produce new export products or upgrade existing ones (see 
Appendix D) . They can either set up a base in an interior raw- 
material-producing place and organise production locally, or 
bring raw materials, semi-finished products or even finished
5. Their inland counterparts are only allowed to keep 25 
percent.
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products to the SEZ for further fine processing or packing6. 
This means that the zone enterprises have been granted almost 
unlimited access to the interior market in securing their 
continual and competitive export supplies.
4. Xiamen has been granted the authority to engage in 
entrepot trade and, in particular, deal directly with Taiwan. 
Also, Xiamen firms can deal in any export product except a 
dozen of goods directly controlled by the MOFERT, despite the 
fact that the SEZ itself only produces a small number of 
exports. Furthermore, they have the privilege of getting more 
export licences and quotas for exports to Hong Kong, Macau, 
Taiwan, and other Southeast Asian countries due to Xiamen's 
proximity to these markets, although the SEZ only has a 
comparatively small target of foreign exchange earnings to 
fulfil every year. This has created a strong resentment on the 
part of interior producers and exporters who are responsible 
for about 80 percent of the Chinese foreign exchange earnings.
5. All firms in Xiamen are exempted from duties,
consolidated tax and licensing procedures for importing 
capital goods, intermediate goods and raw materials for use in 
export production. Exemption is also granted for a reasonable 
quantity of imported consumer goods for their own consumption 
(but wine, spirit, cigarettes and cosmetics only get 50%
exemption). However, there is no effective way at present to 
prevent the zone enterprises from smuggling or reselling these 
duty-free imported goods, particularly luxurious consumer 
goods, into the interior market since the second customs 
border separating the SEZ from the interior is not yet set up.
6. Products manufactured by the FIEs or domestic-
associated enterprises in Xiamen may be sold to the domestic 
market in appropriate proportion, provided they 1) provide 
China with advanced technology and equipment, or 2) replace
6. According to the Regulation of the Xiamen SEZ, any 
product which is added more than 20 percent value in the SEZ 
will be regarded as the SEZ's product, and subsequently the 
foreign exchange earned from the export of this product will 
be shared between the SEZ's and inland partners at the ratio 
of 80:20 or 90:10.
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the products currently imported by China, or 3) use a large 
proportion of local raw materials/parts/components. As these 
conditions are defined very loosely, the zone firms can always 
find some loopholes in them and get outlets for their illicit 
products in the domestic market.
7-3. Policy Distortions and the Trade Problems
The above discussion tells us that the price reform in 
Xiamen has produced a new price system which is dominated 
largely by market forces. However, the impact of the new 
system on the operation of foreign trade has been compounded 
by the simultaneous and vigorous implementation of the Special 
Policy in the SEZ. Thus, in order to resolve the foreign trade 
problems identified in Section 7-1, it is important to find 
out the reasons for the problems in the context of the price 
reform and the Special Policy, or more specifically, to 
explore the relationship between the price reform and the 
Special Policy on the one hand and the trade problems on the 
other.
By combining Figure 7-2.2 with 7-2.3, the derived 
figure, Figure 7-3.1, reflects the fundamental price trend and 
pricing policy in the Xiamen SEZ and can therefore be used to 
explore the crucial relationship7.
7. Figure 7-3.1 only shows the price trend for primary 
and manufactured goods in Xiamen and the pricing policy for 
exports and imports implemented by the SEZ authorities. It 
should not therefore be understood as that all exports from 
Xiamen are primary goods and all imports into the SEZ 
manufactured goods. For the actual commodity composition of 
exports and imports, see Table 7-1.1 and 7-1.2.
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Figure 7-3.1 The price differentiations between primary and 
manufactured goods, and between exports and imports 
in the interior, Xiamen and world markets
Price Price
Primary 
C Goods 
Exports
A
A'
>Market
Manufactured 
\  Goods 
A' Imports 
----- >Marke t
Interior Xiamen World Interior Xiamen World
(a) (b)
Sources: Figure 7-2.2 and 7-2.3.
As shown in Figure 7-3.la, line ABC represents the price 
level for primary goods in the interior, Xiamen and world 
markets, and the pricing policy for. exports implemented in 
Xiamen. It indicates that it is generally profitable for 
Xiamen to export primary goods since it can get these goods 
from the domestic market at lower prices (between A and B) and 
sell them in the world market at higher prices (between B and 
C) . This incentive structure explains, to a large extent, the 
following phenomena:
1) . Why the share of the primary goods in total exports 
has remained high (48.02% in 1989, see Table 7-1.1), despite 
the long-standing official policy calling for the export of 
more manufactured goods. Table 7-1.1 seems to show a 
significant improvement in the share of light industrial 
products and textile (from 4.39% and 0.47% in 1985 to 28.55% 
and 10.52% in 1989, respectively), but it is an open knowledge 
that the gross export figures of the Chinese SEZs should be 
treated cautiously since they contain a considerable part of 
imported contents, with little domestic value added8. In fact,
8. The Xiamen authorities have declined my request for 
the data regarding the imported contents in their gross export 
figures. However, Table 7-1.2 clearly shows that the share of
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the share of machinery and equipment actually dropped from 
5.35 percent in 1985 to 4.84 percent in 1988 and to 4.55 
percent in 1989. This certainly had a lot to do with the price 
policy favouring the export of primary goods.
2) . Why there has been a shortage of export supplies, 
especially agricultural, animal, native and sideline products, 
in Xiamen. It is much more profitable for domestic producers 
and traders to export these products directly rather than to 
sell them to Xiamen for processing or further processing 
(because C>B). Thus many interior regions were reluctant to 
trade with the SEZ unless other incentives were offered to 
them. As a result, the SEZ accused them of "shielding domestic 
markets from competition" while they attacked the SEZ for 
"making profits through exploiting interior regions" (XMRB, 
10/1/88: 2). This has created a sharp conflict between the 
Xiamen SEZ and interior regions in the sharing of export 
profits.
3). How it was possible for the zone firms to engage in 
the "parallel trade." This can be explained by the fact that 
world prices for most primary goods are much higher than those 
in the Chinese domestic market (C>A), which has provided a big 
margin for the zone firms to wage a price war among themselves 
both in securing export supplies and selling goods overseas. 
This price war can be illustrated by Figure 7-3.2: where firms 
compete with each other by, on the one hand, raising their 
procurement prices well above the domestic prices in obtaining 
export supplies from domestic suppliers (A->A1) and, on the 
other hand, slashing their selling prices in the world market 
well below the normal level (C->C1) , provided that they could 
still make some profits (i.e. as long as C1>A1) .
Light Industrial Products in Xiamen's total imports jumped 
from 8.71% in 1985 to 21.01% in 1989.
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Figure 7-3.2 How the "Parallel Trade" took place in Xiamen 
Price
> Market
Interior Xiamen World
Of course, such "cut-throat" competition has not only 
seriously disrupted the normal supply-demand plans for export 
goods in the domestic market, but also, where foreign demand 
is price inelastic, led to losses for the country as a whole 
(Research Office, 1989: 166). The case of tinned mushroom
mentioned in Section 7-1 has illustrated this point. Lack of 
co-ordination between the price reform (which allows the zone 
firms to set prices for their own business operations) and the 
Special Policy (which gives them unlimited access to both the 
domestic and foreign markets) seemed to be responsible for 
this problem.
4) . Why many of the zone firms have suffered from high 
export costs and even losses. As can be seen from Figure 7-
3.3, with the zone firms buying export supplies in the 
domestic market at higher and higher prices (A->AX) , the costs 
of their exports go up steadily (B->B2) . The high procurement 
prices are the result not only of "cut-throat" competition but 
also of increasingly strong demands for exportable goods 
(especially daily consumer goods) for local consumption in 
both the domestic and zone markets. As a result, many Xiamen 
firms has run into deep financial trouble owing to their 
inability to absorb the high costs. Figure 7-3.3a shows a 
substantial reduction in profits (from BC to BXC) if prices 
for those export goods in the world market remain unchanged, 
while Figure 7-3.3b reflects a net loss in profits (C^Bi) if 
the world prices decline (C->Ci) , which, unfortunately,
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happened quite often due to the irrational competition and/or 
stagnant demand in the world market for the primary goods. 
Thus, both cases have resulted in serious economic losses for 
Xiamen trading firms.
Figure 7-3.3 How economic losses incurred 
in Xiamen's export operations
Price Price
C
B
B
>Market -------------------- >Marke t
Interior Xiamen WorldInterior Xiamen World
(a) (b)
5) . How loss-making firms in Xiamen have been able to 
sustain business without receiving substantial government 
subsidies, as their domestic counterparts often did. As 
explained above; the zone firms, domestic- or foreign- 
involved, are entitled to retain all foreign exchange earnings 
they made from exports, and to sell their unused foreign 
exchanges through the swapping centre at the adjusted price, 
which is normally 20-25 percent higher than the official 
exchange rate9. This means that the zone firms generally had 
more circulating capital for their business operations than 
domestic trading firms do. At the same time, consumer funds in 
Xiamen have grown expanded rapidly due to huge pay rises for 
the existing zone workers and staff and to the massive 
presence of immigrant workers engaged in capital 
constructions. These two elements have, as shown in Figure 7-
3.4, sharply pushed up local prices of both producer and
9. In fact, it is a widespread practice for many zone 
firms to sell their foreign exchange through black markets 
and/or other illegal channels in order to gain more RMB 
cashes.
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consumer goods (moving up line BaBb to Ba'Bb' level) and hence 
led to a rampant inflation in Xiamen (higher than both 
Fujian's and China's levels, see Figure 7-2.1). As a result, 
the zone firms had to offer extremely high prices to purchase 
export supplies and thus pushed up the general price level in 
the domestic market (moving A up to AJ , transmitting trade- 
induced inflation into the domestic economy. This indicates 
that it is the Special Policy which has given the zone firms 
the financial resources to compete with domestic firms and 
hence to sustain business without receiving government 
subsidies.
Figure 7-3.4 How Xiamen firms compete favourably with domestic 
fizms and transmit inflation into the domestic economy
Price
> Market
Interior Xiamen World
Figure 7-3.lb, on the other hand, tells the other side of 
story. Line A'B'C' shows the price level for manufactured 
goods in the interior, Xiamen and world markets, and the 
pricing policy for imports in the SEZ. It demonstrates that it 
is generally beneficial for Xiamen to import manufactured 
goods as it can import them at relatively low prices (A'<B') . 
This is especially true since, in the light of the Special 
Policy, most manufactured imports are exempt from duties, 
consolidated tax and licensing procedures (i.e. lowering B' 
level towards A') , provided they are used for export 
production. This, to a large extent, explains:
1) . Why manufactured inputs, particularly the spare 
parts and components for assembling lines, has constituted the
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overwhelming share of Xiamen's total imports (nearly 80% in 
1989, see Table 7-1.2). For example, medical and chemical, 
light industrial, and precision instrument industries recorded 
a sharp increase in the share of their imported inputs over 
the period of 1985-1989 (from 1.56% to 25.98%, 8.71% to 21.01% 
and from 0.12% to 10.66%, respectively, see Table 7-1.2). This 
has further reinforced the view that the gross data of 
Xiamen's manufactured exports must be treated with a great 
caution, since it does not reflect the true level of Xiamen's 
own export manufacturing capacity.
2) . How the "foreign exchange bottleneck" and the severe 
shortage of domestic inputs supplemental to FIEs in Xiamen 
have been created and indeed exacerbated. With the fast growth 
of manufactured imports, manufacturing sectors, particularly 
those mainly relying on imported inputs, have expanded 
quickly. In fact, there has been a tendency that the imported 
components in the total output of many zone firms became 
bigger and bigger (Meng Zen, 1989: 51). This has created two 
pressing problems: the first was the shortage of foreign 
exchange because the growth of foreign exchange incomes lagged 
far behind the increase in expenditures; the second was the 
acute shortage of domestic inputs supplemental to the fast 
growing foreign-invested processing or assembling workshops, 
particularly power, water, transport and telecommunication 
facilities. That is to say, uncontrolled expansion of imported 
manufacturing/processing/assembling capacities has excessively 
absorbed up Xiamen's already scarce financial (including 
foreign exchange) and physical resources.
3). Why many of the zone firms have tried to sell their 
manufactured products to the domestic market, instead of 
exporting them. Obviously, the higher price level in the 
protected domestic market for manufactured goods has been the 
key reason (C'>B'). This is particularly true at the present 
since the majority of Xiamen's products are not yet 
internationally competitive. Also, the strong demand for 
consumer goods, especially the zone-produced/assembled 
luxurious goods with imported parts and components, has
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provided the zone firms with a great motivation to sell their 
products to domestic consumers. As a result, many Xiamen firms 
tried to seek quotas of domestic sales for their products by 
taking advantage of the loopholes in the Special Policy (see 
Section 7-2), such as giving false information about their 
export volumes, level and type of the technologies and/or 
equipment under which their products had been manufactured 
(ibid: 53). Clearly, the ill-defined Special Policy has been 
largely responsible for the large scale of domestic sales.
Even in the case of manufactured imports, it is still 
profitable to sell them to the domestic market as long as the 
zone firms can succeed in evading the normal import duty and 
the consolidated tax levied on the domestic sales of imported 
goods (gaining most part of difference between C' and B'). 
Indeed, quite a number of the zone firms have managed to do so 
by selling manufactured imports, such as vehicles, air- 
conditioners, colour TV and video recorders, to their interior 
partner(s) in economic associations in the name of "internal 
technology transfer" (Zhang Xie and Liu Xinhua, 1986: 36).
While line A'B'C' in Figure 7-3. lb tells us that 
manufactured goods in the Xiamen SEZ are generally more 
expensive than in the world market (B'>A') , line ABC in Figure
7-3.la reflects the SEZ authorities' pricing policy for 
exports that allows them to be cheaper in Xiamen than in the 
world market (C>B). Together, Figure 7-3.1 explains why Xiamen 
has made losses by unduly encouraging the exports of its 
manufactured outputs. In order to achieve this, the 
authorities have not only continued to supply the export 
producers with cheap raw materials, energy and credits but 
also, more significantly, set up a special fund to subsidize 
the prices of manufactured exports, with a view to overcoming 
the disadvantage of high cost of production (Research Office 
1989: 176-7) (i.e. making B' close to or even lower than A').
As a result, despite the fact that Xiamen's manufactured 
exports have increased markedly in recent years, financial 
losses have also gone up steadily and, indeed, become a heavy 
burden on the SEZ government (Chen Guangchong, 1988: 38). It
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is therefore fair to say that the new price trend and pricing 
policy created by the price reform and the Special Policy of 
promoting exports of manufactured goods, have brought about 
substantial economic costs as well as achievements to Xiamen's 
export development.
To sum up, the price reform has empowered the zone firms 
to set prices for their own business operations, created price 
differences for primary and manufactured goods, and 
implemented a differential pricing policy for exports and 
imports between the interior, Xiamen and world markets. At the 
same time, the Special Policy has allowed the firms to deal in 
almost any goods they judge profitable, and granted them 
accesses to both the overseas and domestic markets. Xiamen 
firms were also encouraged to develop a variety of economic 
links with domestic firms in order to "strengthen the SEZ's 
capacity to absorb more foreign investment" and to "facilitate 
technology transfer into the hinterland." Under this regime, 
it is hard to prevent the zone firms from making use of their 
links with the highly protected domestic economy to engage in 
the "parallel trade" and large-scale domestic sales. These 
activities have led to sharp conflicts between Xiamen and 
interior regions, serious economic inefficiency in external 
dealings, and rampant inflation both in the SEZ and interior 
regions.
Thus, it is the lack of coordination between the domestic 
economic reform and the foreign trade liberalization, or more 
specifically, the price reform and the implementation of the 
Special Policy, which has been the fundamental reason for the 
problems in Xiamen's foreign trade performance.
7-4. Trade Development and Inflation
Experience in some developing countries, especially those 
undergoing the transition from import-substitute to export- 
oriented development strategy, shows that trade liberalization 
tends to start when the economy already exhibits serious
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macroeconomic disequilibrium, such as severe foreign exchange 
shortages and high inflation as a result of large government 
deficits and devaluations10. In Xiamen's case, we have already 
demonstrated that the SEZ has suffered from both severe 
foreign exchange shortages and high inflation.
The reasons for macroeconomic disequilibrium in Xiamen 
are, however, much more complicated than those observed in the 
developing countries. As far as the inflation is concerned, 
this was caused not only by the successive devaluations of RMB 
since the late 1970s and early 1980s and the huge government 
deficits, but also by other radical domestic economic reforms, 
chiefly the price and wage reforms. As examined above, the 
drastic decentralization of the price management system, 
together with the implementation of the Special Policy, in the 
SEZ triggered off the inflation, particularly in 1985, 1988
and 1989 (See Figure 7-2.1).11
The inflation level has also been strongly influenced by 
the rapid expansion of foreign trade (exports and imports) in 
recent years. Table 7-4.1 shows that year to year fluctuations 
in the Domestic Retail Price Index are closely and positively 
related to the fluctuations in the growth of the Total Volume 
of Foreign Trade (over the previous year). Figure 7-4.1 
demonstrates more clearly that the price index goes up (down) 
with the expansion (contraction) of foreign trade, though the 
latter fluctuating with bigger amplitude than the former.
10. See Dornbusch and Helmers eds. (1988), chiefly,
Chapter 10.
11. According to Harding, the Chinese policy-makers have 
learned the lesson that "price reform is highly inflationary 
unless it is conducted during a period of relative equilibrium 
between supply and demand" (1992: 84).
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Table 7-4.1 The Domestic Retail Price Index and growth rates
of total volume of foreign trade in Xiamen (1981 - 1989) (%)
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Price 
index 104.7 102.6 101.9 107.2 123.1 109.8 111.9 130.1 124.8
Growth rate 
of foreign 
trade 107.1 97.3 95.0 217.2 146.1 62.7 149.4 210.2 111.2
Sources: 1). The price indexes: 1981-85: AXSEZ Editorial Board (1986), p. 91;
1986: XSB (1987), p. 340;
1987: XSB (1988), p. 320;
1988: XSB (1989), p. 352;
1989: AXSEZ Editorial Board (1990), p. 307; 
2) . The growth rates: the AXSEZ Editorial Board (1986) , p.94; (1990), 
p. 324.
Figure 7-4.1 Trend of the price index and growth 
rates of foreign trade in Xiamen (1981-1989) (%)
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The purpose of this section is to provide an empirical
test of the above observation inflation is closely and
positively related to the expansion of foreign trade in 
Xiamen.
John C. Hsu (1989) has made an elaborate study on the 
relationship in China in both pre- and post-reform periods12. 
By adopting the purchasing power imbalance approach13, he 
concludes that foreign trade growth has had a significant 
effect on the degree of consumer goods imbalance in China. An 
increase or a decrease in foreign trade would, he argues, 
increase or decrease trade-induced demand for domestic goods, 
cause an increase or a decrease in the ratio of money incomes 
to consumption expenditure {MI/C) , and hence signify a 
deterioration or an improvement in inflation rate (Hsu, 1989: 
160) .
In Xiamen's case, however, one cannot use the MI/C ratio 
as an indicator of the degree of inflation. This is because a 
considerable part of the consumption expenditure in the SEZ 
does not come from the local money incomes, but from the 
externally originated incomes brought in by the increasing 
number of floating population and tourists from other parts of 
and indeed outside China. Instead, we choose to use the 
Domestic Retail Price Index (PI), which is, according to the 
official definition, a weighted mean of the price indexes of 
goods and services purchased by both urban and rural people 
from both public and private sectors14. Clearly, when the PI 
goes down (up) it signifies an increase (decrease) in the 
purchasing power of people's money incomes. The question to 
ask is therefore: Will the PI increase (decrease) with an
increase (decrease) in the relative importance of foreign
12. See Hsu (1989), chiefly Chapter 4 and 5.
13. According to this approach, a rise or fall in the 
money incomes-consumption expenditure ratio, MI/C, indicates 
a deterioration or an improvement in consumer goods imbalance. 
See Hsu (1989), pp. 151-5.
14. Sometimes it is also called as the Whole-Society 
Retail Price Index.
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trade in national output?
To carry out the test, we first list the PI for each year 
from 1970 to 1989, using the officially published statistics 
(see Table 7-4.2). Then, we turn to the estimation of the 
relative importance of foreign trade in national output. The 
trade-GNP ratio is one of the most frequently used indicators 
of the relative importance of foreign trade in the economy. In 
general, the greater the ratio, the more dependent is the 
economy on foreign trade. However, what is required here is an 
indicator which can reflect the relative size of trade-induced 
demand for domestic goods. We therefore decide to adopt the
same approach as Hsu d i d  finding out the trade-induced
demand for domestic goods (T) first, then dividing T by 
national output (Y) , and thus yielding the required indicator 
of the relative importance of foreign trade in national 
output. The T is set as
T = (X" - M") + \M* + X* = X - M ” + Xlf,
where X " is consumer goods exports, M" is consumer goods 
imports, if is producer goods imports, X* is producer goods 
exports, X = X" + X*, and X is a multiplier representing the 
amount of domestically produced producer goods needed to work 
with a unit of imported producer goods. To estimate M" and M*, 
we use the Renminbi value of imports, multiplied by the 
proportions of consumer goods and producer goods in total 
imports as published in the official statistical yearbooks. X 
is estimated to be 2.3 (Zhou Yunyuan, 1987).
The above equation states that the trade-induced demand 
for imports is equal to net consumer goods exports plus 
producer goods exports plus the amount of domestically 
produced producer goods working with imported producer goods. 
We again use the official national income statistics for Y. 
The resultant T/Y ratios are also listed in Table 7-4.2.
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Table 7-4.2 The price indexes and foreign trade-national
output ratio in Xiamen (1970 - 1989) (%)
Year PI(%) T/Y
1970 98.4 0.0913
1971 100.0 0.1027
1972 100.7 0.0998
1973 100.1 0.1006
1974 99.8 0.0946
1975 100.1 0.1073
1976 100.2 0.1141
1977 100.1 0.0996
1978 100.3 0.1207
1979 102 .9 0.1507
1980 103.2 0.1742
1981 104.7 0.1847
1982 102.6 0.1791
1983 101.9 0.1812
1984 107.2 0.2481
1985 123.1 0.3076
1986 109.8 0.2105
1987 111.9 0.3058
1988 130.1 0.3803
1989 124.8 0.3567
Sources: 1). 1970-80: XSB (1980), pp. 281 & 258;
2). 1981-89: PI, Table 7-4.1;
3). 1981-85: T/Y, the AXSEZ Editorial Board (1986), p. 94;
1986-89: the AXSEZ Editorial Board (1990), p. 324.
To determine the extent to which the level of the price 
index has been influenced by the growth of foreign trade, we 
regress PI on T/Y, using the ordinary least squares method. 
The regression results are given as follows15:
PI = 88.92 + 95.19 T/Y, 
(57.073) (12.333)
R2 = 0.894, D - W = 1.8202.
Figures in parentheses are t statistics, R2 is Predictive 
Ability Score, and D - W refers to Durbin-Watson Statistics.
These results show that the coefficient of T/Y is of the 
correct sign, both coefficients are significant, the Durbin-
15. For details of the calculation, see Appendix F.
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Watson statistics indicates the absence of auto-correlation, 
and the R2 statistics is almost 90 percent. They reveal that 
from 1970 to 1989 foreign trade growth had a significant 
influence on the level of the price index in Xiamen.
This result tells us the following causal link: an
expansion of foreign trade will raise the level of investment 
at the expense of current consumption; the growth of 
investment will require a greater labour input, hence raising 
the wage bill; and the tendency for the investment growth to 
be biased in favour of producer goods production, especially 
infrastructure construction, will further aggravate the 
shortage of consumer goods. Such an effect will, according to 
Hsu, occur irrespective of whether imports of investment goods 
are financed by consumer goods or producer goods exports (Hsu, 
1989: 145). In the prereform, centrally planned economy, the 
effect would take the form of an increase in repressed 
inflation, but under the economic reform and the Special 
Policy (or in the presence of free markets), the effect will 
manifest itself, at least in part, as open inflation.
Inflation does not take place only in Xiamen. In fact, 
many economies, in the process of liberalization, are often 
plagued by double- or even triple-digit inflation. This is 
because the policy adopted to tackle one set of problems 
frequently exacerbate another set. For example, a price reform 
may lead to a sharp price rise and hence overvaluation of 
domestic currency in the short run, while a devaluation may 
worsen inflation.
It is therefore necessary to link the maintenance of the 
liberalization process with the choice of stabilization 
policies. One of key reasons for the foreign trade problems in 
Xiamen has been that its reform packages only contained 
liberalization policies but no stabilization measures. Thus 
when inflation gets out of control and macroeconomic 
environment deteriorates, a austerity policy would be imposed 
by the central government, and the SEZ economy would then 
cycle back to an earlier, less liberalized phase.
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7-5. Conclusions
The experience of trade liberalization in many developing 
countries shows that the transition strategy from a previously 
centralized and closed economic system to a decentralized and 
open one, is more important than the choice of the final 
objective of the reform. This is due to the general 
equilibrium (or disequilibrium) nature of economic 
interdependence and the fact that speeds of adjustment in 
various markets differ. In particular, because reform usually 
starts when the economy has serious macro imbalances, such as 
foreign exchange shortages and high inflation, it is essential 
for the reform policy to contain both a long-term market 
liberalization strategy to promote more efficient resource 
allocation, and short-run stabilization programme to reduce 
inflation and balance of payments difficulties (Bruno, 1988: 
223-4) .
Having realized the difficulty and complexity of the 
trade reform, the Xiamen authorities specifically called for 
"close coordination between the trade reform and price, 
tariff, enterprise and financial reforms" (Research Office, 
1989: 176-7). Why, therefore, was there such a lack of policy 
consistency and coordination between the trade reform, and the 
price reform in the SEZ?
There seemed to be four major reasons. First, the trade 
reform, as an indispensable part of the overall economic 
reform, should be conducted in parallel with various internal 
economic reforms, especially the price reform. However, like 
the reform in the Chinese domestic economy, Xiamen has found 
it easier to develop trade links with the outside world than 
to reform the old, Soviet-style economic system. In other 
words, the Xiamen authorities tried to use foreign trade and 
investment to side-step the hard choice of the economic 
reform. As a result, the trade reform became "one-step ahead 
of" the domestic economic reform and in fact was implemented 
while the distortions of the economy remained largely 
uncorrected. The consequence has been that authority,
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responsibility and economic interests were not integrated 
properly either in governmental organizations or trading 
companies. This can to a large degree explain why the chaos 
took place as soon as the decentralizations were carried out. 
As a result, it was hard for the government to design an 
effective macroeconomic policy to regulate decentralized 
trading operations. Instead, it ended up with no option but to 
regulate different products, sectors, localities and 
enterprises on an ad hoc basis, relying on elaborate policies 
and measures normally mixing administrative means and economic 
levers.
In fact, the World Bank has pointed out in one of its 
country reports that when domestic prices, taxes, wages and 
interest rates are still distorted the devolution of export 
and import decision-making powers to enterprises could "result 
in inappropriate trade pattern and even in trade and balance 
of payment difficulties." It urged that the trade reform 
should proceed "in parallel with internal economic reforms" 
(World Bank, 1985: 100-1). Unfortunately, the Xiamen (and
indeed the Chinese) authorities have either ignored or been 
unable to implement this crucial advice.
Second, the price reform includes the adjustments of the 
foreign exchange rate and tariffs, which are central to the 
success of a trade reform. Though China has successively 
depreciated its exchange rate since the late 1970s, the ever 
increasing domestic production costs and hence inflation has 
offset the effect of the devaluations, leaving the distortion 
in the exchange rate largely uncorrected. Although the tariff 
reform has been carried out more radically in the SEZ than in 
interior China as a whole, Xiamen is still a partially 
protected area, as indicated by the existence of the "two- 
ladder-price" and the "two-way-slope"pricing policy. This 
indicates that the price reform has done little to reverse the 
old incentive structure which tends to bias against export. 
That is to say, Xiamen is "far from creating a neutral trade 
incentive system" (Zhou Xiaochuan, 1988: 23), one of important 
goals of the trade liberalization.
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Third, the Special Policy was also responsible for the 
problem. Despite the fact that the CRS and later the STP 
scheme have been widely introduced in zone firms to harden 
their financial constraints, the firms were still able to 
expand and compete by bidding up costs because they were all 
subsidised, in one way or another, by the Special Policy (i.e. 
through exemption from or reduction in taxes and tariffs, and 
foreign exchange retention and sales etc.). In other words, 
the trade reform still lacked an appropriate microeconomic 
foundation.
And finally, the close link with the domestic economy has 
been a major reason. While Xiamen was authorized to go "one 
step ahead of the domestic economy" in carrying out the trade 
liberalization and other radical economic reforms, it was also 
encouraged to develop a variety of economic links with the 
domestic economy, which is still largely centralized and 
protected. As examined in previous sections, the reliance of 
Xiamen on the domestic economy to get export input supplies 
and to sell a part of its outputs has made it very vulnerable 
to the domestic economic cycle.
At the same time, the rapid proliferation of a variety of 
domestic economic associations in Xiamen has, while greatly 
enhancing the SEZ's capacity to manufacture and export more 
competitive products, brought many aspects of the less- 
reformed domestic economic elements into the SEZ, reinforced 
the old economic system and policy, and thus retarded the 
speed of the development of a new and open economy in the SEZ. 
As a result, the conflicts between the old, centralized, 
inward-looking regime and the new, market-based, export- 
oriented approach, between sectors, regions and enterprises, 
and indeed between the SEZ and the domestic economy as a whole 
have inevitably been intensified.
Thus, as far as the relationship between the Xiamen SEZ 
and the domestic economy is concerned, it is the close 
institutional links between the two which has caused the 
problem of policy inconsistency, ambiguity and 
unpredictability in the Xiamen SEZ. Despite the implementation
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of the Special Policy and the heavy presence of foreign 
capital, the foreign trade and price reforms in Xiamen have 
not been coordinated properly and produced any innovative 
results which could benefit the national trade and price 
reforms.
Thus, it is clear that how to deal with the relationship 
between the Xiamen SEZ and the domestic economy, or more 
specifically, how to, on the one hand, maintain and enhance 
the normal economic links with the domestic market and, on the 
other hand, to lessen and sever the institutional connections 
with the domestic economic system, holds the key to the 
success of the export-oriented outward-looking economy in 
Xiamen.
266
CHAPTER 8 
SUMMARY AMD CONCLUSIONS
Having experienced as a commercial seaport for more than 
three centuries, then a closed coastal industrial city for 
three decades and now a SEZ, Xiamen is clearly entering a new 
stage of development. It faces unique and formidable 
challenges: reforming the old, centrally planned economic
regime at the same time as building a new, market-based 
system; combining the transformation of the outmoded 
industrial structure and inefficient enterprises with the 
utilization of FDI; developing an industry-oriented SEZ in the 
short run and a FTP in the long run; strengthening its links 
with the interior economy while developing its own export- 
oriented outward-looking economic mode; and implementing the 
Special Policy on the one hand and creating some instrumental 
and applicable experiences for the domestic economic reform on 
the other.
Although the problems Xiamen has encountered are not 
uncommon in other developing countries, EPZ-type economic 
zones and reforming socialist economies, the challenges it 
faces are certainly unprecedented in its system-wide scope, 
its political and historical context, its impacts on China's 
economic reform and "open-door," and its far-reaching 
implications for the development of the economic cooperation 
between the PRC and Taiwan and indeed the formation of the 
"Greater China Economic Areas."
This thesis has explored two important issues untouched
in the previous researches on China's SEZs the reasons for
the problem of policy inconsistency, ambiguity and
unpredictability in the Xiamen SEZ and the assessment of the
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effectiveness and significance of the SEZ serving as a 
"laboratory" for the domestic economic reform. It has
approached the issues from a new perspective --  the
interactions between the Special Policy and the economic 
reform, between the local economic development and FDI 
(especially TDI), and between the SEZ and the domestic 
economy.
Chapter 5, taking a micro view and examining the 
enterprise reform in Xiamen, concludes that it is the 
confusion of a real economic reform and the implementation of 
the Special Policy and, in some cases, the substitution of the 
former with the latter which has been largely responsible for 
the problem in Xiamen's reform policy.
Chapter 6, taking a macro view and investigating the 
effects of FDI, especially TDI, on Ximen's industrial 
transformation, concludes that it is the increasing domination 
of Taiwan capital in Xiamen's foreign economic scene which has 
induced the local authorities to change, or change the 
emphasis of, their industrial development priority and plan 
and thus caused the problem in Xiamen's industrial development 
policy.
Chapter 7, taking an overall view and exploring the 
relationship between the foreign trade liberalization and the 
price reform in Xiamen, concludes that it is the close 
institutional links between the Xiamen SEZ and the domestic 
economy which has made the former very vulnerable to the 
latter's recurrent fluctuations, especially the boom-bust 
cycle, and should therefore be seen as the major reason for 
the problem of policy inconsistency, ambiguity and 
unpredictability in Xiamen.
China is now at a critical stage --  the coexistence of
the old, closed and the new, open economic systems, which 
means that the two systems are functioning simultaneously in 
the economy. This obviously makes the reform and "open-door" 
more difficult and complicated. It is easy, therefore, to 
understand the importance of the experimental role the SEZs 
are expected to play. However, given the small size and high
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labour-intensity of most of the FIEs in Xiamen the 
transferability of their experiences for improving the 
efficiency of generally larger SOEs in other parts of China 
seems to be very limited. Indeed, the analyses conducted in 
Chapter 5, 6 and 7 have overwhelmingly indicated that the
experimental role played by the SEZ has been much less 
significant than originally anticipated. This implies that it 
is still too early, if not unrealistic, to ask the Chinese 
SEZs to perform the important and complex experimental 
function.
Apart from the above three crucial relationships, several 
other important issues have also emerged from the discussions 
in Chapter 5, 6 and 7. This final chapter is to make a brief 
summary of and draw further conclusions on them.
8-1-1. The Scheme of the Separation of Tax and Profits
Reform of SOEs is the centrepiece of the economic reform 
programme in almost all socialist and the formerly socialist 
economies. China's enterprise reform in the last decade or so 
failed to improve the productivity and efficiency of most of 
its SOEs because, as shown by the experience of the first- 
stage reform in Xiamen (see Section 5-2), the authorities were 
reluctant to terminate subsidies to the local SOEs, which were 
still the largest contributor to the government coffers.
According to Stepanek, the Chinese authorities' 
dependence on the income from SOEs creates a "crippling fear 
of innovation" in the enterprise reform policy (1992: 453) . It 
is in this sense that the new STP scheme could be seen as 
Xiamen's indigenous and bold attempt to break the deadlock of
the enterprise reform and tackle the deep-rooted problem --
soft budget constraints" --- embodied in its SOEs. As analyzed
in Chapter 5, however, the overall result of the two-year 
reform (from 1988 to 1989) has been disappointing, despite the 
claim of success made by the local authorities.
Compared with previous reform packages, such as the Tax- 
for-Profits and the CRS, the design of the STP scheme seems to
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have three potential advantages. First, by separating the 
profit tax and the after-tax profit delivery, it has resolved, 
in theory at least, a crucial problem which all the previous
reform programmes, had failed to tackle the distinction
between the state as tax collector and the state as owner of 
fixed assets. This should greatly enhance the government's 
ability to regulate the economy through the taxation policy 
and to manage the state-owned assets, both of which are vital 
for the success of China's enterprise reform. This could also 
offer China the best way to separate enterprise ownership and 
management --  the essence of the enterprise reform.
Second, the new 15 percent tax rate applies not only to 
foreign-invested firms but to the local Chinese ones as well. 
This is crucial for the removal of the distortions in 
financial rates of return and investments and the creation of 
a level playing field for the SOEs to compete with non-state 
enterprises, especially FIEs. At the same time, the abolition 
of the adjustment tax previously applied to the SOEs has 
contributed to introduce a more transparent treatment of 
enterprise taxes. China has been repeatedly urged to reform 
its enterprise tax system, in particular, to set up a non- 
negotiable and uniform direct tax regime (e.g. World Bank, 
1988b: Chapter 9; Wood, 1991: 34; Singh, 1992: 82). Thus,
Xiamen's action could be seen as an important step toward the 
establishment of a genuine and effective enterprise tax system 
in China.
Third, the provision that all enterprise loans should be 
repaid out of after-tax profits, instead of pre-tax profits, 
is generally seen as a more effective measure to induce 
enterprises to exercise more caution in using investment 
resources and thereby improve the efficiency of investment.1 
By making enterprises accountable to their investment 
decisions, it helps harden their financial constraints.
However, the STP scheme in Xiamen, just like similar 
contract plans implemented in public enterprises in many
1. For the criticism of the pre-tax repayment of bank 
loans, see, for example, the World Bank (1988b), para. 68.
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countries, had more problems "in implementation than in 
design" (Nellis, 1989: xv) . Three problems are fundamental. 
First, the rate of after-tax profit delivery, which in fact 
served as a profit adjustment tax, was negotiated between the 
enterprises and their supervisory bureau on ad hoc base. The 
negotiable status of the rate enabled both enterprises and 
bureaucracies to manipulate the after-tax profitability and 
thereby influence the level of enterprises' retained profits 
independent of their underlying performance. As a result, 
similar enterprises may face quite different rates and other 
financial treatments. This is precisely the major defect of 
the CRS.
Second, the provision that enterprises are allowed to 
choose when and how much to repay their bank loans encouraged 
them to delay the repayment and diverted the funds to other 
purposes, notably bonuses and other welfare expenditures. 
Again, this is a typical defect of previous enterprise reform 
programmes (Byrd, 1992: 4-5 & 18). In Xiamen's case, the
"softness" of this provision has almost, if not totally, 
offset the "toughness" supposed to be introduced by the change 
in the source of repaying bank loans (from pre-tax profits to 
after-tax profits). The Xiamen authorities apparently failed 
to understand that prohibiting excessive bonus and other 
welfare payments to SOE personnel and enforcing loan repayment 
on time are not only essential for hardening budget 
constraints on the enterprises but also, from macroeconomic 
point of view, a prerequisite for the effective use of 
interest rate and credit policy and hence the control of 
inflation. In fact, Xiamen's experience has reinforced the 
view that an incomplete enterprise reform will inevitably lead 
to macroeconomic instability (Woo et al., 1993: 4).
Third, like the CRS, the STP scheme did not have an 
effective mechanism to prevent the director of enterprise, or 
the contractor, from maximizing the short-term profits of 
state-owned assets which he temporarily owns within the 
contract period. This was due to the fact that many agreements 
did not contain the provision which compels him to increase,
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by certain degree, the value of the enterprise's fixed assets 
over the contract period. Besides, the STP scheme did not 
specify how to penalize poorly performed managers and 
enterprises failing to meet their targets. Bankruptcy never 
became a real threat to the SOEs, especially sizable ones. 
That is to say, the weak or reluctant defence of capital 
income by the SOE managers during the contract period has been 
the key reason for the relatively poor financial performance 
of the SOEs and the reduce in the government revenue in Xiamen 
in recent years. This has once again highlighted the 
importance of ownership reform.
In short, the STP scheme is an important policy 
innovation on the part of the Xiamen authorities. It moves 
from pre-tax to after-tax contracting, removing the direct tax 
out of negotiation, and could thus be regarded as an advanced 
form of the CRS. Obviously, it has, to some extent, increased 
the complexity and sophistication of China's tax system. 
However, like the CRS, it is also a negotiated performance 
agreement between the government and the enterprise. Further, 
it seemed, more often than not, to be used by various local
interest groups --- workers, managers and the SEZ government -
-- to appropriate rents rather than as a mechanism to enhance 
enterprise accountability and improve productive efficiency, 
as indicated by the continuing increase in the scale of 
enterprise losses (see Table 5-4.4).2 Experience in many 
developing countries suggests that contract-based performance 
agreements "have not improved the financial performance of 
public enterprises dramatically, " especially, they are not 
effective in "healing a sick company" (Nellis, 1989: iii).
2. Of course, the nature of semi-reformed price, 
financial and tax systems and the lack of coordination among 
the various reforms have also affected the effectiveness of 
the STP scheme.
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8-1-2. Enterprise Association, Ownership Reform and 
Privatization
Apart from the heavy dependence of the authorities on the 
income from SOEs, another crucial factor which has hindered 
the Chinese enterprise reform from going further is the 
important social functions assumed by SOEs, which are 
generally obliged to provide health care, housing, education, 
entertainments and, in some cases, even scarce consumer goods 
to their employees. This means that to penalize a SOE for its 
poor performance would have serious social consequences in the 
absence of a nationwide social security net. That is why the 
Chinese authorities have been reluctant to apply the 
Bankruptcy Law to most loss-making SOEs and extremely cautious 
towards the implementation of ownership reform and 
privatization in the domestic economic reform.3 Thus, how 
Xiamen takes advantage of its special status to carry out some 
radical ownership reforms and privatization programmes remains 
a great challenge to the SEZ authorities.
The STP scheme operated in the Xiamen SEZ, like the CRS 
implemented in elsewhere of China, is only a performance 
agreement negotiated between the government and the 
enterprise, with no private individuals or sectors being 
involved. It is therefore even not a preliminary form of 
privatization, let alone a ownership reform. Thus, it appears 
to accord with the basic principle of the Chinese enterprise
reform --  separating government ownership and enterprise
management while maintaining state ownership in most SOEs, 
especially sizeable ones (Dong Fureng, 1990: 68-9).
On the other hand, various forms of enterprise 
association, which flourished throughout 1980s largely as a 
result of industrial reorganization, have provided an unique
3. The term of Privatization has many meanings. In this 
thesis, it refers to the general process involving the private 
sector in the ownership or operation of a SOE. That is to say, 
it covers both the private purchase of all or part of a SOE 
and the contracting-out of the management of a SOE, such as 
leases, management contracts, and franchise arrangements.
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opportunity for Xiamen to experiment with some forms of 
ownership reform. While the association between the public 
sector and the private sector creates a new economic sector 
with mixed ownership, the nature of the association between 
public sectors, particularly between SOEs, however, is an 
interesting issue deserving a detailed discussion.
The constituent members of the SOE associations in Xiamen 
are different types of SOEs. Some are owned by various local 
governments while others by central ministries; some are 
manufacturers while others trading companies or financial 
institutions; and some are located locally while others from 
elsewhere of the country. Together they form a new mixture of 
state ownership, referred by some Chinese economists as 
"socialist enterprise ownership" (Shehuizhuyi Qiye Suoyouzhi) . 
These associations are generally headed by a board of 
directors (Dongshihui) . They could thus be seen as the 
embryonic form of the so-called socialist joint stock company
  a SOE owned by several different state institutions
interested mainly in its profits envisaged by the World
Bank and some Western economists for the Chinese enterprise 
reform (e.g. World Bank, 1985: 166; 1988b: Chapter 3; Wood, 
1991: 38-9).
It is argued that such arrangement is possibly the most 
realistic and feasible way to restructuring the SOEs in China, 
given the fact that the dominant position of state ownership 
is, for political, economic and social reasons, unlikely to 
change in the foreseeable future. Compared with the old SOE, 
the new, associated enterprise seems to have two important 
advantages. 1) The enterprise management is interested not 
only in its short-term profits but also in the long-term 
change in the value of its assets, which is crucial for 
toughening its financial disciplines; and 2) As most of the 
associations are managed by the board of directors, the local 
government will find it hard to interfere in their business 
operations, as often happened in dealing with the SOEs 
implementing the STP scheme or other contract-based 
agreements. Having attracted a large number of interior SOEs
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to come to the SEZ to form a variety of economic associations 
with the local SOEs, Xiamen definitely has a great role to 
play in pioneering this particular enterprise reform.
Of course, this does not mean that the proposed joint 
stock ownership is a perfect solution. Indeed, there is even 
no guarantee that it will succeed in the future reform, 
especially in view of the fact it provides no answers to all 
the problems related to SOEs' social functions. The World Bank 
admits that such solution "has no parallel elsewhere" (World 
Bank, 1985: 166).
At the moment, the development of the economic 
associations between SOEs in Xiamen still has some problems. 
For example, state assets and shares of few small SOEs 
experimenting limited privatization were substantially 
underpriced, especially when they were sold to their own 
employees. Some associations became new administrative organs 
set up to oversee their small members while others were
engaged in illicit trade to take advantage of the Special
Policy. Also, some members of boards of directors were 
selected because of their political influence instead of their 
professional competence.
These problems are not unusual. They simply reflect the 
distortions which are bound to arise when market reform is 
conducted in a piecemeal and uncoordinated way. What is 
important for the Xiamen authorities, however, is to
understand that a simple dispersion or combination of the
ownership and capital of the existing SOEs is not enough to 
eradicate the underlying problems in the SOEs. Instead, they 
should endeavour to reinforce the system in the long run by 
diversifying investment pattern and attracting more state 
institutions, especially state asset management bureaus, 
banks, insurance companies and pension funds, to acquire 
financial interests in existing and new enterprises. At the 
same time, they should collaborate with these institutions to 
build a comprehensive and effective social security system in 
order to free the SOEs from the responsibility of providing 
the multiple social services to their employees, thus paving
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way for a more radical ownership reform and privatization.
In addition, Xiamen, as a SEZ, should make full use of 
foreign economic resources in pushing ahead its enterprise 
reform.4 The local SOEs could be sold either outright or 
partially to foreign investors and thus become WFOEs or JEVs. 
As Xiamen still has not possessed a properly functioning 
capital market and the majority of the households there are 
not yet sufficiently rich and financially sophisticated, the 
method of public offering of shares, typically suitable for 
large and commercially sound enterprises, is clearly not an 
ideal option for Xiamen to implement privatization.5
However, the techniques of private sale of shares, sale 
of assets, and new private investment are clearly more 
suitable for Xiamen, where most of the SOEs are small- and 
medium-sized and unprofitable. These methods provide an 
attractive opportunity for private (including foreign, 
particularly Taiwanese) sectors and individuals to invest in 
Xiamen and to become whole or partial owners of previously 
SOEs, thus opening up a new dimension of ownership reform.
Similarly, the techniques of lease and management 
contracts, in which no transfer of ownership is involved, are 
an ideal way to introduce foreign industrial management 
expertise. The experiences of Hong Kong and Taiwan 
entrepreneurs in managing small- and medium-sized and 
relatively labour-intensive enterprises are among the best in 
the world, and Xiamen should maximize its special links with 
Taiwan in this regard. Of course, in the long run Xiamen
4. For more detailed studies on the privatization of SOEs 
and various techniques it applies, see the World Bank (1988c) . 
The terminology and classification used in the following text 
are those of the document.
5. The alleged "inside dealings" and other 
irregularities, which led to riots by hundreds of protesting 
share buyers, during the public offering of shares in the 
Shenzhen SEZ in the late 1992 seems to have vindicated this 
point.
For more arguments against rapid privatisation of SOEs 
via share issue in Soviet-type economies, see Nolan (1993), 
pp 182-3 Sc 292-4.
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should use lease and management contracts only as an interim 
solution, particularly as a mechanism to restore failing 
enterprises to some form of health, and lay a foundation for 
a fully-fledged privatization in the future.
Thus, foreign involvement in Xiamen can not only bring in 
badly needed capital into the SOE sector but also, if guided 
properly, play an instrumental role in the ownership reform. 
It is undeniable fact that most of the foreign investors in 
Xiamen tended to sidestep the SOEs in seeking local partners 
because of their generally poor financial performances and 
market potentials. A recent World Bank study on foreign 
investment in China also finds that "improvements in 
productivity and efficiency were slow to come in joint 
ventures formed on the base of original SOEs" (Khan, 1991: 
14). Thus, the Xiamen authorities must do everything they can 
to create a conducive economic, administrative and legal 
environment which will facilitate the participation of foreign 
private sectors and entrepreneurs in the process of the 
ownership reform and privatization.
8-2-1. Selection of Leading Industry and Linkage Effects
Obviously, it is important for the selection of leading 
industry to be based on the regular analyses of changes in the 
structure of world industry and its probable future evolution. 
Some authors argue that most developing countries tend to 
select the leading industry from established industries, the 
one which has most extensive linkage effects on, and hence can 
transmit biggest amount of stimuli to, other industries. In 
other words, it has to be on the existing technology frontier 
(e.g. Weiss, 1988: 319-21).6
Historical experiences in both mature and newly 
industrialized countries have proved the vital importance of 
the machinery sector, or capital goods sector, in the process
6. For more detailed discussion of selecting the leading 
industry and of linkage effects, see Meier (1989), Chapter VI; 
and Weiss (1988), pp 319-21.
277
of industrialization due to its extensive technological 
external effects. It has not only played a key role in the 
industrial development of countries like the U.S.A. and Great 
Britain, but also enabled Japan to transform from a technology 
follower to a technology leader.7 Developing countries with 
substantial capital goods sector, such as Brazil, India, South 
Korea and Taiwan, have also witnessed its dynamic contribution 
to their economic development.8 Today, the machinery sector 
is essential for all countries to attain and indeed maintain 
international competitiveness because of its centrality in the 
generation and diffusion of technical and productivity change.
Compared with most developing countries, China is very 
fortunate to have possessed a relatively strong and diverse 
machinery sector and resourceful engineering skills, though as 
a legacy of the Soviet-type command economy. It would 
therefore be a "huge waste" if it disregards, intentionally or 
unintentionally, this well-established "advantage" (Nolan, 
1993: 188-90) in deference to the development of new
industries, such as electronics. A group of Chinese economists 
made, with the cooperations from the Chinese authorities and 
foreign experts, an elaborate study on the optimization of 
China's industrial structure. Using the technique of 
Analytical Hierarchy Process, they identify the machinery 
sector as the number one industry which should be designated 
for priority development.9 There is no place for the 
electronics industry in all the 19 industries/sectors selected 
for priority development. But in order to "prepare China to 
rise to the challenge, " they recommend the electronics 
industry, especially microelectronics, be developed side by
7. For the Japanese experience in this regard, see OECD 
(1972) .
8. Many authors have noted that important role. The World 
Bank and UNCTAD even undertook special surveys on the issue in 
several countries. See chiefly Fransman (1986), Little (1982) 
and Rosenberg (1976).
9. This seems to coincide with Nolan's view that Soviet- 
type economies should not "close" but "restructure" their 
heavy industry in the transition period (Nolan, 1993: 190).
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side with the machinery industry (Yu Jingyuang et al., 1993: 
197-203) .10
The Xiamen authorities justify their choice by arguing 
that the electronics industry is a modern, dynamic sector and 
has played a crucial role in stimulating the industrial 
development both in Western industrialized and, more recently, 
some successful developing economies. This may be true so far 
as the fact is concerned, but the authorities forget an 
important fact: Xiamen in the early and mid-1980s was
substantially weaker than those economies when they started 
developing electronics, at least in terms of the overall 
industrial capacity and the level of R & D. This implies that 
the success in those countries will be hard, if not 
impossible, to be repeated in Xiamen. Indeed, the record of 
the development in the first decade, as shown in Chapter 6, 
has vindicated this prediction.
There is no doubt that China, as a developing country 
striving for industrialization, needs to develop a strong and 
internationally competitive electronics industry, which will 
sever as catalyst to the upgrading of its outmoded industries. 
What the Xiamen authorities need to understand is that there 
are many industrial cities or centres in China which posses 
far better conditions and indeed have already developed more 
advanced and efficient electronics industry. Over-ambitious 
development goal, as shown by the Chinese own experience in 
the last four decades, often leads to high economic costs and 
eventually the delay or even setback of the development.
The consequence of the ill choice of the leading sector 
in Xiamen has, as we see in Chapter 6, been the profound lack 
of linkage effects between the "leading industry" and others, 
and between most of the FIEs and the local enterprises. The 
so-called electronics industry, though growing fast, was in 
fact nothing more than a dozen of foreign-transplanted
10. The first ten industries/sectors chosen for priority 
development are: machinery, agriculture, railway transport, 
ferrous metal, chemicals, petroleum, electricity, other 
transportation sectors and telecommunications, construction, 
and commerce. See Yu, op cit.
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workshops/assembly lines, or more precisely, an enclave 
import-export industry.
In fact, Xiamen's case exemplifies a typical problem 
currently faced by China: many coastal cities and development 
zones have chosen electronics, microbiological engineering or 
other hi-tech industries as their development priority, 
regardless of local economic and technological conditions. 
Almost every of these open areas has built one or more hi-tech 
parks, vowing to become the centre of that technology in the 
country. This vividly reminds people of the Great Leap Forward 
campaign in the late 1950s, when almost every town and village 
in China built one or more steel mills, considered to be 
essential to the industrialization of China at that time. The 
result of the campaign was of course disastrous to China.
It is, therefore, high time for the Chinese authorities 
to, on the one hand, modify the country's development strategy 
for electronics and, on the other hand, transform the old 
machinery industry into a dynamic manufacturing force which 
will stimulate the innovations in other industries and thus 
generate a sustained economic growth. In other words, they 
should formulate a new industrial development policy which, as 
recommended by the World Bank study, should include "targeting 
of priority industries" and the development of "backward and 
forward linkages (...) in conjunction with foreign invested 
projects" (Khan, 1991: 25).
8-2-2. Enclave Characteristics of FDI and Dual Economy
The enclave characteristics of FDI in the Xiamen SEZ is 
not uncommon in other EPZ-type economic zones. In fact, UNCTAD 
(1985) reveals that linkages between most of the EPZ firms and 
the local economies "have not as a rule been created. " The 
main reason is the "bias implicit in the EPZ device in favour 
of import-intensive operations" (p. 17).X1
11. Some scholars argue that the enclave nature of EPZ 
operations in developing country is in fact one of major 
attractions to foreign investors. See, for example, T. Takeo
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Experiences in many developing countries have shown that 
the only way to integrate FDI into the development programmes 
of recipient country and safe-guard against enclave-type 
investment is to form a partnership between private foreign 
capital and local private or public capital. That is why East 
Asian countries "have placed high importance on the 
development of backward and forward linkages" through the 
partnership (Khan, 1991: 18). The new approach to FDI has,
according to Gerald M. Meier, been "to focus on alternative 
arrangement for securing capital, management, technology, and 
marketing capabilities without the foreign ownership and 
control." As a result, the developing country has been 
strongly advised to forge the partnership through contractual 
arrangements, which can supply the needed foreign managerial 
and technological knowledge at a lower cost (Meier, 1989: 260- 
1). It is therefore sad to see that the shares of both CMEs 
and JEVs in total number of FIEs in Xiamen declined steeply 
from 1985 to 1989.
There were other factors exacerbating Xiamen's problem. 
First, in terms of the sectoral structure of FDI, the 
proportion of the electronics industry, which traditionally 
has very low propensity to use local inputs (Basile and 
Germidis, 1984: 48-49), has been too high, ranging from 75 to 
85 percent (see Table 6-2.4). Other industries, such as 
textiles and clothing, food processing and toy manufacturing, 
have little chance of technology transfer (ibid: 51). On the 
other hand, the industries most likely to create linkage 
effects, such as capital goods and construction materials, 
only took negligible shares.
Second, more than three-quarters of FDI firms in Xiamen 
were WFOEs (see Table 6-2.7), most of which were vertically 
integrated into parent corporations overseas, and thus 
concerned with maintaining their own international production 
network rather than with setting up links with the local 
economy.
(1978)
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Third, as the Xiamen SEZ is located in the remote and 
largely isolated Xiamen Island, characterized by the 
inadequacy of basic infrastructures in the island itself and 
of industrial development in the surrounding areas, it is 
difficult for the FIEs to develop sub-contracting activities 
with the local firms. Sub-contracting is widely regarded as 
the most effective way to break the 'enclave' of EPZ firms, 
penetrate the host economy, and thereby increase local value- 
added (ibid: 53-4).
As a result, Xiamen inevitably witnesses the phenomenon 
of dual economy, with new, dynamic FIEs, which manufacture 
light industrial/consumer goods largely for export, on the one 
hand, and old, stagnant or even declining local enterprises, 
which provide basic infrastructures or produce traditional 
necessities mainly for local consumption, on the other. 
Without doubt, this situation, if not rectified soon, will 
escalate social tensions and destabilize Xiamen's economy in 
the long run.
Thus, it is important for the Xiamen authorities to stop 
indiscriminately attracting FDI projects in pursuit of the 
amount of foreign capital and, where possible, negotiate to 
improve the terms on which the links between foreign and local 
firms can be established.
8-3-1. Trade Reform, Conflicts and Economic Inefficiency
With the operation of a largely decentralized foreign 
trade system and semi-reformed prices, Xiamen encountered a 
serious problem: sharp interest conflict between zone traders 
and interior producers/suppliers of export goods. The result 
of it is, as we have seen in Chapter 7, ferocious "trade wars" 
fought between traders themselves, and between traders and 
producers/suppliers. Two important issues can be raised from 
this problem.
First, the problem is unique to the Chinese economy. It 
is in fact conflicts between the Special Policy and the 
general economic policy, and between the new, decentralized
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export-oriented system and the old, centralized import- 
substitute regime. To a large extent, it is the reflection of 
the traditional problem embedded in the Chinese central-
planning system --  conflicts between regions and sectors and
between coastal and interior regions. The Chinese had never 
solved the old problem due primarily to their failure to break 
the cycle of over-centralization - decentralization - chaos - 
re-centralization. The new problem seems, too, intractable so 
long as the economy remains partially reformed and the policy 
differentials exist among enterprises, regions and sectors.
Second, the problem has been the biggest source of 
economic inefficiency brought about by the trade 
liberalization in the SEZ. This can be explained by the 
following points: 1). it artificially increased the costs of 
export and import dealings; 2) . it pushed up the rate of 
inflation in both the SEZ and interior regions; 3) . it 
interrupted normal production and export plans and trading 
networks in the interior, leading to wastes; and 4) . it 
encouraged illicit dealings and other forms of corruption.
Ii is important, therefore, for the Xiamen authorities to 
realize that the trade liberalization which instituted a 
multi-tier price system in the SEZ has created an environment 
which encourages speculation and corruption as much as profit 
seeking by the rational means of cutting costs and increasing 
factor productivity. Indeed, one can only hope that the static 
efficiency costs caused by the irrational trade competition 
will not totally offset the dynamic gains resulting from the 
trade decentralization in the SEZ.
8-3-2. Trade Reform and Macroeconomic Stabilization
The empirical test in Section 7-4 clearly reveals that 
increases in foreign trade in Xiamen during the decade of the 
1980s raised, in every case, the rate of inflation. So does 
this vindicate the argument that trade liberalization and 
macroeconomic stabilization are incompatible? or, as argued 
strongly by some Chinese economists, that trade reform can
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only be introduced after inflation is contained?
In fact, experience in many countries in the 1980s, 
except few with extremely high inflation, indicates that trade 
reform and stabilization can proceed in parallel successfully 
(Thomas and Nash, 1992: 44-5). Like other developing
countries, Xiamen can also introduce some trade reforms, such 
as converting non-tariff barriers to tariffs and eliminating 
tariff exemptions, to increase government revenue, which is 
crucial for the reduction in the fiscal deficit, current 
account deficit, and hence the rate of inflation (ibid: 45). 
But these measures can only produce limited effects in Xiamen 
because the main structural reasons for the trade-induced 
inflation in Xiamen, as discussed in Section 7-4, are 
different from those in other developing countries.
According to Harding, China's recent experience with 
inflation was the predictable result of granting greater 
financial autonomy to localities and enterprises, without 
simultaneously subjecting them to hard budget constraints 
(1992: 84). To tackle the problem it is essential for Xiamen 
to coordinate the trade reform with other economic policy 
reforms. For example, the foreign exchange retention scheme 
should be gradually phased out or replaced by another form of 
incentive in order to reduce monetary expansion; fiscal reform 
can make tax rates on domestically produced final goods equal 
to tariff rates on their imports, thereby reducing protection, 
increasing revenue, and allowing tariff rates to be reduced 
further; reducing very high tariff rates may cause tariff 
evasion rates to fall and hence increase revenue; the use of 
a crawling peg and correction of the underlying fiscal 
imbalance can achieve a real depreciation; selective import 
liberalization can lower domestic prices by providing 
competition in the domestic market; and the scale and speed of 
infrastructure construction and real estate development can be 
reduced to easy pressure on the consumer goods market. Of 
course, these measures could not be introduced overnight, but 
should be phased-in over a period of two to three years and in 
right sequence.
284
However, they will not be effective in damping 
inflationary pressure if the price reform remains stagnant. 
This is because semi-reformed prices and the resulting 
relative prices continue to send out wrong signals to 
producers and traders. If the exchange rate is used to combat 
inflation in this situation, as occurred in a few Latin 
American countries (Corbo and de Melo, 1987; Kiguel and 
Liviatan, 1988), the effectiveness of those measures will be 
further reduced. The price reform in Xiamen has, as 
demonstrated in Chapter 7, been strongly influenced by the 
domestic price reform policy because of Xiamen's close and 
growing links with the domestic economy. Thus, as long as 
Xiamen is refrained from carrying out a radical price reform 
in the light of its own needs (inter alia, to co-ordinate the 
drastic changes in its foreign trade sector), the anti- 
inflationary measures will not be effective and a rapid trade 
expansion will inevitably result in a high rate of inflation.
8-4. Prospects of the Xiamen SEZ: the Three Important 
Relat ionships
The relationships between the Special Policy and the 
economic reform in Xiamen, between the SEZ and the domestic 
economy, and between the local economic development and the 
foreign economic forces are crucial because they not only, as 
we have seen, hold the key to the understanding of the policy 
problem in Xiamen and the effectiveness and significance of 
its experimental function, but also will play a decisive role 
in shaping Xiamen's future.
8-4-1. The Relationship between the Special Policy and the 
Economic Reform
The Special Policy is unique to China's SEZs. Clearly, it 
has been responsible for the rapid development of foreign 
economic activities, in particular the introduction of FDI,
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which has become the engine of the growth of Xiamen's economy 
in recent years. Also, it has facilitated some instrumental 
experiments in the SEZ, such as the ways of organising capital 
construction and recruiting staff and workers, and the gradual 
introduction of foreign enterprise management ethics 
(including discipline in production, respect of deadlines, 
striving for quality, and spirit of innovation). These 
experiences are certainly conducive to China's industrial 
reform.
However, the foreign economic achievements in the SEZ 
were made primarily by opening up more and more areas or 
sectors, and by offering more and more financial concessions, 
to foreign (especially Taiwanese) investors. The so-called 
reform experiences are piecemeal and fragmentary and derived 
from less important fields of the reform. In the crucial 
areas, such as the reform of SOEs, the transformation of the 
local industry, and the management of the decentralized trade 
system and semi-reformed prices, Xiamen has hardly produced 
any significant and applicable experiences for the domestic 
reform.
Further, the Special Policy has also created some 
negative effects. The financial incentives offered to foreign 
investors have attracted the attention of the controllers of 
resource flows both in the SEZ and interior regions, and they 
have abused the terms for their own benefits. The distortions 
created by such incentives have sent out the wrong signals to 
producers and traders, leading to the severe internal price 
competitions, widespread corruptions and the loss of economic 
efficiency. It is in this sense that the implementation of the 
Special Policy has obscured and indeed, in some cases, 
disrupted the economic reform in the SEZ.
In short, the Xiamen authorities have failed to 
constructively make use of the power and privilege granted by 
the Special Policy to tackle the outstanding problems in the 
old economic system. They ought to realize that the Special 
Policy may facilitate but cannot substitute the real economic 
reform and that a package of financial incentives and
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administrative simplifications does not add up to a market 
economy.
8-4-2. The Relationship between Xiamen and the Domestic 
Economy
Compared with EPZs, the close and extensive link with the 
domestic economy is a distinctive feature of the Xiamen SEZ. 
The experience to date has suggested that the link is more 
important to the development of the SEZ than its relationship 
with the outside world, despite the fact that the SEZ is 
designated to develop an outward-looking economy.
There are both political and economic reasons for the 
close tie. Politically, the Chinese central government, though 
encouraging all SEZs to develop a market-oriented economy, has 
always seen them as "an integral part of the national economy" 
and their development must therefore come under "direct 
control of the central or provincial government" (Chen and He, 
1989: 10).12 Clearly, China will never accept that SEZ economy 
may one day become independent of the national economy. That 
is why the SEZs have, from very beginning, been saddled with 
many tasks designed to serve the domestic economy, or to play 
many "inward functions" (Neixiang Gongneng).
The economic reason is that all SEZs need external 
assistance, especially at the early stage of development, to 
build or improve their infrastructures and industrial 
capacities. Domestic resources, which are both cheap and easy 
to get, obviously are their number one choice. For Xiamen, 
there is one more piratical reason. As an established 
industrial city within China's old central planning system, it 
had already developed all kinds of economic links with various 
sectors, regions and enterprises in the interior. Thus, it is 
hard for Xiamen to replace the old supply-demand network 
overnight, but has to continue relying on it to develop for 
the time being.
12. For more accounts on this stance of the Chinese 
government, see Kleinberg (1990), Chapter 3, 4 and 10.
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From a national perspective, the crucial question to ask 
is whether the transfer of resources from the interior to the 
SEZ represents a more efficient use of the resources and hence 
a net gain to the Chinese economy as a whole. Unfortunately, 
observers are now increasingly inclined to suggest or argue 
that it represents a net loss (e.g. Wall, 1992; Crane, 1992; 
Zhang Jun, 1993) , although none of them has produced 
convincing evidences to support this view.
As far as the Xiamen SEZ is concerned, the close link 
with the interior economy has mixed effects on its 
development. On the one hand, the link has enabled Xiamen to 
get vitally needed interior physical, human and financial 
resources, which have greatly strengthened the local 
infrastructures and industrial capacities and thus enhanced 
Xiamen's ability to attract more and better-quality foreign 
investments.
On the other hand, as a result of the domestic tie, 
Xiamen has become very reliant on the domestic market and 
indeed more vulnerable to the domestic economic cycle than to 
the changes in the world market. During the 1980s, the Chinese 
economy underwent boom-bust cycle twice (in 1985 and 1988-89) 
and the Xiamen economy has also been hit hard (Chen and He, 
1989: 10),13 Further, many domestic-associated enterprises are 
also the result of distortions in the price, planning and 
factor supply systems. For example, a large number of them 
came to the SEZ to run commercial and trade businesses, 
instead of manufacturing ventures, as the SEZ would hope, in 
order to maximize the windfall gains created by the Special 
Policy.
More significantly, the domestic link has brought 
substantial amount of the old, less-reformed domestic economic 
elements into the SEZ through various forms of economic
13. The effects of the austerity programmes on the 
development of the SEZs have worked mainly through credit 
tightening and the cutback of the supplies of key raw 
materials and energy, imposed by the central authorities 
uniformly throughout the country
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associations, reinforcing the old economic system in the 
SEZ.14 To deal with the growing domestic businesses, Xiamen 
had to maintain or restore some parts of the old planning and 
management structure, rather than reform or replace them, in 
order to be "compatible to the hierarchy of domestic 
authorities" (Huang Shanghe, 1988: 15). It is in this sense 
that the close domestic economic link has retarded the pace of 
the development of a new, outward-looking economy in the SEZ.
That is why the reform in Xiamen has been, as pointed out 
by many critics, "dominated by the domestic reform policy" 
(ibid; Guo Zheming, 1988: 45), rather than its own needs of 
developing an export-oriented market economy. That is why the 
reform policy in Xiamen has shown many symptoms observed in 
the domestic reform policy, notably, lack of co-ordination, 
inconsistency, ambiguity, and uncertainty. Thus, how to deal 
with the dilemma of weakening or severing the institutional 
link with the domestic economic system and policy while 
maintaining or developing the normal economic link with the 
domestic market will hold the balance on the success of 
Xiamen's new, open economy in the future.
8-4-3. The Relationship between Xiamen and Taiwan
The unique Taiwan link is an important asset for Xiamen 
and indeed the SEZ has so far benefitted greatly from it. 
Today, Taiwan capital, as the largest FDI source in the SEZ, 
is exerting a significant impact on its economic development 
and indeed enhancing its role as a regional growth pole in the 
southeastern China.
However, Xiamen should be under no illusion about the 
role of Taiwan capital in its economy. Indeed, the kind of 
economic cooperation and integration which is taking place 
between the Shenzhen SEZ and Hong Kong will not happen between 
Xiamen and Taiwan in the near future. The main reason is that 
the PRC-Hong Kong relationship is quite different from the
14. For example, for the "window" purpose, interior 
workers and managers were regularly sent to the SEZ for 
training. OQQ
PRC-Taiwan one. The former has been largely decided by Hong 
Kong's impending return to the PRC's sovereignty. The 
fundamental economic interests for both sides to cooperate are 
far more important than any other considerations. Without 
doubt, after 1997 the integration process will only become 
faster and smoother.
The latter, on the other hand, is still plagued by the 
four-decade-old political rivalry. The persistent refusal by 
the PRC and Taiwan to meet each other's political demands has 
become the major obstacle to further economic cooperation, let 
alone integration, between the two sides. There is very little 
prospect, at least in the foreseeable future, of either of the 
two changing its stance. It is this political stalemate in the 
PRC-Taiwan relationship which has prevented the potential of 
the economic cooperation and integration between the two sides 
from being fully tapped, thus overshadowing the prospects of 
Xiamen's development in the future.
At the same time, Xiamen must realize that its advantage 
over other parts of China in terms of the Taiwan link will 
gradually diminish as the sophistication level and sectoral 
scope of TDI in the mainland increase. Clearly, Xiamen has 
little chance to participate in hi-tech cooperations with its 
limited and weak industrial and technological capacities. 
Already, a number of Taiwan investors, especially those from 
Taiwan's leading companies with high technology, have chosen 
more developed industrial cities, such as Shanghai, Tianjing, 
Shengyang, Beijing, Wuhan and Chongqing, to set up their 
large, technology/capital-intensive projects. Thus, it is 
important for Xiamen to formulate, on the basis of its own 
comparative advantages and the dynamics of the industrial 
restructuring in both China and the neighbouring countries 
/regions, a long-term policy of utilizing TDI. From now on, 
the inflow of TDI projects should be subject to a stringent 
scrutiny and then directed to serve its own industrial 
development priority or designated investment structure. 
Otherwise, Xiamen will face a danger of becoming a dumping 
ground for Taiwan's "sunset industries."
However, Xiamen's unique role as a springboard for 
Taiwan's operations in the mainland will not be weakened as 
long as the one-way cross-straits investment is still 
conducted on an indirect base. There can be no doubt that once 
direct communication, transportation and business links with 
Taiwan commence, Xiamen will probably become the logistical 
centre for a larger-scale Taiwan business operations in the 
vast hinterland of the PRC.
For the moment, Xiamen can play a pioneering role in 
facilitating the formation of a possible, partial economic 
integration between Taiwan and the southern Fujian, with the 
former focusing on R & D and design of products, manufacturing 
technologies, business management and international marketing 
while the latter on massive production, especially of labour- 
intensive, light industrial exports. In the long run, 
particularly after the PRC take over the control of Hong Kong 
in 1997, Xiamen has a great potential in developing entrepdt 
trade between Hong Kong and Taiwan due to its unique 
geographical location.
Thus, there can be doubt that Xiamen will continue to 
play a constructive role in promoting the economic cooperation 
and integration between the southeastern China, Taiwan and 
Hong Kong. The pressure to keep up with Taiwan and Hong Kong, 
particularly for their investments, may give the authorities 
in Xiamen and indeed all over Southeast China motives for 
carrying out more radical market reforms. This will 
undoubtedly pave the way for the eventual formation of the so- 
called "Greater China Economic Areas," pulling the Chinese 
economy into the mainstream of the Asia-Pacific economy.
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A P P E N D I X  A
The Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of 
China on Reform of the Economic Structure
—  approved by the Third Plenary Session of the Twelfth Central Committee of 
the Communist Party of China on October, 20,1984
The Third Plenary Session of the 12th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China , hav­
ing analysed the current economic and political situation in China and summed up the experience, 
both positive and negative, in socialist construction and particularly that of reform of the economic 
structure in the urban and rural areas over the past few years, holds the consensus view that, pro­
ceeding from the overall need to build socialism with Chinese characteristics by integrating the basic 
tenets of Marxism with actual conditions in China, we must go a step further with the policy of invig­
orating the domestic economy and opening to the outside world and accelerate the restructuring of 
the national economy as a whole, with the focus on the urban economy, so as to create a new better 
situation for our socialist modernization.
I. Reform Is a Pressing Necessity In the Current Developments in China
China has prepared and practised reform of its economic structure for several years. The Third 
Plenary session of the Party’s 11th Central Committee, in deciding to shift the focus of the work of 
the whole Party to economic construction stressed the imperative need to reform the economic struc­
ture for China’s socialist modernization. The Party made tremendous efforts after that session to set 
things to rights and readjust the national economy and carried out reform mainly in the rural areas. 
The 12th Congress, basing itself on the historic change consequent upon the rectification of the guid­
ing ideology of the Party set the explicit task of reforming the economic structure systematically. It 
pointed out that this reform would provide an important guarantee for keeping to the socialist road
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and achieving socialist modernization. In the past two years and particularly since the beginning of 
this year the Party Central Committee and the State Council have taken a number of policy decisions 
and issued major directives stimulating reform in various fields in depth and breadth.
Our economic restructuring scored great achievements first in the countryside. Agricultural pro­
duction which worried us for so long has been enabled to develop vigorously in a very short time, 
displaying the great vitality of our socialist agriculture. This is due fundamentally to a bold break 
with “Left” ideas. W e  have changed the structure of China’s rural economy that was incompatible 
with the development of the forces of production in agriculture and introduced across the coun­
tryside the system of contracted responsibility for production with remuneration linked to output, 
bringing into play the enormous initiative of the 800 million peasants for building socialism. The rural 
reform is going forward and the rural economy is moving towards specialization, large-scale com­
modity production and modernization. Therefore, there is an urgent need to unclog the channels of 
circulation between town and country, expand the market for the increasing amount of agriculture 
products, and satisfy the rising needs of the peasants for manufactured goods, science and technology 
as well as culture and education. Our successes in rural reform and the demands on the cities by the 
growing rural economy provide highly favourable conditions for restructuring China's entire national 
economy, focusing on the urban economy.
Such restructuring has been repeatedly explored and tested in recent years, and a number of 
important measures have been taken. This has yielded marked results and important experience, and 
economic life has been invigorated to an extend unknown for many years. Our urban reform is only 
in the initial stage, however, and defects in the urban economic structure that seriously hinder the 
expansion of the forces of production are yet to be eradicated. The economic effectiveness of our 
urban enterprises is still very low, the huge potential of our urban economy is far from being fully 
tapped and there is serious loss and waste in production, construction and circulation. Expediting 
reform is a prerequisite for the growth of the urban economy. The cities are economic, political, sci­
entific, technological, cultural and educational centres where modern industry and members of the 
working class are concentrated and they play the leading role in socialist modernization. Firm, sys­
tematic reform is the only way that the cities will play their due leading role of invigorating the urban 
economy and enlivening the domestic economy as well as opening to the outside world and promot­
ing a healthier and faster development of the national economy as a whole.
It should also be noted that emerging on a global scale is a new technological revolution which 
presents both new opportunities and new challenges to our economic growth. This means that our 
economic structure must become better able to utilize the latest scientific and technological achieve­
ments, promoting scientific and technological advancement and generating new forces of produc­
tion. Reform, therefore, is all the more imperative.
Political unity and stability in China are ever more consolidated; major successes have been 
achieved in economic readjustment; the economy has been growing steadily; the major targets of the 
Sixth Five-Year Plan (1981-85) have been fulfilled ahead of schedule; and the country’s financial situ­
ation has improved gradually. This has made all comrades in the Party and the people of all 
nationalities much more confident about socialist modernization. Their wish to speed up reform of 
the economic structure is much stronger. In particular, the sound all-round consolidation of Party 
organizations at the central and the provincial, autonomous regional and municipal levels, has set, 
or is setting, to rights the ideas guiding all fields of work in modernization and has given or is giving, 
the reform a clear orientation. Conditions are now ripe for all-round reform of the conomic struc­
ture. W e  both can and must raise and expound in a rather systematic way, a number of major issues 
related to the reform so as to achieve unity of thinking and enhance it among all comrades in the 
Party (particularly among leading Party cadres). W e  must make the reform more effective and give 
fuller play to the superiority of socialism. The Central Committee hopes and is confident that the 
Third Plenary Session of the 12th Central Committee will play a historic role in drawing up a bluep­
rint for an all-round reform quickening its tempo and stimulating the restructuring of the entire 
national economy with the urban economy as the focus, just as the Third Plenary Session of the 11th 
Central Committee did in setting things to rights and raising the task of restructuring the economy 
and promoting rural reform.
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II. Reform is Aimed of Establishing a Dynamic Socialist Economic Structure
The founding of the People’s Republic of China and the establishment of the socialist system 
marked the end of the century-old history of our people’s misery in a semi-feudal and semi-colonial 
society. The system of exploitation was abolished and the people of all nationalities became real mas­
ters of their country. The people of the whole country, led by the Chinese Communist Party, has 
established an independent and fairly comprehensive industrial as well as national economic system 
through arduous efforts and have scored tremendous successes inconceivable in the old China, thus 
laying the indispensable material foundation for building China into a powerful and prosperous 
modern socialist country with high level of democracy and civilization. The people of all our 
nationalities have come to realize through long historical experience that only socialism can save 
China.
The founders of Marxism predictd that by eliminating the exploitation of man by man, socialism 
would make possible a higher rate of labour productivity and a faster expansion of the forces of pro­
duction. The profound changes that have taken place in the 35 years since the founding of the 
People’s Republic are an initial demonstration of the superiority of the socialist system. But this 
superiority, it must be pointed out, has yet to be brought into full play. Apart from historical, political 
and ideological causes, a major economic cause for this is a rigid economic structure that cannot meet 
the needs of the growing forces of production. Following are the major defects of this structure: N o  
clear distinction has been drawn between the functions of the government and those of the enter­
prise; barriers exist between different departments or regions; the state has exercised excessive and 
rigid control over enterprises; no adequate importance has been given to commodity production, the 
law of value and the regulatory role of the market; and there is absolute equalitarianism in distribu­
tion. This has resulted in enterprises lacking necessary decision making power and the practice of 
“eating from the same big pot” prevailing in the relations of the enterprises to the state and in those 
of the workers and staff members to their enterprises. The enthusiasm, initiative and creativeness of 
enterprises and workers and staff members have, as a result, been seriously dampened and the 
socialist economy is bereft of much of the vitality it should possess.
China gradually established a unified and centralized economic structure on a nationwide scale in 
the early post-liberation days and during the Five Five-Year Plan (1953-57) when the country faced 
the heavy tasks of unifying its financial and other economic work carrying out socialism transforma­
tion of capitalist industry and commerce and under taking large scale planned economic construction. 
However, control then was not very rigid in many aspects and the measures and steps we took for 
socialist transformation were based on China’s actual conditions and were highly creative. But with the 
basic completion of socialist transformation and the ever-growing scale of economic construction, 
the measures taken to restrict and transform capitalist industry and commerce no longer suited the 
new situation. The defect of excessive and rigid control gradually become manifest in some aspects 
of the economic structure. The Central Committee and especially the comrades in overall charge of 
economic work, at the Eighth National Congress of the Party in 1956 as well as before and after per­
ceived this problem and raised some suggestions for correction. However, our Party was after all, 
inexperienced in guiding socialist construction. Certain rigid concepts about socialism developed 
over the years that were not in keeping with the actual conditions in China. The influence of the 
“Left”-deviationist errors in the Party’s guiding ideology after 1957 in particular, resulted in the 
various correct measures aimed at enlivening enterprises and developing socialist commodity 
economy being regarded as “capitalist”. As a result of all these, the problem of overconcentration 
in the economic structure long remained unsolved and , what is more, became more and more seri­
ous. It is true that we tried to delegate power to lower levels on a number of occasions. But this was 
limited solely to readjusting the administrative power of the central and local authorities and of the 
different departments and regions. The critical issue of giving enterprise decision-making power was 
not dealt with. W e  therefore failed to break with outmoded conventions.
To bring about a radical change in the economic structure that hinders development of the forces 
of production, we must conscientiously sum up China’s historical experience and study the concrete
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conditions and requirements for economic growth. In addition, we must draw on the world’s 
advanced methods of management, including those of developed capitalist countries that conform 
to the laws of modern socialized production. In line with the Party’s consistent principle of integrat­
ing the fundamental tenets of Marxism with China’s actual conditions and the principle of adopting 
a correct approach towards foreign experience the Central Committee holds that we must emancipate 
our minds more, follow our own road and build a socialist economic structure with Chinese charac­
teristics that is full of vigour and vitality so as to promote the growth of the forces of production. This 
is the fundamental objective of our present reform.
The basic contradiction in socialist society remains that between the relations of production and 
the forces of production, between the superstructure and the economic base. Reform of China’s 
economic structure means reforming, on the premise of adherence to the socialist system, a series of 
inter-related links and aspects of the relations of production and the superstructure that are not 
suited to the development of the forces of production. As a form of self-improvement and develop­
ment of the socialist system, this reform is to be carried out under Party and government leadership 
in a planned, systematic and methodical way. It should serve to advance, and not to impair, social 
stability, expansion of production, improvement of the people’s living standards and the growth of 
state revenue. The essential task of socialism is to develop the forces of production, create ever more 
social wealth and meet the people’s growing material and cultural needs. Socialism does not mean 
pauperism, for it aims at the elimination of poverty. W e  must, with firm determination and 
maximum tenacity, concentrate on economic development and modernize China’s industry, agricul­
ture, national defence and science and technology. This is the inevitable trend of history and the wish 
of the people. In carrying out reform, all Party comrades must unfailingly grasp the above-mentioned 
basic concept of Marxism and set whether the reform facilitates this task as the most important criter­
ion for assessing the success or failure of all reforms.
III. Invigorating Enterprises is The Key to Restructuring the National Economy
The chief and direct responsibility for industrial production and construction and commodity cir­
culation falls on urban enterprises. They constitute the main force spurring the growth of the forces 
of production and encouraging economic and technological progress. China now has over one 
million urban industrial, building, transport, commercial and service enterprises, with a total work 
force of more than 80 million. The taxes and profits delivered by urban industrial enterprises alone 
account for over 80 per cent of the state’s revenue. This means that the enthusiasm, initiative and 
creativity of the urban enterprises for production and operation as well as their 80 million workers 
and staff members must be brought into full play, in other words, the urban enterprises must have 
great vitality. This has a vital bearing on basic improvement of the national economy as a whole and 
of the state’s financial and economic situation and on quadrupling China’s annual industrial and 
agricultural output value by the end of the century, a task set by the Party’s 12th National Congress. 
Socialism with Chinese characteristics should, first and foremost, be able to instil vitality into the 
enterprises. In essence, the drawbacks of our present economic structure are precisely the lack of vit­
ality in our enterprises. Therefore, the key to restructuring the national economy, with the focus on 
the urban economy, is invigoration of enterprises, particularly the large and medium-sized enter­
prises owned by the whole people.
With this key in mind, we must handle two types of relationships satisfactorily. That means we 
should extend the decision-making power of enterprises owned by the whole people by establishing a 
correct relationship between them and the state, and safeguard the status of the workers and staff 
members as masters of the enterprises by establishing correct relationships between them and their 
enterprises.
One of the main reasons why the state exercised excessive and rigid control over enterprises in 
the past was to equate the concept of their ownership by the whole people with the concept of their 
direct operation by the state institutions. As Marxist theory and the practice of socialism have shown, 
ownership can be duly separated from the power of operation. To make the economic activities of
all enterprises conform to the overall requirement of economic growth, the socialist state institutions 
must manage, inspect, guide and regulate the activities of the enterprises, as is necessary, through 
planning and by economic adminsitrative and legal means; it must use taxation and other means to 
concentrate in its treasury that part of enterprises net income which should be used by the state in a 
unified way; it must designate, appoint and remove the principal leading members of the enterprises 
or approve their employment and election; and it must decide on the establishment of enterprises, 
their removal to other places, their switching over to other lines of products, their merger with 
others, suspension of operations, or closing down. However, since social demand is very complex 
and in a state of constant flux, since the conditions in enterprises differ in a thousand and one ways 
and since the economic links between enterprises are complicated, no state institution can know the 
whole situation fully and cope with everything in good time. If the state institutions were to directly 
administer and manage various kinds of enterprises owned by the whole people, it would be very 
hard to avoid serious subjectivism and bureaucratism with a consequent suppression of enterprise 
vitality. Therefore on the premise of following the state plans and subjecting itself to state control, 
the enterprise has the power to adopt flexible and diversified forms of operation; plan its production 
supply and marketing; keep and budget funds it is entitled to retain; appoint, remove, employ or 
elect its own pesonnel according to relevant regulations; decide on how to recruit and use its work 
force, and on wages and rewards; set the prices of its products within the limits prescribed by the 
state; and so on. In short, the enterprise should be truly made a relatively independent economic 
entity and should become a producer and operator of socialist commodity production that is indepen­
dent and responsible for its own profit and loss and capable of transforming and developing itself and 
that acts as a legal person with certain rights and duties. This is the way to ensure both overall unity 
of the growth of the national economy as a whole and the diversity and flexibility of individual enter­
prises in production and management as well as their desire to make progress. Instead of weakening 
socialist ownership by the whole people, this will contribute to consolidating and improving it.
The well-spring of vitality of the enterprise lies in the initiative, wisdom and creativeness of its 
workers by hand and brain. W h e n  the status of the working people as masters of their own enterprise 
is guaranteed by its rules and regulations and when their labour is closely linked with their own 
material benefits, their initiative, wisdom and creativeness can be brought into full play. This has 
been vividly and convincingly proved by our experience in rural reform. In restructuring the urban 
economy, it is imperative to handle correctly the relationship of the workers and staff to their enter­
prise so that they are its real masters and can work as such at their jobs. This will arouse their deep 
interest in the operation and effectiveness of their enterprise, so that their performance is closely 
linked with their social prestige and material benefits. Modern enterprise calls for centralized and 
unified leadership and direction of production and strict labour discipline. Because ours are socialist 
modern enterprises, in carrying out such centralized leadership and strict discipline, we must resol­
utely ensure the workers and staff and their elected representatives the right to participate in demo­
cratic management of the enterprise. Under socialism, there is unity between the authority of the 
enterprise’s leadership and the status'of the working people as masters of the enterprise and their 
initiative and creativity. This unity is a prerequisite for the proper effective exercise of their initia­
tive.
Correct relations between the state and the enterprise and between an enterprise and its workers 
and staff are the essence and basic requirement of the restructuring of the national economy as a 
whole with focus on the cities. Fulfilment of this basic requirement inevitably calls for reform of 
every aspect of the entire economic structure. This involves a whole range of reforms including plan­
ning, pricing, economic management by state institutions, and the labour and wage system. The 
Central Committee is of the opinion that these reforms should be carried out step by step in harmony 
with the inherent connections between the various links of the national economy, according to the 
degree pf ripening of the subjective and objective conditions and in the right order of importance, 
urgency and feasibility, and that they should basically be accomplished in about five years. Specific 
plans will be drawn up separately to this end.
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IV. Establish a Planning System Under Which the Law of Value Is Consciously Applied
For Developing a Socialist Comodity Economy
Socialist society practises a planned economy on the basis of public ownership of the means of pro­
duction. It can thus avoid the anarchy of production and cyclical crises characteristic of capitalist soc­
iety and ensure that production constantly meets the growing material and cultural needs of the 
people. This is one of the fundamental indicators of the superiority of a socialist economy over a 
capitalist economy. Since the founding of the People’s Republic, we have practised a planned 
economy and concentrated vast financial, material and human resources on large-scale socialist 
economic construction with tremendous achievements to our credit. At the same time, historical 
experience shows that the socialist planning system should be one that combines uniformity and 
flexibiligy. W e  must take into account China’s vast territory and large population, the difficulty of 
drastically improving in a short period its poor transport conditions, its inadequate information 
facilities and the obviously uneven economic and cultural development of its various regions and we 
must realize that because of China’s rather undeveloped commodity production at the present stage, 
it is necessary to stimulate commodity production and exchange. In view of all this, it is all'the more 
urgent for us to institute this planning system. If the actual conditions of our country are ignored and 
if we try to incorporate all economic activities into the plans and implement them by administrative 
orders alone in disregard of the importance of the economic levers and the market, then there will 
unavoidably be a discrepancy between the subjective guidelines for planning and objective condi- . 
tions, with the plans seriously out of step with reality. After the October Revolution, Lenin expres­
sed the idea when working out Russia’s plan for electrification that “a complete, integrated, real plan 
for us at present =  ‘a bureaucratic utopia’.” “D o n ’t chase it,” he added. Although China’s conditions 
today are vastly different from those of Russia at that time when its economy was in extreme difficul­
ties, our practical experience has proved that this idea of Lenin’s was not only applicable to the Rus­
sia of that day, it is also of lasting significance. W e  must be realistic and admit that for a considerably 
long time to come, our national economic plans on the whole can only be rough and elastic and that 
we can do no more than, by striking an overall balance in planning and through regulation by 
economic means, exercise effective control over major issues while allowing flexibility on minor 
ones. In this way, we will be able to ensure the appropriate proportions between the major economic 
branches and, in general, the proportionate and co-ordinated growth of the national economy.
In the reform of the planning system, it is necessary, first of all, to discard the traditional idea of 
pitting the planned economy against the commodity economy. W e  should clearly understand that the 
socialist planned economy is a planned commodity economy based on public ownership, in which the 
law of value must be consciously followed and applied. The full development of a commodity 
economy is an indispensable stage in the economic growth of society and a prerequisite for our 
economic modernization. It is the only way to.invigorate our economy and prompt enterprise to raise 
their efficiency, carry out flexible operations and promptly adapt themselves to complex and chang­
ing social demands. This cannot be achieved by relying only on administrative means and mandatory 
plans. Meanwhile we must also realize that the extensive growth of a socialist commodity economy 
may also lead to certain disorder in production and there have to be guidance, regulation and 
administrative control through planning . This can be achieved under socialist conditions. Therefore 
a planned economy by no means excludes the application of the law of value and the growth of com­
modity economy; they in fact form a unity. It would be wrong to pose one against the other. The 
difference between socialist and capitalist economy as far as a commodity economy and the law of 
value are concerned, lies not in whether these are still functioning, but in the difference in owner­
ship, in whether there is an exploiting class and whether the working people are masters of the state, 
in the different purposes of the production, in whether the law of value can be consciously applied 
throughout society and in the different scopes of commodity relations. Under our socialist condi­
tions, neither labour power nor land, mines, banks, railways and all other state-owned enterprises 
and resources are commodities.
In the light of historical experience and the practice since the Third Plenary Session of the 11th 
Party Central Committee, the basic characteristics of our planning system can be further summed up
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as follows: First, ours is on the whole a planned economy, that is, a planned commodity economy, 
not a market economy that is entirely subject to market regulation. Second, production and 
exchange completely subject to market regulation are confined mainly to certain farm and sideline 
products, small articles of daily use and labour services in the services and repair trades, all of which 
play a supplementary but indispensable role in the national economy. Third, our planned economy 
does not necessarily mean the predominance of mandatory planning, both mandatory and guidance 
planning being its specific forms. Fourth, guidance plans are fulfilled mainly by use of economic lev­
ers; mandatory plans have to be implemented, but even then the law of value must be observed. To 
reform our present planning system in accordance with the above points, it is necessary, step by step 
and to an appropriate extent, to reduce the scope of mandatory planning and extend guidance plan­
ning. Mandatory planning will be applied to major products which have a direct bearing on the 
national economy and the people’s livelihood and which have to be allocated and distributed by the 
state, as well as major economic activities that affect the overall situation. Other products and 
economic activities which are far more numerous should either come under guidance planning or be 
left entirely to the operation of the market, as the case may require. The focus of planning will be 
shifted to medium and long-term planning, and annual plans will be appropriately simplified. There 
should be a corresponding reform of the methods of planning, full attention should be paid to 
economic information and forecasting so as to raise the scientific level of planning.
V. Establish a Rational Price System and Pay Full Attention To Economic Levers
Because the law of value was long neglected and because of various other historical reasons, there 
is much confusion in our present system of pricing. The prices of many commodities reflect neither 
their value nor the relation of supply to demand. This irrational price system has to be reformed. 
Otherwise it will be impossible to assess correctly the performance of enterprises, ensure the smooth 
circulation of goods between urban and rural areas, promote technological advances and rationalize 
the production mix and consumption patterns. This will result in an enormous waste of social labour 
and seriously hamper application of the principle of distribution according to work. As the decision­
making power of enterprises grows, pricing will be increasingly important in regulating their produc­
tion and operation..It is, therefore, all the more urgent to establish a rational system of pricing. The 
various aspects of the reform in economic structure, including planning and wage system, depend to 
a large extent on reform of the price system. Pricing is a most effective means of regulation, and 
rational prices constitute an important condition for ensuring a dynamic yet not chaotic economy. 
Therefore, reform of the price system is the key to reform of the entire economic structure.
Our present irrational price system finds expression mainly in the following: inadequate price 
differentials for a given product with diverse quality, irrational price ratios between different com­
modities, particularly the relatively low prices for some mineral products and raw and semi-finished 
materials and the retail price of major farm and sideline products being lower than their state pur­
chasing price. From now on, we must gradually redress this irrational situation.
The irrational system of pricing is closely related to the irrational system of price control. In read­
justing prices we must reform the over-centralized system of price control gradually reducing the 
scope of uniform prices set by the state and appropriately enlarging the scope of floating prices within 
certain limits and of free prices. Thus prices will respond rather quickly to changes in labour produc­
tivity and the relation between market supply and demand and better meet the needs of national 
economic development.
As the reform of the price system affects every household and the national economy as a whole, 
we must be extremely prudent, formulate a well-conceived, feasible programme based oh the growth 
of production and the capability of state finances and on the premise that the people’s real income 
will gradually be increased, and then carry it out in a planned and systematic way. The principles 
guiding the reform are: First, we should readjust irrational price ratios on the basis of the exchange 
of equal values and changes in the relation between supply and demand, lowering or raising prices
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as the case may be. Second, when the prices of some mineral products and raw and semi-finished 
materials are raised, the processing enterprises must substatially cut down consumption so that the 
increased production cost resulting from the higher prices of such products and mateials can be bas­
ically offset within the enterprises, with only a small part of the increase being borne by the state 
through tax reductions and exemptions. This will avoid a consequent rise in market sales pries of 
manufactured consumer goods. Third, in solving the problem of the state purchasing farm and 
sideline products at prices higher than their selling prices and in readjusting the prices of consumer 
goods, we must adopt effective measures to ensure that the real income of urban and rural inhabit­
ants does not go down as a result of price readjustments. Instead, with the growth of production and 
improvement in economic results, the pay of workers and staff members will have to be raised gradu­
ally. It must be widely publicized among the people that on the condition of developed production 
and ever greater abundance of goods, the reform of the price system and readjustment of various 
irrational price ratios carried out on our own initiative will never bring about a general and spiralling 
price rise. Such a reform is the urgent need for further developing production and accords with the 
fundamental interests of the consumers. All enterprises should achieve better economic results 
through efforts to improve management and operation and should never try to increase their income 
by price increases. It is absolutely impermissible for any unit or person to boost prices at will by tak­
ing advantage of the reform, deliberately generating a tendency towards a general rise in prices dis­
rupt the socialist market and harm the interests of the state and the consumers.
While reforming the price system, we should further improve the tax system and reform the finan­
cial and banking systems. The more the economy is enlivened, the more attention we should pay to 
macro-economic regulation and the more we should try to have timely grasp of economic trends so 
as to use pricing , taxation, credit and other economic levers better. This will help regulate such 
major proportional relations as those between aggregate social supply and aggregate social demand 
and between accumulation and consumption, regulate the direction of the flow of financial, material 
and human resources, regulate the industrial set-ups and the distribution of the forces of production, 
regulate market supply and demand, regulate external economic exchange and so on. W e  have fallen 
into the habit of using administrative means to keep the economy functioning and have long neg­
lected the use of economic levers for regulation. Economic departments at various levels, especially 
the departments in charge of comprehensive economic management must take it as an important task 
to learn to use the economic levers and make this aspect the focus of our leadership over economic 
work.
VI. Separate Government From Enterprise Functions So That Government Organs 
Can Properly Perform Their Function of Managing the Economy
After the proletariat and the whole people take state power in their hands, it becomes a basic 
function of the state organs to lead and organize economic construction. Over the past 30 years or 
more since the founding of N e w  China, our state organs have, on the whole, played a significant role 
in performing this function. But how the state organs, especially government departments can better 
lead and organize economic construction to meet the needs of the national economy and social 
development still remains a question calling for effective solution. The functions of government for 
a long time were not separated from those of enterprises which in fact became appendages of 
administrative organs and the central and local governments took responsibility for many matters 
which were not really theirs and at the same time did not do well what they ought to do. This plus 
the barriers between different departments or regions and the practice of endless wrangles increased 
the difficulties in running enterprises. If this state of affairs were not changed, the enthusiasm of the 
enterprises and other grass-roots units could not be aroused, co-operation, association and compet­
ition between enterprises could not develop and a unified socialist market would not grow. 
Moreover, the role that government organs should play in managing the economy would be seriously 
weakened. So there is a pressing need to conduct reform in line with the principle of separating the 
functions of government and enterprises, streamlining administration-and instituting decentraliza­
tion in order to invigorate the enterprises and the national economy as a whole.
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Practical experience over the years shows the following to be the principal functions of govern­
ment organs in managing the economy: They should formulate the strategy, plans, principles and 
policies for economic and social development, work out plans for the exploitation of natural 
resources, for technological transformation and for the development of intellectual resources; co­
ordinate the development plans of localities, departments or enterprises and the economic relations 
among them; arrange for the construction of key projects, especially those in energy, transport and 
the raw and semi-finished materials industries; collect and disseminate economic information, learn 
to utilize economic means of regulation; work out economic regulations and ordinances and super­
vise their execution; appoint and remove cadres within a prescribed scope; administer matters 
related to external economic and technological exchanges and co-operation; etc. The performance 
of these functions requires immense efforts on the part of the governments at various levels. In the 
past some of the functions were not performed well and others not performed at all. As far as the 
relations between governments and enterprises are concerned, from now on government departments 
at various levels will, in principle, not manage or operate enterprises directly. As for the small 
number of government economic departments that have been entrusted by the state with direct oper­
ations and management of enterprise, they must also correctly handle their relations with the enter­
prises under them through simpler adminsitration and decentralization so as to enhance the capacity 
of enterprises and other grass-roots units for independent management and avoid drawbacks that 
may arise from over-centralization. The national and local corporations are economic associations 
set up for better economic development and mutual benefit of enterprises concerned. They must be 
enterprises and not administrative organs and must not follow old practices but should master 
modern methods of scientific management.
After the function of government and enterprises are separated, the central role of cities must be 
brought into full play and open and inter-connected economic zones of various size gradually formed 
with support from cities, the large and medium-sized cities in particular. In this reform it is necessary 
to call the attention of all leading urban comrades to the need for the city governments to separate 
their functions from those of enterprises and achieve simpler and decentralized adminsitration, and 
not to repeat the past practice of mainly depending on administrative means to control enterprises 
so as to avoid creating new barriers between departments or regions. City governments should con­
centrate on urban planning, construction and management; building public facilities; carrying out 
comprehensive ecological improvement; guiding and promoting the specialized co-operation of 
enterprises, their reorganization, association and technical transformation and the modernization of 
their management and operation; guiding and promoting a rational circulation of materials and com­
modities; improving cultural, educational, public health and social welfare work and various 
services; promoting the building of a civilization with a high cultural and ideological level, and the fos­
tering of better social conduct; and maintaining public order. Moreover, they should also work out 
satisfactory medium and long-term plans for economic and social development based on the general 
requirements of developing the national economy and on local conditions.
The relationship between socialist enterprises is first of all one of co-operation and mutual 
support, but this by no means excludes competition.For a long time, people used to consider compet­
ition peculiar to capitalism. As a matter of fact, where there is commodity production, there is bound 
to be competition. The point is that the purpose, nature, scope and means of competition vary under 
different social systems. Competition between socialist enterprises is fundamentally different from 
that under capitalism where the law of the jungle prevails. O n  the basis of public ownership and sub­
ject to the control of state planning and laws, and for the purpose of serving socialist modernization, 
our enterprises are put to the test of direct judgement by consumers in the marketplace so that only 
the best survive. This will help to break the blockade and monopoly hampering the growth of pro­
duction lay bare the defects of enterprise quickly and stimulate enterprises to improve technology, 
operation and management. It will stimulate the economy as a whole and benefit socialism. As for 
some undesirable trends and unlawful acts that may appear in the course of competition, the relevant 
leading organs at various levels should keep a clear head and strengthen education and control and 
tackle such problems in real earnest.
More and more norms guiding economic relations and activities will have to be framed in the form
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of law in the restructuring of the economy and national economic development. State legislative 
bodies must produce economic legislation faster, the courts should make greater efforts to try 
economic cases, the procuratorates should strengthen their work in dealing with economic crimes, 
and the judicial departments should offer active legal services for economic construction.
The separation of the functions of government and enterprises as well as simpler and decen­
tralized adminsitration constitute a deep-going transformation of the socialist superstructure. W h e n  
the structure changes, the organization and the style of thinking and work should also change. W e  
must unhesitatingly change the working style of government departments in accordance with the 
principles of serving the people and of streamlining, unification and efficiency and raise the compe­
tence of their functionaries. W e  must end the long-standing practice of leading organs making enter­
prises and units completely dependent on them, instead of serving the enterprises and other grass­
roots units, and eliminate such bureaucratic maladies as organizational overlapping, overstaffing, 
vague delimitation of functions and endless wrangling. The leading organs at various levels will thus 
be able to orient their work towards promoting production, serving the enterprises and other grass­
roots units and helping build a strong and prosperous country and bring prosperity and happiness to 
the people.
VII. Establish Various Forms of Economic Responsibility System and Conscientiously 
Implement the Principle of Distribution According to Work
Experimental urban reforms in the past few years have amply demonstrated that the basic experi­
ence of the system for contracted responsibility in the rural areas is also applicable in the cities. 
Enterprises must specify in explicit terms the requirements for each work post and the duties of each 
worker and staff member and must establish various forms of the economic responsibility system 
with contracted jobs as the main content so as to invigorate the urban enterprises, raise the sense of 
responsibility of the workers and staff members and bring into full play their initiative, enthusiasm 
and creativeness. The basic principles of this responsibility system are a combination of responsibil­
ity, authority and benefit; the unity of the interests of the state, the collectives and the individuals; 
and the linking of the income of workers and staff members with their job performance. In applying 
rural experiences to urban areas, we must take into account the characteristics of urban enterprises. 
It is neither feasible nor necessary to transplant mechanically the specific measures of the rural areas. 
As the nature of trades and the size and production conditions of enterprises differ from one another, 
urban enterprises cannot follow a single model of responsibility system. Our comrades, leading com­
rades of enterprises in particular, should always proceed from reality and in the course of practice 
gradually work out concrete forms of the responsibility system suited to their specific conditions. 
Then the contracted responsibility system will take root, blossom and bear fruit in the cities.
M o d e m  enterprises have a minute division of larbour, a high degree of continuity in production, 
strict technological requirements and complex relations of co-operation. It is therefore necessary to 
establish a unified, authoritative and highly efficient system to direct production and conduct opera­
tions and management. This calls for a system of the director or manager assuming full responsibility. 
Party organizations in enterprises should actively support directors in exercising their authority in 
giving unified direction to production and operations, guarantee and supervise the implementation 
of the principles and policies of the Party, and the state, strengthen the Party’s ideological and 
organizational work in enterprises, improve their leadership over the trade unions and Communist 
Youth League organizations and do effective ideological and political work among the workers and 
staff members. While the director assumes full responsibility, we must improve the system of congress­
es of workers and staff members and other systems of democratic management, give play to the 
authority and role of the trade union organizations and workers’ and staff members’ deputies in 
examining and discussing major decisions to be taken by the enterprises, supervising administrative 
leadership and safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of the workers and staff members. All 
of this expresses the status of the working people as masters of the enterprise. Their status is deter­
mined by the nature of the socialist enterprise and must in no way be neglected or weakened.
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With the general replacement of profit delivery by taxes and the widespread establishment of 
various forms of economic responsibility in enterprises, the socialist principle of distribution accord­
ing to work will be implemented more fully. A n  important step already taken in this respect is that 
enterprises decide on the amount of bonuses for their workers and staff members according to the 
results of enterprise operation, while the state only collect an appropriate amount of tax on the 
above-norm bonus from enterprises. In the future, adequate measures will be taken to better link 
wages and bonuses with the improved enterprise performance. In the enterprise, the difference 
between the wages of various trades and jobs should be widened, so as to apply fully the principle 
of rewarding the diligent and good and punishing the lazy and bad and of giving more pay for more 
work and less pay for less work as well as to fully reflect the difference between mental and manual, 
complex and simple, skilled and unskilled, and heavy and light work. In particular, it is necessary to 
change the present remuneration for mental work which is relatively low. W e  should also reform the 
wage system in state institutions and public organizations in accordance with the principle of linking 
wages with responsibilities and achievements. W'hile reform of the wage system in enterprises, state 
institutions and public organizations is under way, the reform of the labour system will be speeded 
up.
There has long been a misunderstanding about the distribution of consumer goods under 
socialism, as if it meant equalitarianism. If some members of society got higher wages throught their 
labour resulting in wide gaps in income, it was considered polarization and a deviation from 
socialism. This equalitarian thinking is utterly incompatible with scientific Marxist views on 
socialism. History has shown that equalitarian thinking is a serious obstacle to implementing the 
principle of distribution according to work and that if it is unchecked, the forces of production will 
inevitably be undermined. Naturally, a socialist society must guarantee its members a gradual 
improvement in material and cultural life and their common prosperity. But c o mmon prosperity can­
not and will never mean absolute equalitarianism or that all members of society become better off 
simultaneously at the same speed. If common prosperity were understood as absolute 
equalitarianism and simultaneous prosperity not only would this be impossible, but such thinking 
would lead to com m o n  poverty. Only when some regions, enterprises and individuals are allowed 
and encouraged to get better off first through diligent work can there be a strong attraction and inspi­
ration to the majority of the people. More and more people will be prompted to take the road of pro­
sperity, one group after another. At the same time, we must provide social relief for the old, weak, 
sick, disabled and for widows, widowers, orphans and childless elders who cannot support them­
selves. W e  must aid those who have not yet become well-off and adopt special and preferential 
policies towards some old revolutionary base areas and minority nationality, remote and other areas 
where the economy is still very backward and give them the necessary material and technical assis­
tance. The difference arising from the prosprity of some people before others is a differencce in speed, 
with all members of society advancing on the road to common prosperity. It is certainly not polariza­
tion, which means that a handful of people become exploiters while the vast majority fall into pov­
erty. The policy of encouraging some people to get better off earlier accords with the law of socialist 
development and is the only road to prosperity for the whole of society.
W e  must never discard the fine tradition of working hard and building the country through 
diligence and thrift that was developed during the long period of our revolution and construction. In 
the new historical period this tradition chiefly means the spirit of working hard and defying all dif­
ficulties in dedication to the motherland and the people, practice of strict economy in production and 
construction, opposition to any act that squanders state materials and funds, and avoidance of 
erroneous policy decisions that result in waste. It should not be misconstrued as overlooking due 
growth in the people’s level of consumption. According to the basic tenets of Marxism, production 
is the starting point arid the predominant factor of all economic activities and determines consump­
tion; but consumption also determines production in that the growth of consumption gives a strong 
impetus to creation of new social demands, opens up vast markets and encourages production. W e  
must gradually bring about substantial increases in the pay of workers and staff members and in the 
people’s level of consumption. This should be based on increased production, better economic 
results, a steady increase in state revenue and a correct proportion of accumulation and consump­
tion. It is incorrect to put forward demands for consumption in excess of the capacity of current pro­
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duction. But it is likewise incorrect not to appropriately increase but keep restricting consumption 
that is well within the capacity of current production.
VIII. Work to Develop Diverse Economic Forms and Continue to Expand Foreign And 
Domestic Economic and Technological Exchanges
W e  must mobilize all positive factors if we are to achieve rapid growth in all fields of production 
and construction and make our country strong and prosperous and our people rich and happy at a 
fairly fast pace. Under the guidance of state policies and planning, the initiative of the state, the 
collective and the individual should all be encouraged. W e  must work to develop diversified economic 
forms and various methods of management. A n d  we must actively expand foreign economic co-oper­
ation and technological exchange on the basis of independence, self-reliance, equality and mutual 
benefit and mutual good faith.
Enterprises owned by the whole people constitute the leading force in China’s socialist economy 
and are decisive in ensuring our socialist orientation and the steady growth of our entire national 
economy. But their consolidation and development should not be predicated on restriction and 
exclusion of other economic forms and other methods of management. The collective economy is an 
important component of the socialist economy and we can give the collectives a free hand in running 
enterprises in many area of production and construction. The individual economy now found in 
China is linked with socialist public ownership and differs from the individual economy linked with 
capitalist private ownership. It plays an irreplaceable role in expanding production meeting the 
people’s daily needs and providing employment. It is a necessary and valuable adjunct to the socialist 
economy and is subordinate to it. At present, we should try to remove obstacles in the way of the 
collective economy and individual eocnomy in cities and rural towns and create conditions for their 
development and give them the protection of the law. W e  should promote individual economy par­
ticularly in those economic fields mainly based on labour services and where decentralized operation 
is suitable. Meanwhile we should on the basis of voluntary participation and mutual benefit exten­
sively encourage diverse and flexible forms of co-operative management and economic association 
among the state, collectives and individual sectors of the economy. Some small state-owned enter­
prises can be leased to collectives or individuals, or run by them on a contract basis. It is our long 
term policy and the need of socialist development to promote diversified economic forms and various 
methods of operation simultaneously. This is not retrogression to the new-democratic economy of 
the early period of the People’s Republic when the socialist public ownership was not yet predomin­
ant in town and country. Far from undermining China’s socialist economic system, the new policy 
will help consolidate and develop it.
Marx and Engels pointed out long ago in the Manifesto of the Communist Party that with the 
exploitation of the world market due to the growth of capitalism, the old local and national seclusion 
and self-sufficiency had given place to intercourse between nations in every direction, and produc­
tion and consumption in every country had become cosmopolitan in character. The productive forces 
including science and technology in our times are developing ever faster. Although international 
relations are complex and ridden with contradictions international economic and technological ties 
are, generally speaking, very close, and national seclusion cannot lead to modernization. Since the 
Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee, we have taken opening to the outside world 
to be our long-term basic state policy, a strategic measure for accelerating socialist modernization. 
Practice has already yielded marked results. W e  must continue to pursue flexible policies, reform our 
foreign trade structure in line with the principle of both arousing the enthusiasm of all quarters and 
developing a unified approach in our external dealings. W e  will work to expand economic and 
technological exchanges and co-operation with other countries, strive for the success of the special 
economic zones and open more coastal cities. Using foreign funds and attracting foreign 
businessmen for joint ventures, co-operative management or exclusive investment in enterprises are 
also a necessary and beneficial complement to China’s socialist economy. W e  must make the best 
use of both domestic and foreign resources and both the domestic and foreign markets, and learn 
both to organize domestic construction and develop foreign economic relations.
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As we open to the outside world, we shall open up even more between different areas within China 
itself. W e  should smash blockades and open doors in the relations between economically more 
developed and less developed areas, coastal areas and interior and border areas, cities and coun­
tryside, and between all trades and enterprises. W e  must act in conformity with the principle of mak­
ing the best possible use of favourable cvonditions and avoiding the effects of unfavourable ones, 
developing diversity of forms, offering mutual benefit and achieving common progress, and strive to 
develop economic relations among enterprises and regions, promote appropriate exchanges of funds, 
equipment, technology and qualified personnel, introduce diverse forms of economic and technological 
co-operation and run joint economic enterprises. This will speed up the rationalization of our economic 
setup and of the geographical distribution of our enterprises and accelerate modernization.
IX. Promote a New Generation of Cadres and Create a Mighty Contingent of Managerial 
Personnel for the Socialist Economy
Reform of our economic structure and the development of our national economy badly need a 
large contingent of managerial and administrative personnel, and especially managers, who are both 
knowledgeable in modern economics and technology and imbued with a creative, innovative spirit 
and who are capable of bringing about a new situation in whatever they do. The point now is that 
our contingent of managerial personnel falls far short of the above requirements. W e  have large 
numbers of veteran comrades in this contingent who, in the long period of hard struggle, have made 
great contribution to our socialist economic construction. Their good work style, managerial ability 
and steadfastness in observing the rules of inner-Party life had an educational influence on many 
young and middje-aged cadres. But they are getting up in years, and we can no longer ask them to 
continue in arduous leading posts. Our present urgent task is to promote boldly thousands upon 
thousands of young and middle-aged managerial personnel and take steps to train them.
Large numbers of talented persons have come to the fore in economic construction, especially in 
the course of Party consolidation and the reform of the economic structure. Party committees at all 
levels must take pains to discover and assess them and must not be fettered by outdate ideas and con­
vention. They must not fault-find and demand_perfection and must guard against the influence of fac­
tionalism and gossip. W h e n  we act in this manner, we can discover large numbers of excellent cadres. 
Of course, young and middle-aged cadres lack experience in giving leadership. But they can gain 
experience through tempering in practical work and will gradually do so. Under no circumstances 
should we use lack of experience as an excuse for holding back young cadres. W e  have to be analyt­
ical in our attitude to experience. Our comrades accumulated rich experience, both positive and 
negative, in the course of revolution and construction. This is very valuable. Generally speaking, 
however, all our cadres, old, middle-aged or young, are facing brand-new tasks in the new historical 
period and all lack the new knowledge and experience necessary for modernization. All of them will 
have to re-evaluate their capabilities and make new efforts to learn. It would be wrong to hang on 
to the outmoded and rest complacent about experience that is no longer applicable.
The Central Committee calls for completion of the reshuffling of leadership in enterprises, 
especially key enterprises, before the end of 1985. In addition, plans should be drawn up and effective 
measures taken to train fairly soon large numbers of directors (managers) who can successfully 
organize and direct enterprise production and operations of chief engineers who can strengthen tech­
nical management and promote technological progress, of chief economic managers who can 
improve business operations for better economic results, of chief accountants who can strictly uphold 
financial and economic discipline, do careful budgeting and exploit new sources of revenue, and of 
Party secretaries who can keep to a correct political orientation and unite the workers and staff m e m ­
bers of the enterprises. This is how to create a mighty contingent of managerial and technical cadres 
for the socialist economy. This contingent should consist of qualified personnel in all trades and occu­
pations of the whole chain of enterprise management.
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The Central Committee has pointed out on many occasions that in our drive for socialist moderni­
zation we must respect knowledge and talented people. W e  must combat all idea and practices that 
belittle science and technology, the cultivation of intellectual resources and the role of intellectuals. 
W e  must take resolute action to redress cases of discrimination against intellectuals which still exist 
in many localities and to raise the social standing of intellectuals and improve the working and living 
conditions. All our reforms must lead to progress in science and technology, to greater intiative of 
the localities, departments, units and individuals in making effective use of intellectual resources and 
must enable our vast numbers of young people as well as workers, peasants and intellectuals to raise 
their cultural and technical levels quickly. Those who have made important inventions and innova­
tions or other outstanding contribution should be ample rewarded.
Science, technology and education are extremely important in developing our national economy. 
Advances in reforming the economic structure pose as a matter of increasingly urgent strategic 
importance the reform of our scientific, technical and educational setups. The Central Committee 
will hold special discussions on these issues and take relevant decisions.
X. Strengthen Party Leadership To Ensure the Success of Reforms
Reform of China’s economic structure will be carried out over the fairly broad area and in a fairly 
deep-going way. It will have a direct bearing oh the nation’s future and affect the vital interests of 
millons upon millions of workers, peasants and intellectuals. All Party comrades should stand in the 
forefront of the reform, which represents the trend of our times. This reform is an exploratory and 
innovative undertaking by the masses and it is very complex. W e  are generally now at the stage of 
accumulating experience in the reform of the entire economic structure which focuses on cities, and 
the vast number of cadres are not familiar with this work. Leading Party and government 
functionaries at all levels have to be sober-minded and give meticulous guidance. They should eman­
cipate their minds, seek truth from facts and proceed from reality and carry out Party policies crea­
tively by integrating them with the actual situation in each locality, department and unit. Full consid­
eration should be given to the particularities of the regions concerned in reforming the economic 
structure in minority nationality regions. All moves in the reform have to be tested in practice, 
through which new experience will be acquired. Errors can hardly be avoided, but we should make 
every effort to prevent them whenever possible. Once an error does occur, we must try to discover 
it promptly, resolutely correct it, draw the lessons and continue to go ahead. W e  should take active 
but prudent steps in carrying out reforms. W e  should carry them out firmly where we are sure of 
success, make reforms one by one when the conditions are ripe, and make experiments when we are 
not sure of success. W e  must not try to accomplish the whole task at one stroke. All major reforms 
which effect the whole country will be arranged by the Stat£ Council under a unified plan. All 
localities, departments and units should be encouraged to conduct exploratory and pilot reforms. 
Nevertheless, any reform involving the overall situation or one that is extensive in scope must first 
be approved by the State Council.
Party organizations in numberous localities and enterprises will undergo consolidation next year. 
Reform should be closely linked with this. Party consolidation should promote economic growth, 
which is an indicator of how successful it is. While carrying out the reform, we must strengthen the 
leadership over Party consolidation, making sure that the consolidation will not become a mere for­
mality. The more we enliven the economy and invigorate enterprises, the more we must pay atten­
tion to combating the corrosive influence of capitalist ideas, eliminating the decadent practice of 
seeking personal gain by abusing one’s position and authority and preventing any action that seri­
ously harms the interests of the state and the consumers, and the more we should strengthen the buil­
ding of a fine Party style and sense of discipline and maintain healthy inner-Party political life. In 
ideological and organizational work in the new historical period, we must firmly carry out the Party’s 
guiding principle that such work should help fulfil the general task and reach the general goal set by 
the Party and be closely linked with economic construction and reform of the economic structure. 
W e  should actively support cadres and the masses who are keen on reforms. W h e n  errors or devia-
305
tions appear in the course of reform, apart from those seriously violating the law and discipline which 
must be dealt with according to law, we should adopt a policy of persuasion, criticism and education 
towards the persons concerned and must not stick political labels on them. People with different 
views and approaches about reforms may discuss their differences. W e  must not divide the cadres 
and masses by calling some people “reformers” and other “conservatives.” W e  should have faith in 
comrades who fall behind the developing situation for a time, confident that they will understand 
things better in the course of reform. In the past five years of rural reform, many comrades who had 
doubts about it have been convinced by the facts and have changed their views. The Central Commit­
tee has adhered to the principle of patient education in guiding rural reform, thereby ensuring its 
smooth progress. This is a valuable experience in solving ideological problems inside the Party on 
the question of major policies and we should keep to this principle in the future. By citing the facts 
about reform, we should provide Party members and the masses with lively education in the theory 
and policies of the reform. This will help them realize that socialism with Chinese characteristics 
should be full of vitality, different from the rigid pattern of the past and fundamentally different from 
the capitalist system. This will deepen their understanding of scientific socialism so that they devote 
themselves to making reforms.
The reform of economic structure will lead to tremendous changes not only in people’s economic 
life, but also in their mental outlook and way of life. W e  should build socialist civilization with both 
a high material level and high cultural and ideologcial level. This is our Party’s unswerving principle. 
While trying to create a socialist economic structure full of vigour, we should work to create a cul­
tured healthy and scientific way of life for the whole society that meets the requirements of expand­
ing the modern forces of production and social progress, and eliminate backward and decadent ideas 
and ignorance. W e  should foster throughout society an active, forward-looking and enterprising 
attitude and overcome such forces of habit as complacency, mental sluggishness, fear of change and 
conventionality. Such, an approach of life and such an attitude are important aspects of a socialist 
civilization that has a high cultural and ideological level. They give great impetus to reform of the 
economic structure and the building of a socialist civilization with a high material level. Comrade 
M a o  Zedong said, “Mankind makes constant progress and nature undergoes constant change; they 
never remain at the same level. Therefore, man has constantly to sum up experience and go on dis­
covering, inventing, creating and advancing. Ideas of stagnation, pessimism, inertia and compla­
cency are all wrong. They are wrong because they agree neither with the historical facts of social 
development nor with the historical facts of nature so far known to us.” This statement is a graphic 
expression of one of the fundamental points of view of the Marxist world outlook and conception of 
history. The Chinese Communists take the constant promotion of social development and progress 
as their historical mission. Our Party led the masses of the people under reactionary rule in the past 
in making revolution to overthrow the old order. Under the socialist system with the people as mas­
ters of the country, our Party has been leading the masses in consientiously carrying out reforms and 
building China into a modern, powerful socialist country with a high level of culture and democracy.
The current situation is very favourable to reform. The people are highly creative in this 
endeavour. By relying on their wisdom and strength and adhering to the four cardinal principles, 
we will certainly succeed in our reform and fulfil the general task and reach the general goal set by 
the Party’s 12th National Congress.
As published in the ACFERT Editorial Board (1985), pp. 373-87.
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A P P E N D I X  B
Notice by the State Council on the Approval of the Report 
from the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations 
and Trade on Reform of the Foreign Trade System
September IS, 1984
The State Council has approved the Report on Reform of the Foreign Trade System submitted 
by the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade ( hereinafter referred to as M F E R T  ), 
which is hereby published for a conscientious study and implementation.
With a view to developing foreign trade in a better way, catering the needs of the socialist moder­
nization drive, the reform on foreign trade system must be carried out. The current reform of foreign 
trade system is an important reform in our national economic structure. It is of great significance in 
implementing the policy of opening to the outside world and revitalizing domestic economy, further 
developing our foreign trade and accelerating the Four Modernization programs.
The reform of foreign trade system will involve a wide-ranging area in fundamental policy deci­
sion, and it is an arduous task. It is hoped that the cadres at all levels in the field of foreign trade, in 
localities and in other departments concerned should unify their thinking to understand the signifi­
cance of these reforms, do away with out-dated conventions and the unwanted forces of habit. They 
must emancipate their minds, be boldly creative and carry out these reforms vigorously. They should 
do a sound job in earnest and implement the current reforms step by step in a planned way. In prac­
tice, they should study the new situation and solve the emerging problems in their work without 
delay. M O F E R T  should pay attention to and keep informed of the situation in the course of reforms 
from which the arising problems will be studied and settled promptly, so as to ensure that the foreign 
trade business will be conducted normally.
After the foreign trade system is reformed, M F E R T  must exercise overall leadership and cen­
tralized management of specialized departments over the national foreign economic relations and 
trade, assume fully the state function of administrating the foreign trade, and promote the develop­
ment of foreign economic relations and trade by both arousing the enthusiasm of all quarters and 
developing a unified approach in our external dealings and with effective use of administrative and 
economic means.
All localities and the relevant departments should keep the overall situation in mind, strengthen 
leadership, make a concerted effort and act in close cooperation, so as to guarantee that the current 
reforms will be carried on successfully. W e  are convinced that, with joint efforts, the reform of fore­
ign trade system will certainly achieve success, and a new situation in our national foreign trade will 
surely emerge, which will make new contributions to accelerating our national economic develop­
ment.
MFERT’s Report on Reform of the Foreign Trade System 
(Extracts)
August 14,1984
In order to implement the policy of opening to the outside world and invigorating the domestic 
economy, bring into full play the initiatives of all quarters, continue to develop our national foreign 
trade and accelerate socialist modernization, we  must carry out reforms on foreign trade system.
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The basic principles set out by the State Council guiding these reforms are:
(1) To separate government functions from enterprise management so that M F E R T  holds the 
administrative control only;
(2) To introduce an agency system for foreign trade;
(3) to integrate foreign trade with increased production and the introduction of new technology, 
and imports with exports.
According to these principles and on the basis of investigation and serious discussions with relev­
ant departments, we hereby put forward the following suggestions for the reform.
1. Separate Government Functions from Enterprise Management and Strengthen 
Administrative Management of Foreign Trade
After the government functions are separated from the enterprise management, M F E R T  and 
Foreign Economic Relations and Trade Departments (Commissions) of the provinces, autonomous 
regions and municipalities will hold administrative control only for foreign trade. The foreign trade 
enterprises will conduct independently the import-export business, keeping their own accounts and 
assuming responsibility for their own profits and losses. The administrative departments at all levels 
should not interfere with the specific business handled by the foreign trade enterprises.
To safeguard our national interests, we must exercise an unified leadership and centralized 
management of specialized departments in our foreign trade. W e  should fully arouse the enthusiasm 
of all quarters and adhere to the principle of an unified approach in our external dealings. M F E R T  
should lead and administer the national foreign trade work plus various foreign trade enterprises by 
administrative and economic means. It’s main tasks are as follows:
(1) To formulate foreign trade principles, policies, rules and regulations, organize their enforce­
ment and supervise their execution.
(2) To draw up and assign the long-term plans for national foreign trade development and annual 
import-export commodity plans in coordination with the State Planning Commission, supervise and 
monitor their implementation, and hold responsibility for statistics.
(3) To work out economic measures for regulating import and export trade by using various 
economic means, supervise and monitor the operations of the foreign trade.
(4) To draw up foreign trade plans covering specific countries and regions, organize trade negoti­
ations between governments, sign trade agreements and organize their implementations, represent 
the government to attend international economic and trade conferences.
(5) To examine and approve the establishment, merger and liquidation of the foreign economic 
and trade enterprises both at home and abroad, examine and approve the establishment of represen­
tative offices in China by foreign enterprises and administer their operations, and to administer our 
country’s economic and commercial offices abroad.
(6) To examine, approve and issue import-Export licences take charge of end allocate quotas and 
quantitative limits, make and readjust the catalogues of import-export commodities which are under 
the unified management, examine and approve the import-export contracts relate to key technology 
items according to the state relevant rules and regulations.
(7) To keep the export trade marks under unified management.
(8) To take charge of the international market investigation and study, information exchange, 
provide prompt information and forecasting for the economic and trade enterprises and relevant 
departments all over the country.
(9) To report to the next higher economic and trade departments for the record of appointment 
and removal of members of board of directors, managers and deputy managers in various foreign
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trade corporations throughout the country. The next higher economic and trade departments should 
supervise their business activities and put forward proposals to remove those who are not competent,
(10) To take the responsibility of excercising leadership over the higher learning institutes and 
schools of foreign economic relations and trade all over the country, organize staff training in the 
field of foreign economic relations and trade, and help the localities run well the schools of foreign 
economic relations and trade.
In accordance with the principle of administration at different levels, we call for the economic and 
trade departments of the provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities, as authorized by 
M  FERT, to do a good job, within the above-mentioned ten functions, in administrating and super­
vising the various foreign trade enterprises in localities.
2. Simplify Administration and Transfer Power to Lower Administrative Levels and Bring
into Full Play the Managing Initiative of Various Foreign Trade Enterprises
Simplification of administration and decentralization is the key to restructuring the foreign trade 
system. The specialized foreign trade corporations under M F E R T  and the foreign trade companies 
of other departments and localities should gradually become independent from their original 
administrative departments to which they were formly subordinated and perform management func­
tions independently whilst keeping their own accounts, assuming responsibility for their own profits 
and losses, and developing in the direction of specialization and socialization.
To ensure the growth of foreign trade, we must continue to manage well the existing head offices 
of the national foreign trade corporations which are specialized and socialized. They are the mainstay ' 
of our national foreign trade. W e  should help them develop further. However, these big corporations 
will not be able to monopolize the entire foreign trade. There must be a large number of small and 
medium sized companies and enterprises to participate in foreign trade. They and the specialized 
foreign trade corporations will complement and promote each other’s work, so as to activate foreign 
trade. W h e n  the conditions are ripe, we can set up a number of specialized companies according to 
needs. Some qualified big production enterprises may handle foreign trade business subject to 
approval.
To carry out the integration of foreign trade with production and technology remains an important 
policy for developing foreign trade and accelerating technological progress of our country. In line 
with their specific commodities, the foreign trade enterprises should actively develop diverse forms 
of such combinations with production enterprises and scientific and technical units, thus providing 
positive and good services in a better way for the enterprises’ technical up-grading and introduction 
of advanced technology in our country. W e  should promote energetically the export of industrial 
manufactured goods, further improve the structure of our export commodities. The administrative 
departments at all levels should actively encourage and support the combination of foreign trade 
enterprises with production units.
The various foreign trade enterprises should do as follows:
(1) To implement conscientiously the state’s principles, policies, rules and regulations on foreign 
trade, and accept M F E R T ’s unified administration and supervision and undertake the assignments 
set by the state for export earnings and other import-export plans, and establish the economic 
responsibility system so as to integrate responsibility, management power and economic interests.
(2) The enterprises which apply for the power of managing foreign trade must submit their appli­
cations to M F E R T  for approval before their registration with the administrative departments of 
industry and commerce. They are to operate independently and assume full responsibility for their 
own profits and losses within approved business scope, and develop actively diverse forms of integ­
rating foreign trade with increased production and new technology and adopt various forms of associ­
ations.
(3) All foreign trade enterprises should institute a management system under which the manager
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either assume sole responsibility or report to a board of directors.
(4) According to the relevant policies and regulations set by the state, the foreign trade enterprises 
will manage their own internal affairs such as the organizational set-up, cadres allocation, staff m a n ­
agement, wages, bonus, etc..
(5) The head offices of specialized foreign trade corporations will assume leadership over their 
branches, covering their plans and business etc.. The branches keep their own accounts, and under­
take responsibility for their own profits and losses. The local foreign trade companies can form combi­
nations with specialized corporations on a voluntary basis, or establish relations, partnerships, co­
management or associations with them. However, they should not be regarded as branches of the 
specialized corporations.
3. Adopt Import and Export Agency System and Improve Operations and Management of
Foreign Trade
By import and export agency system, we mean that foreign trade enterprises should provide diver­
sified services, handle import and export business as entrusted by production units and order-placing 
departments and collect service charges, while profits and losses are to be b o m  by the entrusting 
units. The fulfilment of the state foreign trade plan is jointly undertaken by foreign trade corpora­
tions and production enterprises. The import and export agency system will facilitate the direct com­
bination of foreign trade enterprises with production units, and accelerate the integration of foreign 
trade with production and technology, improve the operation and management arid raise economic 
efficiency. Therefore, the import and export agency system should be popularized gradually as the 
basic form of foreign trade.
(1) A n  agency system for all import business will be practised in principle, while the end-users take 
the responsibility for their own profits and losses.
The adoption of import agency system can facilitate economic accounts, encourage the end-users 
to use domestic products, help save foreign exchange and protect domestic production.
W e  should strive for success of the integration of foreign trade with production unit and technol­
ogy, and import with export. While importing commodities, complete sets of equipment and 
advanced technology, the foreign trade corporations should earnestly consult the end-users, produc­
tion units and the departments for material allocation and etc., invite them to join in technical and 
commercial negotiations and sign contracts according to their needs.
(2) A n  agency system for export business will be practised basically, but they will be defined sep­
arately as conditions vary with different commodities.
For the export of industrial and mineral products, we can basically practise agency system. In this 
case, production units will hold the responsibility for their own profits and losses; we can also adopt 
other forms such as entrusted processing, co-management, joint venture etc. Under such forms, the 
production units and foreign trade enterprises share their profits and losses. For the export of 
agricultural and side-line products and some handicrafts, the foreign trade corporations can still use 
the methods of direct purchase, entrusted purchased or jointly running the production bases. They 
can also practise an agency system if conditions permit. N o  matter what forms of management are 
to be taken, both sides should sign economic contracts, with a clear definition of economic responsi­
bility and interest which the foreign trade enterprises and production units should take and share 
respectively. The foreign trade enterprises should provide the production units with good service and 
guidance, effect earnestly the linking of production with sales, so as to arouse the enthusiasm of pro­
duction units, pay more attention to raising economic efficiency of export commodities, and continue 
to develop in the direction of more channels and less precedures. W e  should strive to develop the 
processing with imported materials in coastal cities, so as to promote a more vigorious development 
of foreign trade.
The import and export agency system should not be applied indiscriminately and foreign trade
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corporations should be allowed to use more trading forms such as sole-operation, barter trade, 
cooperation and association, etc., to activate their operation.
4. Reform the Foreign Trade Planning System and Simplify Its Contents
The reform of foreign trade planning system is aimed at transferring more decision-making power 
of management to the foreign trade enterprises and production units under the state unified plan, 
enabling the foreign trade enterprises to be more flexible in their operation and more responsible to 
the changable international market, improving their management skills, and fulfilling the state plan 
with the maximum economic returns.
5. Reform the Foreign Trade Financial System and Strengthen the Economic Means of
Regulation
The gradual introduction of import and export agency system will create favourable conditions to 
solve the problems of the existing foreign trade financial system under which “everyone eats from 
the same big pot” whilst the state bears the responsibility for all profits and losses. The various fore­
ign trade enterprises should start paying tax instead turning over profits to the state. They should 
operate independently and undertake the duty for their own profits and losses. In line with the state 
relevant rules and regulations, they must pay taxes to the departments of finance and taxation. It is 
necessary to work out appropriate policies and measures to strengthen the economic means of regu­
lation, establish economic responsibility system and guide the foreign trade enterprises to manage 
well according to the state needs.
If the above report is acceptable, please approve and inform the various departments and 
localities to implement it.
As published in the ACFERT Editorial Board (1985), pp 388-92.
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a p p e n d i x  c
The Law of the People’s Republic of China on Joint Ventures Using. Chinese 
and Foreign Investment
Adopted on July 1, 1979 at the Second Session of the Fifth National 
People's Congress; Promulgated on July 8, 1979
Article 1 With a view to expanding international 
economic cooperation and technological exchange, 
the People’s Republic of China permits foreign 
companies, enterprises, other economic entities or 
individuals (hereinafter referred to as foreign par­
ticipants) to incorporate themselves, within the ter­
ritory of the People’s Republic of China, into joint 
ventures with Chinese companies, enterprises or 
other economic entities (hereinafter referred to as 
Chinese participants) on the principle of equality 
and mutual benefit and subject to authorization by 
the Chinese Government.
Article 2 The Chinese Government protects, by 
the legislation in force, the resources invested by a 
foreign participant in a joint venture and the profits 
due him pursuant to the agreements, contracts and 
articles of association authorized by the Chinese 
Government as well as his other lawful rights and 
interests.
All the activities of a joint venture shall be governed 
by the laws, decrees and pertinent rules and regula­
tions of the People’s Republic of China.
Article 3 A joint venture shall apply to the Foreign 
Investment Commission of the People’s Republic of 
China for authorization of the agreements and con­
tracts concluded between the parties to the venture 
and the articles of association of the venture for­
mulated by them, and the commission shall 
authorize or reject these documents within three 
months. When authorized, the joint venture shall 
register with the General Administration for In­
dustry and Commerce of the People’s Republic of 
China and start operations under license.
Article 4 A joint venture shall take the form of a 
limited liability company.
In the registered capital of a joint venture, the pro­
portion of the investment contributed by the foreign 
participant(s) shall in general not be less than 25 per 
cent.
The profits, risks and losses of a joint venture shall 
be shared by the parties to the venture in proportion 
to their contributions to the registered capital.
The transfer of one party’s share in the registered 
capital shall be effected only with the consent of the 
other parties to the venture.
Article 5 Each party to a joint venture may con­
tribute cash, capital goods, industrial property 
rights, etc., as its investment in the venture.
The technology or equipment contributed by any 
foreign participant as investment shall be truly ad­
vanced and appropriate to China’s needs. In cases 
of losses caused by deception through the interna­
tional provision of outdated equipment or 
technology, compensation shall be paid for the 
losses.
The investment contributed by a Chinese participant 
may include the right to the use of a site provided 
for the joint venture during the period of its opera­
tion. In case such a contribution does not constitute 
a part of the investment from the Chinese partici­
pant, the joint venture shall pay the Chinese 
Government for its use.
The various contributions referred to in the present 
article shall be specified in the contracts concerning 
the joint venture or in its articles of association, and 
the value of each contribution (excluding that of the 
site) shall be ascertained by the parties to the ven­
ture through joint assessment.
Article 6 A joint venture shall have a board of 
directors with a composition stipulated in the con­
tracts and the articles of association after consulta­
tion between the parties to the venture, and each 
director shall be appointed or removed by his own 
side. The board of directors shall have a chairman 
appointed by the Chinese participant and one or two 
vice-chairmen appointed by the foreign partici­
pants). In handling an important problem, the 
board of directors shall reach decision through con­
sultation by the participants on the principle of 
equality and mutual benefit.
The board of directors, is empowered to discuss and 
take action on, pursuant to the provisions of the ar­
ticles of association of the joint venture, all fun­
damental issues concerning the venture, namely, ex­
pansion projects, production and business program­
mes, the budget, distribution of profits, plans con­
cerning manpower and pay scales, the termination 
of business, the appointment or hiring of the presi­
dent, the vice-president(s), the chief engineer, the 
treasurer and the auditors as well as their functions 
and powers and their remuneration, etc.
The president and vice-president(s) (or the general 
manager and assistant general manager(s) in a fac­
tory) shall be chosen from the various parties to the 
joint venture.
Procedures covering the employment and discharge 
of the workers and staff members of a joint venture 
shall be stipulated according to law in the agreement 
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or contract concluded between the parties to the 
venture.
Article 7 The net profit of a joint venture shall be 
distributed between the parties to the venture in pro­
portion to their respective shares in the registered 
capital after the payment of a joint venture income 
tax on its gross profit pursuant to the tax laws of the 
People’s Republic of China and after the deductions 
therefrom as stipulated in the articles of association 
of the venture for the reserve funds, the bonus and 
welfare funds for the workers and staff members 
and the expansion funds of the venture.
A joint venture equipped with up-to-date 
technology by world standards may apply for a 
reduction of or exemption from income tax for the 
first two to three profit-making years.
A foreign participant who re-invests any part of his 
share of the net profit within Chinese territory may 
apply for the restitution of a part of the income 
taxes paid.
Article 8 A joint venture shall open an account 
with the Bank of China or a bank approved by the 
Bank of China.
A joint venture shall conduct its foreign exchange 
transactions in accordance with the Foreign Ex­
change Regulations of the People’s Republic of 
China.
A  joint venture may, in its business operations, ob­
tain funds from foreign banks directly.
The insurances appropriate to a joint venture shall 
be furnished by Chinese insurance companies.
Article 9 The production and business program­
mes of a joint venture shall be filed with the 
authorities concerned and shall be implemented 
through business contracts.
In its purchase of required raw and semi-processed 
materials, fuels, auxiliary equipment, etc., a joint 
venture should give first priority to Chinese sources, 
but may also acquire them directly from the world 
market with its own foreign exchange funds.
A  joint venture is encouraged to market its products 
outside China. It may distribute its export products 
on foreign markets through direct channels or its 
associated agencies or China’s foreign trade 
establishments. Its products may also be distributed 
on the Chinese market.
Wherever necessary, a joint venture may set up af­
filiated agencies outside China.
Article 10 The net profit which a foreign partici­
pant receives as his share after executing his obliga­
tions under the pertinent laws and agreements and 
contracts, the funds he receives at the time when the 
joint venture terminates or winds up its operations, 
and his other funds may be remitted abroad through 
the Bank of China in accordance with the foreign 
exchange regulations and in the currency or curren­
cies specified in the contracts concerning the joint 
venture.
A foreign participant shall receive encouragements 
for depositing in the Bank of China any pan of 
foreign exchange which he is entitled to remit 
abroad.
Article 11 The wages, salaries or other legitimate 
income earned by a foreign worker or staff member 
of a joint venture, after payment of the personal in­
come tax under the tax laws of the People’s 
Republic of China, may be remitted abroad through 
the Bank of China in accordance with the foreign 
exchange regulations.
Article 12 The contract period of a joint venture 
may be agreed upon between the parties to the ven­
ture according to its particular line of business and 
circumstances. The period may be extended upon 
expiration through agreement between the parties, 
subject to authorization by the Foreign Investment 
Commission of the People’s Republic of China. 
Any application for such extension shall be made six 
months before the expiration of the contract.
Article 13 In cases of heavy losses, the failure of 
any party to a joint venture to execute its obligations 
under the contracts or the articles of association of 
the venture, force majeure, etc., prior to the expira­
tion of the contract period of a joint venture, the 
contract may be terminated before the date of ex­
piration by consultation and agreement between the 
parties and through authorization by the Foreign In­
vestment Commission of the People’s Republic of 
China and registration with the General Administra­
tion for Industry and Commerce. In cases of losses 
caused by breach of the contract(s) by a party to the 
venture, the financial responsibility shall be borne 
by the said party.
Article 14 Disputes arising between the parties to 
a joint venture which the board of directors fails to 
settle through consultation may be settled through 
conciliation or arbitration by an arbitral body of 
China or through arbitration by an arbitral body 
agreed upon by the parties.
Article 15 The present law comes into force on the 
date of promulgation. The power of amendment is 
vested in the National People’s Congress.
As published in the ACFERT 
Editorial Board (1984) , pp 428-9.
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APPENDIX d
Regulations on Economic Association Between the 
Xiamen Special Economic Zone and Inland Areas of China
Approved at the Eighth Session of the Standing Committee of the Sixth Fujian Provincial People's Congress on July 14,1984 
Promulgated by the Standing Committee of Fujian Provincial People’s Congress on February 24, 1985
A rticle 1 The present regulations are formu­
lated in line with the relevant laws and decrees of 
the People’s Republic of China, with a view to 
strengthening the economic and technical coopera­
tion between the special zone and inland areas of 
China and promoting the growth of the national 
economy.
A rticle 2 Enterprises of various provinces, 
municipalities directly under the State Council and 
autonomous regions and central government 
departments may, on the principle of equality and 
mutual benefit, make investment in the special 
zone to run industrial, commercial, communica­
tions and transport undertakings, public utilities.
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building trade, restaurants, and undertakings in sci­
ence, technology, culture, education and other 
enterprises. The above-mentioned enterprises and 
undertakings are encouraged to invest in Xiamen 
City in the area of upgrading the technology of the 
city’s existing enterprises.
A rticle 3 Forms of the economic association 
between the special zone and the inland areas 
(hereinafter refered to as innerly associated enter­
prise) are:
(1) tripartite association among those from the 
inland areas and the SEZ and foreign firms;
(2) association between the inland areas and 
the special zone; and
(3) enterprises wholly-owned by inland areas 
and other forms of participation.
The first two forms of association, (1) and (2), 
may take the form of equity joint venture or contra­
ctual cooperation.
A rticle 4 An inland enterprise or undertak­
ing which invests in the SEZ must produce the cer­
tificate proving its legal person status and the cer­
tificate issued by the relevant county department or 
department(s) above the county level, when they 
negotiate with the relevant units of the SEZ. Once 
a contract is signed it must be examined and 
approved by the Xiamen City People’s Govern­
ment, and go through the procedures of registra­
tion with the Xiamen City Administration for 
Industry and Commerce.
A rticle 5 Innerly  associated enterprises and 
undertakings established i.. the SEZ should be sub­
ordinated to the overall planning and unified man­
agement of the SEZ, abide by the zone’s laws and 
decrees and their legitimate rights and interests are 
protected by law.
A rticle 6 The income tax rate is 15% for 
those innerly associated enterprises and undertak­
ings with the composition of foreign capital; while 
those without the composition of foreign capital but 
are engaged in undertakings of a developmental 
nature will enjoy tax deduction or exemption for 
one to three years starting from the first profit- 
making year with the approval of the Xiamen Tax 
Bureau.
A rticle 7 Products of the innerly associated 
enterprises are mainly for export.
A rticle 8 An innerly associated enterprise 
should open an account with a SEZ-based bank. 
That part of the net profit allocated to the inland 
party may be freely remitted to the inland areas; it 
may also be used to purchase equipment and 
materials in the SEZ or the international market, 
and transported to the inland area after paying the 
customs duties according to the customs regula­
tions.
A rticle 9 An appropriately higher percen­
tage may be offered in the foreign exchange part of 
the profit sharing for the inland party in innerly 
associated enterprises, if no composition of foreign 
capital is involved. The specific ways of doing this 
may be discussed and determined by the two par­
ties concerned.
A rticle 10 The number of personnel of the 
inland party of an innerly associated enterprises 
who are dispatched to the special zone is to be 
checked and determined by the Xiamen City 
People’s Government. These personnel should 
apply for temporary residence permits.
A rticle 11 The non-rotating management 
executives and technicians sent by the inland party 
to these innerly associated enterprises may apply 
for permanent residence in the SEZ and approp­
riate consideration may also be given to their family 
members to accompany them, if the term of 
cooperation between the two parties is more than 
five years and the economic results are good after 
the first year’s business operation.
A rticle 12 When the term of cooperation 
expires or is terminated half-way, assets may be 
sold freely, funds may be remitted back and the 
party that sends the employees to the special zone 
is to be responsible for their reemployment after 
the innerly associated enterprise has gone through 
the cancellation procedures as regards its business 
registration.
A rticle 13 The present regulations shall 
come into force on the date of promulgation.
As published in the ACFERT Editorial Board (1986), pp 646-7
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APPENDIX E
Provisions for the Improvement of Foreign Investment 
Environment in Xiamen Special Economic Zone
November 10,1986
I . Improving management, simplifying pro­
cedures and raising work efficiency.
A decision has been made to set up a Xiamen 
municipal heading group in charge of foreign inves­
tment in order to strengthen the leadership over 
and the coordinating work of foreign investment, 
and to arbitrate and handle relevant important pro­
blems.
All departments • of the Municipal Govern­
ment shall further improve its work efficiency. 
Xiamen Municipal Foreign Economic Relations 
and Trade Commission shall give a formal reply to 
any foreign investor applying for setting up an 
enterprise with foreign investment within one 
month from the date of receipt of the whole set of 
documents. The Customs shall complete at one 
time the procedures concerning the application for 
registration of enterprise, contract examination 
and approval, issuance of import material entry 
pamphlets and examination and approval of tax 
reduction and exemption in its declaration hall in a 
coordinated process. The Administrative Bureau 
of Industry and Commerce shall give a reply to the 
application for registration or for changes in regist­
ration within seven days from the date of receiving 
the application and related documents. The 
Department of Commodity Inspection shall issue 
the certificate within twenty days after receiving an 
application for inspection, so as to avoid delay in 
fixing claims on imports, in making shipment and 
settlement in trade. The Taxation Department 
shall give a reply to the application for tax reduc­
tion or exemption as well as to the taxation appeal 
within fifteen days from the date of receipt of the 
application.
II. Providing good service to enterprises
with foreign investment.
1. To set up a service company for enterprises 
with foreign investment, provide investors with 
information consultancy service, assist in handling 
the application procedures and give other services;
2. To set up an engineering and technological 
consultancy company to assist investors in 
engineering and technological consultancy, project 
evaluation, and feasibility study upon entrustment;
3. To set up a material supply company for 
enterprises with foreign investment to help them 
solve the problem of material supply required in 
production and construction.
I I I . . Productive enterprises with foreign 
investment may enjoy the following preferential 
treatments provided the related contract includes 
the plan of product marketing abroad and of 
import and export:
Application, approval and import licence may 
be dispensed with where import of machinery and 
equipment, vehicles for use in production, raw 
materials, fuel, bulk parts, spare parts, compo­
nents and fittings (including imports restricted by 
the State) is needed. The Customs department will 
exercise supervision and the examination and 
release the import or export on the strength of the 
contract of the enterprises or the import and export 
contract.
According to Document No. 85 issued by the 
State Council in 1985, certain policies concerning 
free port will be gradually implemented in Xiamen 
Special Economic Zone. At present, the emphasis 
is to be laid on the development of bonded fac­
tories, bonded warehouses and boned zones as well 
as on transit and re-export trades. Any enterprise 
which is qualified for having a bonded warehouse
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or a bonded factory (i.e. having a special factory, 
warehouse, special persons in charge and a special 
account) and observing the regulations of the 
Customs may apply to the Customs for examina­
tion and approval. The Customs will appoint its 
officials to station at the factory or warehouse to 
supervise and check import and export 
commodities on the spot.
IV. Credit funding and foreign exchange 
adjusting.
Export enterprises and technologically 
advanced enterprises, after examination by the 
Bank of China, Xiamen branch, other specialized 
banks and Xiamen International Trust and Invest­
ment Company, will be given priority in obtaining 
short term revolving funds and the necessary credit 
funds. Banking business such as current account 
overdraft, foreign exchange mortgage, fixed asset 
mortgage, and export documentary credits are to 
be developed to solve the problem of circulating 
funds in RMB or in foreign exchange as may be 
encountered by enterprises with foreign invest­
ment. Under the supervision of the foreign 
exchange control department, enterprises with 
foreign investment may mutually adjust their fore­
ign exchange surpluses and deficiencies.
V. Continuing the checking-up and read­
justment of fee-collection items and scales, and 
reducing the charge to enterprises with foreign 
investment.
The Municipal Government has decided to 
cancel six items of fee-collection, such as gas 
development fee, examination and approval fee for 
import and export, etc. Enterprises with foreign 
investment will be charged the same as state-run 
enterprises for such items as medical care, initial 
telephone installation, commission for interna­
tional direct distance dialing, road maintenance for 
city buses, supplies of water, power and gas, cargo 
transportation, engineering design, consultancy 
service, advertisment, etc. If enterprises with fore­
ign investment are charged unreasonably, they 
may refuse to pay and may also appeal to the 
Municipal Foreign Economic Relations and Trade
Commission or other higher authorities.
VI. Providing special preferential treatment 
to productive enterprises investing in Huli Indus­
trial District.
The site use fee for enterprises with foreign 
investment will be charged at RMB 5 yuan per 
square metre per year. If it is lower than RMB 5 
yuan in the contracts already signed, the original 
one remains effective. The price and rent for gen­
eral-purpose factories will be cut down by 10%. 
General-purpose factories may be purchased by 
installment payment, 30% of the selling price paid 
in the first installment and th rest paid within one 
year. Subsidies for electricity and the charge for 
capacity-increase of water pipe for enterprises 
with foreign investment will also be cancelled. A 
bonded zone will be established in Huli Industrial 
District. Under the supervision of the Customs, 
foreign stored, processed, repacked and relabeled 
in the bonded zone and re-exported.
VII. Permitting the transfer of personnel.
Enterprises with foreign investment may, in
accordance with their production and operation 
requirement, determined by themselves the employ­
ment or dismissal of their staff members and work­
ers. Technical and managerial personnel may be 
employed locally or from other parts of China or 
from abroad. The unit to which such employees 
belong should support and permit their resignation 
and employment. Their working years before 
resignation and after employment may be calcu­
lated successively. After the expiration of the 
labour contract, the personnel and labour depart­
ments should assist them in finding jobs.
VIII. Prices for the products manufactured 
by enterprises with foreign investment and 
approved for domestic sale may be fixed by the 
enterprises themselves according to the supply and 
demand of the market except the unified prices 
fixed by the State for certain commodities.
These Provisions shall go into effect on the 
date of promulgation.
As published in the ACFERT Editorial Board (1987), pp 201-2.
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APPENDIX F
The Regression Analysis of the Price Index and Growth
of Foreign Trade in the Xiamen SEZ (1970 - 1989)16
1). Calculation of least squares coefficients:
Yi (PI) Xi(T/Y) Yi=Yi-Y Xi=Xi-X YiXi x,2 Yi2 Xi2
1 98.4 0.0913 -7.7 -0.0892 0.6868 0.0080 59.29 0.0083
2 100.0 0.1027 -6.1 -0.0778 0.4746 0.0061 37.21 0.0105
3 100.7 0.0998 -5.4 -0.0807 0.4358 0.0065 29.16 0.0100
4 100.1 0.1006 -6.0 -0.0799 0.4794 0.0064 36.00 0.0101
5 99.8 0.0946 -6.3 -0.0859 0.5412 0.0074 39.69 0.0089
6 100.1 0.1073 -6.0 -0.0732 0.4392 0.0054 36.00 0.0115
7 100.2 0.1141 -5.9 -0.0664 0.3918 0.0044 34.81 0.0130
8 100.1 0.0996 -6.0 -0.0809 0.4854 0.0065 36.00 0.0099
9 100.3 0.1207 -5.8 -0.0598 0.3468 0.0036 33.64 0.0146
10 102.9 0.1507 -3.2 -0.0298 0.0954 0.0009 10.24 0.0227
11 103 .2 0.1742 -2.9 -0.0063 0.0183 0.0000 8.41 0.0303
12 104.7 0.1847 -1.4 0.0042 -0.0059 0.0000 1.96 0.0341
13 102.6 0.1791 -3.5 -0.0014 0.0049 0.0000 12 .25 0.0321
14 101.9 0.1812 -4.2 0.0007 -0.0029 0.0000 17.64 0.0328
15 107.2 0.2481 1.1 0.0676 0.0744 0.0046 1.21 0.0616
16 123.1 0.3076 17.0 0.1271 2.1607 0.0162 289.00 0.0946
17 109.8 0.2105 3.7 0.0300 0.1110 0.0009 13.69 0.0443
18 111.9 0.3058 5.8 0.1253 0.7267 0.0157 33.64 0.0935
19 130.1 0.3803 24.0 0.1998 4.7952 0.0400 576.00 0.1446
20 124.8 0.3567 18.7 0.1762 3.2949 0.0310 349.69 0.1272
Z 2121.9 3.6096 -0.1* -0.0004*15.5536 0.1634 1655.53 0.8149
T  = 106.095 X = 0.18048
* should be zero, but slight rounding error is due to approximation of means.
Thus,
I Xi 3.6096 I Yi 2121.9
X = ----- =   = 0.18048; Y =------  = -------   106.095
n 20 n 20
I 15.553 6
And so b =   =   = 95.19 and
Z 0.1634
a = Y - b3T = 106.095 - (95.19) (0.18048) = 88.92. 
The fitted relationship is therefore:
= a + bX± = 88.92 + 95.19Xi
16. For explanation of the statistical method, refer to 
John D. Hey (1974) .
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which is graphed in the following figure:
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2). Calculation of estimated deviations:
i YJPI) (T/Y)
/\
Yi e =Y- -Y-X  1 X  x ei-x Si2 ei-ei-i (Si-ei-i)2
1 98.4 0.0913 97.61 0.79 ---- 0.6241 ---- ------
2 100.0 0.1027 98.70 1.30 0.79 1.6900 0.51 0.2601
3 100.7 0.0998 98.42 2.28 1.30 5.1984 0.98 0.9604
4 100.1 0.1006 98.50 1.60 2.28 2.5600 -0.68 0.4624
5 99.8 0.0946 97 .92 1.88 1.60 3.5344 0.28 0.0784
6 100.1 0.1073 99.13 0.97 1.88 0.9409 -0.91 0.8281
7 100 .2 0.1141 99.78 0.42 0.97 0.1764 -0.55 0.3025
8 100.1 0.0996 98.40 1.70 0.42 2.8900 1.28 1.6384
9 100 .3 0.1207 100.41 -0.11 1.70 0.0121 -1,81 3 .2761
10 102.9 0.1507 103.27 -0.37 -0.11 0.1369 -0.26 0.0676
11 103 .2 0.1742 105.50 -2.30 -0.37 5.2900 -1.93 3 .7249
12 104.7 0.1847 106.50 -1.80 -2.30 3 .2400 0.50 0.2500
13 102 . 6 0.1791 105.97 -3 .37 -1.80 11.3569 -1.57 2.4649
14 101.9 0.1812 106.17 -4.27 -3.37 18.2329 -0.90 0.8100
15 107 .2 0.2481 112 .54 -5.34 -4.27 28.5156 -1.07 1.1449
16 123 .1 0.3076 118.20 4.90 -5.34 24.0100 10.24 104.8576
17 109 . 8 0.2105 108.96 0.84 4.90 0.7056 -4.06 16.4836
18 111.9 0.3058 118.03 -6.13 0.84 37.5769 -6.97 48.5809
19 130.1 0.3803 125.12 4.98 -6.13 24.8004 11.11 123 .4321
20 124.8 0.3567 122.87 1.93 4.98 3 .7249 -3 .05 9 .3025
z :2121.9 3 .6096 2121.99'a-0.10b --- 175.2164 318.9254
a. should equal lY^but slight inaccuracy is due to rounding error;
b. should be zero, but slight inaccuracy is due to rounding error.
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b. should be zero, but slight inaccuracy is due to rounding error.
Thus
2 eA2 175.2164
R2 = 1 ---------- = 1    0.894 and
2 1655.53
1 1
s2 = -----  2 ei2 =    (175.2164) = 9.734; s = 3.12
n - 2 18
3). Testing regression coefficients:
H0: a = 0
Hi: a / 0
a - aVnZXi2 88.92^20(0.1634) 160.746
ta = ----- = = ----  =  _ — = ---------   57.073
s V2X2 3.12V0.8149 2.816
When D .F . =18, P(-3.922 > t18 > 3.992) = 0.0005. So we
reject the null hypothesis H0: a = 0 in favour of the
alternative that Ha: a f 0. This means that the coefficient a 
is significant with 99.95% confidence.
Similarly,
H0: & = 0
B 1: £ f 0
b - fcVZXi2 95.19^0.1634 38.478
tb = ------------  = --------------- =---------  = 12.333
s 3.12 3.12
So we again reject H0: & = 0 and accept Hx: S ^ 0. This 
means that the regression coefficient, b, is also significant 
with 99.95% confidence.
4). Calculation of Durbin-Watson Statistics:
2 (ei - e ^ ) 2 318.9254
D - W = -------------  =   = 1.82
2e±2 175.2164
When n = 20 and k = 1, dL = 1.20 and d„ = 1.41 at the 5% 
significance level. So we accept (at 5% significance level) 
the null hypothesis of no auto-correlation.
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